U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30262

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 April 1940

PG30262

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

K r i e g s t a g e b u c h B. d. U.

At sea:

a)	In the area east to southeast of Shetlands: U 38, 43, 52.
b)	East of Pentland Firth: U 22
c)	Approaching the entrance to Scapa: U 13, 58, 59.
d)	Off Narvik: U 46. Off Trondheim U 51.
e)	Possibly also U 44. Position unknown, loss however, is probable.

Intention:

To recall U 38, 43 and 52 as soon as U 13, 58, 59 reach the Orkney area. B.d.U. will be informed by telephone of the imminent sending of the keyword. As the boats U 38, 43 and 52 at sea and fully armed, should be well prepared for the "Weser Exercise" it is high time that they were recalled. In order to shorten their return route they have already been in the area east of the Shetlands for several days. As long as their engine equipment is ready for action a supplementation of consumable stores is still possible up to the estimated beginning of the exercise. In this connection, I have decided to order the return passage of these boats. The keyword for the "Weser Exercise" will be received in the evening. It is the 9th of April.

3. / 4.

Put out to take up position: U 7, 10, 19, 25, 30, 34, 47, 49. Otherwise no events.

4. / 4.

Put out to take up position: U 9, 14, 48, 56, 57, 60, 62.

U 52 put in. No successes as the boat was in a traffic-less area and was for the most part restricted to action.

5. / 4.

Put out to take up position: U 1, 2, 4, 5, 6.

6. / 4.

Put out to take up position: U 50 also U 64 escorting the auxiliary cruiser "Ship 36". After executing her assignment (escorting the auxiliary cruiser until breakthrough into the Atlantic) this boat is at the disposal of B.d.U.

At the moment therefore 2 U-boats are detailed for escort duties with outward bound auxiliary cruisers (U 37, U 64). Their participation in the Weser operation is, it is true, intended, but does not appear certain. It is not possible to foresee the course of the duties assigned to them so exactly that almost with any reserves of time, they may be further deployed. Enemy action or adverse weather conditions could easily upset calculations and cause delay and surprise. In view of the tireless concentration demanded by the coming task I have done everything to avoid splitting up.

I consider the value of U-boat protection for surface craft negligible. I see 2 possibilities in the execution:

1)	Indirect protection: i.e.
	Occupation of potentially dangerous areas by U-boats. Protection of these areas by U-boat attacks on patrol surface

- 1 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.

	craft in this area. Warning auxiliary cruisers of enemy forces, which should be observed here.

	Stipulation: large number of available U-boats.
	Advantage: ship and U-boat are not dependent on one another they each operate in the way best suited to them.
	Disadvantage:
	a)	The protection of the ships is to take place in certain limited areas, not during the entire passage. If the ship is not to dispense with protection it must pass through pre-arranged area of the U-boat and cannot therefore presume every U-boat to be encountered to be an enemy boat.
	b)	Large number of U-boats required.
2)	Direct protection by a permanent U-boat escort:
	Advantages:
	a)	Permanent protection by the U-boat.
	b)	Independence in choice of course, therefore, the possibility of adapting the course to the enemy situation without having to dispense with U-boat protection.
	c)	Need of only one U-boat from time to time.
	Disadvantages:
	a)	Dependence on maintenance of contact between ship and U-boat difficult, time-wasting and not always certain.
	b)	Necessary mutual consideration of the tactical measures appropriate to the differing peculiarities of surface craft and U-boats in an encounter with the enemy and during passage - which would cause numerous restrictions on both sides.

As we, at present, possess so very few U-boats the last possibility is to be given preference under all circumstances. The simultaneous employment of U-boats in operation for merchant shipping warfare promises small success as the penetration route of an auxiliary cruiser must lead through the most far off and little used areas and these have long approaches. If only 4 boats were used for this purpose, it would, in the present situation, mean an absence of 50% of all the large U-boats now in use against the enemy for the duration of the operations. As not one, but several cruisers are involved, such an operation would considerably influence U-boat warfare. (sinking figures of large U-boats for February over 200,000 tons, an amount unlikely to be exceeded by auxiliary cruisers).

U 38 and U 43 have put in. While U 43 observed no traffic in her operations area west and north of England and was unable to sink anything, U 38 had more luck. It sank: 5 steamers one in a convoy, of altogether 17 to 19,794 tons. Both boats report strong and hindering U-boat patrol by fishing boats in the Shetland and Orkney area. None of the three boats recently berthed are in a fit state to put out again in the next few days.

U 51 (Trondheim area patrol) has received orders to return to its original position in West Fjord, while the boats U 30 and 34, which have in the meantime arrived,

- 2 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.


					are to take over the patrol of Trondheim. U-boats at sea have received instructions to open the operational orders for the occupation of Norway. The general political situation is coming to a head. English operations against Norway again appear imminent. This time a landing does not appear to be indicated by operations against German merchant shipping in territorial waters. According to operational instructions transmitted before "Weser" day, the U-boats of the 1st U-boat Group off Westfjord are to patrol the fjord, if they are already there in place of delayed U 64 which put out with the auxiliary cruiser. U 25 received orders to take up its position. U 37 is intended as 4th boat of the group. The boat should leave the auxiliary cruiser in good time, so that it will be able to take up this position before the 9th. The fjord is to be patrolled for as long as possible. The intermediate positions (to cut out changes) are only to be occupied shortly before the arrival of our destroyers (2000 on 8.4).

7. / 4.					U 30 and U 34 must have reached their waiting position before tomorrow.

					As owing to the early intelligence of the Weser day the boats have already taken up position two days before zero hour in the harbor area, one boat (U 30) is to take over the patrol of the entrance. U 37 reported leaving escort duties with ship 16. The boat's position is so far west, that prompt occupation of the intended position near Narvik is no longer possible. (Note: I regret this very much as I considered the presence of tried and older commanders at this spot, where the greatest number of U-boats was deployed especially desirable.)

					U 52 has put out.

8. / 4.					U 13 reports the presence of a heavy cruiser and 2 destroyers full speed ahead on a northeasterly course east of Pentland Firth. Short signal received from U 64 according to which contact with the auxiliary cruiser was lost 24 hours ago. Orders were given to proceed to Westfjord at high speed and to join 1st U-boat Group, while U 37, which would arrive too late in any case, is to be re-directed to a meeting point with the auxiliary cruisers. The announcement of English declared areas on the Norwegian coast makes the appearance of English forces in the coastal waters appear probable. The quickest possible closing of the entrances to our own landing ports is in this case particularly desirable. Orders to draw in the end positions is therefore not only for the isolated groups but partly for the boats individually distributed. (F.T. No. 3)

					U 57 reports a heavy cruiser with destroyers on a southeasterly course east of Pentland Firth. It presumes this to be a French unit.

					U 38 has put out.

					A German transport ship was torpedoed off the south coast of Norway.

9. / 4.					Shortly before midnight Norwegian coastal lights were extinguished. This apparently caused no delay to our surface craft putting into the rocky waters. Reports are received according to plan. The U-boats received orders to take in the end positions up to U 56 (inner position off Bergen) if this has not already been done as the occupation of these positions no longer appears necessary with the appearance of adequate patrols by other forces. It remains for free disposal in the area west of Bergen.

- 3 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



		a)	Situation:
			"Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" contacted heavy enemy units at dawn about 60 sea miles west of Westfjord. No further reports have been received today. It is presumed that the battleships have managed to elude the enemy.

			U 51 reported 5 enemy destroyers on a southwesterly course in Westfjord at 2100.

		b)	Waters of Shetland and Norway
			The evaluation of the enemy situation of 8.4 makes it appear certain that the enemy has strong forces at sea. The enemy contact with our own battleships confirms this conjecture. His heavy forces are far to the north. In this case, the 5th U-boat Group's task - to intercept the enemy approaching to the northeast from English bases, pointless. The enemy is already to the north in force. Further, with the moving up of the Bergen boats to the area west of Bergen there is a gap which it would be desirable to fill.
	For this reason I have decided to transfer the group about 90 sea miles in the direction of 120⁰.

	U 37 is relieved of her escort duties, and receives orders to proceed at high speed to the area northeast of the Shetlands. Together with U 38 and U 56 it joins the 5th U-boat Group.

	A W/T message was received from U 56 at 0920 reporting the sighting of 2 battleships on a southerly course in grid 8747 (northern east section of the Straits Shetland/Norway). On account of radio intelligence reports the S.O. Home Fleet is presumed to be in this area, while a group of 2 battle cruisers are said to be in the north. The enemy's southerly course - he is aware of German battleships to the north - shows that he has no intention of operating with the groupdirect.It must be presumed in this connection, that he will spread out in a cutting off position south of it with a group of heavy forces. In order to deflect him on the way there, it is necessary to dispose as many U-boats as possible on his suspected course. U 7's waiting position is to be transferred to the east. The 3 U-boat training ships U 2, 5 and 6 are to be moved somewhat to the west, in order protect the flanks of our own sea route to Norway. While, for the time being, there are no further U-boat reports, several a/c reports show that the enemy is actually moving forward in the area southwest of Norway. Here, he is without question in an area that can no longer be occupied by U-boats. It also lies within close range of our Air Force. It is impossible to move U-boats there quickly enough. At 1815 U 49 approaching from the north established contact. The enemy, however, withdrew northwards.

1955	U 49 reported again losing sight of him. Apparently no other boats have come up. Meanwhile - against my own judgment, by order of the Group - I have transferred the 4 U-boats disposed around Scapa, to the east.

	The group is of the opinion that the boats at present off Scapa where there are no more enemy forces, fulfill no useful purpose for the time being, while their presence east of the Shetlands could be of great value in the event of the enemy repeating his movements in the next few days. U 10 and U 19 will in any case be

- 4 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



	moved further to the east. Such measures need more time for execution. No noteworthy progress can be expected before the close of the coming night as in the operational area alone it will be necessary to submerge frequently owing to danger from a/c. The withdrawal of the Scapa boats means as far as can be seen, that during the operations, they will be entirely lost to this position. The area in which they were disposed provided every possibility of contact with the enemy, as sooner or later he must pass through it.

	The question as to which area is most important in view of the whole operation depends on an assessment of the war situation as a whole - a survey I am not in a position to make - in all operations with U-boats, however, one must not lose sight of the fact that the U-boat is a slow, unmaneuverable weapon which can only experience more than accidental success if given time to be effective in the ordered area. In the case of transfer, it is especially to be remembered that they must be ordered in the evening and not in the morning, because in areas threatened by air activity U-boat practically only makes progress at night.

	A signal was received at 2145 that heavy enemy ships damaged in air attacks at 1730 were in grid AN 2338. U 49, 50 and 52 received orders to proceed thither and to attack them.

	U 65 has put out for the operations area.

	2)	Enemy reports: See Appendix 2 to KTB of 9.4.

	3)	Sketch of position and movements of U-boats with enemy reports in Appendix 3. (not attached)

	4)	Collection of most important W/T messages to the U-boats, including boats disposition at 1000. (in ink: see Appendix 1)

10. / 4.	As they have not established contact, the operation was broken off as being no longer promising, so that the boats could take up their intended positions before dawn.

	U 49 was in contact with 2 large cruisers from 0159 to 0229. They disappeared from sight at high speed on a southerly course. U 50 and 52 were detailed to attack but did not sight them

	1)	Situation:
		a)	English destroyers attempted at dawn in mist weather and snow flurries to penetrate the Westfjord as far as Narvik. They were detected with losses to both sides. The U-boats disposed in the Westfjord could not, it seems, prevent the penetration. The reason for this will be clear when the boats put in. Without a doubt, their task is very tricky, especially opposed to destroyers which force their way through at high speed using depth charges, and twice as difficult in misty weather. The operation shows though that one cannot be strong enough for such tasks. In the course of the forenoon Naval War Staff ordered the dispatch of two boats to Trondheim and 4 to Narvik. This order crossed with a relevant suggestion of mine to the Group. There, the center point of the operation appears to have moved.This would be especially attractive to the English as an area for counter-attacks as it would be more difficult for us to be reinforced from home. This situation is tricky for our own forces, as supplies have not arrived - the destroyers are for the most part unready to sail

- 5 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



			and their putting out is now questionable owing to the enemy - one small boat has been assigned to patrol the Kors Fjord
		b)	A new distribution of boats in the northern North Sea is necessary as a result of this movement. One has the impression that the English fleet has withdrawn in a northerly and southwesterly direction. The Naval War Staff does not believe that a counter-landing on the southwest of Norway is imminent; in this connection they see no necessity for the enemy to operate near German bases from where apparently successful air attacks were carried out on 9.4. In view of the considerable losses of surface craft and the return of units still lying in the landing ports, in the near future, they (SKL) consider the U-boat's main task to consist not so much in searching for targets as in the patrol of the recently occupied areas. The new disposition shows here a concentration in the eastern section of the Shetland/Norway Straits. The Narvik boats, to whom the very difficult and decisively important task at the moment calls - that of protecting these ports against every pursuing enemy - have received orders to penetrate still deeper into the fjord so that all boats are disposed in the narrowest possible positions, abandoning outer sections which are difficult to patrol.

11. / 4.	Two destroyers of the Narvik Group attempted to put out of the Westfjord. The attempt failed because they sighted a cruiser and a destroyer when they were still in the narrow part of the fjord, and were unable to pass them in the clear night. They returned. On their report of the enemy, U 51 received orders to attack. The boat, however, did not apparently find the enemy. It can be seen from the repeated confirmation of enemy forces in this area that he constantly patrols it, systematically, perhaps against the U-boats, passing their positions. I must make a picture of the situation and therefore request a situation report from the boats. There is no need to maintain wireless silence in this area. There is no danger of bearings being taken. The confirmation of U-boats here can only have a discouraging effect on the enemy, which is what we want. U 46 has has no contact with the enemy. U 51 was pursued by destroyers - it fired 2 misses and 2 self detonators. U 25 reports having torpedoed 2 destroyers last night in her position. The effect of the explosion not observed. Hydrophone search. Non report from U 64. Summing up the situation in the North Sea this afternoon, the Group said that imminent enemy battle fleet operations were not expected. For the time being, the enemy has withdrawn from the area apparently under the impression that there would be successful air attacks during the momentary favorable flying weather. The Group is in favor of a concentration of U-boats around the Shetland area, in order to have reconnaissance independent of the weather, for the return of our own battleships. This task must not be underrated, it means, however, that the more promising disposition of small U-boats in the area around Scapa must be finally abandoned.

	U 48 in the Group proceeding to Narvik established contact with heavy cruisers; later also battleships and light forces. The enemy is apparently patrolling northwest of Trondheim. Although the other boats belonging to the group must be in the vicinity, no other boat managed to come up.

- 6 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



Address
Excerpt from
Enquiry into Torpedo Failures
M 83 S/42 Most Secret III copy

	6)	The point of view expressed by B.d.U. in his reports and War Diary, that shortages of torpedoes and warhead pistols were especially prevalent during the Norwegian operations and had a decisive effect on the outcome makes it necessary to point out that one cannot speak of a particularly noticeable increase of failures during the Norwegian operation in the comparison with previous U-boat results. The mishaps of this period can be attributed to a far greater extent to explained misses - 41.8%. They were considerably influenced by the unique, tricky conditions of U-boat warfare experienced in this operation (high firing range, small fast-moving targets, heavy protection, short light nights, un-heated torpedoes and unusual light conditions.

		Kr (Archives) is to include this statement in the text of B.d.U.'s War Diary dealing with the Norwegian operations and is to indicate the relevant passages in the War Diary.
		(signed): Raeder.

U 48 reported 2 triple spreads in the evening on a large cruiser, no hits scored, 4 self detonators. THis report of failure, together with those of U 51 and U 25 give rise to extreme doubts as to the effectiveness of magnetic fuse in Zone O. The question of torpedo failure appears to threaten the success of the entire operation. The following reflections are given and relevant measures taken.

On 11 April and during the night of 11/12 the following W/T messages were received:
	11.4 T.O.R. 1350:
	W/T message T.O.O. 1246........2 destroyers torpedoed on the evening of April 10th. Effect of explosion not observed. U 25.
	11.4 T.O.R. 2340:
	W/T message 2115. Triple spread miss on Cumberland, one detonation at end of run. Triple spread on York cruiser in grid 5617 at 2115. Spread fused prematurely. Depth 7 meters, zone - 4. Position grid 5672. U 48.
	12.4 T.O.R. 0305:
	W/T message 2250. 2 failures, one detonated at safety distance, one after 30 seconds, 100 meters off large destroyer. U 51.
According to the wireless messages of U 48 and U 51 the possibility of a premature fuse must be also conjectured in the case of U 25, as all further information on the sinking of the destroyer is lacking that means that in one day, there were 6 to 8 self detonators out of 12 torpedoes - a percentage of 50-75%. (There is, of course, the possibility in the case of U 48 that the premature fusing of the third caused the counter detonation of the other two torpedoes.)

- 7 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



These premature fusings mean, especially in the present area of operations, not only a significant lack of hits, but a considerable danger to the boats themselves. This particularly affects the boats defending Westfjord, which, after firing at a destroyer with a premature, are greatly handicapped in the comparatively restricted area during the search for them. An alteration of the state of affairs is therefore urgently requested. Telephone conversations with Torpedo Institute and Professor Cornelius bring me no support in this doubtful situation. The latter advises sticking to methods employed tendency for granted that Norway has any effect on the magnetic fuse.
On the latter point B.d.U. expressed his doubts to the Torpedo Institute in November 1939 (in connection with U 38's operations) and requested an enquiry and definite ruling. They were unanimously of the opinion that no magnetic effect existed. The Torpedo Institute suggests firing torpedo spreads either with acoustic detonation or magnetic detonators with a time interval of 8 seconds (between each). Both sources point out that a change over to contact detonators would mean the discontinuation of attacks on destroyers owing to the probability of undershooting. On no account especially after the events of today forenoon (destroyer battle off Narvik) can I abandon anti-destroyer warfare, as for the most part, without it, U-boats would be unable to carry out their duties. The following decision must be made:
1)	Introduction of contact firing device with switch setting A.
	Advantage: Cutting out of self detonators and therefore the greater safety of the boats.
	Disadvantage: Relinquishing of destroyer warfare and with it, the boat's duties. Further disadvantage:slighter torpedo effect on large target.
2)	Continuing to use magnetic firing device:
	Advantage: Greater effect with the event of a hit.
	Disadvantage: Considerably less likelihood of hit owing to prematures. (with regard to the facts given now I must presume a 50% proportion of failures.)
	A further disadvantage weighing heavily against it: Considerable danger to valuable boats, which if lost would be lacking not only for their protective duties but also for further operations.
The failures have so far only been in Zone O and north of this, while there have been no failures in among the several successes in the last few weeks in the southerly area.
The following points are relevant:
	1)	Boats must be able to fulfill their protective duties against every opponent, including destroyers.
	2)	The endangering of the boats through premature detonation is on no account justifiable during the present operations, as the chances of success are also jeopardized, and boats lost cannot be replaced by other forces. Protection of the fjords and bases is, however, an essential task at the moment.

- 8 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



I have come to the following conclusions regarding the boats:
	1)	In Zone O and to the north of it, keep 3 torpedoes with switch setting A, and 1 torpedo with magnetic fuse setting, ready for action.
	2)	Fire on ships only with setting A. Depth setting depth 2 meters.
	3)	Always double shot, first torpedo setting A, depth 3 meters, then torpedo with magnetic setting, depth - draught - 1 meter, time interval if possible 8 seconds.
I am aware that this means giving up the considerably greater torpedo effects obtained by magnetic detonation, in order to make the chances of hitting more certain. (Even a large warship is put out of action for at least the duration of the operation by contact torpedo hit) With the double shot on destroyers, I hope, in consideration of the tricky situation, to obtain at least one hit with one torpedo and to thereby considerably decrease the danger to the U-boats.
We are, then, technically in the same position as in 1910 with the reservation that the torpedo is less reliable in maintaining depth. The difficulties and obscurities which arise in the use of the magnetic firing device are after Professor Gerlach's recent research, at the moment insurmountable and in no way even nearly clearly outlined.
There is no doubt that the premature detonation of torpedoes has caused U-boat losses; it will perhaps never be known how many boats we have lost on this account.
I intend to use contact detonators at least during the current operations, or at any rate in the areas momentarily especially endangered in the northerly zones. If premature detonation also occurs in the southerly areas, a general change over to contact detonators will be unavoidable if and when a return to magnetic detonators will follow depends on the results of research and trial shots.

The recent enemy report from U 48 strengthens my belief that the central point in the sea operations is moving to the northeast. I have therefore decided to move U 65 also to Narvik where other losses appear to have taken place.

Our surface craft which have put into the landing ports have received orders to return home as soon as the situation permits. The F.O. Scouting Forces is already back."Hipper" and the C-in-C Fleet intend to pass through the Shetlands/Norway narrows during the coming night.

The disposition of the U-boats southwest of Norway is thereby justified. They are available for other duties and are to receive new waiting positions in the vicinity of the north barrier gap of the Skagerrak minefield. There they will lie in wait for the English U-boats proceeding to the Kattegatt. These are apparently in this area in large numbers to dislocate German transport traffic to Norway.

- 9 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					For the time being the disposition must wait, as according to a radio intelligence report an English operation is to take place in the area between 58⁰ N on the Norwegian coast on 12.4 and their deployment is more necessary there. They are to be disposed off England. U 48 again established contact with a heavy enemy cruiser in the evening. It was again lost after a time, owing to poor visibility. It must be presumed that the positions of the Narvik boats are known to the enemy as a result of the English attack on Narvik. They are to be moved slightly, and incorporated with the new boats (U 38, 47, 48, 49). The latter are to patrol the Westfjord continuously.

12. / 4.					U 2 reports return passage owing to damage to hydroplane.

					U 48 regained contact unfortunately only temporarily, with 2 large cruisers with destroyers on a southerly course, medium speed. The enemy is then, in the area northwest of Trondheim. I do not now consider a new deployment of the boats proceeding to Narvik, which must be in the vicinity, advisable. If the enemy is in this area it only is a starting off point for operations against the neighboring areas. Narvik appears especially threatened. The boats are to proceed there with the utmost speed in order to be in position when the enemy arrives. A message from U 38 indicates a change in the situation, this boat sighted 2 freighters and an escorting destroyer on a northeasterly course. Convoys of ordinary merchant ships do not now sail in this area. These units were in all probability transport ships used in connection with an enemy operation - possibly transport of material for a landing. U 38 received orders to attack, or if that is not possible, to maintain contact. It is important to know where these steamers are going.

					At the same time the 1st U-boat Group receives permission to attack all ships (not just warships and troop transport ships as previously) as it is practically certain that no ordinary merchant shipping now proceeds through this area.

					A reliable radio intelligence report relates to the putting out of an English cruiser with 2 destroyers from Scapa for Vaagsfjord. This confirms the conjecture that the enemy plans counter operation possibly landings north of Narvik after being beaten off in Westfjord. From this I see another situation. A disposition of U-boats is necessary and promising on the strength of this report. 3 boats from the group proceeding to Narvik are to be deflected to the Vaagsfjord.

					2 other boats to protect Andalsnes and Namsos from possible landings are to be detailed. Only U 65, proceeding to Narvik is still available. The second boat will be taken from the Trondheim group which appears comparatively adequately safeguarded when the first coastal batteries there are ready for action. There is to be new distribution of positions for the Narvik boats (which U 48 joins today) and a supplementation of supplies by one boat, from the supply ship "Jan Wellem" is intended for the coming day.
					At the same time the boat is to hand over its small arms and machine guns to the Harbormaster for the use of the infantry.

					U 43 and U 61 have put out for Narvik with munitions.

					The U-boat next available will be detailed to supply troops in Narvik. The following have put out: U 43 with 35 tons of cargo for Narvik, 15 tons of which consists of 2 cm. ammunition, 13 tons of infantry ammunition, 7 tons of heavy mortar ammunition.

- 10 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



	U 26 and U 29 will also be available in the next few days.

13. / 4.	The following deductions may be made from the radio intelligence reports received during the night:
	1)	C-in-C Home Fleet is directing all operations on the northwest coast of Norway. He is himself at sea.
	2)	A fighter Group "A" has been formed, consisting presumably of 3 heavy cruisers and destroyers, under S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron. They are operating off Indre Folder where a landing has already taken place.
	3)	Fighter Group "B" consisting of 1 battleship, i battle cruiser, 1 a/c carrier, 1 cruiser, and 9 destroyers under S.O. Battle Cruiser Squadron, is to carry out operations in the Narvik area on the afternoon of 13.4. Two convoys were mentioned in connection with this group,
		a)	2 transport vessels and one net layer, which put out of Scapa on 12.4 and
		b)	a convoy proceeding from a west coast port, which was in North Minch on 12.4.
	4)	Further operations are planned in the Vaagsfjord area. A part of the forces intended for this are already at sea; another section intends to reach Vaagsfjord on the morning of 15.4.
	5)	Mining operations are to be carried out in the Skudesnes area.
		U 1 and U 4 are to be informed of the mining operations, While U-boats are either disposed or about to be disposed in all other English operational areas Folla Fjord is still unoccupied.Only the occupation of Namsen Fjord branching to the south by U 65 now en route is intended. Another U-boat is to be transferred for the patrol of this fjord, by order of the Naval War Staff.

	As no other large boat is at the moment available in open waters (U 37 can only operate for a short time owing to shortage of lubricating oil) I shall have to take this boat away from the least vulnerable coastal protection group. When several coastal batteries are ready for action this will be the Trondheim group. U 50 receives orders to proceed to the Folla Fjord.

	The question of relieving the small boats of their duties in order to supplement supplies, is becoming increasingly urgent. The boats put out almost simultaneously. If they remain at sea until supplies are exhausted, they will also begin the return passage at the same time. There will then be a complete absence of boats in the operations area. The possibility of taking on supplies above all in Bergen is being energetically looked into.

	U 48 and U 52 have been expressly assigned to reconnoiter the areas in the vicinity of their operational sector.
	For one thing I wish to obtain a picture of the situation in the neighborhood of the ordered positions for another thing to give the boats an opportunity of finding the enemy themselves, not obliging them to wait until the enemy comes into their area.

- 11 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					U 38 and U 64 who were requested to report and did not, have reported today.

					A report of a new break-through by English forces in the Ofot Fjord and off Narvik, was received in the afternoon. There were 9 destroyers and a battleship. The report came from the Naval Signal Officer, Narvik, not from the U-boats who apparently were neither able to give warning nor prevent the penetration in spite of the fact that there were at least 3 boats one behind the other in the narrow channel of the fjord. I cannot, as yet, obtain a clear picture of events. One must wait for the boat's reports and messages, in order to explain the circumstances. One thing is certain, the boats did what they could.The protective duties assigned to them were tricky and it seems, too difficult, against a strong, well-equipped enemy prepared for U-boats and as a result of torpedo shortage only combated at a disadvantage.

					All boats in Westfjord have received orders to proceed to Narvik and attack the enemy as a result of the news of the successful break-through.

					U 46 reported at 2000 that the enemy battleship had again put out.

					All boats off Narvik are requested to send a situation report. I must form a picture from closer information of the break-through and know which of the boats is still there. In Naval War Staff Most Secret 4432/40 the order is received to move all large boats up to U-50 to the north - to carry out supplying of small boats' consumable goods - if possible in Bergen and then to dispense them in all positions south of Westfjord.

					U 30, 34, 52, 65 received orders to proceed at high speed to the Lofoten Islands.

					Supplying in Bergen has, in the meantime, been proved possible. The 5 boats off, and in the approaches are not to put in until dawn, as for the time being, it is impossible to pass through the rocks at night owing to danger of mines and tricky navigation.

					Trondheim is, therefore, cleared of U-boats. The coastal batteries here, however do provide a certain amount of protection. In my opinion it is far more important to leave a boat in Romsdal Fjord and Folla Fjord where there can no longer be any doubt of the enemy's landing intentions. The reoccupying of these positions by small boats will not be possible for several days. The enemy operations, however, are imminent.

					U 52, 30 and 34, have been recalled all the same against my judgment. As the number of U-boats in Norway is in no way adequate for the tasks assigned to them, Naval War Staff is detailing the boats lying in readiness for operation "Gelb" for action in Norway.

					U 17, 23, 24 are putting out for the present for the northern North Sea where they will receive further orders by W/T.

14. / 4.					U 65 received orders to proceed to the Vaagsfjord west of the Lofoten Islands. I presume that there is the center point of the English operations and therefore affirm that the strengthening of the Westfjord position.

- 12 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					W/T messages from U 38 and 47 in the Vaagsfjord were received last night. U 38 sighted an English destroyer near Anderes. U 47 reports its position and area free of enemy units. It probably transmitted because it thought it was also requested to send a situation report. When in reality this request was merely directed at the boats in Westfjord. The group identification will again be repeated by W/T.

					While I have no fear of the enemy D/F'ing W/T messages in this area it is possible that the boats might betray their presence if enemy units were in the vicinity. I therefore consider it circumspect to use W/T only in an emergency on contacting main targets, heavy forces or transport ships. The boats are to receive the relevant order.

					Radio Intelligence Service gives the route of an enemy convoy. It passes west of the Lofotens also probably in the Vaagsfjord. While the possibility of a landing in the area of this extensively branching fjord increases, there is still doubt as to which part of the fjord could be used for disembarkation.
					Naval War Staff considers Lavangen or Grabangen most likely. I have decided to use U 47 for reconnaissance in this area, after U 65 has put in (expected on about 15.4).

					Meanwhile fresh directions on U-boat warfare have been received from Naval War Staff. All large boats except U 65, which is to proceed, are now to operate in the Trondheim, Namsen, Romsdal area. The boats are to proceed to a grid in the direction of the new disposition for the time being, and if no further orders are received from Naval War Staff I will indicate the final positions.
					Further, the Naval War Staff orders boats with supplies to no longer proceed to Narvik, but instead to Trondheim where the introduction of supplying facilities for U-boats is being attempted.
					The boats ordered to take on supplies in Bergen, put in during the day. The supplying appeared to work without a hitch. All boats will put out again in the evening and will proceed on a northerly course to a pre-arranged grid, until the final distribution has been decided upon.
					The boats are then ordered to take on supplies north of the Shetlands, except for 3 boats which are to remain in the area. Boats requiring extensive repairs are to proceed to Wilhelmshaven the rest to Bergen.

					U 4 returned to Wilhelmshaven unexpectedly. It was unable to report the return passage owing to W/T breakdown. The boat destroyed an English U-boat in its position.

					U 61 is to patrol the Namsen Fjord with U 34.

					U 1 which should put to sea soon is to be transferred from Stavanger to the Lindesnes area as English U-boat chaser, as it is no longer needed in its former area. If protection of the approaches to Bergen is momentarily superfluous the same applies to Stavanger. As, according to reports received, the presence of light enemy forces must already be presumed in Vaagsfjord, U-boats are not to attack destroyers in order to keep the surprise attack until the arrival of the transport vessels.

15. / 4.					It would seem from all the messages received in the forenoon that the enemy is consolidating his position in the area between

- 13 -

Date	Position, Wind, Weather
and	Sea State, Illumination,	Events
Time	Air Pressure, Moonlight etc.



					Tromsoe and Vaagsfjord including Harstadt, reinforced by the Norwegian sea, land and air forces there. In this connection, the sending of 4 U-boats to Vaagsfjord was justified. Conditions for attack are extremely tricky there, very short nights, at the moment very calm weather. The best U-boat commanders are up there.

					U 47 (Lieut. Prien) was forced (beneath the surface) for 20 hours by steamers and fishing vessels. Fishing craft suitable.
					U-boat chasers are available in unlimited numbers. Prien was not able to fire a shot. U 48 (Lieut. Schulze, Herbert) attacked the Warspite in Westfjord yesterday without success. He reported in the afternoon that his second attempt to proceed to Narvik had failed, owing to hydrophone and depth charge activity.
					Torpedo misses and failures on 2 destroyers.

					U 64 (Lieut. W. Schulz) was lost in Ofot Fjord as a result of a bombing attack. 8 men were rescued.

					The boats in Westfjord have received instructions to withdraw to the western entrance and to search the inlets.

					According to messages received there is no possibility of success - scarcely possibility of survival in Ofot Fjord, owing to very strong defense.

					U 65 (Lieut. v. Stockhausen) reported at 1400 that a transport ship escorted by a battleship and destroyers put into the Anden Fjord at 0800. Double shot a transport ship. No successes.
					U 65 was forced therefore to submerge from 0800 to 1400.
					THe position is unfavorable, as U 49 and U 39 in the northerly section of Vaagsfjord, received the important message too late, and are now unable to proceed promptly to the south by day in order to attack the transport vessel. Everything depends on reaching the transport by all means.
					I therefore order the boats in Vaagsfjord to pursue to the limits of the fjord.
					I gave the following order to the Vaagsfjord boat at 2020: Operate according to opportunity and defense situation in Vaagsfjord and Andefjord area. The aforementioned considerations lead to this decision.

					The steamer "Unitas" under the command of Lieut. (Reserve) Heye has put into Bergen with fuel and lubricating oil for the U-boats. THis passage through the North Sea carried out with speed and dash deserves recognition. The supply situation of U-boats in Bergen is thereby improved.

					(signed): Dönitz

- 14 -

Appendix I to Kriegstagebuch B.d.U. Op. of 9.4. 1940.

A) Disposition of U-boats at 1000 on 9.4. 1940:

1)	U-boat groups	At end positions as ordered:
		a) U 46; b) U 25; c) U 64 in passage in position early on 10.4; d) U 51.
2)	U-boat groups	At end position as ordered:
		a) U 30; b) U 34.
3)	" "	At end position as ordered:
		a) U 9; b) U 14; c) Unoccupied; d) U 60; e) U 62.
4)	" "	At end position as ordered:
		a) U 1; b) U 4.
5)	" "	In waiting position 18 sea miles around central point:
		a) U 47 grid 2258 AN; b) U 48 grid 7959 AF;
		c) U 52 grid 2310 AN; d) U 50 grid 8787 AF;
		e) U 49 grid 2359 AN; f) U 56 grid 8715 AF;
		g) U 37 grid 7890 AF; (in position evening of 10.4)
		h) U 38 grid 2810 AN.
6)	" "	In end position as ordered:
		a) U 13; b) U 57?; c) U 58; d) U 59.
7)	" "	Southern North Sea. Not yet determined.
8)	" "	Waiting positions:
		a) U 2 grid 4610 AN; b) U 5 grid 4650 AN; c) U 6 grid 4340 AN.
9)	" "	Waiting positions:
		a) U 19 grid 2620 AN ; b) U 7 grid 2880 AN; c) U 10 grid 2710 AN.

B) Important Wireless Messages:

1)	0654	W/T message to U 38:
		New waiting position grid 4340 AN. Full speed ahead.
2)	0450	W/T message to 1st U-boat group:
		Occupy end positions. One straggler.
3)	0457	W/T message to 2nd U-boat group:
		Occupy end positions.
4)	0558	W/T message to 3rd U-boat group, minus U 56:
		Occupy end positions.
5)	0725	W/T message to U 37:
		Take up waiting position in grid 7890 AF with utmost speed.
6)	0751	W/T message to all boats:
		New waiting disposition U 47 48.49. and 50 at 90 sea miles towards 120⁰; U 52 grid 2310, U 38 grid 2810 AN, U 37 grid 7890 AF.
7)	0930	W/T message to U 7:
		New waiting position grid 2880. Utmost speed.
8)	1004	W/T message to 8th U-group:
		New waiting positions: U 2 grid 4610; U 5 grid 4650; U 6 grid 4340.
9)	1127	W/T message to all boats:
		Join 5th group. U 37, 38 and 56.
10)	1809	W/T message to U 65:
		Proceed to position unobserved.

- 15 -

11)	2000	W/T message to U 30, 34, 65:
		Immediate course Lofoten.
		Maximum cruising speed. Confirm.
		Danger of mines in Skjörn Fjord for 2nd group.
12)	2055	W/T message to U 52:
		Course Lofoten.
		Maximum cruising speed. Confirm.
13)	2122	W/T message to U-boats in Westfjord:
		Report situation as soon as possible. Add weather report.
14)	0138	W/T message to U 61:
		Patrol Namsen Fjord, in grid 6497 AF.
		Enemy landing possible. Remain unobserved.
		Passage report near 62⁰ N.
15)	0012	Most Immediate. W/T message to Narvik U-boats. Enemy destroyer in Narvik Bay near Framnes and Rombaken. Attack.

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Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 10.4. 1940.

Important Wireless Messages.

1)	0146	W/T message to U 49, 50, 52:
		If no contact with damaged ship, take up ordered position before daylight.
2)	0255	radio signal to U 48, 50, 52:
		Z.AQ. 2338.
3)	0947	W/T message to U 50 and 52:
		New waiting position grid 5930 AF. Utmost speed.
4)	0946	W/T to U 7:
		New waiting position patrol Kors Fjord west of 5⁰ 08 minutes E. Utmost speed.
5)	1001	W/T message to U 56:
		New waiting position grid 2330 AN. Utmost speed.
6)	1220	W/T message to all U-boats:
		New waiting disposition: U 37 grid 2340; U 19 grid 2390; U 57 grid 2820; U 59 grid 2790; U 13 grid 2890 all AN. U 2, 5, 6 36 sea miles to the east.
7)	1143	W/T message to U 38, 47, 48, 49:
		Proceed to Narvik at high speed.
8)	1144	W/T message to all boats:
		All Norwegian warships to be treated as enemy units.
9)	1031	W/T message to all boats:
		To occupy waiting positions:
		U 34 grid 9116 AF; U 30 grid 9112 AF; U 50 grid 6777 AF; U 52 for Havet. Concentration in south. Latter to go over to Atlantic system at 2400 on 10th April 1940.
10)	1300	W/T message to all boats:
		Prevent pressing on by English in occupied ports. Of decisive importance supplies overland insured.
11)	1908	W/T message to U 65:
		Waiting position grid 2290 AN.
12)	2126	W/T message to 1st U-boat group:
		U 46 to patrol narrows Fornes west of 17⁰, 10 mins. E. Remaining boats to withdraw to a position to the east. Possible break-through by heavy forces.
13)	0150	W/T message to U 51:
		Enemy cruisers and destroyers near Tranoex. Attack.

- 16 -

Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 11.4. 1940.

Important Wireless Messages.

1)	0955	W/T message to following boats:
		New waiting position:
		U 58 grid 7810; U 37 grid 7830; U 57 grid 7850; U 59 grid 7870; U 13 grid 7890; U 56 grid 7920; U 19 grid 7940; U 10 grid 7980; U 65 grid 7670; all in AF. Cruising speed 10 knots. Large boats full speed ahead.
2)	1140	W/T message to 1st U-boat group:
		All boats situation and position report.
3)	1511	W/T message to U 38, U 52:
		Attack. Heavy units in grid 5830 AF.
4)	1846	W/T message to U 38, 52:
		Proceed if no contact.
5)	1847	W/T message to U 5, 6, 2:
		New waiting disposition:
		U 2 north of 5748 N east of 0655 as far as barrier gap; U 6 north of 5754 between 0620 and 0644 E; U 5 south of U 6 as far as 5742 N. Look out for U-boats.
6)	2222	W/T message to Narvik boats:
		1) New positions: U 25 east of Nero 1 to 1655 E; U 64 between Nero 1 and 2; U 51 between Nero 2 and 3.
		2) U 38, 47, 48, 49 are not to wait for one another, but to enter Westfjord and wait there in patrol strips of the same depth. Distribution from NW to SE. Subsequently waiting dispositions west of Nero 3: U 38 north; U 49 south of Line Barey on 60⁰. Nero 3: U 47; Nero 2 U 48.
		3) U 38 etc. arrive presumably in 12th April.
7)	2052	W/T message to U 65:
		Proceed to Narvik. Maximum cruising speed. Go over to Atlantic system on 12 April at 0600.
8)	0038	W/T message to all boats:
		Enemy attack expected on Stavanger or Egersund on 12.4. New waiting disposition.
		U 6 grid 3192 - 3193; U 2 grid 3196; U 5 grid 3274

- 17 -

Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 12.4. 1940.

Important Wireless Messages.

1)	0118	W/T to U 2, 5, 6:
		U 2 return passage route 2; U 6 to occupy grid 3196 instead of U 2; Meeting with Hipper possible forenoon in grid 4600 -4900.
2)	1022	W/T message to U 38:
		With ref. to W/T 0835. Attack. Otherwise maintain contact and report.
3)	1516	W/T to U 38, 47, 49:
		Acknowledge receipt. Proceed at high speed west of Lofotens to Vaagsfjord on 69 degree North. Remain unobserved.
4)	1607	W/T message to U 38, 47,49:
		1) Waiting disposition in Vaagsfjord:
		U 38 northeast of Aakercey Island
		U 47 south of Sandsoey Island.
		Ensure surprise arrival. Attack warships, transport vessels and supply ships only.
		2) Situation: Cruiser Southampton left Scapa for Vaagsfjord midday on 12.4 with 2 destroyers, possibly escort for transport ship. Landing attempt expected there.
5)	1652	W/T message to U 52 and U 65:
		Take up waiting positions as guard against landings. U 52 Romsdal Fjord on about 7 deg. 20 mins. E. U 65 Namsen Fjord on about 11 degs. 08 mins. E.
6)	1914	W/T message to U 5, 6:
		New waiting disposition. U 5 north of 5748 east of 0655 to barrier gap; U 6 north of 5742 between 0620 and 0644 E. Lookout for U-boats.
7)	1853	W/T message to 3rd and 4th U-boat groups and U 7:
		Report supply etc. situation.
8)	1902	W/T message to Narvik boats:
		U 46 waiting position between Nero 2 and 3. U 48 waiting position Nero 3. Both boats to search area for enemy forces. U 51 patrol Fornes narrows west of 17 deg. 10 mins. E.
9)	2237	W/T message to U 1, 4:
		English destroyer to lay mines near Skuegsnes. Time unknown.
10)	0005	T/P message Emergency Group East:
		Secret! Urgent! U 5 north 5748 east 0655 E to 0720 E; U 6 north 5742 N between 0620 E and 0644 E.
11)	0027	W/T to U 51:
		1) Put into Narvik in daylight. Supply supplement from Jan Wellem.
		2) Hand over machine guns and small arms if convenient and required, also guns to harbor master for Army.

- 18 -

		3) Rest if situation allows. Again take up position on April 14th before daylight.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 13.4. 1940.

Important Wireless Messages.

1)	1009	W/T message to U 6:
		Take up waiting disposition immediately between Nero 1 and 2.
2)	1011	W/T message to U 50
		Take up waiting disposition immediately at western exit Volla Fjord on 64 degs. 38 mins. N. Danger of landing, above all near Namsen. U 65 is in Namsen Fjord.
3)	1153	W/T message to U 48:
		Reconnoiter along coast of Tranoey, Brenneset to Helligvaer. Report results, English declared area between:
		a) 67 deg. 25 mins. N; 1434 E
		b) 67 deg. 27 mins. N; 1424 E
		c) 67 deg. 29 mins. N; 1407 E
		d) 67 deg. 34 mins. N; 1352 E
		e) 67 deg. 38 mins. N; 1402 E
		f) 67 deg. 27 mins. N; 1439 E
4)	1156	W/T message to U 52:
		Reconnoiter unobserved as far as Andalsnes and report situation.
5)	1238	W/T message to boats north of Shetlands:
		As soon as fuel situation necessitates return passage proceed. Boats not requiring important repairs refuel in Bergen. Short signal VPL on passing 0230 E. Route for putting in and pilot station will be transmitted. Boats needing repairs to return to Wilhelmshaven by route II. Short signal NEW on passing 59 N.
6)	1238	W/T message to Admiral West Coast:
		Propose fuel, lubricating oil, provisioning of U-boats in Bergen. Request preparations for delivery, entrance channel, installation of Pilot stations.
7)	1447	W/T message to Narvik U-boats:
		Proceed to Narvik. English forces penetration.
8)	1730	W/T message to Narvik U-boats:
		Enemy battleship and destroyer in Rombaken east of Narvik.
9)	1530	W/T message to Narvik U-boats:
		Further orders: The attack on Narvik to be beaten off by all means.
10)	1315	W/T message to 9th U-boat group:
		New waiting disposition. U 10 square 2830; U 19 square 2720.
11)	1416	W/T message to 6th and 9th U-boat group:
		New waiting disposition. U 13 square 2770; U 57 square 2790; U 59 square 2620; U 58 square 2710.
12)	1736	W/T message to 5th, 6th and 9th U-boat groups:
		Move the positions already ordered 20 miles to 135⁰.

- 19 -

13)	2205	W/T message to U 49, 50 and 52. At 1730 GAF reported large vessel in square 2338 AN. Damaged. Listing. Attack.
14)	2300	Radio message to U 19:
		New waiting disposition is square 2760 AN.

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Appendix I to KTB B.d.U. Op. of 14.4. 1940.

Important Wireless Messages.

1)	0455	W/T message to all boats:
		Entrance to Bergen is Kors Fjord Leroeyosen Fleslands light Helliver route. Pilots for By-Fjord to be expected near Stangen owing to mine barrier. Put in only in daylight.
2)	0456	W/T message to 3rd U-boat group and U 7:
		Put into Bergen and Kors Fjord at dawn. Take on entire supply of food and provisions. Danger of air attacks. Report likely time of completion after putting in.
3)	1009	W/T message to Admiral West Coast:
		Report requested up to 1900 on 14.4 whether the supplying of 5 more boats including provisioning is possible in Bergen on 15.4.
4)	1228	W/T message to U 30, 34, 52:
		Immediate: U 30, 34 waiting disposition in grid 5690 AF. U 52 return from Romsdal Fjord as far as Andelsnes.
5)	1101	W/T message to all boats: Vaagsfjord boats - U 38, 47, 49, 65.
		Wireless silence except for important enemy reports.
6)	1101	W/T message to U 65:
		Proceed to Vaagsfjord via Andenes.
7)	1538	W/T message to 3rd U-boat group and U 7:
		As soon as supplying completed, report. Put out for grid 8250 AF.
8)	1823	W/T message to U 30, 34:
		To occupy the following positions: U 30 Romsdals Fjord. U 52 also here. Varstonen as far as Andalsnes. U 34 Namsen Fjord. U 50 is in west section of Foller. Boats are to remain unobserved.
9)	2038	W/T message to U 56:
		Occupy grid 7830.
10)	2037	W/T message to boats in Westfjord:
		Report position and situation.
11)	2037	W/T message to boats in Vaagsfjord:
		Enemy landing must be expected in Ratangen and Lavangen. U 47 to reconnoiter there on 15.4. U 65 occupies position south of Kjoetta.
12)	2126	W/T message to U 1 and U 6 to be passed to U 5:
		U 6 group to operate north of 57 degs. 54 mins. N. U 1 new position grid 3550 southern half.
13)	2142	W/T message to U 50:
		Destroyer sighted putting into Namsen Fjord. Landing probable. Pursue.
14)	2213	W/T message to Vaagsfjord boats:
		Main task surprise appearance on arrival of transport ships. Before this permission to attack destroyers is not given.

- 20 -

15)	2255	W/T message emergency to Vaagsfjord boats:
		Only report troop transport ships and warships.

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APPENDIX 2 to KTB

Enemy Situation on 8.4.1940.

0730	-	At 0030 in grid 1643 one heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers, northeasterly course, high speed - U 13
1010	-	At 0930 in grid 5855 AF in action with enemy destroyers - B.v.A.
1240	-	At 1139 cruiser "Galathea" reported a/c in grid 4524 AN.
1525	-	Bearing of unknown unit at 1445 north of 64 N between 08 degs. and 09 degs. E.
1800	-	Additional report of a/c reconnaissance:
		1)	At 1348 in grid 8172; 2 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 6 destroyers, northerly course, high speed.
		Addition from Main Observation post:
			Leading ship 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron "Birmingham" and destroyer 2nd Flotilla. 2nd battleship probably Rodney.
		2)	One cruiser off Narvik.
		3)	At 1145 in grid 4260, 18 destroyers northeasterly course.
2000	-	Radio intelligence report from Oslo: Warships near Hustadvika Bay north of Bud, one ship battleship(?)
2115	-	A/c report: At 1145 in grid 4260, 17 to 19 destroyers, course NE, high speed.
2120	-	Radio intelligence report: Admiralty sent first OU W/T at 1850 to S.O. Battle Cruisers and 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
2309	-	At 2000 in grid 1647 one heavy cruiser, 2 destroyers. 140⁰ medium speed. - U 57
2320	-	Radio intelligence report: French unit in grid 1562 AN at 0730 on 9.4. From Brest through Irish Sea.
2330	-	Re: message of 2020. Enemy destroyers are 2 French torpedo cruisers(?) (translator's query) and possibly Emil Bertie (translator's note: French cruiser minelayer 5,886 tons "Emile Bertie"?)

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APPENDIX 2 to KTB

Enemy Situation on 9.4.1940.

- 21 -

0225	-	Wireless message: Norway has extinguished all lights on Norwegian coast from Lister to Narvik.
0416	-	Urgent OU W/T message to U-boats on English area broadcast.
0420	-	From Naval War Staff: Norwegian air forces in state of readiness.
0520	-	Heavy forces in grid 3440 AF in action with fleet.
0742	-	Radio intelligence report: C-in-C Home Fleet at 000 in grid 8444. Southerly course, speed 18 knots.
0827	-	Radio intelligence report: At 0738 one battleship, one destroyer in grid 2736 presumably C-in-C Home Fleet.
0830	-	Radio intelligence report: "Repulse" and "Renown" presumed to be to the north.
0920	-	At 0830 2 battleships in grid 8747 southerly course medium speed. - U 56.
0922	-	At 0800 C-in-C Home Fleet encountered light cruiser squadron about 60 degs. N, 3 degs. E.
1025	-	At 0955, 3 enemy cruisers, 15 destroyers in grid 2734 90 degs. - A/c. At 0955, 3 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, course E. 1030 change of course to 30 degs. high speed, no destroyers. - A/c.
1112	-	Corrupt report of 1?5?11? course 40⁰, medium speed. - A/c.
1120	-	Radio intelligence report: French units possibly in north Scottish waters - 3 large units. 5 Flotilla leaders and destroyers.
1810	-	At 1400, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers; 20 destroyers in grid 2811. Northerly course. - A/c.
1815	-	At 1535 3 battleships in grid 2238, northerly course, medium speed. - U 49.
1821	-	At 1648 battle cruiser, one light cruiser, 2 destroyers in grid 2236. Northerly course, medium speed. - U 49.
1836	-	Radio intelligence report: 4th and 6th Destroyer Flotilla near C-in-C Home Fleet.
1955	-	At 1805 enemy out of sight, grid 2235. Light cruiser northeasterly course, medium speed. - U 49.
2045	-	At 2025, 2 destroyers in grid 2353 course 145⁰, medium speed. - A/c.
2050	-	At 2035 4 destroyers in grid 2324 course 90⁰, medium speed. - A/c.
2124	-	2100, 5 destroyers, southwesterly course, medium speed. Westfjord. - U 51.
2145	-	At 1730 hit on battleship or heavy cruiser in grid AN 2338 damaged with list. In grid AN 2417, 1 cruiser and destroyers. - A/c.

- 22 -

Enemy Situation on 10.4.1940.

0105	-	Radio intelligence report: Glasgow and Southampton damaged. Probably by air attack.
0243	-	At 0159 2 large cruisers in grid 2338. - U 49.
0345	-	0229 enemy out of sight in 180⁰ high speed. - U 49.
1035	-	0948 1 light cruiser in grid 2765 AN westerly course. - U 19.
1120	-	1105 1 destroyer in grid 2718 course W., very high speed. - A/c.
1153	-	1125 1 destroyer in grid 2352 course west, very high speed. - A/c. 1120 one enemy destroyer in grid 2717 course west. - A/c.
1249	-	"Warspite" put out of Scapa at 2130 on 9.4 with 6 destroyers of the 7th Flotilla. "Furious" is at sea.
1810	-	Radio intelligence report: Cruiser "Birmingham" reported bombing attack at 1643 in grid 1455.
1848	-	"Birmingham" reported U-boat at 1709 in grid 1458.
1914	-	At 1815, 5 destroyers in fixed position near Bremnes. - U 51.
1920	-	Radio Intelligence report: "Repulse" is presumed to be in Lofoten area and 2nd Destroyer Flotilla off Narvik, 8th Destroyer Flotilla off Scapa on evening of 9.4.
2114	-	Flying Corps X sighted one battleship, 2 heavy, 2 light cruisers, several destroyers at 1650 in grid 2646.
2207	-	Intelligence reports: French squadrons with battleships "Strasbourg", "Dunkerque", a/c carrier "Bearn", 2nd Torpedo (boat?) Flotilla. 1st U-boat Flotilla on 10.4 forenoon in Channel exit North Sea direction. Time and position unlikely. Presence in North Sea possible.
2210	-	Radio Intelligence report: A/c attacks at grid 1832 on northbound convoy in grid AN, 0156 and at 1834 in grid 1837.
2256	-	Radio intelligence report: English units bombed at 1850 in grid 2798 AN.

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Enemy Situation on 11.4.1940.

0050	-	Operations control from 4th Destroyer Flotilla: Turned back with "Zenker", "Giese" at 2200 as destroyer(s) near Tranoe, followed by cruiser(s).
0115	-	Intelligence report: Steamer "Leopard"(?) reported U-boat at 0020 in grid 4164 (south of Oslo Fjord).

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0135	-	Intelligence report: Majority of large cruisers put out from Toulon for NOrth Sea.
0330	-	Radio intelligence report: Unreliable bearing on English units at 0200 in grid 3390 (SE of Norwegian coast).
0725	-	W/T message 0554 from U 5: Enemy U-boat in grid 3446.
1044	-	Radio intelligence report: Put into Scapa on 10.4: "Aurora" at 1620. 2000-2100, "Sheffield", "Glasgow", "Birmingham", Galatea", "Arethusa", Manchester", "Southampton". French cruiser "Emile Bartin", flotilla leader "Tartu" and "Maille Breze".
1051	-	A/c report: 2 destroyers in grid 2941, course N, medium speed.
1120	-	Radio signal 1113 from U 48: 4 heavy cruisers in grid 5863 AF.
1350	-	W/T message 1246 from U 25: Nero 2, destroyer hydrophone activity. 2 destroyers torpedoed on the evening of 10.4. Effect not observed.
1515	-	Radio signal 1429 from U 48: 3 battleships, 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, 5 destroyers on changing course, high speed, up and down grid 5830 AF.
1935	-	Radio intelligence report: S.O. 3rd Destroyer Flotilla confirmed at sea on the afternoon of 11.4.
1950	-	Flying Corps X reported: Sighting report at 1740 in grid 5593 AF, 1 a/c carrier, 3 heavy cruisers, 8 light cruisers. Full speed ahead, course ENE.
2000	-	Daventry: Churchill announced: On Monday "Glowworm sunk after destroyer action. Damaged on Tuesday in air attack, 2 light cruisers, battleship "Rodney", destroyer "Gurhka" sunk, "Renown" in action with "Scharnhorst".
2000	-	Radio intelligence report: At 1815 "AW" OU W/T to S.O. Battle Cruisers and Admiralty bearing direction grid 3380.
2018	-	Radio intelligence report: At 1700 OU W/T from C-in-C Home Fleet (?) to S.O. Battle Cruiser Squadron and Admiralty from Trondheim area.
2036	-	Bearings: AC 1950 in AN 6410. AY 1943 in direction west of Orkneys.
2113	-	Flying Corps X reported: At 1800 in grid 5567 AF, heavy enemy group attacked. Consisting of 1 a/c carrier, 3 battle cruisers, 20 light forces course 210 ⁰.
2155	-	Radio intelligence report: 1707 OU W/T from Admiralty to S.O. Battle cruisers and unknown unit. 1841 S.O. Battle Cruisers sent OU W/T to C-in-C Home Fleet info. Admiralty.
2225	-	W/T message from Trondheim patrol: 2 English destroyers off Agdenes in action with Hysnes Battery.

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2229	-	Radio signal 2158 from U 48: One heavy cruiser, out of control in grid 5675.
2339	-	Radio intelligence report: At 1915 W/T message from Admiral Rosyth to light cruiser squadron about planned operation on 12.4 against Norwegian coast between 58⁰ and 59⁰ N (probably in the afternoon.) (Translator's note: too abbreviated to be clear)
2340	-	W/T message from U 48: At 1230 triple spread on "Cumberland" in grid 5917. At 2115 triple spread on "York" cruiser in grid 5672.

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Enemy Situation on 12.4.1940.

0340	-	Radio intelligence report: From W/T Rosyth to Light Cruiser Squadron: Operation of 12th afternoon between 58 degs. and 59 degs. info. to Adm. C-in-C Home Fleet, Adm. Scapa., Cruiser Glascow. Transport ships (Polish steamers) Chrobry and Balory with 6 destroyers of "V" class and the U-boat from Thames put into Scapa.
0650	-	C-in-C Home Fleet reported, 11th: Bombing attack on "Furious" at 2051. Subsequently Group led by C-in-C Home Fleet was in grid 5569 AF at 1800 on 11.4.
0705	-	Radio intelligence report: Daventry from Stockholm. English troop landings in Oslo Fjord
0915	-	Radio signal 0835 from U 38 (see Radio signal 1056): One destroyer, 2 freighters in 3760 AF northeasterly course.
0945	-	Radio intelligence report: W/T message of 9.4 contains report that "Furious covered by "Warspite" is to put in on 10.4 and that destroyers are to patrol off Bergen.
1025	-	Radio intelligence report: U-boat positions on 12.4 at 0700: Seal of Skudesnes "Unity" in grid 3945 (south of Habstholm).
1056	-	Radio signal 1056 from U 38: Enemy forces consist of 2 destroyers 1 tanker. Have lost contact.
1435	-	Radio intelligence report: "Southampton", "Electra", and "Escapada" are to put out for Vaagsfjord at midday on 12.4.
1516	-	Radio signal 1431 from U 48: One destroyer in grid 3558 NE course, medium speed.
1530	-	Radio intelligence report: Daventry gives declared mined area in North Sea, Skagerrak and Kattegat.
1650	-	Intelligence report: From Intelligence Organization Spain: English Mediterranean Fleet passed Gibraltar to the west. (Still to be confirmed).
1715	-	A/c W/T message: At 1430 in grid 3539 2 English U-boats on the surface. Westerly course.
1730	-	Most Immediate 1705: Carrier borne a/c attack on Bergen.
2125	-	Radio signal 2010: 2 destroyers in grid 3610 AF northeasterly course.

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2205	-	Radio signal 2024 from U 48: 2 destroyers in grid 3610 NE course.
2235	-	Radio intelligence report: A destroyer flotilla is to lay mines near Skudesnes.
2250	-	W/T message 2024 from 4th Destroyer Division: Attack by carrier borne a/c at about 1850.
2315	-	Flying Corps X report: A/c sighted Westfjord in afternoon: "where it begins to be narrow", 1 large ship with 2 funnels, 1 small ship with 1 funnel, 4 torpedo boats, 3 destroyers further out.

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Enemy Situation on 13.4.1940.

0033	-	W/T message from U 37: Suspect of enemy U-boat north of Shetlands. Noise of torpedo under the boat at 2200. Sunk up to now: 2 armed steamers, an armed tanker of 17,000 tons.
0145	-	W/T message from U 64: Report of strong destroyer patrol in Westfjord.
0245	-	Radio intelligence report: (special): Unidentified convoy is escorted by "Warspite", "Repulse" and "Furious". 3 destroyers in Scapa Flow transport ship escort, after carrying out escort duties they are to return to operations area with "Warspite".
0330	-	Radio intelligence report 0300: At 0700 on 12.4 "Aurora" (with a Flag OFficer on board) reported to "Southampton" that she would arrive at Vaagsfjord early on 15th.
0345	-	Radio intelligence report 0315: S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron reported landing operations by "Indresia" (Indre Folda) "Isis" has found Namsos and Mosjoen suitable for landings.
0457	-	Radio intelligence report: 0430 order from C-in-C Home Fleet of 12.4: S.O. Battle Cruisers on "Repulse", Warspite", Beecoutin Pujabi", one destroyer of 6th Flotilla "Cossack", one destroyer of Tribal class, "Foxhound", "Forester", "Hero", and one destroyer of 3rd Flotilla comprise B forces for Operation Atlantic: Attack defenses at - - - - - - -
0615	-	Radio intelligence report 0525: 4 ships escorted by 4 units are proceeding northwards at 2000 on 12.4 in 3656 AM.
0615	-	Radio intelligence report 0525: At 1515 on 12.4 netlayer "Protector" put out of Scapa with "Batory" and "Chroby" escorted by 4 units ("V" class destroyers?).
0802	-	Radio intelligence report: 0745 operation according to radio intelligence report 0430 is to take place at Narvik on the afternoon of 13.4.
0900	-	Radio intelligence report: All given forces are to take part in the operation.
0900	-	Radio intelligence report: Presumably C-in-C Home Fleet, 1st Cruiser Squadron and destroyers from Forces A. The following were mentioned with Forces B (see RIP 0430): 1) Convoy "Batory", "Chrobry", 4 destroyers put out of Scapa at 1515 on 12.4. 2) Convoy from west coast north of Minch at 1200.

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1045	-	W/T message from M.11: In action with U-boat in grid 3946.
1055	-	Radio intelligence report: C-in-C Home Fleet to "Penelope" and destroyers - The following are to take part in Operation 13, one destroyer of 3rd Flotilla, 6th Destroyer Flotilla and Tribal destroyer, in 3530 AF or to the north at 0800.
1116	-	Radio signal 0911: Underwater engine noise in 4465 - F.O.I.C. Baltic Defenses.
1337	-	Radio signal 1154 from U 49: One enemy cruiser, varying course in grid 3460.
1358	-	Radio intelligence report 1340: Wick radio sent urgent W/T message to Alesund for Admiral Smart in Lillhammer at 1232. At 1240 extremely urgent W/T message for Reid at Grand Hotel Andalsnes.
1420	-	Radio signal 1330 from U 49: Enemy out of sight direction 30⁰.
1425	-	W/T message 1300: Destroyer action in Ofotfjord, 9 English destroyers broke through.
1335	-	W/T message 1325 from ship 40: Have been torpedoed by U-boat in grid 4517.
1440	-	W/T message 1315: from 4th Destroyer Division: A large unit apart from destroyers in destroyer flotilla.
1500	-	W/T message 1427 from List: A/c reported 1245, Norwegian time; Norwegian minelayer "Froeya" grid 6775.
1512	-	Intelligence report: Agent reported: One French squadron with 3rd Light Cruiser Division, 5th and 7th Destroyer Divisions and 3rd torpedo boat Division. 7 U-boats and a/c carrier "Bearn" or "Teste" with 4 transport vessels carrying about 10,000 men put out Brest on the night of the 11th or 12th for an unknown destination. 3 French transport vessels and 2 destroyers put out of Cherbourg and Dunkirk for England on 11.4.
1555	-	W/T message 1426 from Naval Signal Officer Narvik: English destroyer Z.O. 3 on fire.
1600	-	Radio signal 1230 from U 37: 1 light cruiser and destroyer in grid 7835 AF medium speed northerly course.
1635	-	W/T message 1300 from U 37: "Have attacked Glascow type"-------
1635	-	W/T message 1402 from Group Narvik: In action with English surface and air forces.
1705	-	Radio signal 1529 from U 49: One battleship, one a/c carrier, 2 light cruisers in grid 3510 AF. Enemy no longer visible. Direction 35⁰.
1700	-	Flying Corps X reports: Reported by a/c reconnaissance: In grids 8510 and 8520 AF: 6 destroyers, 1 cruiser and torpedo boats (3?), 1 battleship (?) proceeding to and fro.
1720	-	W/T message from Narvik: Battleship in Rombaken.

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1725	-	W/T message from Narvik: Enemy warships surround Narvik, attempt landing in Rombaken.
1810	-	W/T message 1554 - from Narvik: -------English destroyer. F 05 on ground in the harbor.
1845	-	W/T message 1813 from Narvik: Battleship leaves Rombaken.
1925	-	W/T message 1707 from U 37: Oil patches and wreckage at contact point.
2030	-	W/T message 1900 from U 34: Minelayer "Freeya" torpedoed sitting on the beach.
2232	-	W/T message 2200 from M6: Burning oil in grid 9477, 1.0 after depth charge. (Note: U-boat presumably sunk).
2310	-	W/T message 2000 from U 46: Battleship and 6 destroyers put out of Ofotfjord--------
2355	-	W/T message 2157 from Narvik: Destroyer near Framnes and Rombaken.


Radio Intelligence Situation Report 1700:
	C-in-C Home Fleet in command of operations. Re-transmission by "Rodney" and destroyers, area west of line Trondheim-Narvik.
	Force B:	Op. near Narvik
		In command: S.O. Battle Cruiser Squadron. "Repulse", "Warspite", "Furious", "Penelope" and 9 destroyers.
	Force A:	Op. Indre Folda
		(landing took place)
		In command S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron "York", "Berwick", "Suffolk", destroyers.
		Taking part: "Sheffield", "Glasgow".

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Enemy Situation on 14.4.1940.

0045	-	W/T message 1852 from Narvik: F 03 grounded in harbor.
0045	-	W/T message 1709 from Narvik: Destroyer F 75 lacks port 2nd gun. H 74 also taking part (in ops.).
0335	-	W/T message 2120 from U 38: 2 destroyers northeasterly course Andesnes.
0505	-	W/T message 0315 from 15th Patrol Flotilla: U-boat on the surface sighted in grid 4462 (east of Skagen).
0530	-	W/T message 0325 from 1508: Half submerged U-boat passed through grid 4464. Center.
0530	-	W/T message 0318 from 19th Minelaying Flotilla: U-boat in grid 4437 left upper section.
0530	-	A/c report: At 2040 east of Molde, Romsdal (or Lang) Fjord 3 destroyers, course 80⁰ and 1 destroyer at the jetty. 3 destroyers, course 80⁰ in Fanne(?) Fjord.

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0615	-	W/T message from Group 506: Evening reconnaissance. In grid 8611 Romsdal Fjord 7 English destroyers, 1 tied to the jetty.
0645	-	W/T traffic Aalesund to Wick: The Germans are coming (GKR).
0802	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 0750: The following U-boats are in Skagerrak and Kattegat (12) Orzel, Triad, Sterlet, Sealion, Sunfish, Snapper, Spearfish, Porpoise, Seawolf, Severn, Shark, Clyde.
0947	-	W/T message 0744 from Naval Signals Officer Narvik: Grounded English destroyer presumably towed off during the night.
1130	-	Intelligence report: Between 0300 and 0400 on 12.4 8 PLM ships and 2 destroyers of Simon class carrying 1st Division Marines from Cherbourg and Calais to presumably Newcastle.
1230	-	Intelligence report:
		a)	2nd Battalion Irish Fusiliers embarked at Falmouth to reinforce Weygands Army. Transport will be escorted by cruiser squadron.
		b)	French Reconnaissance Squadron 1B Brest put out from English coast to the north on 12.4.
1345	-	Flying Corps X: Reconnaissance results early 14.4. 6 English destroyers in grid 8292 AF northerly course, high speed at 0510 1 10,000 ton tanker "Orarkaer" in grid 8328 AF, unknown.
1500	-	Flying Corps X: English destroyers near Aalesund in Lang Fjord and Fanne Fjord on the evening of 13.4.
1230	-	W/T message 1943 from Admiral West: Dive bombing attack from 0730 to 0800. Army patrols report penetrating craft in Korsfjord (--------not yet explained).
1425	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 1345: C-in-C Mediterranean Fleet orders ships to get up steam for full speed ahead and half hour readiness for action.
1600	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 1550: C-in-C Home Fleet is in grid 3165 AF at 2330 on 13.4. Course 45 degs., speed 15 knots. Reports position to S.O. 3rd Destroyer Division S.O. 1st Cruiser Squadron info., S.O. Battle Cruisers.
1620	-	Intelligence report from Intelligence Group Spain 14.4: "Ark Royal" and "Glorious" were not yet at Gibraltar on the afternoon of 14.4.
1640	-	Radio intelligence report (special): Y positions, 2 U-boats in grid 9557. "Unity", "Ursula" and another boat north of Utsire. "Seal" near Skudesnes (?), "Triton", "Thistle" at Ris afternoon of 14.4. One Trident boat from Skag.(errak) to Ros.(ythe?).One U-boat left Ros.(ythe) on the afternoon of 13.4.
1750	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 1715: Wick to unknown unit directions to proceed via grid 4964 AF, 3715 AF to prearranged position. (added by Intelligence Office: presumably convoy).

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1555	-	Radio intelligence report 1725: Unit reported unidentified a/c at 1630 in grid AN 7355.
1755	-	Radio intelligence report 1710: According to W/T, mine-laying U-boat "Porpoise" proceeded to position 4494 AO via AN 7312, AN 5388, AN 3476 and about AN 3565 for operations FD 5.
1755	-	Radio intelligence report 1730: A/c reported at 1605 that contact with enemy U-boat was lost. Last contacted in AF 8515.
1825	-	W/T message 1603 from Naval Signals Officer Narvik: Enemy destroyers off Narvik. Bombing attack by Norwegian planes.
1900	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 1840: Destroyers "Nubian" and "Fortune" put out of Scapa for Westfjord at nearly 2100 with tanker. (Reported by U 49).
2120	-	Flying Corps X reports: 7 English destroyers in grid 6487 AF at 1850. Northeasterly course, medium speed (11-17 knots) 1905 enemy making for Namsen Fjord.
2140	-	Radio intelligence report 2045:
		1)	"Hostile" and "Ivanhoe" ordered by S.O. Battle Cruiser Squadron to proceed to Narvik at 1955 on 13.4.
		2)	"Galatea" put out of Scapa at 1415 on 13.4.
2216	-	Radio signal 2115 from U 38: 3 destroyers in 1110 AG southerly course. High speed.
2220	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 2140: Presumably "Repulse" and "Enterprise" put into Scapa on 14.4. "Bedouin" and "Eskimo" intend to arrive at Skiel Fjord at 0400 on 15.4. (lofotens).
2215	-	Radio signal 1150 (2150?) from U 38: 1 light cruiser, 1 destroyer NE course Vanopy Fjord (Vaagsfjord).
2332	-	W/T message 2030 from U 48: "Warspite" put out with escort. Grid 3620 AF.

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Enemy Situation on 15.4.1940.

0011	-	W/T message 2300 from U 47: Situation in Vaagsfjord: 1 cruiser at least 6 destroyers. Radar activity by trawler and steamer.
0018	-	Radio signal 2330 from U 37: Suspicious vessel in 7942 AF southwesterly course, high speed.
0018	-	Radio signal 2359 from U 37: Enemy no longer visible.
0110	-	Radio intelligence report 0025: "Aurora" reported at midday that Admiral of the Fleet Lord Cheatfield had embarked.
0200	-	Radio intelligence report 0130: C-in-C Home Fleet at 1516 14.4 to S.O. Light Cruiser Squadron info. S.O. 3rd Destroyer Division: "Furious" detached to Ivansoe.
0235	-	W/T message 1245 from U 51: Continuous destroyer patrol in Westfjord....

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0420	-	Radio signal 0328 from U 34: 3 enemy destroyers (near) lighthouse Kya (grid 6713) course 230⁰, medium speed.
0540	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 0515: "Curlew" informed of assembly point in possibly grid 3443 AF (or 6446 AF) for 1730 on 15.4 at 2230 on the 14th by unidentified command.
1325	-	Radio signal 0829 from U 65: 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, 5 destroyers, 3 troop transport ships putting into Andoey Fjord.
1350	-	W/T message 1125 from U 65: With ref. to signal Alpha 105 enemy proceeding at low speed. Double miss on transport vessel, enemy out of sight in fjord, appears to be making for Topsund.
1400	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 1345: "Warspite" is to primarily remain in Narvik area....... "Renown" was mentioned in same W/T message.
1420	-	W/T message 1332 from U 65: Position grid 9743 AB. Proceed.
1425	-	W/T message 0610 from U 34: Grid 6486 2 destroyers course 260⁰, miss. Destroyer patrol with radar and fishing boat protection near Knapholmen.
1433	-	T/P from Flying Corps X: W/T report 1030 from 1 KG 40 (Bomber Squadron): 16 merchant ships, 5 transport ships, 1 cruiser (?) at Harstad.
1435	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 1340: 3 French U-boats coming from the south, were in the vicinity of Outer-Gabland at 1230 on 14.4. Passage to the north possible.
1623	-	Flying Corps X reported: 1 enemy destroyer in grid 8525 at 1200. Flying Corps X reported: English destroyer in Namsen Fjord at 1348.
1653	-	Radio signal 1548 from U 59: 1 light cruiser in 2228 AN, northerly course, speed 15 knots.
1657	-	Radio signal 1645 from U 59: Enemy no longer visible. Grid 2234.
1700	-	Radio intelligence report (special): S.O. 18th (?) Cruiser Squadron to S.O. 6th Destroyer Division, cruiser "Glascow" (info. 2nd Cruiser Squadron): Transport ship "Chobry" proceeding to Namsos.
1740	-	Radio signal 1718 from U 10 or U 19: Heavy cruiser in 7895. Course 205⁰.
1930	-	Radio signal 1900 from U 43: Light cruiser in 8774 upper edge center. Medium speed. Course 0⁰.
2135	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 2045: It appears from message that the "Southampton" has landed troops near Salangen in 68 degs. 48 mins. N., 17 degs. 45 mins. E. At the same time a Norwegian Division.
2140	-	W/T message 1900 from a/c: 2 English destroyers in 6497 AF one putting out. There is apparently an a/c carrier in grid 6732.

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2240	-	Radio intelligence report (special) 2205: Destroyer "Imogen" reported to S.O. Battle Cruisers that Norwegian Liaison Officer has arrived in Kirkenes.

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