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16.9. |
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U 94, on the outward passage, reported the sinking of two steamers of 11,375 GRT in AK 6761. 3 isolated steamers have been sunk in the same area within two days therefore. The boat reported in this connection that all the steamers steered the same general course (SW). It appears that there are still outward bound convoys which disperse after passing the narrow rendezvous area. |
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As the attack on U 85's convoy must be considered at an end, it is intended to form a new concentration with the boats still able to remain in the operational area for a time, and the outward bound boats, in the area S.E. of Greenland. |
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U 74, U 94, U 576, U 372, U 373, U 552, U 69, U 562 and U 572 received orders to form a patrol channel from AD 9564 to AJ 3986. |
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These boats are to patrol up and down in these lines at economical cruising speed. The disposition is planned for the 18 to 19 September. |
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Although previous attempts to intercept the enemy by means of shore controlled U-boat operations has in many cases been unsuccessful, and judging from experience alone, by far the greatest number of convoys are sighted more or less accidentally by boats in passage. This fact can on no account be considered a hard and fast rule. The reasons for non-interception and non-sighting of the convoy from fixed dispositions, must be presumed to lie in the fact that the enemy has information on the areas of these dispositions, obtained by methods as yet undiscovered by us. There is not a shadow of a doubt that such fixed dispositions of U-boats provide the best conditions, both for the fixing and the actual attacking of the enemy, providing the areas of those dispositions are kept secret from him. |
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The measures recently put into operation for this purpose, i.e., restrictions in the number of personnel informed of U-boat operations, as far as is practicable. Cyphering of the grid indicators and the limiting of knowledge of the key to departments to which this knowledge is indispensable, justify the assumption that the enemy is unable to gain any information on U-boat dispositions from the Communications Service. I have decided this time also, therefore, to form the available boats into a group, and to dispose them in pre-arranged positions in a narrow area. With regard to the choice of area, considerable attention must be paid to possible enemy air reconnaissance. Areas usually covered by them, are less suited to the formation of U-boat concentrations, in that the enemy has the possibility of by-passing them. Only short-term concentrations have any point in such areas, and then only when a certain enemy target is expected. If a fairly long waiting period is anticipated, it appears advisable to withdraw to areas so far away that even in the event of a long wait there is no danger of being discovered by the enemy himself. The areas S.E. of Greenland appears particularly favorable for this purpose. |
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U 564 put out of Brest, U 124 put out of Lorient, on operations. |
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