U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30310A

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 August 1942

PG30310a

Comments by Naval War Staff on War Diary of B.d.U.
for 11.8.42 on paragraph "Operation Cape Town"

1)	Naval War Staff expects excellent strategic results on the vital South Atlantic - Indian Ocean traffic from the projected Cape Town Operation. It should throw the whole South Africa traffic in confusion and have repercussions on reinforcements for the land fighting in the Near East. When the enemy has to divert traffic to S.E. African harbors, e.g. Port Elizabeth, Durban etc., this will have an adverse effect on all supplies for the Indian Area, as these harbors are already over filled since the Japanese commenced operating. It is clear that the less time the enemy is given to organize counter measures, the greater will be our strategic success.

2)	It has been proved that the enemy can obtain a pretty good idea of the positions of our submarines from their radio traffic. Attacks by the boats, i.e. reports made by steamers when attacked, complete this picture. If our submarines appear in the South Atlantic on their way to Cape Town, or if they send radio messages, it must be assumed that the enemy will deduce that the submarine is on a southerly course. Thus it may well be that he will recognize Cape Town as the goal before the attack is launched and that both traffic and defense measures will react accordingly. This would reduce the strategic effect desired by us.
	It may also be, if things go badly, as they did when our submarines operated south of St. Helena, against Cape Town traffic, that no damage can be inflicted on this same traffic at the present time. Conditions have also changed somewhat, as it must be assumed that the enemy is aware of the presence of our submarine tankers. Therefore, he will be prepared for a long-distance attack in the vital Cape Town area. This is, of course all assumption, but in the opinion of Naval War Staff it is better not to count on the enemy being dim-witted.

3)	The reasons given in paras. 1 and 2 have caused the Naval War Staff to forbid the submarines to attack while en route beyond the equator. They must also maintain complete radio silence. Only attacks on battleships and aircraft carriers are permitted - providing firing data is certain. Naval War Staff does not consider that this will reduce the sinkings carried out by the submarines, as the approach route runs through an area where there is little movement, and the chances of success off Cape Town will probably be increased if the boats are not expected.

4)	The statement in No. 3) of the preceding document shows that the Naval War Staff was misunderstood:
		" if the main importance of such an operation is considered to lie in its strategic pressure and if this is achieved by attacking south of the Equator to 15⁰ South, it is unnecessary to proceed to Cape Town".
		THe exact contrary is correct, for Naval War Staff considers that the sooner the enemy recognizes our intention, the less the strategic effect, for the enemy will be able to carry out an orderly transfer of traffic to alternative harbors.


			(Signed): FRICKE.

- 64 -

1.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	CD 40-Op	U 160	-	ET-Op	U 402	-	BE 76	U 572	-	ET-Op
	66	-	ET-Op	161	-	BE 76	437	-	CD 40-Op	575	-	DC 22
	67	-	CD 66	162	-	BF 62	454	-	CD 40-Op	582	-	EJ 32
	71	-	CD 40-Op	163	-	AK 83	458	-	CB 10-Op	588	-	BC 93-Op
	84	-	CE 8h	164	-	BC 68-Op	461	-	CD 40-Op	593	-	BD 24
	86	-	CD 40	166	-	DA 90-Op	462	-	AL 21	595	-	AL 27
	89	-	CB 10-Op	171	-	DA 92-Op	463	-	DE 11	597	-	CD 40-Op
	98	-	CB 97	173	-	DO 30-Op	505	-	ED 75	598	-	DD 60-Op
	108	-	DB 63	174	-	AN 36	506	-	BE 96	600	-	CC 68
	109	-	DF 68	176	-	AL 41	507	-	FC 30-Op	605	-	Bergen
	116	-	ES-Op	201	-	EK 11	508	-	DM 80-Op	607	-	CD 40-Op
	125	-	CF 33	210	-	BC 13-Op	509	-	DL 69	609	-	AL 21
	129	-	DO 33	213	-	CF 79-Op	510	-	DD 80-Op	654	-	DP 20
	130	-	ES-Op	217	-	BC 68-Op	511	-	DL 69	658	-	DO 90-Op
	132	-	CB 12	254	-	AD 83	552	-	DD 80-Op	660	-	AE 83
	134	-	DN 80-Op	256	-	AF 76	553	-	BC 64-Op	704	-	CD 40
	154	-	DO 60-Op	332	-	BF 61	558	-	BF 57	752	-	ET-Op
	155	-	ET-Op	335	-	AN 35	564	-	DE 70-Op	754	-	CB 10-Op
	157	-	CD 56	379	-	CD 42-Op	571	-	DE 65

	On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 129 - 132 - 161 - 201 - 402 - 437 - 505 - 571 - 575 - 582.
	Entered Port: U 332 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: U 438 - 705 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 155 sank: British ship "Clan Macnaughtor" (6,088 GRT) in EE 94, and a "Dallington Court" class ship (6,889 GRT) in EE 86, both ships on a course of 260⁰.
		U 510 sighted a loaded Greek freighter in DD 8485, on course of 310⁰, showing navigation and flag lights. Submarine was instructed to sink the ship providing there was no possibility of confusing it with Argentine, Swiss or Portuguese ship.
		U 89 situation report: sought from BA 9969 to BB 7844 without success. Underwater bearings taken 9 times in 7 days.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CG 4854 - DA 91 - BB 46 - DR 68 - DB 98 - CA 26 - DN 9176 - CA 7326.
		Sighted by plane: BE 6585. Attacked by plane in CB 1193 - BF 4936 (probably one hit) and EE 77.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 38:
		At 1630 U 511 sighted destroyer on westerly course in BC 6584. Boat was forced to submerge. Convoy itself was not found. As no further shadower reports were received by evening and as according to calculations the convoy must have passed the patrol strip at about 1000, the search was abandoned. See No. IV b) for order given to boats.

- 65 -

U 553 and 588 were approaching DD 90 to take on supplies and subsequently attack in the Caribbean.

U 43 - 217 - 511 - 164 proceeding to DO 50.

At 0800 on 6 August U 216 - 607 - 454 - 552 - 71 - 597 - 704 - 379 were on patrol stations from AJ 1411 to BC 5465. Boats form new Group "Steinbrink".

Because of major damage U 26 requested DD 60 - 80 as attack area. Boat was allotted the area round CB 7255 for operations. Width 400 miles. Directed to attack N.W. or N. S. traffic.

12 cb.m. of fuel was transferred from U 463 to U 84.

Tanker reserves: 647 cb.m. fuel 187 days supplies.

None.

Reports of Success:

U 154 - 2 ships 12,977 GRT.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Submarines on 1.8.1942.

I.	In service on 1 June	331
	Commissioned during July	21
		352
	Losses *)	10	(5 not yet * accounted for)
		342

U 158,	Rostin, second trip, last report 29.6. from Atlantic while returning from Gulf of Mexico. No clue to loss.
U 502,	von Rosenstiel, experienced boat, last report on homeward course west of Biscay on 3.7. Probably bombed by plane.
U 157,	Henne, first trip, last report on 10.6. from Windward Passage. Probably sank steamer on 11.6. in Bahama Channel. No other clue.
U 701,	Degen, experienced boat, last report 7.7.42. off Hatteras.
U 751,	Bigalk, experienced boat, did not report after leaving port 14.7. Probably bombed by plane in Biscay.
U 153,	Reichmann, first trip, last report on 30.6. N.E. Puerto Rico, otherwise no clue. Was to have gone to Panama Canal.
U 136,	Zimmermann, experienced boat, last report 5.7. about convoy 200 miles W. Finisterre. Probably rammed by destroyer.
U 90,	Oldeorp, first trip, no more reports after attacking convoy east of Newfoundland Bank on 28.7.42.
U 576,	Heinicke, experienced boat, no further message after reporting damage from bomb off Hatteras on 23.7.42.

- 66 -

U 215,

Hoeckner, first trip, last message sent 3.7.42. south of Cape Sable. Was to proceed to Hatteras, no clue.

II.

Distribution:

	II	VIIa	VIIb/c	VIId	IXb/c	IXD1	IXD2	XB	XIV

On active service :	-	-	103	3	40	-	-	1	5	152
On trials:	-	-	97	2	22	1	5	3	1	131
Training:	37	4	16	-	2	-	-	-	-	59

	37	4	216	5	64	1	5	4	6	342

III.

During July:

Total number increased by:	+	11
Boats on active service increased:	+	12
Boats on trial reduced by:	-	1
Training boats:	+/-	0

IV.

Boats on active service as distributed on 1.8.42:

Atlantic	113	boats
Mediterranean	16	"
Norway area	23	"
	152	"

During July following left port:

Average daily number at sea:	69.6	boats.
Of these, in operational area:	21.7	"
En route to Op. area:	48.2	"
Returning from Op. area:	12.3	"

VI.

During July following left port:

From home ports	24	boats.
From W. France	23	"

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2.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BC 85-Op	U 157	-	CD 63	U 402	-	BE 82	U 571	-	DF 41
	66	-	ET-Op	160	-	EO 18-Op	437	-	CD 45	572	-	ES 92-Op
	67	-	CE 17	161	-	BE 87	438	-	AO 72	575	-	CE 99
	71	-	BC 91	162	-	EG 14	454	-	BC 56	582	-	DT 92-Op
	84	-	CC 94	163	-	AK 84	458	-	CB-Op	588	-	BC 97
	86	-	BC 89	164	-	BC 83-Op	461	-	CD 43	593	-	AK 78
	89	-	CB 16-Op	166	-	DA 90-Op	462	-	AL 21	595	-	AL 03
	98	-	DD 13	171	-	DA 90-Op	463	-	DD 66	597	-	BC 83
	108	-	DP 91	173	-	DO 30-Op	505	-	ED 51	598	-	DD 60-Op
	109	-	DS 14	174	-	AN 29	506	-	BE 91	600	-	CC 86
	116	-	ES-Op	176	-	AK 67	507	-	FC-Op	605	-	AF 72
	125	-	CF 35	201	-	DU 71	508	-	DM 10-Op	607	-	BC 67
	129	-	DD 89	210	-	BC 56	509	-	DM 50-Op	609	-	AL 16


- 67 -

130	-	ES-Op	213	-	CF 78-Op	510	-	DD 84-Op	654	-	DE 74
132	-	CB 22	217	-	BC 58-Op	511	-	BC 11-Op	658	-	DO 30-Op
134	-	DN 80-Op	254	-	AD 83-Op	552	-	BC 67	660	-	EE 87
154	-	DO 76-Op	256	-	AF 71	553	-	BC 86-Op	704	-	BC 94
155	-	EE-Op	335	-	AN 28	558	-	BE 68	705	-	AO 72
			379	-	CD 18	564	-	DD 99	752	-	ET-Op
									754	-	CA 32-Op

	On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 129 - 132 - 161 - 201 - 402 - 437 - 505 - 571 - 575 - 582.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 94 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 132 sighted in CB 3119 2 steamers, 1 destroyer, course 270⁰, speed 8 knots. Boat had fired all torpedoes and was returning.
		2)	U 660 saw several patrols in AE 86 and 88 while proceeding through Iceland Passage.
		3)	U 508 situation report: On 29.7. in DN 3126 triple and single miss on "Mormacstar" (8,000 GRT), course 350⁰, 17 knots. Good data. No traffic by day in Crooked Passage, no patrols. On 1.8. in 6919 "California" class battleship with 3 destroyers sighted, course 130⁰, high speed submarine forced to sheer off!
		4)	U 134 situation report: On 29.7. convoy in DM 6439, 8 ships, 2 destroyers, 4 planes, westerly course forced to sheer off by planes. Nothing seen in DN 72-83 and 86. Strong air patrols, probably location at night.
		5)	U 509 was attacked with depth charges in DM 1732. Necessary to retire for repairs.
		6)	U 160 situation report: No traffic for 3 nights in EO 10 and 40, no chance of attacking by day.
			2.8. "Treminnard" (4,694 GRT) sunk in EE 8783, course 270. Submarine sighted 0020/3 in EE 8782 six to eight large steamers with air protection, was forced to submerge. Followed convoy, but could not get contact again. U 155 reported that he was stalking large formation of steamers.
		7)	U 155 situation report: According to own experience and statements made by captain, brisk tanker traffic in sea area east of Trinidad. Approach routes change at least once a week (lack of oil in South American and probably West African parts). Oil for Brazil via Straits of Magellan (Magelhanstrasse). West-East tanker traffic and return to Freetown. Former neutral ships are allowed little oil in port to prevent them from returning to Europe.

- 68 -

			Based on Port of Spain 1 old cruiser, 2 destroyers, about 6 patrol boats.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DC 11 - DM 51 - DM 25 - EO 21 - EE 8778 - DA 9196 - BB 7926 - ED 99 - DM 15 - AH 34 - DM 28.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 38:
		At 0859, U 552 sighted convoy on westerly course in BC 5952. Boat attacked immediately, was forced to submerge and follow convoy. 0910 contact was restored in BC 5955. Boats formerly belonging to Groups "Wolf" and "Pirat" were ordered to stalk convoy. This convoy was ON 115 (No. 38), which was last reported at 0507 on 31.7. in BD 1284. According to this information speed of advance must be 7 to 8 knots, instead of the formerly calculated speed of 10 to 11 knots. Thus convoy had slowed down or made a large zig-zag. U 552 maintained contact in BC 4969 until 0520. Convoy course was S.W. in BC 8223 until 1701, after attack by U 552 or U 71 was west in BC 5777 until 0347, then N.W. U 704 was the first boat to get contact at 1325, reported positions several times and was forced to sheer off at 1637.
		At 1414 U 71 requested beacon signal, attacked at 1918 in BC 5887. He probably scored one hit in an underwater attack. After 1600 visibility became worse, so that location and shadowing were very difficult. 1846, U 217 got close to the convoy in BC 5884, was forced to move away and was chased by destroyers. At 1700 U 597 sighted 2 destroyers in BC 5898, probably rearguard, depth charges were dropped.
		2226 U 553 made contact in BC 5798, lost it in BC 5772 and followed up star shell fire from west-south; again contacted in BC 5771, and at 0400 sank a freighter (7,000 GRT). 5 hours dogged pursuit with depth charges; only hydrophone hunt, no Asdic.
		U 552 lost contact in fog. Last position at 0603 in BC 4969, course 270⁰. Boat had attacked during the night and sunk 2 freighters (16,000 GRT). U 210 again requested beacon signals. Contact again entirely interrupted through continued poor visibility, not restored. As the convoy had then reached the Newfoundland Banks, an area of constant thick fog, there was no chance of finding it again. Operation was therefore broken off. Boats were given fresh orders (see War Diary of 3.8.42.)
	b)	U 754 was directed to make a practice shoot in the Cape Cod Bay.
		U 609 and 254 were to try to pick up a convoy in AD 53 - 59. Convoy was to leave Reykjavik for the north during the first week in August.
	c)	U 609 transferred sick man to U 462.

- 69 -

U 437 refueled from U 461.

None.

Reports of Success:

U 552	2 freighters	16,000 GRT
553	1 freighter	7,000 GRT
160	1 ship	4,694 GRT
71	1 hit	probably

VI.

General:

Successful attacks on convoys east of the Newfoundland Bank were again mainly carried out by experienced commanders (Topp, Mengersen).

It has again been proved that the weather situation, which is affected by seasonal and local conditions, permits only chance successes. These conditions were known, but it was necessary to carry attacks into this area in order to re-establish contact with convoys, and as temporary improvements in visibility made successes seem possible, (they were indeed scored) so that the chase could not be broken off.

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3.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BC 80-Op	U 160	-	ED 21-Op	U 437	-	CD 52	U 572	-	ES-Op
	66	-	ED-Op	161	-	BE 86	438	-	AN 36	575	-	CF 73
	67	-	CE 24	162	-	EQ 21	454	-	BC 80-Op	582	-	DT 63
	71	-	BC 80-Op	163	-	BD 11	458	-	BB 77-Op	588	-	BC 80-Op
	84	-	CD 71	164	-	BC 80-Op	461	-	CD 19	593	-	AJ 99
	86	-	CD 19	166	-	DA 90-Op	462	-	AL 17	595	-	AK 64
	89	-	CB-Op	171	-	DM 90-Op	463	-	DD 94	597	-	BC 80-Op
	94	-	BF 58	173	-	DP 10-Op	505	-	ED 22	598	-	DD 94
	98	-	DD 14	174	-	AF 87	506	-	CF 32	600	-	DE 13
	108	-	DP 88	176	-	AK 82	507	-	FC-Op	605	-	AE 69
	109	-	DS 44	201	-	DU 41	508	-	DM 51	607	-	BC 80-Op
	116	-	ES-Op	210	-	BC 80-Op	509	-	DM 17-Op	609	-	AL 12
	125	-	CF 53	213	-	CF 78-Op	510	-	DM 40-Op	654	-	DD 94
	129	-	DD 94	217	-	BC 80-Op	511	-	DD 94	658	-	DD 94
	130	-	ES-Op	254	-	AD 83-Op	552	-	BC 80-Op	660	-	AL 61
	132	-	BB 89	256	-	AE 67	553	-	BC 80-Op	704	-	BC 80-Op
	134	-	DN 82-Op	335	-	AF 76	558	-	BE 57	705	-	AN 36
	154	-	EE 76	379	-	CD 19	564	-	DD 94	752	-	ET-Op
	155	-	EO-Op	402	-	BE 92	571	-	DF 16	754	-	CA 32-Op
	157	-	CE 19

	On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 129 - 132 - 161 - 201 - 402 - 437 - 505 - 571 - 575 - 582.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 71 reported "Iren" in BC 4989 on a course of 240⁰.

- 70 -

		2)	U 552 suddenly encountered destroyer in fog. Air intake and exhaust shaft holed by gunfire, stern periscope only limitedly serviceable. Position BC 5772.
		3)	U 125 sighted two-funelled steamer and 1 destroyer in CF 1937, course 0⁰, speed over 16 knots. No contact.
		4)	U 43: Both compressors broken down, 2 bow caps half open, through depth charge attack. Necessary to return home.
		5)	U 108 situation report: 3.8. in BE 9475 tanker sighted on course of 270⁰, 13 knots, also freighter and tanker on course of 80⁰. Probably convoy assembly point.
			Sunk: tanker (10,000 GRT).
		6)	U 607 sank stationary tanker (8,000 GRT) in BC 5746. After stalking a hydrophone bearing moving east for eleven hours, located by a submarine while listening. After surfacing definitely saw a thin periscope.
		7)	U 458 situation report: No traffic sighted. In BB 76 only air activity, in BB 77 and CB 12 a great deal of air patrolling, moderate sea patrol, frequent fog.
		8)	U 509 situation: Nothing seen in EC 2890 - EB 3847 - DM 7179. Air patrols day and night in DM 1732. Searchlights, flares, impossible to disperse oil trace.
		9)	U 160 sank Norwegian "Havsten" (6,161 GRT) on course of 300⁰, in EE 8915. Ship had been ordered to make for EE 8766 from Freetown.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DM 51 - AJ 4656 - EF 2899 - CA 35 - DB 36 - BC 7395 - BC 49 - FE 4344 - DC 1137 - ED 9920.
		By planes: BF 8343 - BE 8958 (attack) - AE 4777.
		Submarine attacks: BC 72 - EE 97 - EE 94 - EC 77.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	U 134's attack area was extended along the coast to the north as far as DM 64.
		2)	Group "Steinbrink" (U 210 - 607 - 454 - 593 - 71 - 597 - 704 - 379) were ordered to take up patrol stations from AJ 9411 to BC 3465 at 1200 on 7 August.
			U 553 and 508 again steering for DD 90 to refuel.
			U 164 - 511 - 43 - 217 approaching DO 50.
	c)	U 553 took over fuel from U 552 in BC 7638. U 564 carried out refueling from U 463. Requested torpedoes from U 154, who was on return journey. U 162 requested

- 71 -

fuel from U 160.

U 379 carried out refueling from U 461. Tanker reserve: 59 cbm. 22 days' provisions.

None.

Reports of Success:

U 108	tanker	10,000 GRT
607	freighter	8,000 GRT
160	ship	6,161 GRT

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4.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BC 84	U 160	-	EE 88-Op	U 437	-	CD 34	U 372	-	ES-Op
	66	-	DO-Op	161	-	BE 95	438	-	AN 28	575	-	CF 55
	67	-	BE 98	162	-	EP 22	454	-	BC 46	582	-	DT 33
	71	-	BC 55	163	-	BC 69	458	-	CB 22-Op	588	-	CC 31
	84	-	CD 49	164	-	BC 77	461	-	CD 34	593	-	AJ 99
	86	-	CC 61	166	-	DA 90-Op	462	-	AK 62	595	-	AK 85
	89	-	CB-Op	171	-	DA 80-Op	463	-	DD 94	597	-	BC 47
	94	-	BF 91	173	-	DO 30-Op	505	-	DO 62	598	-	DD 94
	98	-	DC 38	174	-	AF 72	506	-	CF 37	600	-	DE 42
	108	-	EE 95	176	-	BD 12	507	-	ES 10-Op	605	-	AE 86
	109	-	DS 72	201	-	DU 11	508	-	DM 50-Op	607	-	BC 54
	116	-	ES-Op	210	-	BC 51	509	-	DM 17-Op	609	-	AE 71-Op
	125	-	CF 42	213	-	CF 78-Op	510	-	DD 94	654	-	DD 94
	129	-	DD 94	217	-	BC 74	511	-	BC 79	658	-	DD 94
	130	-	ES-Op	254	-	AD-Op	552	-	BC 83	660	-	AK 66
	132	-	BB 99	256	-	AE 85	553	-	BC 76	704	-	BC 55
	134	-	DN 70-Op	335	-	AF 71	558	-	BE 72	705	-	AN 29
	154	-	DD 62	379	-	BC 83	564	-	DD 94	752	-	ET-Op
	155	-	EE 70-Op	402	-	BF 71	571	-	CD 89	754	-	CA 32-Op

	On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 129 - 161 - 201 - 402 - 437 - 505 - 552 - 571 - 575 - 582.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 604 - 755 - 464 - 380 - Kiel; U 569 - La Pallice; U 594 - St. Nazaire.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 39 see No. IVa.
		2)	U 505 situation report: From EC 84 via 96 to ED 76 and ED 63, no shipping seen, little air activity. On 3.8. hospital ship on course of 140⁰ in ED 5926.
			U 155 sank "Empire Arnold" (7,049 GRT) in EF 77, ship was from a dispersed convoy. Course east. Cargo of tanks and planes for Alexandria via Cape Town. On 4.8. pistol dud fired at tanker in EE 97.
			U 176 sank English "Richmond Castle" (7,798 GRT) 4.8. in BD 1387, course 30⁰, 15 knots.
			U 597 made under water attack on independent freighter, course 250⁰. Explained double miss. Pursuit

- 72 -

			given up because of enemy's high speed and fog.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CA 8713 - EE 79 - DM 43 - DB 98 - CB 21 - BB 8684 - BB 78 - CA 54 - BA 97 - DB 62.
		By planes: AD 83 - AE 7144.
		Submarine attack in EE 9144.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 39:
		At 1615 U 704 sighted a convoy on S.W. course in BC 2998, speed 8 knots, air escort.
		Group "Steinbrink" was ordered to attack only if visibility was good. Boats proceeding south continued their voyage. U 704 maintained contact in steadily worsening visibility until 2105 in BC 5321, at 2231 in BC 5319 he was forced by destroyer to fall back and lost convoy completely in the fog that then gathered. Shortly afterwards U 454 sighted the convoy again in BC 5345 but soon lost it again in poor visibility. At 1940 U 210 reported that he, too, was stalking the convoy. As contact was interrupted and all boats reported fog or poor visibility, control decided to break off the chase and leave the fog belt.
		Group "Steinbrink" was ordered to continue voyage to patrol area designated. 0300 U 607 came upon 2 destroyers in BC 5294, probably part of the convoy's escort. Attempt to attack failed because of thundery showers. Operation against convoy was closed.
		Operation against convoy was closed.
	b)	1)	New positions: U 595 and 600 - AH 96; U 125 - CF 79; U 462 - DD 60.
		2)	U 458 to operate until return in BB 6670 and 6380.
		3)	Attack area: U 564 - EE and EO in accordance with latest situation reports. U 509 and 173 - southern third of EE, and EO. U 162 same area. U 6554 - lower third of EB and south to the coast. Main attack area there. Move away if defenses and shipping situation make it necessary. U 598 and 658 - DN 80, 70 and S.W. part of 40, also DM 60. Main attack area for U 598 - DM 65, for U 658 - DN 76 and 84. U 510 to proceed via DN 78 to sea area within a radius of 100 miles of DL 6855.
	c)	U 552 transferred 40 cbm fuel to U 553 in BC 8442.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

5.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	CD 21	U 161	-	BF 71	U 454	-	BC 29	U 582	-	DH 76
	66	-	DO 70-Op	162	-	EP 12	458	-	BB 88	588	-	CC 28
	67	-	BF 74	163	-	BC 94	461	-	CD 22	593	-	AJ 99


- 73 -

71	-	BC 51	164	-	CC 24	462	-	AK 96	594	-	BF 58
84	-	CD 56	166	-	DA 90-Op	463	-	DD 90	595	-	MJ 99
86	-	CC 51	171	-	DA 80-Op	464	-	MO 71	597	-	BC 27
89	-	CB-Op	173	-	DO 84	505	-	EE 14	598	-	DD 90
94	-	BF 82	174	-	AE 69	506	-	CF 81	600	-	DD 69
98	-	BB 78	176	-	BD 18	507	-	ES-Op	604	-	AO 72
108	-	EE 80-Op	201	-	DH 84	508	-	DM 50-Op	605	-	AM 11
109	-	EH 13	210	-	BC 22	509	-	DL 66	607	-	BC 52
116	-	ES-Op	213	-	CF 78-Op	510	-	DD 90	609	-	AE 71-Op
125	-	CF 94	217	-	CC 24	511	-	CC 29	654	-	DD 90
129	-	DD 90	254	-	AD 90	552	-	BC 85	658	-	DD 90
130	-	ES-Op	256	-	AL 32	553	-	CC 35	660	-	AK 59
132	-	BC 75	335	-	AE 68	558	-	BD 96	704	-	BC 29
134	-	DN 70-Op	379	-	BC 61	564	-	DP 15	705	-	Bergen
154	-	DP 14	380	-	AO 72	569	-	BF 83	752	-	ES-Op
155	-	EE 76-Op	402	-	BF 83	571	-	CD 96	754	-	CA 32-Op
157	-	CE 32	437	-	CE 11	572	-	ES-Op	755	-	AO 72
160	-	EE 99	438	-	AF 87	575	-	CF 37

	On Return Passage: U 67 - 84 - 43 - 129 - 132 - 160 - 161 - 201 - 437 - 505 - 552 - 571 - 575 - 582.
	Entered Port: U 402 - La Pallice.
	Sailed: U 653 - Brest.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 40 see No. IVa.
		2)	U 254 situation report: In AE 7120 forced to submerge for 20 hours, depth charges dropped 3 times, major damage. At first unable to dive, escaped in fog. In AK 3230 again partly able to dive. Went to AK 28 for repairs.
			2.8. sank freighter (4,500 GRT) in AE 7664, course 130⁰, 12 knots.
		3)	U 217 reported large fast ship, a destroyer, in CC 5146, course 10⁰.
		4)	U 510 sank "Uruguayer" (5,300 GRT) on 2.8. in DD 8485 according to prize decree. Ship was carrying corned beef from Montevideo to New York. Because of faulty listening gear requested area EO-EP and south therefrom.
		5)	U 66 situation report: No traffic between Grenada - Trinidad and Tobago. Strong air patrols at night in Passage. Assumed that radar location was used.
			4.8. miss fired at freighter in EE 950, course 290⁰. Boat requested EE 70 and 80 as Ops. area.
		6)	U 116 situation report: 22.7. single miss fired at medium sized freighter in ES 5359. Course 300⁰, 10 knots. 27.7. sighted tanker in ES 5850, course 80⁰.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: BB 7886 - DN 71 - BB 8284 - DA 96 - DM 43 - ED 35 - EC 36 - CA 5483.
		English plane reported submerging submarine in BF 5589.
		Submarine attacks: DM 51 - AJ 94.

- 74 -

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Convoy No. 40:

U 593 - one of the "Steinbrink" Group - sighted a convoy on N.E. course at 1510 in AJ 9178 in the patrol band of this group. The other submarines were still some 250-350 miles behind the position reported, as they had been delayed by the attack on the S.W. convoy the previous day. Orders to stalk the convoy were given to: Group "Steinbrink", U 660 - 116 and 595, also on request U 379 from BC 3772, U 256 from AL 26 and U 605 from AL 3322. The last two boats approached the convoy on a SW course at cruising speed. 1654 U 593 reported convoy in AJ 9776, course 40⁰, 7 knots. Visibility 12 miles. Boat attacked and sank freighter (5,000 GRT) in AJ 9191, another explosion was heard. Last sighting - 5 steamers, 2 escorts, course 80⁰. Contact was interrupted by hydrophone pursuit lasting 5 hours. 2208 U 595 reported the convoy in AJ 9169, was forced away when he tried to attack at 0040, depth charges were dropped. Position AJ 9273, course 40⁰, 7 knots. 23 steamers escorted by corvettes. Visibility was spoilt by drizzle and contact was not reestablished until the morning.

The operation continued.

U 125 and 506 patrolled from CF 7977 to 7999 on 6.8. after 2200, course 175⁰, day's run 150 miles.

U 256 and 605 were allotted AK 60 as temporary attack area.

U 116 transferred fuel and provisions to U 752 and 572 in ES 9277.

U 461 handed over "Junkers" compressor to U 43. He still had 18 cbm to transfer.

U 154 transferred torpedoes to U 564.

U 213, en route to south, last reported on 31.7. from CF 7390, that he had been hunted by corvettes for 5 hours.

Despite repeated call-up, the boat did not answer any more. Its loss must be assumed.

U 588 combined with Group "Pirat" in attacking a S.W. bound convoy (No. 38). He reported 0037/31.7. that he had contact with convoy. Position approx. AK 7989. Boat sent no further radio message. No reply to request for position. Loss must be assumed.

Reports of Success:

U 254	freighter	4,500 GRT
510	"	5,300 GRT
593	"	5,000 GRT
593	1 explosion	heard.

- 75 -

6.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	CD 20	U 161	-	BF 57	U 458	-	EB 94	U 593	-	AJ 91
	66	-	EE 75-Op	162	-	EP 10	461	-	CD 23	594	-	BF 49
	67	-	BF 73	163	-	CD 12	462	-	BF 23	595	-	AJ 69
	71	-	BC 26	164	-	CC 45	463	-	DD 94	597	-	BC 23
	84	-	CD 62	166	-	DA 90	464	-	AN 36	598	-	DD 94
	86	-	CC 44	171	-	DA 90	505	-	DP 74	600	-	DD 94
	89	-	BB 87	173	-	DO 97	506	-	CF 79	604	-	AN 36
	94	-	BE 83	174	-	AE 83	507	-	FD + FC-Op	605	-	AL 26
	98	-	DC 46	176	-	BC 33	508	-	DM 50-Op	607	-	BC 31
	108	-	EE-Op	201	-	DH 55	509	-	DM 71	609	-	AD 83
	109	-	DR 79	210	-	AJ 97	510	-	DO 31	653	-	BF 54
	116	-	ES 53	217	-	CC 46	511	-	CC 54	654	-	DD 94
	125	-	CF 72	254	-	AK 35	552	-	BC 94	658	-	DD 94
	129	-	DD 94	256	-	AL 25	553	-	CC 26	606	-	AK 49
	130	-	ES-Op	335	-	AE 83	558	-	CE 23	704	-	BC 31
	132	-	BC 85	379	-	BC 35	564	-	DP 14	705	-	AF 72
	134	-	DN-Op	380	-	AN 66	569	-	DF 81	752	-	ET 71
	154	-	DD 97	437	-	CE 32	571	-	BF 83	754	-	CA 32-Op
	155	-	EE-Op	438	-	AF 72	572	-	ES-Op	755	-	AN 36
	157	-	BE 77	454	-	BC 23	575	-	BF 83
							582	-	DH 54		-

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 67 - 84 - 129 - 132 - 157 - 160 - 161 - 201 - 437 - 505 - 552 - 571 - 575 - 582.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 566 - Brest; U 578 - St. Nazaire; U 373 - La Pallice.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 40 see No. IVa.
		2)	U 752 situation: sighted large steamer with destroyer on 4.8. in ES 9727. 16 knots, 70⁰. Otherwise no traffic. Slight air activity in ET 84 and 85.
		3)	U 162 reported 2 funneled vessel in EE 9769, course 245⁰, 15 knots. U 66 then requested beacon signals. Boat was in EE 8774. U 162 lost the steamer at 1930 in EE 8988. 2300 U 108 got contact in EO 2266. No further reports.
		4)	U 134 sank destroyer "Erar" (Gleavest class) on 4.8. in DN 7550. Otherwise nothing seen. Return was necessary because of sickness of commander.
		5)	U 572 sighted: 26 - 31.7. in ET 7250 3 steamers, course 300⁰, speed 16 knots. 7.8. in ES 5466 large ammunition freighter (8,000 GRT) sunk. Course 130⁰, 10 knots.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CA 5344 - EB 67 - EC 69 - EC 9376 - CA 32 - DC 1245 - AJ 6962 - DM 2779 - DM 51.
		Planes sighted submarines in BF 4288 and BF 5877.
		Submarine attack in EE 97.
	d)	None.

- 76 -

IV.

Current Operations:

Convoy No. 40:

1115 U 704 reported the convoy in AJ 6989 on a course of 80. Contact was shortly afterwards lost with 500 meters visibility. At 1144 U 595 sighted convoy in AJ 6988, about 20 steamers. 1330 was shelled by destroyer and then pursued with depth charges. Visibility changeable 2-8 miles misty. U 660, 176 and 595 joined Group "Steinbrink". At 1452 U 607 sighted enemy at 1751 U 454 also spotted him. 1817 U 660 reported enemy position in AK 4719. Contact again reported by 607 and 454.

0120 U 660 suddenly came across the convoy in fog in AK 4571, immediately lost contact again. All boats that had so far made contact, were forced by destroyers to sheer off in fog. Some were pursued with numerous depth charges. U 595 had to move away to make repairs. U 454 was temporarily only partially able to dive in AK 4495, and had to turn back. U 176 reported at 0501 that he had been followed with depth charges for five hours in AK 4490. Constantly recurring fog rendered continuous shadowing or attack almost impossible. Boats suddenly came upon enemy in poor visibility, and were usually spotted immediately and forced to make off. Destroyers had excellent opportunities to use their depth charges. No submarine was able to attack during the night. As there were prospects of improving visibility next day, the operation was continued.

U 108 was given a free hand in southern half of EE and in EO.

Attack areas: U 510 - EO to EP and south of them. U 66 as requested EE 70 and 80.

U 600 to proceed via DN 78 to sea area in 100 mile radius of DL 6855. U 609 was ordered to continue operations, as instructed on 24.7.

Convoy that was reported has left port.

c) -

None.

Reports of Success:

U 134	1 destroyer	sunk
572	ammunition freighter	8,000 GRT sunk

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BD 79	U 162	-	EO 31-Op	U 461	-	CE 36	U 593	-	AK 40
	66	-	EO 21-Op	163	-	CC 63	462	-	BD 27	594	-	BF 47
	67	-	BF 40	164	-	CC 71	463	-	DD 94	595	-	AK 48-Op
	71	-	AK 42-Op	166	-	DA 90-Op	464	-	AN 30	597	-	AK 40
	84	-	CE 18	171	-	DA 90-Op	505	-	DP 15	598	-	DO 23
	86	-	CB 68	173	-	EE 14	506	-	DA 14	600	-	DD 94
	89	-	BB 97	174	-	AE 87	507	-	FD + FC-Op	604	-	AN 30
	94	-	BE 76	176	-	AK 19-Op	508	-	DM 50-Op	605	-	AL 19


- 77 -

98	-	DC 44	201	-	BF 54	509	-	EB 87	607	-	AK 42-Op
108	-	EO 22-Op	210	-	AJ 69-Op	510	-	DO 38	609	-	AE-Op
109	-	EG 38	217	-	AK 40	511	-	CC 72	653	-	BF 48
116	-	ES 31	254	-	CC 71	552	-	BD 71	654	-	DO 25
125	-	DH 14	256	-	AK 28	553	-	CC 51	658	-	DO 24
129	-	DE 45	335	-	AE 87	558	-	CE 22	660	-	AK 45-Op
130	-	ES-Op	373	-	BF 91	564	-	DP 48	704	-	AK 46-Op
132	-	BC 94	379	-	AK 49-Op	566	-	BF 54	705	-	AE 69
134	-	DN 56-Op	380	-	AN 30	569	-	BF 72	752	-	ET 71-Op
154	-	DD 94	437	-	BE 78	572	-	ES 54-Op	754	-	CA-Op
155	-	EE-Op	438	-	AE 68	578	-	BF 83	755	-	AN 30
157	-	BE 84	454	-	AK 45-Op	582	-	BF 77	575	-	off St. Nazaire
160	-	EF 57	458	-	BB 69	161	-	off Lorient	571	-	off La Pallice

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 454 - 552 - 582 - 201 - 132 - 505 - 89 - 437 - 67 - 84 - 461 - 116 - 129 - 154 - 134 -160
	Entered Port: U 575 - St. Nazaire; U 571 - La Pallice; U 161 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 165 - 513 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 40 see No. IVa.
		2)	U 507 situation report: 23.7. - 7.8. patrolled from ES 50 to FB 93 and back to FC 33, nothing sighted. Request for free hand off coast of Brazil.
		3)	U 508 situation report: 3 and 4.8. nothing seen off Havana. 5.8. 4 ships, 3 planes in DM 4338. Making for harbor; evening 20 ships seen in periscope, 4 destroyers, 3 planes, mean course easterly. Attack made, 1 definite hit, 1 probable. Subsequently depth charges and bombs were dropped. Strong air but no sea patrols.
		4)	U 132 reported single ship in BD 7575, course 180⁰, 12 knots.
		5)	U 171 situation report: During the day brisk shipping movements within the 20 meter line in DA 90. Strong air patrols, no chance to attack. Nothing sighted at night. Nothing in DA 94 - 84, and from 4 - 7.8. nothing in DA 81.
		6)	U 254 fired a spread of four at a destroyer in AE 7137 on 1.8. 2 hits probable.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: BB 7743 - BB 7734 - CA 58 - DC 14 - EB 6737.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 40:
		Group "Steinbrink" continued to stalk in direction of mean advance course. At 1010 convoy was picked up by U 176 in AK 4259. Course 30⁰. U 593 requested beacon signals. About 1200 contact lost in fog. Last position AK 4264, course 30⁰. Once again the fog pretty well put the boats off

- 78 -

		the scent. As they had not picked the convoy up again by 1900, the boats were ordered to report their position after dark. It was intended that they should patrol the next day. However, U 176 again sighted the convoy at 2125 in AK 9199. Contact was maintained until the morning. At 0108 convoy was in AK 0179, at 0331 in AK 0183, at 0742 in AK 2973. U 176, 607, 379 and 704 reported. U 256 requested beacon signals.
		U 606 reported in the evening that he had contact at 1725 in AK 1978 and had attacked. Quadruple and single miss at extreme range. Boat again reported at 0510 that he had not been able to engage because of fog and squalls of rain. On starboard side 2 corvettes; 1 destroyer as remote escort. No submarine managed to attack during the night. Time and again in poor visibility that occasionally improved for a spell, they suddenly came upon escort forces and were forced to withdraw. Thus no successes were scored.
		U 254 reported that he was stalking a convoy from AK 3713. U 174 and 335, which had reached AL 20 on their outward journey, were given AL 15 as a temporary attack area and were instructed to stalk the convoy later from that position. Pursuit of convoy was continued.
	b)	U 164 and 217 were making for DD 9455 to refuel.
	c)	None.
	d)	Because traffic on route "Antar" is about to recommence, attacks on unescorted single ships are forbidden from 10th August in the area through which the route runs north of 20⁰ North. From 16th August at 0000 the same applies to the area through which the route runs south of 20⁰ North. The following areas remain unrestricted for attacks on unescorted independent ships: area in a radius of 200 miles from Ascension and St. Helena; a strip 400 miles wide along the coast of Brazil; and a strip 300 miles wide along the coast of Africa.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 254 - 2 hits on destroyer.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

8.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BD 86	U 162	-	EE-Op	U 454	-	AK 81	U 578	-	BF 40
	66	-	EE 70-Op	163	-	CC 67	458	-	CB 76-Op	582	-	BF 75
	67	-	BF 60	164	-	DE 11	461	-	CF 16	593	-	AK 51
	71	-	AK 51-Op	165	-	AO 40	462	-	BD 45	594	-	BE 67
	84	-	CE 22	166	-	DA-Op	463	-	DP	595	-	AK 52
	86	-	CB CA-Op	171	-	DA 84	464	-	AN 23	597	-	AK 02
	89	-	BB 95	173	-	EE 46-Op	505	-	DD 94	598	-	DO 16
	94	-	BD 96	174	-	AL 23	506	-	DH 45	600	-	DO 89
	98	-	DB 64	176	-	AK 29	507	-	ES 11-Op	604	-	AN 20
	108	-	EE EO-Op	201	-	BE 60	508	-	DL 39-Op	605	-	AK 28
	109	-	EG 69	210	-	AK-Op	509	-	EB 34	607	-	AK 02
	116	-	EJ 92	217	-	DE 12	510	-	DO 69	609	-	AE 4720-Op
	125	-	DH 44	254	-	AK 28	511	-	CC 79	653	-	BF 70
	129	-	DE 28	256	-	AK 29	513	-	AO 40	654	-	DD 43
	130	-	ET 90	335	-	AL 24	552	-	BD 81	658	-	DO 42
	132	-	DB 74	373	-	BF 80	553	-	CC 48	660	-	AK 02
	134	-	DN 63	379	-	AK 29	558	-	CE 16	704	-	AK 01
	154	-	DD 92	380	-	AN 20	564	-	DP 79	705	-	AE 83


- 79 -

155	-	EO-Op	437	-	BF 85	566	-	BF 40	752	-	ET 86-Op
157	-	BE 83	438	-	AF 83	569	-	BF 60	754	-	CH 31-Op
160	-	EF 61				572	-	ET 57	755	-	AN 20

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 454 - 552 - 582 - 132 - 505 - 89 - 437 - 64 - 461 - 116 - 157 - 129 - 154 - 505 - 134 - 160.
	Entered Port: U 201 - Brest; U 67 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 517 - 211 - Kiel; U 135 - St. Nazaire; U 596 - Bergen.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 155 sank tanker (9,000 GRT) in EO 61 course east. 5.8. sank Dutch ship "Dreco" (389 GRT) by gunfire in EE 98.
			6.8. gunfight with small armed freighter in EE 98. Both ships were on a course of 300⁰.
		2)	U 173 double miss in EE 1640 on passenger freighter with a course of 255⁰, speed 13 knots.
		3)	U 109 unsuccessfully chased a fast freighter ship on 5.8. in EH 4230. Course 300⁰, 18-20 knots. 8.8. sank armed tanker "Arthur W. Seewall" (6,030 GRT) on 8.8. in ER 1839, course 260⁰, 9 knots. Boat requested a free hand in the coastal area FC and FJ; was instructed to operate in accordance with para. IVb (Freetown).
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DB 6359 - DC 87 - AK 02.
		Attack report: AK 2991.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 40:
		U 164 and 335 were instructed to stalk the convoy. At 1159 U 176 reported position of convoy in Ak 2964, course 80⁰. U 256 requested beacon signals shortly afterwards. During the day and following night more shadower reports were sent by U 593, U 607 and U 595. Because of continuous poor visibility differences in fixes occur among the boats. So that positions are somewhat scattered. At 0540 the convoy was in AK 3928. At 0530 on 8.8. U 704 fired a quadruple miss, followed by a single shot on a seven thousand tonner. Detonation heard. At 1200 U 597 sighted a single ship with a destroyer in AK 2954, course 60⁰, high speed. At 1305 U 605 fired several single misses at what was probably the same single ship in AK 2952. U 704 turned back because of damage from depth charges, also U 71 because of damage and illness of Engineering Officer. About 0200 U 595 fired triple miss at a destroyer, but probably scored one hit on a second destroyer.
		U 176 a still inexperienced boat - distinguished itself by its excellent shadowing of the convoy and by its determined follow-up when contact was lost. At 1518 it made an underwater attack and sank 2 ships totaling 15,000 GRT, and torpedoed a four thousand tonner, probably the same that it contacted again in the morning in the same position and sank. Ship was 7,000 GRT. Convoy was sailing in 4 columns of 5

- 80 -

to 6 steamers in each, with a leading ship ahead. At 0540 U 607 also attacked. Spread of three missed because enemy turned away. During the night visibility was greatly limited by drizzle, it varied from 1-5 miles. Although there was no prospect of an improvement in the weather, the operation was continued.

U 171 was given a free hand east of DA 90 and 69. Boat was to attempt to pick up the night run of the traffic.

U 507 was given a free hand off the Brazilian coast.

U 109 was ordered to make zig-zags via EH70 to ES 50.

c) -

None.

Reports of Success:

U 155	tanker	9,000 GRT	sunk
155	freighter	389 GRT	sunk
109	tanker	6,030	sunk
176	3 ships	22,000	sunk
704	ship	7,000	explosion heard
95	destroyer		probable hit

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	CE 22	U 163	-	CC 85	U 462	-	BC 93	U 594	-	BE 82
	66	-	EE-Op	164	-	DD 63	463	-	DD 94	595	-	AK 35-Op
	71	-	AK 67	165	-	AN 30	464	-	AN 24 Bergen	596	-	AN 20
	84	-	BE 67	166	-	DA-Op	505	-	DD 90	597	-	AK 37-Op
	86	-	CB-Op	171	-	DA-Op	506	-	DA 72	598	-	DN 63
	89	-	BC 71	173	-	EE 16-Op	507	-	EC-Op	600	-	DO 26
	94	-	BD 89	174	-	AK 38	508	-	DM-Op	604	-	AF 70
	98	-	BB 60-Op	176	-	AK 39-Op	509	-	EB 39	605	-	AK 37-Op
	108	-	EE-Op	210	-	AK-Op	510	-	DP 77	607	-	AK 03-Op
	109	-	ER 46	211	-	AO 40	511	-	DD 36	609	-	AE-Op
	116	-	EJ 62	217	-	DD 41	513	-	AN 30	653	-	BE 92
	125	-	DH 71	254	-	AK 20-Op	517	-	AO 40	654	-	DN 66
	129	-	DE 34	256	-	AK-Op	552	-	BD 91	658	-	DN 68
	130	-	ET-Op	335	-	AK 38	553	-	CB 99	660	-	AK-Op
	132	-	BD 84	373	-	BF 40	558	-	CE 17	704	-	AK 03-Op
	134	-	DO 19	379	-	AK-Op	564	-	CE 17	705	-	AE 87
	135	-	BF 50	380	-	AF 80	566	-	BF 70	752	-	ET-Op
	154	-	DE 47	437	-	BE 94	569	-	BE 64	754	-	CH-Op
	155	-	EO 64-Op	438	-	AE 87	572	-	ET-Op	755	-	AF 79
	157	-	BE 93	454	-	AK 90	578	-	BF 40
	160	-	EF 36	458	-	CB 76-Op	582	-	BF 80
	162	-	EE-Op	461	-	CE 24	593	-	AK 37-Op

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 84 - 89 - 109 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 437 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 552 - 582 - 704.
	Entered Port: U 211 - Arendal.
	Sailed: U 406 - St. Nazaire; U 214 - Brest.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 130 sank "Malmanger" (7,078 GRT) in ES 5144, course 90⁰. Bound for Caboon.

- 81 -

		2)	U 704 fired 2 singles at a vessel of "Ormonde" class, course 270⁰. Probable hit shelled.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: AL 1959 - AK 0258 - DC 8711 - ED 3997 - BB 7299 - FS 44 - EB 37.
		Sighted by plane: AL 1399.
		BE 9625 (Probably 2 hits).
		BF 4814 - BE 9620 - BF 4757.
		Submarine warnings by unidentified ship in AL 1488 - AL 4771.
		Submarine attack in EO 36, EO 61.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 40:
		U 607 reported it at 1115 in AK 0344. At 1334 U 174 requested beacon signals. According to later reports, convoy steered a due easterly course, speed about 7-8 knots. Contact was announced by U 597 - 605 - 205 - 174 and 256. For the first time planes also appeared, some of them land planes. Boats were thus constantly forced to withdraw and submerge. LAst convoy position at 2000 was in AK 0365. Contact was then interrupted and was not reestablished by the morning. From 1800 U 705 and U 438 were also stalking the convoy from AL 20. Group "Steinbrink" was ordered to continue the chase without worrying about fuel reserves. At 1610 U 254 fired 3 single misses at short range with exact data at the middle column. Commander of boat thought that torpedoes may have bee affected by depth charge explosions. Convoy was sailing in wide formation. At 2000 U 607 gave the following situation report:
		So far, convoy has not made any large zig-zags at dusk. At dust the escort made fast sweeps well away from the convoy. Yesterday at this time fireworks 20 miles north of the convoy. Corvettes were supplied by day from steamers as far as 25 miles behind the convoy. Both stationary for a time, closed up at dusk. Submarine began return journey with one air driven torpedo.
		U 595 turned back because of major damage, in AK 6169 he sighted a large steamer on a course of 70⁰, 15 knots and chased it unsuccessfully as far as AK 6239.
		The convoy was also attacked by U 256 at 2100 in AK 0362, when he fired a triple miss at "Jervis" destroyer, and by U 174 at 1752 in AK 0365 with an accountable triple miss at the main convoy. No further reports received. Operation was continued.
	b)	Contrary to previous orders U 564 went to ED 90 and attacked east-west traffic during the new moon period off and west of Port of Spain.
	c)	1)	U 98 reported special task carried out. (Minelaying Jacksonville - Inner area).
		2)	U 564 - 654 - 658 - 510 - 598 - 600 - 129 - 154 - 209 were supplied by U 463. Tanker reserves 150 cbm., 96 days' provisions.

- 82 -

	d)	1)	Contrary to previous orders, it was forbidden to attack independent ships on route "Antar" north of 20⁰ North from then on, and south of 20⁰ North from 14.8. at 0000.
		2)	Boats were informed that the blockade runner "Uckermark" had left port. On 10.8. at 1400 vessel was approx. in BF 8475.
		3)	According to reliable reports, Georgetown is the port where convoys bunker when proceeding to or from New York - Freetown. It was suggested that submarines in the vicinity should operate against these convoys.
		4)	U 166 - a boat making its first trip in enemy waters - was ordered to lay mines in the Mississippi Estuary. At 0030 on 27.7. he reported task completed, also gave situation report. Since then the boat has not replied to repeated calls. No clues are available to suggest that he had been sunk. Loss must be assumed.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 130 - 1 ship 7,078 GRT.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

10.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BD 99	U 163	-	DE 13	U 461	-	CE 31	U 593	-	Op(AL 17
	66	-	Op(EE)	164	-	DD 68	462	-	CD 24	594	-	BE 76
	71	-	AK 96	165	-	AN 23	463	-	DD 94	595	-	Op(AL)
	84	-	BE 69	166	-	Op(DA)	464	-	Bergen	596	-	AF 48
	86	-	Op(CB)	171	-	Op(DB)	505	-	DE 72	597	-	Op(AL 18)
	89	-	Op(EE)	173	-	EE 54	506	-	DT 32	598	-	DN 56
	94	-	CE 16	174	-	Op(AL)	507	-	Op(ES)	600	-	DO 43
	98	-	Op(DB)	176	-	Op(AL 17)	508	-	Op(DM)	604	-	AF 72
	108	-	Op(EE)	210	-	Op(AL)	509	-	EC 43	605	-	Op(AL 01)
	109	-	ER 76	214	-	BF 40	510	-	EE 18	607	-	AL 47
	116	-	EJ 33	217	-	DD 68	511	-	DD 65	609	-	Op(AE)
	125	-	DT 31	254	-	Op(AL 18)	513	-	AN 20	653	-	BE 83
	129	-	CD 64	256	-	Op(AL 01)	517	-	AN 30	654	-	DN 83
	130	-	Op(ES 46)	335	-	Op(AL)	552	-	BD 69	658	-	Op(DN)
	132	-	BD 91	373	-	DE 68	553	-	DD 34	660	-	Op(AL 01)
	134	-	DO 29	379	-	Op(AL)	558	-	CD 64	704	-	AL 47
	135	-	BF 40	380	-	AF 73	564	-	EE 44	705	-	Op(AL 18)
	154	-	DE 46	406	-	BF 40	566	-	BE 91	752	-	Op(ET)
	155	-	Op(EO)	437	-	BE 93	569	-	BE 28	754	-	Op(CA)
	157	-	BF 47	438	-	AL 24	572	-	Op(ET)	755	-	AF 71
	160	-	DR 75	454	-	BD 36	578	-	BE 65
	162	-	Op(EE)	458	-	Op(CB)	582	-	BF 54

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 84 - 89 - 109 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 437 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 552 - 582 - 595 - 607 - 704.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 594 sighted armed freighter on a suspiciously varying course in BE 7642. Boat was given a free hand as he requested.
		2)	U 552 was bombed by a plane at 1700 in BE 66566

- 83 -

		3)	U 752 sank Dutch vessel, formerly the "Cassel" (6,047 GRT) on 9.8. in ET 7383. Course 140⁰, 12 knots. Ship was carrying planes and locomotives from New York to Alexandria.
		4)	U 510 sank a tanker (14,000 GRT) on 10.8. Gun defenses, course west, 15 knots.
		5)	U 108 sank Norwegian "Nrinas" (2,687 GRT) in EO 2276. Course 245⁰ from Merakao to New York, otherwise nothing seen.
		6)	U 704 reported much traffic. In 24 hours boat saw 4 single ships and 1 destroyer on a course to east and to west between AL 47 and BE 11.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings:
		EC 18 - DN 4 - DM 1860 - DN 96 - CA 73 - ED 3696 - DM 23.
		Sighted by planes: AL 2850 (attack with depth charges) - AL 0135 - AL 2893 - BE 6955 - BF 4950.
		Submarine attacks: EO 61 - ED 62.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 40:
		At dawn U 597 attacked in AL 0155 and scored in all 3 hits on 2 steamers (each 8,000 GRT).
		During the night escort closes right up and makes no zig-zags. During the day the constantly increasing air patrols give the boats a lot of trouble.
		U 597 was hunted with depth charges for 3 hours, subsequently requested permission to return because of damage. Boat had also used up all fuel.
		U 593 moved away because of a crack in the cylinder block. Towards evening Group "Steinbrink" was given the following order: Continue operation if boats can catch up with convoy by 11.8., at any rate stand east of it. After taking all the opportunities for attack that the convoy offers, or if it is impossible to catch up or get in position, boats are to break off immediately and run south at an economical speed.
		U 705 reported convoy position at 1900 in AL 2928, course east 7 knots. Lost contact. 2205 boat believed convoy on N.E. course in AL 2935, as flying boats are constantly visible there.
		Later reports showed that U 660 attacked at 1230 in AL 2913 and torpedoed 4 ships. In approximately the same position U 438 scored hit on a ship (5,000 GRT), and at 1629 sank a stationary steamer (6,000 GRT). Boat suspected "Q" ship, as after the second finishing shot depth charges and bombs were dropped. (Possibly one of the 4 ships torpedoed by U 660). U 254 had only one air driven torpedo and was turning back with a sick man. U 597 reported that before attacking on 10.8. he definitely observed 19 steamers and 1 leading ship. Earlier reports from the boats (once 23 ships, another time 5 ships)

- 84 -

were too uncertain to be used in gauging the success achieved. Further reports of attacks were not received. Boats operated until the morning according to orders.

For summing up see War Diary for 11.8.42.

DN 84 is the new operation area for U 553 - 511 - 163.

U 98 was given a free hand in the area between the latitude of square CA 8455 and DM 2989. (Between Hatteras and Florida). Last traffic seen there was on the 200 meter line.

None.

In future a passage report when boats leave the North Sea is to be made only on request, instead of being automatic.

The reason for this is that boats now have a very much shorter run alone through the North Sea, as they are convoyed as far up as Bergen

Reports of Success:

U 752	1 ship	6,047 GRT	sunk
510	tanker	14,000 GRT	"
108	ship	2,687 GRT	"
597	1 ship	8,000 GRT	"
597	1 ship	8,000 GRT	1 hit
660	4 ships		torpedoed
438	1 ship	5,000 GRT	hit
438	1 ship	6,000 GRT	sunk

(Last probably one of the ships torpedoed by U 660)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

11.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BE 79	U 163	-	DE 17	U 461	-	BE 77	U 582	-	BF 54
	66	-	Op(EE)	164	-	DD 97	462	-	CD 42	593	-	Op(AL 01)
	71	-	BE 11	165	-	AF 73	463	-	DD 89	594	-	BE 74
	84	-	BF 40	171	-	Op(DB)	464	-	Bergen	595	-	AL 72
	86	-	Op(CB)	173	-	Op(EO)	505	-	DE 54	596	-	AE 68
	89	-	BC 56	174	-	Op(AL)	506	-	DT 62	597	-	AL 52
	94	-	CD 63	176	-	Op(AL)	507	-	Op(ES)	598	-	Op(DN)
	98	-	Op(CA)	210	-	Op(AL)	508	-	Op(DM)	600	-	DN 69
	108	-	Op(EE)	214	-	BF 40	509	-	EC 56	604	-	AE 69
	109	-	ER 81	217	-	DD 97	510	-	Op(EE)	605	-	Op(AL 02)
	116	-	DU 71	254	-	Op(AL 51)	511	-	DD 83	607	-	AL 72
	125	-	DT 61	256	-	Op(AL 52)	513	-	AF 73	609	-	Op(AE)
	129	-	CD 63	335	-	Op(AL)	517	-	AN 40	653	-	BE 85
	130	-	Op(ES)	373	-	BE 64	552	-	BF 44	654	-	DN 84
	132	-	BE 71	379	-	Op(AL)	553	-	DD 56	658	-	Op(DN)
	134	-	DO 34	380	-	AF 59	558	-	CD 58	660	-	Op(AL 01)
	135	-	BF 40	406	-	BF 50	564	-	Op(EE)	704	-	AL 78
	154	-	DE 29	437	-	BF 70	566	-	BE 85	705	-	Op(AL)
	155	-	Op(EO)	438	-	Op(AL 42)	569	-	BE 13	752	-	Op(ET 73)
	157	-	BF	454	-	BF 18	572	-	Op(ET)	754	-	Op(CA)
	160	-	DE 54	458	-	Op(CB)	578	-	BE 53	755	-	AE 68
	162	-	Op(EE)

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 84 - 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 1134 - 154 - 160 - 254 - 437 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 552 - 582 - 595 - 597 - 607 - 704.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 333 - La Pallice; U 590 - St. Nazaire.

- 85 -

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

Convoy No. 40 see No. IVa.

U 607 sighted two funneled boat (Bretanic class) in BE 1279, 20⁰, 18 knots.

U 130 sank Norwegian vessel "Mirlo" (7,455 GRT) in ES 5198, course 110⁰, from Trinidad to Freetown.

U 109 sank English vessel "Vimeira" (5,728 GRT) in ER 3611, course 110⁰, 10 knots.

U 373 was bombed by a Sunderland in BE 5296. No damage.

U 595 had to break off pursuit of two funneled steamer in AL 8448 because of speed restriction - 10 knots.

None.

U-boat sightings: DO 7889 - DB 9799 - CC 5556 - EE 4744 - CA 86.

Plane attacked submarine with depth charges in BF 4960. Probably no hits.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Convoy No. 40:

During the morning all boats took the southerly course ordered. None was able to make further attacks. U 660 reported that before he attacked in poor visibility he made out about 15 ships. The convoy operation was then wound up. Group "Steinbrink" was dissolved. Those boats that were still operationally serviceable joined Group "Loss" (see under b) for orders for this group).

For summing up of the convoy operation see para VI.

U 594 - 653 - 214 - 135 - 406 - 566 were given square CF 84 as operational area. These boats are to rake the area to the south. Target: picking up the "SL" or "OS" convoys.

U 593 - 660 - 605 - 176 - 705 - 438 - 174 - 569 - 256 - 578 - 373, forming Group "Loss", were ordered to proceed at economical cruising speed, in the order given, to occupy the patrol strip from AL 1955 to AL 8165, width 12 miles. They were to attack convoys between England and America.

c) -

None.

Reports of Success:

U 130		1 ship	7,455 GRT sunk
109		1 ship	5,728 GRT "

VI.

General:

Summing up of Convoy No. 40:

At first 9 boats took part in the convoy attack. ( U 210 - 607

- 86 -

454 - 593 - 71 - 597 - 704 - 379 - 595). In the course of the operation another 8 boats joined in.
1)	The following are believed lost:
	U 210, last report 6.8. Requested beacon signals from shadower.
	U 379, last report 8.8. "Am being forced away by destroyer".
	U 335, nothing known of participation of U 335. Boat was probably sunk by bomb hit when navigating the Straits of Iceland.
	U 210, U 379 were lost at a time when fog and heavy squalls of rain made operations very difficult. Constant changes in visibility bring the danger of sudden surprise and such rapid use of depth charges that the submarine cannot always submerge deep enough in time. Several boats reported fierce depth charge attacks after suddenly being surprised.
2)	The following were damaged by depth charges and had to turn back:
	U 454, ran into a corvette in fog damage from depth charges prevented it from deep diving.
	U 704, oil bunker leaking inwardly.
	U 595, steering gear sticking at 15 on top.
	Slight damage was suffered by: U 176, 607, 597, 593.
3)	These losses are off-set by success as follows:
	Lost: 2 or 3 boats, they sank 6 ships totaling 41,000 GRT;
	Damaged: 3 boats, which torpedoed 4 ships and 1 destroyer.
	Slightly damaged, 5 boats.
The sinkings reported are not absolutely certain; they are probably actually higher as only in a few cases could the boats remain close enough to observe sinkings. At first sight this result appears poor, as a loss of three boats is not tolerable for such sinkings. However, the following must be taken into account:
	a)	With the exception of one boat (U 607) only young commanders with no experience of convoy attacks operated against the convoy.
	b)	Unfavorable weather for the first 3 days.
	c)	More powerful escort than usual, partly strong air escort.
	d)	9 boats attacked. Accountable misses (probably fire control mistakes and other miscalculations caused by the excitement of the first attack) prevented greater success:
The fact that boats were able to press home the attack

- 87 -

	despite powerful escorts should be taken into account when assessing further convoy attacks.
	Another important fact has been established - that several boats successfully carried out an attack by day.

	Cape Town Operation:
	U 68, U 504, U 172, U 156 will leave in the period 16-19.8. for an operation in company with U 459 (Submarine tanker) off Cape Town. (See operational order "Eisbar"). Permission to attack merchant shipping in Southern Atlantic to 15⁰ was considered necessary, but Naval War Staff feared that such attacks would ruin the chances of a surprise attack off Cape Town. Thus, permission was not requested by B.d.U.
	B.d.U. holds the following views:
	1)	Strategic pressure alone is not sufficient, only sinkings count.
	2)	Contrary to Naval War Staff, B.d.U. does not consider that the appearance of submarines as far south as the St. Helena area (15⁰ South) would cause the English to suspect an attack off Cape Town and therefore, stiffen their A/S defenses.
		a)	Submarines have already operated off St. Helena.
		b)	Distance from St. Helena to Cape Town is about 1,700 miles, the distance from Madeira to Freetown.
		c)	B.d.U. considers that previous experience shows that the enemy does not change his routes much because of submarine attacks. Also he will not be able to find an alternative for Cape Town as bunkering station at short notice.
	3)	If it is considered that strategic pressure is the main end of submarine operations and if attacks south of the Equator to 15⁰ South achieve this end, there is no point in going to Cape Town at all.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

12.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BE 85	U 163	-	DD 65	U 461	-	BE 84	U 582	-	Off Brest
	66	-	EE-Op	164	-	DO 33	462	-	CC 92	590	-	BF 50
	71	-	BE 24	165	-	AE 47	463	-	DO 33	593	-	AL 42
	84	-	BF 40	171	-	DB-Op	464	-	Bergen	594	-	BD 98
	86	-	CB CA-Op	173	-	EC plus	505	-	DE 53	595	-	AL 88
	89	-	BD 44	174	-	AE 40 50	506	-	DT 92	596	-	AE 83
	94	-	CD 56	176	-	AL 52	507	-	FC 55	597	-	AL 21
	98	-	DB 39-Op	210	-	AL 40 50	508	-	DM 90	598	-	DN-Op
	108	-	EE EO-Op	214	-	BE 95	509	-	EC 69	600	-	DN 91
	109	-	ES 39-Op	217	-	DO 33	510	-	EO EP-Op	604	-	AE 83
	116	-	DU 41	254	-	AL 91	511	-	DO 32	605	-	AL 52
	125	-	DT 91	256	-	AL 40 50	513	-	AE 47	607	-	AL 88
	129	-	CE 19	333	-	BF 99	517	-	AN 20	609	-	AE-Op
	130	-	ES 46-Op	335	-	AL 40 50	552	-	BF 40	653	-	BE 97
	132	-	BE 73	373	-	BE 27	553	-	DD 81	654	-	ES 12
	134	-	DO 33	379	-	AL 40 50	558	-	CD 75	658	-	DN-Op
	135	-	BE 90	406	-	BF 72	564	-	EE plus	660	-	AL 44
	154	-	DF 14	437	-	St. Nazaire	566	-	BE 79	704	-	BE 16


- 88 -

155	-	BO-Op	438	-	AL 45	569	-	BE 18	705	-	AL 51
157	-	BF	454	-	BE 54	572	-	ET 57-Op	752	-	ET-Op
160	-	DR 29	458	-	AL 40 50	578	-	BE 25	754	-	CA-Op
162	-	EE EO-Op							755	-	AE 83

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 84 - 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 254 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 552 - 593 - 595 - 507 - 607 - 704.
	Entered Port: U 582 - Brest; U 437 - St. Nazaire; U 380 - Trondheim.
	Sailed: U 515 - 92 - 514 - 516 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	U 437 reported thick periscope (enemy) sighted in BF 6497.
		2)	U 505 - returning - sighted a passenger freighter in DE 3583, course 0⁰, 18 knots.
		3)	U 86: On 6.8. left auxiliary sailing vessel "Gawaloma" on fire and sinking in CC 45. Nothing else sighted except neutral ships.
		4)	U 609 situation report: Nothing seen from AD 5990 to AE 4753 other than 2 patrol vessels and 1 motor torpedo boat. Much fog. Was moving operational area to AE 7130, as observed in old area.
		5)	U 593 turned back because of breakdown of port Diesel.
		6)	U 66 sank "Rosewie" (766 GRT) on 6.8. in EE 8717, course 305⁰ from Trinidad to New York. Armament, 3 machine guns, 15 cm cannon. On 7.8. sighted "Rio Primero" in EE 8738, course 120⁰. Nothing more seen.
		7)	U 509 situation report: Traffic at intervals suspected from DL 68 via DM 79 to the Windward Passage. Nothing seen in EB 21 and 37 up to EC 44 and 54. N-S and E-W traffic through the center of the Caribbean unlikely.
		8)	Convoy No. 41:
			U 658 sighted convoy in DN 7656, varying course, speed 8 knots, 24 ships. Boat suspected convoy assembly point, sank tanker (9,000 GRT) and scored another hit.
			U 600 reported that he was stalking convoy.
		9)	U 155 sank Dutch vessel "Curacao" (383 GRT) by gunfire on 10.8. in EO 62, course west. Boat accounted for two previously reported pistol failures and assumed a two acute angle of impact, as enemy turned away after torpedo was fired.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: DM 61 - DN 47 - DC 1225 - ED 59 - ED 94 - DD 88.
		Sighted by planes: BF 4324 - BF 5710.

- 89 -

Plane reported: "Am watching dingy in BF 4320 or BF 1926".

Submarine attack in DM 27.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

None.

U 596 - 604 - 755 were given new area AK 03. Boats to extend previous patrol strips to the north on 11.8.

For the present the position in the patrol strip left empty by the return of U 593 will remain unmanned.

U 135 and 333 were also ordered to make for AK 96; U 590 for CE 84; U 164 and 217 to ED 11 after being supplied.

U 508 was given a free hand (formerly Straits of Florida).

U 98 was ordered to remain off Hatteras outside the 200 meter line.

None.

Area in a radius of 9 miles from DB 5697 upper right hand corner is barred because of own mines.

For loss of U 210 - 335 - 379 see summary "Convoy No. 40" on 11.8. para VI.

Former cancellation of permission to attack single ships in area "Route Anton" south of 20⁰ North is no longer valid. "See War Diary of 9.8. para IVd1).

It is still permissible to attack south of 20⁰ North to 5⁰ South. Eastern boundary between 0 and 5⁰ South is 20⁰ West.

Reports of Success:

U 86	sank	one auxiliary sailing vessel
66	"	1 ship (7,66 GRT)
658		1 ship (10,000 GRT)
658	one hit	(later sunk, see War Diary for 13.8.
155	sank	1 ship (383 GRT).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

13.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BE 92	U 160	-	DR 33	U 463	-	DO 30	U 578	-	BE 20
	66	-	Op(EE)	162	-	Op(EE)	464	-	Bergen	590	-	BF 80
	71	-	BE 53	163	-	DD 83	505	-	DF 14	593	-	AL 48
	84	-	BF	164	-	DO 30	506	-	EJ 33	594	-	CF 18
	86	-	Op(CA)	165	-	AE 91	507	-	Op	595	-	BE 25
	89	-	BD 46	171	-	Op(DA)	508	-	Op(DM)	596	-	AE 87
	92	-	AO 40	173	-	Op(EO)	509	-	EC 68	597	-	AL 98
	94	-	CD 73	174	-	Op(AL)	510	-	Op(EO)	598	-	Op(DM)
	98	-	Op(DM)	176	-	Op(AL)	511	-	DO 30	600	-	DN 82
	108	-	Op(EE)	214	-	CF 23	513	-	AE 91	604	-	AE 88
	109	-	Op(DF)	217	-	DO 30	514	-	AO 40	605	-	Op(AL)


- 90 -

116	-	DT 11	254	-	BE 22	515	-	AO 40	607	-	BE 26
125	-	EJ 32	256	-	Op(AL)	516	-	AO 40	609	-	Op(AE)
129	-	CE 23	333	-	BF 80	517	-	AF 72	653	-	CF 34
130	-	Op(ET)	373	-	AL 88	552	-	BF	654	-	EB 63
132	-	BE 92	406	-	BE 90	553	-	DD 78	658	-	Op(DN)
134	-	DD 89	438	-	Op(AL)	558	-	CC 99	660	-	Op(AL)
135	-	BE 64	454	-	BE 83	564	-	Op(EE)	704	-	BE 29
154	-	CD 88	458	-	Op(CB)	566	-	CF 28	705	-	Op(AL)
155	-	Op(ED)	461	-	BE 83	569	-	AL 87	752	-	Op(DH)
157	-	BF	462	-	CC 89	572	-	Op(ET)	754	-	Op(CA)
									755	-	AK 03

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 254 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 593 - 595 - 597 - 607 - 704 - 84 - 552.
	Entered Port: U 84 - Brest; U 552 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 41 see para. IVa.
		2)	U 162 situation report: Nothing sighted in sector EE 79 - ED 99 - EE 71 including Passage, except strong air patrols between ED 99 and EE 71. Change of route assumed. Intended operating in northern sector round ED 98.
		3)	U 508 situation report: Brisk convoy traffic west and south in DM 1866 - 2755 moderate seas, strong air patrols. On 12.8. day attack made in DM 2748 on convoy of 4 ships, 3 destroyers and 2 flying boats, course 220⁰, 8 knots. Hits certain on 2 ships. Heard to sink. 1 miss, 1 barrel dud. "Bolde" (Trans. radar decoy) used with success when chased.
		4)	U 171 sank tanker (11,000 GRT) in DA 9192, course 260⁰.
		5)	U 600 sank English cargo sailing ship on 10.8. in DN 6937 with gunfire.
		6)	U 98 situation report: 10.8. destroyer, 2 patrols, in DB 6467 on southerly course.
			13.8. convoy seen through periscope at dusk in DB 3689. 6 steamers, a destroyer astern, southerly course, 6-8 knots, contact lost in darkness.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: CA 31 - DD 8846 - DA 76 - DM 19 - ED 94.
		Sighted by planes: DE 9234 - AL 9152. Plane attacked.
		Submarine in DN 8280. Submarine attacks: DA 91 - DN 84 - DN 76. Steamer "California" (5,441 GRT) shelled by submarine in ER 24.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Convoy No. 41:

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At 1058 U 598 requested details of convoy. 1300 U 658 lost contact and reported convoy scattered. When closing for attack forced off by corvette. One hit observed. Hit reported yesterday on 8,000 GRT freighter probably sank vessel. U 600 came upon convoy in DN 7663, sank 2 freighters (14,000 GRT) also observed one hit, one explosion heard. Subsequently forced to submerge by destroyers and air escort, contact lost. Boat followed up and requested instructions whether search should be continued during darkness. Immediately afterwards U 598 sighted the convoy at 0100 in DN 7376, course 300. Last shadower report from DN 7231 at 0523. Enemy steered zig-zag course of 290⁰. Pursuit continued.

Group "Loss" According to a high grade Radio Intercept a convoy on a westerly course was in AL 5112 at 1200. Patrol strips were narrowed to pick it up. U 438 - 174 - 256 proceeded to N.W. and manned gaps in strips between U 660 - 605 - 176 and 705. Operation was carried out on the assumption that the radio intercept was completely reliable. As convoy was not picked up by 2400, Group "Loss" moved away on a course of 260⁰ 8 knots to prevent convoy passing the patrol strip during the night. From 0800 on 14.8. boats remained in the patrol area. U 569 and U 373 extended the strip to the south.

U 217 - 164 - 134 refueled from U 463. U 511 took Junkers compressor section 2 and 3 on board.

Kingston is the assembly area for ships forming a subsidiary convoy to join the main Florida-Trinidad convoy. Boats have been informed.

U 157 last reported his position in DN 73 on 10.6.42. Boat was operating off New Orleans. As several submarines and submarine attacks have been reported in this area and U 67 suspected the presence of another boat (see War Diary for 1.7.42.) it is quite possible that his radio has broken down. U 157 was therefore considered to be operating until fuel and provisions were calculated to be exhausted. Boat had not reported again. It must be presumed lost.

Reports of Success:

U 508	2 ships	1,500 GRT, 1800 (Press report) sunk
171	1 tanker	11,000 GRT sunk
658	1 ship	8,000 GRT probably sunk
600	1 aux. sailing ship	sunk
600	2 freighters	14,000 GRT sunk
600	1 hit, 1 detonation heard

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BF 49	U 163	-	DD 87	U 464	-	Bergen	U 593	-	AL 97
	66	-	Op(EE)	164	-	DO 56	505	-	DF 13	594	-	CF 49
	71	-	BE 65	165	-	AE 85	506	-	DJ 63	595	-	BE 61
	86	-	Op(CB)	171	-	Op(DB)	507	-	Op(FC)	596	-	AL 24
	89	-	BD 56	173	-	Op(EO)	508	-	Op(DM)	597	-	BE 35
	92	-	AN 30	174	-	Op(AL)	509	-	ED 48	598	-	Op(DN)
	94	-	CD 74	176	-	Op(AL)	510	-	Op(EO)	600	-	Op(DN 84)
	98	-	Op(DB)	214	-	CF 37	511	-	DO 33	604	-	AL 24
	108	-	Op(EE)	217	-	DO 64	513	-	AE 85	605	-	Op(AL)
	109	-	Op(ES)	254	-	BE 29	514	-	AN 30	607	-	BE 62
	116	-	DH 81	256	-	Op(AL)	515	-	AN 30	609	-	Op(AE)
	125	-	EJ 62	333	-	BF 48	516	-	AN 30	653	-	CF 53
	129	-	CE 33	373	-	Op(AL)	517	-	AE 69	654	-	Op(EB)


- 92 -

130	-	Op(ET)	406	-	CC 11	553	-	DO 12	658	-	Op(DN)
132	-	BF 40	438	-	Op(AL)	558	-	DE 43	660	-	Op(AL)
134	-	DD 95	454	-	BE 93	564	-	Op(EE)	704	-	BE 69
135	-	BE 29	458	-	Op(BB)	566	-	CF 57	705	-	Op(AL)
154	-	CD 94	461	-	BE 93	569	-	Op(AL)	752	-	Op(ET)
155	-	Op(EO)	462	-	DE 16	572	-	Op(ET)	754	-	Op(CA)
160	-	DF 93	463	-	DO 33	578	-	BE 25	755	-	AL 22
162	-	Op(EE)				590	-	BF 76

	On Return Passage: U 43 - 71 - 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 254 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 593 - 595 - 597 - 607 - 704.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoys Nos. 41 or 42 see para IVa.
		2)	U 458 situation report: Coastal tanker (3,000 GRT) sunk on 5.8. in BB 8682, course 255. Nothing sighted on cruise from Cape Spear on southerly course along the coast, steamer convoy heard, returning home.
		3)	U 43 reported periscope in BF 4964, and U 132 reported a thick periscope in BF 7376.
		4)	U 154 sighted aircraft on westerly course in CD 6912.
		5)	U 165 was attacked with bombs in AL 3182, no damage.
		6)	U 511 requested southern half of EB 49. Slight damage from depth charges.
		7)	U 135 attacked by plane in BF 49. Slight damage from depth charges. 2 men killed by gunfire.
	b)	None.
	c)	U-boat sightings: AL 5748 - BB 4265 - DM 19 - AL 81 - BB 5482 - DA 7668.
		Plane reports: AE 7221 - AL 3254 - AL 8111.
		Submarine attack: DN 47.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	1)	Convoy No. 41: At 1315 U 658 requested beacon signals from DN 4795. As no boat had reported contact, it was possible that a radio message to this effect was not heard here. U 658 was picked up by destroyers and hunted for 3 hours. At 1540 he supposed convoy to be on a course of 280⁰ according to hydrophone bearing. When he requested instructions, he was told to continue pursuit as long as the sea and air escort permitted any opportunity of getting ahead and attacking. At 1200 U 598 attacked convoy in DD 4781 and in a surface attack scored 2 hits on a ship of "San Melito" class. Then forced to submerge for 8 hours. Convoy was on a course of 290⁰. Besides

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		other ships, there were 15 tankers. At dusk U 658 decided that further searching was useless and broke off pursuit; in DN 4781 sighted patches of oil and bits of wreckage. It could therefore be assumed that the boat torpedoed by U 598 sank.
	2)	Convoy No. 42: While en route to the new patrol strip (see para. IVb) U 705 sighted an enemy convoy on N.W. course in AL 4812, but he later reported that it consisted of a cruiser and 4 destroyers. The assumption that this was the expected convoy "ONS 120" was not borne out by later reports from the boats. 0106 U 705 reported several silhouettes in AL 4548 on a N.E. course. Immediately afterwards U 256 sighted the convoy on N.W. course in AL 4493. Group "Loss" and U 596, 755, 604 were ordered to stalk it. Convoy consisted of 4 to 6 steamers, so far only 1 destroyer distinguished. 0358 U 705 sighted a convoy on a N.E. course in AL 4527 and was able to distinguish about 4 steamers as well as 4 destroyers. Submarine fired spread of two at a large freighter, 2 hits observed. Contact was lost after this attack. Both reports must refer to the same convoy which was making large zig-zags to the north.
		U 373, which was also stalking the convoy, was forced to submerge by a corvette at 2131 in AL 8126. 2330 U 569 reported a large two funneled passenger vessel with 2 destroyers in AL 4549, course 10⁰, high speed. Probably not part of the convoy. U 438 contacted the enemy in AL 4543 but was forced to move away. U 605 fired a single miss at a 2,000 tonner that was zig-zagging. It was co-operating with small vessels. The operation was continued.
b)	1)	Before Group "Loss" contacted the convoy, it had been ordered to proceed in the following order: U 660 - 438 - 605 - 174 - 176 - 256 - 705 - 569 - 373 - 135, at cruising speed to take up patrol positions from AL 1994 to AL 8165.
	2)	U 594 - 566 - 653 - 214 - 406 - 590 were collected together to make Group "Bluecher". It is intended that these boats shall man a patrol strip to the south to intercept single ships and convoys, more submarines are to join the group later.
		Until the last boat arrives the attack areas will be a distributed as follows: U 594 - CE 93 - 96; U 566 - CF 72 and 75; U 653 - CF 73 and 76; U 214 - CF 81 and 84; U 406 - CF 82 and 85.
	3)	U 507 was directed to attack shipping off Georgetown. This harbor is reported to be a bunker station and convoy assembly point for convoys and independent ships proceeding from Trinidad to Cape Town.
c)	None.
d)	1)	Several sighting reports give rise to the suspicion that enemy submarine activity in the Bay of Biscay is increasing. Boats are warned to take special care.
	2)	U 578 left St. Nazaire on 6.8. and was convoyed as far as point "Morgen". Since then the boat has not made a passage

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report as ordered, nor answered to several calls. Loss must be assumed. No clue is available to show whether it was destroyed by a plane or submarine. It is presumed that it was sunk by bombing.

Reports of Success:

U 458	tanker	3,000 GRT sunk
598	ship (2 hits)	12,286 GRT sunk
705	freighter (2 hits)	8,000 GRT sunk

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

15.August 1942.

I.	U 43	-	BF 43	U 163	-	DO 24	U 464	-	AF 72	U 593	-	BE 17
	66	-	Op(EE)	164	-	DO 57	505	-	CD 86	594	-	Op(CF)
	71	-	BF 60	165	-	AL 24	506	-	EJ 69	595	-	BE 66
	86	-	Op(CB)	171	-	Op(DB)	507	-	Op(FC)	596	-	AL 41
	89	-	BD 65	173	-	Op(EO)	508	-	Op(DM)	597	-	BE 66
	92	-	AN 20	174	-	Op(AL)	509	-	ED 82	598	-	Op(DM)
	94	-	DE 31	176	-	Op(AL)	510	-	Op(EO)	600	-	Op(DL)
	98	-	Op(CA)	214	-	CF 58	511	-	DO 28	604	-	AL 18
	108	-	Op(EE)	217	-	DO 58	513	-	AL 32	605	-	Op(AL)
	109	-	Op(ES)	254	-	BE 64	514	-	AN 20	607	-	BF 44
	116	-	DH 52	256	-	Op(AL)	515	-	AN 20	609	-	Op(AE)
	125	-	EJ 68	333	-	CF 30	516	-	AN 20	653	-	Op(CF)
	129	-	BE 79	373	-	Op(AL)	517	-	AE 83	654	-	Op(EB)
	130	-	Op(ET)	406	-	CF 30	553	-	DN 39	658	-	Op(DM)
	132	-	BF 73	438	-	Op(AL)	558	-	DE 43	660	-	Op(AL)
	134	-	DE 71	454	-	BF 40	564	-	Op(EO)	704	-	BE 69
	135	-	BE 16	458	-	Op(CB)	566	-	Op(CF)	705	-	Op(AL)
	154	-	CE 44	461	-	BF 70	569	-	Op(AL)	752	-	Op(ET)
	155	-	Op(EO)	462	-	DE 18	572	-	Op(ET)	754	-	Op(CA)
	160	-	DC 48	463	-	DE 95	590	-	BF 70	755	-	AL 18
	162	-	Op(EE)

	On Return Passage: U 89 - 116 - 129 - 132 - 134 - 154 - 160 - 254 - 454 - 461 - 505 - 593 - 595 - 597 - 607 - 704.
	Entered Port: U 71 - St. Nazaire; U 43 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 659 - 407 - 512 - 756 - 179 - 91 - 175 - Kiel; U 107 - Lorient; U 432 - La Pallice.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Convoys Nos. 41 and 42 see para. IVa.
		2)	U 164 situation report: Little air patrolling in Mona Passage, light burning. No shipping in EC 3957.
		3)	U 163 attacked by flying boats on 12 and 13 August in DD 88 and DO 23.
		4)	U 108 15.8. 34 bombs in EO tanker on westerly course seen in EO 37; air patrolling.
		5)	U 173 in EE 82, 83, 85 and 86 for 4 days but nothing sighted. 15.8. slight air activity in EE 87. Intended operating from EO 21 to EE 88.
	b)	None.
	c)	Submarine sightings: EO 34 - ED 98 - DA 92 - DM 13 - DM 1968.
	d)	None.

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IV.

Current Operations:

Convoy No. 41:

U 598 was the only boat still stalking the convoy 2000 contacted destroyer in DM 5371, and at 0130 suspected starboard side escort in DM 5246, course 290⁰. No further reports were received by morning.

Convoy No. 42:

Further reports from boats in this area mention only single ships. 1153 U 256 stalked 1 ship in AL 4271, course 0⁰, large zig-zags.

U 605 reported steamer taking bearings in AL 4169 on a course of 340⁰; "Sperrbrecher" class. As no further convoy reports were received the operation was broken off about 1800. Group "Loss" returned to patrol strip ordered on 14.8. In addition, attack areas with a width of 25 miles were manned as follows: U 604 - AK 6915; U 755 - AK 6935; U 596 - AK 6995.

At 1904 report was received that U 176 had been in contact since 1645 in AL 0141 with a steamer and destroyer; course 0⁰, low speed. Boat was ordered to continue stalking, but lost contact in dusk and heavy seas and after searching in vain continued on its way to patrol area.

Attack areas were ordered for following boats:

U 164 - area in a 150 mile radius round Aruba. Most important area there and Curacao.

U 125 - square EV. Main emphasis on 7310 and 6566.

U 506 - sea area within a line from EU 73 via FF 11 - FF 27 to EU 92. A free hand is given for a short operation off Freetown.

U 600 - DM 10 and 20 and south of them, in accordance with situation report from 508.

U 511 - EB 30 and EC 10.

New areas: U 165 and U 513 - DE 10; U 217 - EC 96.

None.

Reports of Success: None.

(Signed): DÖNITZ.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

B.d.U.	1 August 1942
Ref. No.GKdos/3181/A2

Top Secret!

Supplementary Order "Eisbär" for Operational Order No. 52

U 68, U 156, U 172, U 504 form Group "Eisbär". U 459 is to be attached to Group "Eisbär".

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Task:

Surprise attack on enemy shipping off Cape Town.

While en route between Biscay and Cape Town area attacks to be made on enemy merchant and naval vessels.

Behavior as set out in standing orders and special instructions from B.d.U.

Left free.

Information about the Enemy:

English warships in West African area between Cape Town and Freetown.

In Freetown area:	4 cruisers, 3 auxiliary cruisers, 4 destroyers
In Cape area:	2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, several gun goats and A/S vessels.

Battleships, aircraft carriers and other escort vessels must also be expected in conjunction with important transport convoys that use this route.

American units have been observed all over the area. Their presence is also connected with important convoys.

Recently only 2 auxiliary cruisers have been observed as naval patrols.

Enemy Merchant Shipping in Cape Town - Freetown area.

Enemy tonnage in this area:

Cape Town - Freetown direct:

143 ships totaling 935,000 GRT.

via Gulf of Guinea:

54 ships totaling 239,000 GRT.

Freetown shipping volume:

About 106 ships pass monthly from both directions.

Cape Town shipping volume:

About 201 ships in each direction.

Apart from valuable transport convoys single ships run between Cape Town and Freetown.

Ships sailing to England are made up into convoys in Freetown, convoys coming from England are mostly dispersed there.

Single ships follow widely scattered courses. No convergence has been observed, other than just outside the

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harbor.

A few of the routes used by single ships plying between South Africa and America lie inside the line Cape Town - Freetown.

Besides Cape Town and Freetown the following may also be regarded as important harbors in this area:

	Lagos	Takoradi
	Lobito	Matadi
	Point Noire	Whole Bay
	Duala

There is no information available about the shipping volume in these harbors.

Point Noire has often been named as terminal harbor for American convoys.

Captured documents show that enemy merchant shipping make for a point 34⁰ 14' 12" South, 17⁰ 38' 12" East when entering Cape Town, from there it continues on a course of 60⁰ via a swept channel to 33⁰ 53' 00" South, 18⁰ 22' 00" East, then 90⁰ to 33⁰ 53' 00" South, 18⁰ 25' 40" East, then 140⁰ to 33⁰ 54' 00" South, 18⁰ 26' 40" East.

These routing instructions also state that enemy mines lie on either side of the swept channel, and that enemy mines are known to be in the area in a 20 mile radius from Dassen Island Lighthouse.

All lights, light buoys and radio beacons will be downed without warning when there is imminent danger.

According to an Italian report, convoys and single ships proceeding from Cape Town to the Indian Ocean are to use Route "R 6" which was established at the end of May 1942. It runs over the following points:

	34⁰ 10' S, 18⁰ 00' E; 37⁰ (35 or 40') S, 19⁰ 45' E;
	37⁰ (35 or 40') S, 21 50' E; 34⁰ 00' S, 28⁰ 50' E;
	31⁰ 50 S, 31⁰ 35' E; 30⁰ 50' S, 31⁰ 45' E.

Defenses:

According to an agent's report, patrolling in Cape Town area is carried out by 6 destroyers and several guard boats. This information is unconfirmed.

Air and sea patrols must be expected off the entire coast of West Africa.

Enemy Submarines:

Submarine bases in this area are not known and very probably do not exist. The presence of enemy submarines passing

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		through this sea area must be taken into account.

D)	Mines:
	7)	Own mines off Cape Town inside points:
		a)	33⁰ 48' S, 17⁰ 33.8' E.
		b)	33⁰ 40' S, 17⁰ 49.4' E.
		c)	33⁰ 40' S, 18⁰ 01.6' E.
		d)	33⁰ 57' S, 18⁰ 04.5' E.
		e)	34⁰ 11' S, 17⁰ 59.4' E.
		f)	34⁰ 20.2' S, 17⁰ 47.7' E.
	8)	According to information given June 1940 enemy mines lie off Cape Town:
			East of long. 18⁰ 10' E.
			North of lat. 33⁰ 49.3' N.
		so that Robden Island lies in this minefield.
	9)	Before mines were laid in the area as stated in para. 7, there was a channel from point 33⁰ 54' S, 18⁰ 26.7 E in direction 320⁰, 1.3 miles. From here in the direction 270⁰ 22.5 miles to point 33⁰ 53' S, 17⁰ 59' E. Width of lane 2 miles.
	10)	Own mines off Cape Agulhas inside the points:
		a)	33⁰ 47' S, 19⁰ 14' E.
		b)	36⁰ 58' S, 20⁰ 18' E.
		c)	36⁰ 21' S, 22⁰ 23' E.
		d)	35⁰ 10' S, 21⁰ 20' E.
		and north from these points as far as the coast between long. 19⁰ 49' E and 20⁰ 30' E.
	11)	Left free.

E)	Execution after approach and refueling is to begin with a surprise attack by U 156 and U 172 on the roadsteads off Cape Town. Boats will be guided largely by their own observations. Orders for the period following the commencement of the campaign cannot be given because of lack of information.
	Special Instructions:
	12)	Boats are all to enter the patrol strip to the south together as ordered by radio. U 459 as look-out; boat is not to shadow enemy, is to make off if enemy is contacted, and is to continue on its way.

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	13)	While approaching 20⁰ South there are no restrictions on attack excepting such as apply to Route "A", or are laid down in standing orders.
		If appropriate, attacks on single ships on Route "A", or outside the 300 mile coastal zone, will be sanctioned by radio.
	14)	Beyond 20⁰ south until the first attack as set out in para. 19, only battleships; aircraft carriers and troop transports of over 20,000 GRT may be attacked.
			For the same period: RADIO SILENCE!
	15)	Submarines will refuel from U 459 in Naval Grid Square GG 1999. Time will be fixed by radio message. Beacon signals are permitted only if boats do not succeed in finding the rendezvous within 3 days of the time ordered. U 459 will supply fuel etc. in equal quantities to all boats and will retain only sufficient for his own return journey. He will then make for home and will report the reserves of the boats when 500 miles from the refueling point. U 459 will then return to home port.
	16)	If possible, U 156 and U 172 will be the first to refuel. They will arrange the time for the first attack on Capetown roadsteads. The other two boats must be informed of this time. No radio may be used.
	17)	After refueling, boats will proceed singly to the attack area off Cape Town. The success of the attack on the roadsteads depends on remaining undetected. Attack is therefore, permitted only in accordance with para. 14.
	18)	Left free.

F)	19)	Orders for the first attack on Cape Town Roadsteads by U 156 and U 172.
		a)	After previous reconnaissance, the boats are to move up to the roadsteads at the appointed time. Up to 50 ships lie there at anchor at the same time.
		b)	If the attack does not succeed at the time fixed, it is to be repeated 24 hours later. If it still does not succeed, both boats are free to make further attempts or to move away to the attack areas according to para. 20b).
		c)	For 30 hours after the time fixed, both parts are free to attack only on Cape Town Roadstead or targets as specified in para. 14. After these 30 hours attack is unrestricted.
		d)	Successful attacks on Cape Town Roadsteads are to be reported immediately by radio. These reports give the other boats permission to attack.

- 100 -

	20)	Orders for the first attack by U 68 and U 504.
		a)	Until the first report or observation of an attack on the Capetown Roadsteads or for 30 hours after the time set for an attack on Cape Town Roadsteads attack is permitted only according to para. 14! Subsequently attack is unrestricted. Use of time before attack is allowed for observation. Remain undetected!
		b)	First attack areas:
			U 68 S.W., S.E. of own mined area as given in para. 7. Main area is off the approach point 34⁰ 14' 02" S, 17⁰ 38' 02" E, also between the Cape and the southern point of the mined area.
			U 504 N.E., N. of this mined area. Concentration point for supposed traffic between minefields as given in paras. 7. and 8.
		c)	Report situation as soon as definitely detected through attacks, or if attacks by U 156 and 172 are observed or reported.
	21)	Further Behavior:
		a)	U 156 and U 172 will first proceed to the attack area as given in para. 20.6. once the attack on the roadsteads has succeeded or failed.
			U 156 to go to attack area for U 68.
			U 172 to go to attack area for U 504.
		b)	If after several days observation these areas promise no success, all boats have a free hand as far as and including the Cape Agulhas area.
	22)	Return home when situation demands. Refueling can be reckoned on only after it has been requested and confirmed.
	Miscellaneous:
	23)	It is intended to use type IXD 2 boats off the east coast of Africa. They will be supplied with this order.

G)	Communications instructions:
	24)	The instructions and hints given in Operational Order No. 52 para. 27 - 31 apply so far as they do not clash with the instructions about radio silence etc. given in the supplementary order.
	25)	A few weeks after the requirements in regard to gear and personnel have been organized the "Africa" service will come into operation for communicating with boats operating in the South Atlantic. The rough draft of the order is enclosed. Any alterations that become necessary will be ordered by radio.

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	26)	Little experience has been had in radio communications with submarines in the Southern Atlantic. Therefore the cooperation of the boats is very necessary:
		a)	They should do everything possible to receive all messages sent.
		b)	Radio service "Bruno" and alternative frequencies should be used to transmit radio messages, especially if there is no communication on the "Africa" service frequencies.
		c)	Radio link service and the use of the possibilities for this provided by the Submarine-Group-Service (Standing Order No. 207) must be carried out. Radio traffic on Submarine-Group-Service is only a makeshift, attempts must always be made to communicate with home and pass reports to Operational Control.
		d)	Experience of reception conditions are exceptionally important to assist the control station in passing and repeating radio messages, thus, when sending messages report observations, or use short signals for this purpose. Such data is also important for making any necessary improvements in the "Africa" service.
	27)	Cypher material must be carried to cover the longest possibly operational period, also extracts from frequency plane "Anton" to "Caesar", January 1942 edition.
	28)	Attention is drawn to the exchange of recognition signals outside the European area according to Recognition Signal Regulation para. 110, and also to the extract from Recognition Signal Instructions for Overseas (Standing Order No. 222).
	29)	When operating in shallow water the destruction of confidential books must be prepared documents printed with soluble ink must be stored so that water can penetrate. (See also Standing Order No. 231, para. B).


			(Signed): DÖNITZ.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Draft for Enclosure for Supplementary Order for "Eisbär".

Standing Order from B.d.U. No. 204

Communications Instructions

Submarine Atlantic Service 3
("Atlantic" Service)

1)	"Africa" service is intended for radio traffic between Operational Control and boats operating in the Southern Atlantic

2)	"Africa" Service comprises 2 short waves and 1 long

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wave. The same communications with the same series number will be transmitted on all waves of the service.

(Division of communications on "Africa 1" and "Africa 2" from time to time is not intended for the present).

All current short waves of the "Africa" service may be used as transmitting wave lengths by all boats at sea.

Wavelengths and Routing Times:

Short waves: see schedule enclosure 1.

Very long wave: Bordeaux: 19,150 meters - 15.66 kc/s

Reserve Paris 1: 19,710 meters - 15.22 kc/s.

Routing Times:

0500	-	0600
0900	-	1000
1130	-	1200
1400	-	1500
1700	-	1800
2300	-	0100	- Nightcall

All messages sent during the past 24 hours will be repeated at night-call.

Series Nos. 401 - 500.

Routine acknowledgement of short signals and short weather reports by repeating the signal proceeded by the time of intercept.

(Signed): DÖNITZ.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

Enclosure 1 for Standing Order No. 204

Shortwave schedule for submarine Atlantic Service 3.

(Service "Africa")



German Standard Time					Africa 1			Africa 2

00	-	01
01	-	02
02	-	03	r a	-	38,24 m
03	-	04		-	7845 Kc/s
04	-	05
05	-	06
						c b	-	27,73 m
06	-	07					-	10,818 Kc/s
07	-	08
08	-	09
09	-	10	c g	-	21,79 m
10	-	11		-	13,767 Kc/s
11	-	12
12	-	13
13	-	14

14	-	15
15	-	16	i q	-	15,45 m	s o	-	19,16 m
16	-	17		-	19,420 Kc/s		-	15,655 Kc/s
17	-	18

18	-	19
19	-	20
20	-	21	c g	-	21,79 m	c b	-	27,73 m
21	-	22		-	13,767 Kc/s		-	10,817 Kc/s
22	-	23
23	-	24

Control: Naval Radio Station Villecresnes.

Following are keeping receiving watch:

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