F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 December 1942

PG30314a

     
     
 
1.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BD 56
U 161
-
Op(ES)
U 432
-
BF 91
U 552
-
EH 32
 
67
-
DQ 38
163
-
OP(EP)
435
-
AN 23
553
-
Op(BE 30)
 
68
-
CE 90
164
-
BF 48
439
-
Op(? 50)
564
-
CE 82
 
84
-
BE 48
172
-
Op(ER)
443
-
BF 49
566
-
BF 52
 
86
-
DH 14
174
-
EC 14
445
-
BC 23
569
-
BE 16
 
91
-
CE 20
176
-
Op(ER)
454
-
BD 65
600
-
BD 30-Op
 
92
-
DH 14
177
-
Op(KP)
455
-
Op(BD 30)
603
-
BD 32
 
103
-
CE 30
178
-
GR 72
460
-
BD 45
604
-
BE 19
 
105
-
CF 75
181
-
Op(KP)
461
-
DG 90
606
-
BE 55
 
106
-
Op(BD 40)
183
-
Op(BB)
462
-
CF 87
608
-
BD 40
 
109
-
BE 69
185
-
CE 50
465
-
Op(AK 40)
609
-
BF 67
 
118
-
DG 35
211
-
Op(AK 50)
504
-
DT 77
610
-
Op(BD 30)
 
124
-
CF 52
214
-
BF 55
505
-
DG 60
611
-
BD 70
 
126
-
ES 59
217
-
BD 91
507
-
BF 71
615
-
BE 51
 
128
-
Op(FC)
221
-
Op(B? 38)
508
-
Op(EO)
618
-
CG 72
 
129
-
Op(EP)
224
-
BE 48
510
-
Op(CG 70)
623
-
BC 29
 
130
-
CE 30
254
-
Op(AK 40)
513
-
CE 90
624
-
BF 56
 
134
-
Op(ER)
262
-
BD 37
515
-
CE 30
628
-
AN 38
 
135
-
Op(AK 70)
264
-
BF 45
518
-
BD 62
653
-
DH 14
 
154
-
Op(EP)
332
-
DG 69
519
-
CE 82
663
-
BC 51
 
155
-
CE 30
336
-
AN 31
521
-
BD 68
752
-
BF 75
 
159
-
Op(FC)
373
-
Op(BD 30)
522
-
BF 54
753
-
BE 48
 
160
-
DG 55
383
-
BD 40
524
-
Op(A? 50)
758
-
Op(AK 50)
                   
D 3
-
Op(ER)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 224 - 262 - 264 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 518 - 521 - 522 - 552 - 566 - 606 - 603 - 608 - 624 - 752 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 566 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 591 - Bergen;  U 175 - 602 - Lorient;  U 167 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Group "Draufgänger's" operation cancelled.
    2) Sightings:
      U 564 in CE 8822 large two-funnel type ship similar to "Duchess of York".  Course at first 3300, later 00, speed 15 - 17 knots.  Pursued until 2000 without success - then broke off.
      U 510:  nothing sighted apart from neutral shipping.
      U 129:  no traffic encountered in EP 62, 91 - 8820.
      U 109:  attack on group of enemy warships in BE 9489 at 2240.  Course N.E. full speed ahead.  Forced to submerge by destroyers.  Depth charge attack.
      U 183:  29.11. 4 misses on 2 overlapping vessels in BB 8212.  Forced to submerge by destroyers.  30.11. small convoy sighted in BB 8412 in shallow water.  Nothing seen or heard at convoy assembly point.  Boat received orders to return.  Reinforcements intended in BD 80.
       
- 162 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      U 508 sank British ship "Trevalgan" of 5,299 GRT also "City of Bath" of 5,079 GRT.  Both ships in EO 1270.  Course 3100.
  b) None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BB 9514, BF 3967, BB 8289, ED 69, DM 9270, BF 4653, EN 33, CH 5959.
    U-boat attack in ED 6979.
    Report of torpedoing from English passenger steamer "Llandaff Castle" (10,640 GRT) in KP 56 (U 177).
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) As the convoy was not found and the visibility was only 2 sea miles the Group "Draufgänger" received orders to break off operations and to proceed northwards.  After the group has been reinforced by three boats, reconnaissance lines from AL 1728 - AL 4194 will be occupied until 5.12. at 2000 to intercept an ON(S) convoy expected on 6.12. in the following order:  U 604 - 600 - 610 - 569 - 553 - 615 - 221 - and U 455.  U 373 which originally belonged to Group "Draufgänger" is proceeding to BD 7415 to the M.O.'s ship as the First Watch Keeping Officer is ill.
    2) After supplying U 564 - 519 - 86 - 92 - 653 orders are to occupy the intended reconnaissance lines to cover the America - Gibraltar convoy traffic.  U 106 has recently joined Group "Westwall".  Boats received orders to patrol in reconnaissance channels from CE 1363 - CE 4966 on 3.12. at 0800, course W., daily reckoning 160 miles in the following order:  U 106 - 103 - 130 - 515 - 155 - 91 - 185 - 564 - 519 - 86 - 92 and 653.
    3) U 435 - 336 and U 628 proceed to ordered position via AM 32.
  c) U 608 and U 383 have received a reinforcement U 460.
  d)  Italian blockade runner "Cortelazzo" was attacked by an English cruiser in BE 8481 at 1600 and was scuttled by the crew.  Returning boats received orders, as far as fuel situation allows, to proceed at high speed to scene of the action and to take the crew on board.  The first 5 boats can be in position after about 26 hours - 3 more with course of the 3rd and three more in the morning of the 4th/12.  A U-boat coming from the E. goes to meet a life boat sailing to Spain.  On assembly the boats are to begin the search according to weather conditions and drift.  It is intended to use 3 Condor (rec. planes) on the 2nd.
       
V. Reports of Success:  
    
U 508 2 ships 10,378 BRT.
 
 
 
- 163 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
VI. General:
       
 
U-boats on 1 December 1942.
       
   
I. In service on 1 November 1942:  
368
  In service in November  
23
     
391
  Lost in November:  
15
  Temporarily out of order:  
1
     
375
     
  Foreign U-boats  
7
     
382
   
    Losses in November (those not underlined have not yet been declared missing)
    
Atlantic 3 (98, 411, 173)
Otherwise in Atlantic 5 (132, 658, 520, 184, 517)
Mediterranean 6 (660, 605, 595, 559, 331, 259)
In Training 1 (272)
   
    Consisting of:
  Type VIIC
    
U 98 Eichmann.  Experienced boat.  New Commander.  Middle of November W. of Gibraltar.  No information.
U 132 Vogelsang.  Veteran boat.  At the beginning of November in action with a convoy in N. Atlantic.
U 259 Köpke.  Second trip.  Middle November.  Mediterranean.
U 272 Hepp.  On 12.11. during training in the Baltic.  Rammed and sunk.
U 411 Spindlegger.  Second trip.  New Commander.  In the middle of November W. of Gibraltar.
U 559 Heidtmann.   Veteran boat.  At the end of October in Eastern Mediterranean.  Part of the crew taken prisoner.
U 595 Quaet - Faslem.  Second trip.  Bombed in the middle of the Mediterranean, later presumably scuttled off the coast of Africa.  Part of crew taken prisoner.
U 605 Schutze.  Second trip.  Middle of November.  Mediterranean.
U 658 Senkl.  Second trip.  Last message 20.11.  May have been lost to convoy in North Atlantic.
U 660 Baur.  Second trip.  Middle of November.  In Mediterranean.  Crew for the most part taken prisoner.
U 331 von Tiesenhausen.  Middle of November.  Mediterranean.
 
 
 
- 164 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Type IXC
 
U 173 Schweichel.  Second Trip. New Commander.  Middle of November.  West of Gibraltar.
U 184 Dangschat.  First trip, experienced Commander.  Middle of November to convoy in North Atlantic.
U 517 Hatwig.  Second trip.  On outward voyage west of Biscay.  Air attack.
U 520 Schwarzkopf.  First trip.  Last message 27.10. E. of Newfoundland.
  By far the most sinkings can presumably be attributed to air attacks.
       
II. Distribution:
       
 
II
VIIa
VIIb
VIId
IXb/c
IXD1
IXD2
XB
XIV
Total
Foreign
 
In action :
2
-
140 
3
48
-
3
2
5
203
    2***
 
On trials:
-
-
   82   
-
20
2
5
1
-
110
2
 
In training:
35
4
    21**
-
2
-
-
-
-
62
3
 
 
 37*
4
243
3
70
2
8
3
5
375
7
 
  * 3 other type IIs are temporarily out of action for the Black Sea.
  ** 9 of these boats are temporarily in training for operations.
  *** Foreign ships in action or intended for action to train as their use cannot be relied on for technical reasons.
       
III. In November (without foreign ships):
    
Total added
+
7
Number of boats in action deducted
-
4
Number of trial boats added
+
11
       
IV. Number of boats in action on 1 December 1942:
    
Atlantic (without foreign boats)
154
  plus 2 foreign ships.
Mediterranean (including 4 proceeding from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean
24
 
the North Sea
23
 
Black Sea
2
 
    The number of boats in action in the Atlantic has decreased to 6, owing to losses and boats being sent to the Mediterranean.
       
V. Number of boats in the Atlantic in November:
    
On an average, at sea during the day
94.9
  boats
Of these, in the Op. area
38.2
      "
Of these, outward bound
56.7
      "
Of these, returning to base
24.5
      "
       
VI. Number of boats which put out in November:
    
From home bases
11
boats.
From Western France
42
    "
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 165 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
2.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BD 66
U 161
-
Op(ES)
U 383
-
BD 55
U 603
-
BE 15
 
67
-
DF 84
163
-
Op(EP)
432
-
BF 82
552
-
DS 92
 
68
-
CF 48
164
-
BE 93
435
-
AF 75
553
-
AL 77
 
84
-
BE 87
176
-
Op(ER)
439
-
Op(AJ 90)
564
-
Op(CE 81)
 
86
-
Op(CE 50)
167
-
AO
443
-
CG 43
569
-
BE 12
 
91
-
Op(CE 20)
172
-
Op(ER)
445
-
BC 61
591
-
AF 87
 
92
-
Op(CE 50)
174
-
Op(FC)
454
-
BE 45
600
-
AL 77
 
103
-
Op(CE 20)
175
-
BF 54
455
-
AL 77
602
-
BF 55
 
105
-
DG 30
177
-
Op(KP)
460
-
BD 71
604
-
BE 13
 
106
-
Op(BD 76)
178
-
GQ 65
461
-
DT 17
606
-
BE 65
 
109
-
BE 97
181
-
Op(KP)
462
-
CF 22
608
-
BD 55
 
118
-
DG 35
183
-
BB 76
465
-
Op(AJ 60)
609
-
BF 81
 
124
-
CF 70
185
-
Op(CE 20)
504
-
DT 41
610
-
AL 77
 
126
-
Op(ES)
211
-
Op(AK 70)
505
-
DG 36
611
-
BC 93
 
128
-
Op(FC)
214
-
BF 49
507
-
BE 89
615
-
AL 88
 
129
-
Op(EP)
217
-
BD 88
508
-
Op(EO)
618
-
CG 84
 
130
-
Op(CE 20)
221
-
AL 77
510
-
Op(CF 84)
623
-
BC 65
 
134
-
Op(ER)
224
-
BE 57
513
-
DG 13
624
-
BF 50
 
135
-
Op(AK 70)
354
-
Op(AK 70)
515
-
Op(CE 20)
628
-
AN 23
 
154
-
Op(EP)
262
-
BD 63
518
-
BE 45
653
-
Op(CE 50)
 
155
-
Op(CE 20)
264
-
BF 49
519
-
Op(CE 50)
663
-
BC 56
 
159
-
Op(FC)
332
-
DH 17
521
-
BE 76
752
-
BF 82
 
160
-
DG 35
336
-
AN 63
522
-
BF 61
753
-
BE 48
       
373
-
BD 34
524
-
Op(AJ 60)
758
-
AJ 60-Op
                   
D 3
-
Op(ER)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 183 - 224 - 262 - 264 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 507 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 606 - 608 - 624 - 752 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 522 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 258 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  For the crew of "Cortellazzo".
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Sightings:
      U 67 sighted the Portuguese tanker "Sambras", in DF 8175 proceeding from Lisbon to Curacao.  No papers on board.  Submarine received orders to act according to laws and allow the ship to proceed.
      U 177:  advancing to attack on "Dorsetshire", but she was recognized as a hospital ship shortly before firing.
      U 224:  triple miss on large two-funnel vessel in BD 6367 southerly course, speed 20 knots.
      U 610 reported sound of propellers in AK 6965.  Pursuit discontinued because of Diesel breakdown.  Sounds lost.
    2) Sinkings:
      U 604:  Large passenger steamer - possibly troop transport in BE 1739.  General course 1800, speed 17 knots.
       
- 166 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Tonnage according to survivors' statements 16,000 GRT.
      U 552:  British steamer "Wallsend" (3,157 GRT) carrying planes from Liverpool to Freetown in DT 8416.
      U 174:  British ship "Besholt" (4,977 GRT) carrying tn and copper pyrites from Lobito to Trinidad.  Ship has 6 American sailors taken on board from a previously sunk steamer "George Pecher".  According to statement ships steer a course of 3140 to FC 3296 from there on a course of 299 degrees.
  b) Search for crew of Cortellazzo unsuccessful.
  c) U-boat sightings:  DN 9519, ED 71.
    U-boat warning for KP 96.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Instead of that given in earlier order, the day's reckoning for Group "Westwall" is 140 miles.
    2) U 604 is to occupy the most southerly position in reconnaissance channel of Group "Draufgänger".  All other boats are to occupy a position to the N.
    3) New courses:  U 109 to ED 99, U 105 and U 124 same grid after supply, U 164 and U 507 to EH 60, U 214 and U 175 to CF 70.  U 591 proceeds to AK 60 via AM 32.
    4) Supply is planned to take place in about CD 20 for Trinidad boats.  Return voyage must take place with 40 cubic meters fuel on board.
  c) 1) U 504 has supplemented provisions from U 461.
    2) Supply from U-boat tanker is intended for U 128 - 174 - 172 - 159 - 126 - 161 and perhaps U 134 in ER 5555 from 8.12.  Except for U 134 boats can remain in the operational area for another 14 days.
  d) 1) Rescue action "Cortellazzo":
      U-boats and Condors have so far discovered nothing.  Inasfar as the fuel situation allows boats are to search in a southwesterly and westerly direction and later to proceeds towards the North Spanish coast with large sweeps as it is possible that lifeboats are trying to reach there.
    2) From now on, attacks on isolated ships on the whole of Route "Anton" as far as 50 S. are allowed.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 604 1 ship
16,000 BRT
U 552 1 ship
3,157 BRT
U 174 1 ship
4,977 BRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
 
 
 
- 167 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
3.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BE 72
U 163
-
Op(EP)
U 383
-
BD 65
U 553
-
AL 71
 
67
-
DF 55
164
-
CF 31
432
-
BF 72
564
-
Op(CE 40)
 
68
-
CF 52
167
-
AN 36
435
-
AE 99
569
-
AL 48
 
84
-
BE 80
172
-
Op(ER)
439
-
Op(AJ 80)
591
-
AF 75
 
86
-
Op(CE 40)
174
-
Op(ER)
473
-
CG 82
600
-
AL 71
 
91
-
Op(CE 10)
175
-
BF 48
445
-
BC 68
602
-
BF 49
 
92
-
Op(CE 40)
176
-
Op(ER)
454
-
BE 86
603
-
BE 81
 
103
-
OP(CE 20)
177
-
Op(KP)
455
-
AL 71
604
-
BE 11
 
105
-
DG 45
178
-
GQ 29
460
-
BD 75
606
-
BF 47
 
106
-
Op(CE 20)
181
-
Op(KP)
461
-
DT 71
608
-
BD 69
 
109
-
CF 34
183
-
BB 97
462
-
BE 86
609
-
BF 72
 
118
-
DG 35
185
-
Op(CE 40)
465
-
Op(AJ 80)
610
-
AK 69
 
124
-
CF 76
211
-
OP(AJ 90)
504
-
DT 10
611
-
BD 74
 
126
-
Op(ES)
214
-
BE 69
505
-
CF 79
615
-
AL 72
 
128
-
Op(FC)
217
-
CE 15
507
-
BE 84
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
129
-
Op(EP)
221
-
AL 47
508
-
Op(EO)
623
-
BC 93
 
130
-
Op(CE 20)
224
-
BE 45
510
-
Op(CF 80)
624
-
BF 50
 
134
-
Op(ER)
254
-
Op(AJ 90)
513
-
DG 17
628
-
AF 75
 
135
-
Op(AJ 90)
258
-
BF 91
515
-
Op(CE 10)
653
-
Op(CE 40)
 
154
-
Op(EP)
262
-
BE 80
518
-
BE 45
663
-
BC 92
 
155
-
Op(CE 10)
264
-
BF 50
519
-
Op(CE 40)
753
-
BE 84
 
159
-
Op(FC)
332
-
CF 87
521
-
BE 86
752
-
BF 93
 
160
-
DG 35
336
-
AF 76
524
-
Op(AJ 80)
758
-
Op(AJ 90)
 
161
-
Op(ES 41)
373
-
BD 54
552
-
DT 71
D 3
-
Op(ER)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 183 - 224 - 264 - 262 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 606 - 608 - 624 - 752 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 752 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 301 - Brest;  U 410 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Sightings:
      U 758:  One destroyer in AJ 8385, course 2700, speed 8 knots.  After contact had been lost, ordered to break off search and occupy reconnaissance channel.  It is possible, according to dead reckoning, that the destroyer belongs to the ON(S) (convoy) in the vicinity.  The entire Group "Panzer" could not be employed in searching owing to the proximity of the coast and the expected eastward-bound convoy.
      U 608:  In DE 4858 a two funnel passenger steamer on a course of 500 was trailed without success for 6 hours.
      U D 3:  A Spanish vessel on a course of 300 in ER 9366.
      U 161:  On 1.12. in ES 4291 a Spanish ship "Aolo" on a course of 300, speed 9 knots.  On 3.12. "Monte Oip" in ES 4269 on a course of 2000 proceeding from Barcelona to Buenos Aires.  The boat is again fit for action.
      U 128:  Neutral shipping sighted in FC 3262 on 2.12.  Presumably hunting for "Besholt" (Translator's note:  B sunk).  Operations possible for a further three weeks.
       
- 168 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 183 sank "Empire Dashick" (6,000 GRT) in BB 8896, course 2500.
  b) None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  DB 5935, ED 9953.
    Submarine message from BB 8895 (U 183).
    English aircraft reports U-boat in BF 7869.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) According to dead reckoning, and "SC" convoy is expected from 5.12. at dawn in the patrol channel covered by Group "Panzer".  The boats received instruction to report all sightings at once and to maintain watch on the reconnaissance area according to visibility and weather conditions with increased speed also submerging and listening.
  b) 1) In accordance with the last traffic report, boats in ER and ES are to have freedom of movement until the start of supplying.
    2) U 663 - 623 - 445 and U 611 are to proceed, contrary to previous orders on a course to grid BC 31, after being reinforced by "Schnoor" attachment to Group "Panzer" and operations on the awaited convoy are intended.
  c) 1) U 552 has taken on 10 cubic meters from U 461.
      U 623 has taken on 55 cubic meters from U 460.
    2) U 513 has to start the homeward trip owing to chemically faulty fuel.  Resination and corrosion have led to a considerable number of fuel pump and valve breakdowns.  The causes are explained by the Lorient shipyards.
  d) 1) Rescue action "Cortellazzo":
      U 603 sighted several pieces of wreckage and drifting empty lifeboats in BE 8455.  It is therefore possible that the crew has been picked up by an English warship.
      There are no sighting reports from the other U-boats.  It is intended to discontinue the search at nightfall on 4.12.
    2) Following the putting out of U 258 the ordered number of 4 boats by the Naval War Staff 2412 Secret Order (Gkdos) S.O. only message, consisting of U 443 - 301 - 602 and 258.  The breakthrough the Straits of Gibraltar is to take place in the new moon period on about 8.12.  (See Operational Order Group "Taucher")
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 183 1 ship 6,000 BRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
 
 
 
- 169 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
4.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BE 84
U 163
-
Op(EP)
U 373
-
BD 72
U 524
-
Op(AJ 80)
 
67
-
DF 26
164
-
CF 29
383
-
BE 48
552
-
DT 45
 
68
-
BF 49
167
-
AN 36
410
-
BF 67
553
-
Op(AL 40)
 
84
-
BE 94
172
-
Op(ER)
432
-
BE 99
564
-
Op(CE 40)
 
86
-
Op(CE 40)
174
-
Op(ER)
435
-
AM 32
569
-
Op(AL 40)
 
91
-
Op(CE 10)
175
-
BE 93
439
-
Op(AJ 80)
591
-
AE 99
 
92
-
Op(CE 40)
176
-
ES 71
443
-
Op(DJ 20)
600
-
Op(AL 40)
 
103
-
Op(CE 10)
177
-
Op(KP)
445
-
BD 74
602
-
BF 71
 
105
-
DG 35
178
-
CQ 13
454
-
BE 92
603
-
BE 84
 
106
-
Op(CE 10)
181
-
Op(KP)
455
-
AL 40
604
-
AL 72
 
109
-
CF 27
183
-
BB 90
460
-
BD 74
606
-
BE 49
 
118
-
DG 35
185
-
Op(CE 10)
461
-
DT 70
609
-
BE 64
 
124
-
DG 30
211
-
Op(BC 20)
462
-
BE 96
608
-
BE 56
 
126
-
ES 45
214
-
BE 94
465
-
Op(AJ 80)
610
-
Op(AL 40)
 
128
-
Op(FC 33)
217
-
CD 63
504
-
DG 92
611
-
BD 74
 
129
-
Op(EP)
221
-
AL 40
505
-
CF 58
615
-
Op(AL 40)
 
130
-
Op(CE 10)
224
-
BE 84
507
-
CF 21
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
134
-
Op(ER)
254
-
Op(BC 20)
508
-
Op(ED)
623
-
BD 74
 
135
-
Op(BC 20)
258
-
BF 82
510
-
Op(CF 82)
624
-
BF 64
 
154
-
Op(EP)
262
-
BE 86
513
-
DF 64
628
-
AF 77
 
155
-
Op(CE 10)
264
-
BF 64
515
-
Op(CE 10)
653
-
Op(CE 40)
 
159
-
Op(FC)
301
-
BF 55
518
-
BD 24
663
-
BD 74
 
160
-
DG 35
332
-
CF 82
519
-
Op(CE 40)
753
-
BE 94
 
161
-
Op(ES)
336
-
AF 77
521
-
BE 96
758
-
Op(AJ 80)
                   
D 3
-
Op(ER)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 183 - 224 - 262 - 264 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 606 - 608 - 624 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 624 - 264 - St. Nazaire
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) See paragraph IVa for report on convoy sighted by U 603.
    2) Sightings:
      U 615:  Triple miss on isolated ship on general course W. and speed 18 knots in AL 4559.  Zig-zagged off after fire.
      U D 3:  Spanish ship "Montepynegro" on course of 2200 speed 9 knots in ES 7187.
      U 163:  One cruiser, one destroyer in EO 2998 on a westerly course, speed 20 knots.
      U 177:  Cruiser proceeding at high speed on course 2200 in KP 5960 on 3.12.  Hunted steamer to KP 8310 on 4.12.  Recognized in the darkness as Swedish vessel "Gilimmaren".
    3) U 159 has loaded torpedoes and is ready for further action after supplementing furl supply.
    4) U 181 sank Panama steamer "Amarylis" on a course of 2000 in KP 3583 on 2.12.  Total number of ships sunk:  12 with a total tonnage of 57,500 GRT.  Delayed return trip.
       
- 170 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) None.
  c) English aircraft attacked submerged U-boat with depth charges in AM 3282.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy sighted by U 603:
      U 603, on the return trip owing to the illness of the Commander, sighted a southward bound convoy at 1836 in BE 9826.  Boats favorably disposed for operations on this convoy shall proceed full speed ahead for operations after reporting their position.  This applies to U 175 - 602 - 214 and U 432 which should be able to be in position in the course of the night or the following day.  U 603 was beaten off to the N. by destroyers and received a two hour depth charge bombardment at 2350 in pursuit.  U 602 next boat onto the convoy was located at 2330 in CG 1224 beaten off an hour later and hunted by hydrophone and depth charges for a long time.  No further messages were received.  The operation continues.
    2) U 524, a member of the Group "Panzer" covered coded English R/T from 1800 - 2000 in AJ 8766.  There were 10 participants.  No visual or hydrophone bearing.  As, according to dead reckoning the expected convoy must be somewhere in this region, Group "Panzer" received instructions to proceed on a course of 500 at high speed and to patrol from AJ 8321 - 9762 on 5.12. at 1100 in the patrol channels.
      According to this the boats are almost certainly ahead of the convoy.  It is intended to intercept it during the day in order to avoid a night encounter.  It is possible that the R/T traffic originated from a group at some distance as the range of the waves, and Direction Finding is not yet possible.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U 118 has supplied the boats U 124 - 105 and U 160 and begins the return voyage.
    2) U 611 has taken 70 cubic meters of fuel on board from U 460.
  d) 1) U 258 is on the return voyage owing to the illness of the Commander.  The boat has been destined for the Mediterranean.  U 257 has been ordered to take her place.
    2) U 181 reports that the hydrophone gear installed in type IXD2 is very bad in seaway 4 in swell.  It is suggested that at least in the newly constructed boats large hydrophone deep steering rudders should be fitted.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 181 1 ship 4,328 BRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
 
 
 
- 171 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
5.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BE 67
U 163
-
Op(EO)
U 383
-
BE 57
U 552
-
DT 16
 
67
-
CE 47
164
-
CF 57
410
-
BF 81
553
-
Op(AL 40)
 
68
-
BF 55
167
-
AN 28
432
-
CG 14
564
-
Op(CD 60)
 
84
-
BF 71
172
-
Op(ER)
435
-
AM 22
569
-
Op(AL 40)
 
86
-
Op(CD 60)
174
-
Op(ER)
439
-
Op(AJ 80)
591
-
AM 22
 
91
-
Op(CD 30)
175
-
CG 13
443
-
CG 90
600
-
Op(AL 40)
 
92
-
Op(CD 60)
176
-
Op(ES)
445
-
BD 47
602
-
CG 12
 
103
-
Op(CD 30)
177
-
Op(KP)
454
-
BF 72
603
-
CG 12
 
105
-
DG 57
178
-
CG 85
455
-
Op(AL 40)
604
-
Op(AL 40)
 
106
-
Op(CD 30)
181
-
Op(KP)
460
-
BD 74
606
-
BF 52
 
109
-
CE 66
183
-
BC 77
461
-
FH 62
608
-
BE 59
 
118
-
CF 78
185
-
Op(CD 60)
462
-
BF 73
609
-
BE 25
 
124
-
DG 30
211
-
Op(BC 20)
465
-
Op(AJ 80)
610
-
Op(AL 40)
 
126
-
Op(ES)
214
-
CG 12
504
-
DG 36
611
-
BC 69
 
128
-
Op(ER)
217
-
CD 59
505
-
CF 32
615
-
Op(AL 10)
 
129
-
Op(EP)
221
-
Op(AL 40)
507
-
CF 42
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
130
-
Op(CD 30)
224
-
BE 91
508
-
Op(ED)
623
-
BC 63
 
134
-
Op(ER)
254
-
Op(BC 20)
510
-
CF 82
628
-
AM 31
 
135
-
Op(BC 20)
258
-
BF 99
513
-
DG 43
653
-
Op(CD 60)
 
154
-
Op(EP)
262
-
BE 93
515
-
Op(CG 30)
663
-
BD 74
 
155
-
CD 30
301
-
BF 48
518
-
BD 34
753
-
BE 96
 
159
-
Op(ER)
332
-
BF 92
519
-
Op(CD 60)
758
-
Op(AJ 80)
 
160
-
CF 79
336
-
AM 31
521
-
BF 72
D 3
-
Op(ES)
 
171
-
Op(ES)
373
-
BD 74
524
-
AJ 83      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 160 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 224 - 262 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 606 - 608 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 606 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 664 - 621 - Brest;  U 356 - St. Nazaire;  U 225 - 123 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy U 603, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 591 was bombed in AM 5253 and sustained damage to electrical engine.  Boat remains fir for action.
    3) U 154 has not encountered traffic in EP since 21.11.
    4) U 134 is ready for 3 more weeks operations after refueling.
    5) U 129 hunted steamer with course 1200 in EP 5272 and finally identified it as being of Argentinean nationality.
    6) U 128 sank British steamer "Teesbank" (5,136 GRT) in ER 9817 sailing in ballast from Port Elizabeth to Demarara.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BE2955, BF 4521, EC 9183, CA 98, DB 6875, EC 9150, BC 1346, BD 67.
  d)  None.
       
- 172 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy U 603:
      U 602 reports smoke trails and Sunderland aircraft at 1800 in CG 1890, course S.  Shortly after this she was forced to submerge owing to air activity and lost contact.  The same thing happened to U 175.  As the possibilities of success appear negligible only the southward bound boats are to continue the operation.  U 603 received orders to return as a result of the illness of the Commander.  U 214 is proceeding to the ordered operational area.  U 432 is far to the W. and has so far not been in action against the convoy.  Up to the morning there have been no further signals.  U 175 - 432 and U 602 are also detailed for this operation.
    2) Group "Panzer" approaches the expected convoy from 1100 with a course 2300, speed 6 knots.  The convoy should again be intercepted in the reconnaissance channels from AJ 5992 to 9812 from 1200 on 6.12.  U 623 and 611 also join this group and occupy position AJ 9852 and AJ 9811 in the given reconnaissance channels.
  b) 1) Group "Westwall" remains as patrol from CD 2243 to 5846 from 6.12.  The point of intersection of the great circle America - Gibraltar and the route for ON convoys lies here.
    2) New position for U 214 in ED 99.
  c)  U 443 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and therefore comes under the F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
    
U 128 1 ship 5,136 BRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BE 69
U 164
-
CF 75
U 373
-
BD 74
U 552
-
DG 95
 
67
-
Op(CE)
167
-
Kristiansand
383
-
BE 67
553
-
Op(AL 10)
 
68
-
BF 61
172
-
Op(ER)
410
-
BF 48
564
-
Op(CD 20)
 
84
-
BF 48
174
-
Op(ER)
432
-
CF 67
569
-
Op(AL 10)
 
86
-
Op(CD 20)
175
-
CG 42
435
-
AM 13
591
-
AM 15
 
91
-
Op(CD 20)
176
-
Op(ER)
439
-
Op(AJ 80)
600
-
Op(AL 10)
 
92
-
Op(CD 20)
177
-
Op(KP)
443
-
CG 90
602
-
CG 42
 
103
-
Op(CD 20)
178
-
CG 48
445
-
BD 75
603
-
BF 77
 
105
-
DG 78
181
-
KZ 25
454
-
BF 57
604
-
Op(AL 40)
 
106
-
Op(CD 20)
183
-
BC 88
455
-
Op(AL 40)
608
-
BE 69
 
109
-
CE 91
185
-
Op(CD 25)
460
-
BD 74
609
-
AL 87
 
118
-
CF 81
211
-
Op(AJ 80)
461
-
EH 91
610
-
Op(AL 10)
 
123
-
AO
214
-
CF 62
462
-
BF 57
611
-
BC 38
 
124
-
DG 52
217
-
CD 84
465
-
Op(AJ 80)
615
-
Op(AL 10)
 
126
-
Op(ES)
221
-
Op(AL 40)
504
-
CF 84
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
128
-
Op(ER)
224
-
BE 93
505
-
BE 99
621
-
BF 55
 
129
-
Op(EP 22)
225
-
AO
507
-
CF 72
623
-
BC 32
 
130
-
Op(CD 20)
254
-
Op(AJ 80)
508
-
Op(ED)
628
-
AM 23
 
       
- 173 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
134
-
Op(ER)
258
-
BF 93
510
-
CF 64
653
-
Op(CD 20)
 
135
-
Op(AJ 90)
262
-
BF 73
513
-
DG 22
663
-
BD 74
 
154
-
Op(EE)
301
-
BE 93
515
-
Op(CD 20)
664
-
BF 55
 
155
-
Op(CD 20)
332
-
BF 93
518
-
BD 36
753
-
BF 73
 
159
-
Op(FC)
336
-
AM 23
519
-
Op(CD 20)
758
-
Op(AJ 80)
 
160
-
CF 58
356
-
BF 57
521
-
BF 49
D 3
-
Op(ER)
 
161
-
Op(ES)      
524
-
Op(AJ 80)      
 
163
-
Op(EO)                  
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 68 - 84 - 118 - 160 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 224 - 262 - 332 - 383 - 454 - 462 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 608 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 68 - Lorient;  U 332 - 258 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 463 - Brest;  U 203 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For report on Convoy No. 68 and U 603's convoy report, see paragraph IVa.
    2) Sightings:
      U 106:  In CD 2242 small armed steamer, course 1200, speed 18 knots.
      U 163:  Triple miss at range limit on cruiser of type "Marblehead".
      U 301:  Single and double miss on destroyer group using hydrophone and radar.  Torpedoes were dodged.
    3) Sinkings:
      U 515 sank troop transport "Ceramic" (18,713 GRT) in CD 2927.  Course 1100, speed 16 knots.
      U 155 sank freighter of 7,000 GRT, course 1400 in CD 2858.
      U 103 sank "Henery Stanley" (5,026 GRT) carrying dynamite from Liverpool to Freetown in CD 2611.  All sinkings therefore in patrol channel of Group "Westwall".  It is likely that both freighters belonged to an "ON" convoy and were making the attempt to reach Freetown unescorted.  This would be a confirmation of the fact that the traffic of SL convoys has been discontinued.  (Pencil note:  but not very likely on 400 W.)
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  AJ 6870.
    U-boat attack:  CD 5250.
  d)  None.
       
- 174 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) U 603 convoy report:
      Contact was not re-established.  Owing to leaking exhaust plates, U 175 is only provisionally in a condition to submerge and is proceeding westward.  U 602 and U 432 received instructions to carry out their duties.  The operation is therefore broken off.
    2) Convoy No. 68:
      Group "Panzer" consisting of U 135, 211, 254, 439, 465, 524, 758, which was joined by 2 more boats, U 611 and U 623 from a southerly supply point, intercepted through U 524 the expected SC convoy in AJ 9119 at 1200 on 6.12.  Four more boats belonging to this group established contact in improved weather conditions, wind N.W. strength 2, and good visibility, but lost it again in the evening owing to visibility decreasing to 2 sea miles.  Contact was not resumed during the night.  2 boats report flares - probably decoy flares.  Several boats report hydrophone contact with the convoy but are unable to establish contact.  It may be presumed however, that the boats will not be far from the convoy at dawn.  The operation continues.
  b) U 609 joins Group "Draufgänger" and occupies position AL 4437 to extend the patrol channel to the S.  As the expected convoy will not be in the patrol area of Group "Draufgänger until darkness falls, the Group will proceed in reconnaissance lines on a westerly course, speed 7 knots from 1900.  In daylight the convoy will again be intercepted at 1100 on an easterly course.
  c)  None.
  d) U 443 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and therefore comes under F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 515 1 ship 18,173 BRT
U 155 1 ship 7,000 BRT
U 103 1 ship 5,026 BRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
- 175 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
7.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BF 48
U 172
-
Op(ER)
U 373
-
BD 74
U 552
-
DG 66
 
67
-
BD 87
163
-
Op(EF 47)
383
-
BE 69
553
-
Op(AL 10)
 
84
-
BF 52
164
-
DG 35
410
-
BE 69
564
-
Op(CD 50)
 
86
-
CD 50-Op
167
-
AN 67
432
-
CG 74
569
-
Op(AL 10)
 
91
-
Op(CD 20)
174
-
Op(ER)
435
-
AL 37
591
-
AL 37
 
92
-
Op(CD 50)
175
-
CF 93
439
-
Op(AK 40)
600
-
Op(AL 10)
 
103
-
Op(CD 20)
177
-
Op(KP)
445
-
BD 77
602
-
CG 84
 
105
-
DS 14
176
-
Op(ER)
454
-
BF 64
603
-
BF 76
 
106
-
Op(CD 20)
178
-
GF 63
455
-
AL 40
604
-
AL 40
 
109
-
CE 88
181
-
KZ 51
463
-
BD 74
608
-
BF 47
 
118
-
CF 81
183
-
BC 99
466
-
ER 23
609
-
AL 75
 
123
-
AN 36
185
-
Op(CD 20)
461
-
BF 64
610
-
Op(AL 10)
 
124
-
DG 48
203
-
BF 54
462
-
BF 52
611
-
Op(AJ 93)
 
126
-
Op(ES)
211
-
Op(AJ 60)
465
-
Op(AJ 60)
615
-
Op(AL 10)
 
128
-
Op(ER)
214
-
CF 59
504
-
CF 61
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
129
-
EF 91
217
-
DF 11
505
-
BF 75
621
-
BF 49
 
130
-
Op(CD 20)
221
-
Op(AL 14)
507
-
DG 32
623
-
Op(AJ 60)
 
134
-
Op(ER)
224
-
BF 73
508
-
Op(ED)
628
-
AL 36
 
135
-
Op(AJ 60)
225
-
AN 36
510
-
CF 31
653
-
Op(CD 50)
 
154
-
Op(EE)
254
-
Op(AJ 60)
513
-
CF 75
663
-
BD 74
 
155
-
Op(CD 20)
262
-
BF 82
515
-
Op(CD 20)
664
-
BF 46
 
159
-
Op(FC)
301
-
CG 82
518
-
BE 15
753
-
BF 92
 
160
-
CF 35
336
-
AM 15
519
-
Op(CD 50)
758
-
Op(AJ 60)
 
161
-
Op(ES)
356
-
BF 82
521
-
BF 50
D 3
-
Op(ER)
             
524
-
Op(AJ 60)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 160 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 224 - 262 - 383 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 608 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 84 - Brest;  U 462 - 454 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 409 - 441 - St. Nazaire;  U 257 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For report on Convoy No. 68 see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 600 hunted the four masted freighter "James McGee" (?) of 9,000 GRT from AK 3817 and sank her in AL 1861.
    3) U 185 sank the English ship "Peter Maersk" of 5,476 GRT, course 1500, speed 14 knots, in CD 5283.
    4) U 515 reports that the sunk transport "Ceramic" was laden with troops.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  ED 9842.
     Aircraft report U-boats in CG 8625, CG 8375, BF 7886.
  d) None.
       
- 176 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 68:
    While in the morning of the 7th the weather conditions in the convoy area were still favorable with a slight south westerly wind and good visibility, in the afternoon and towards evening it deteriorated considerably.  The boats reported very variable visibility up to 500 meters and strong rain showers and snow gusts.
    U 524 re-established contact with the convoy at 1000 a.m. in AK 4417, and in the course of the day four more U-boats (U 254, 465, 439 and 135) approached the convoy.  The boats continually lost it in the afternoon owing to the variable visibility but found it again.  In the night 5 boats, U 254, 524, 465, 623, 758 also came up to the convoy
    U 524 reported that the convoy consists of 10 ships in line ahead and 10 destroyers.  The control is unable to form any clear picture of the defence as for one thing, scarcely a boat is in action and for another, only a few boats report being beaten off by destroyers.  U 135 reports horizontal location.  The convoy, steered a course of 45 - 500, speed, according to dead reckoning, 10 knots.  Considering the high speed, this does not appear to refer to the expected SC convoy, but to a fast section of it.  U 254 reports single miss at range limit at 2300 on the 7th.
    U 524 reports:
    1) On the 7th 5 misses 1 probable hit.
    2) On 8th 1 freighter of 5,000 GRT sunk.
      1 tanker of 8,000 GRT sunk.
      1 freighter and 1 destroyer torpedoed.
    The convoy operation continues.
  b) 1) To occupy as temporary attack area:
      U 435, upper third of AL 19
      U 491, lower third of AL 17
      U 628, middle third of AL 17
      U 336, upper third of AL 17, if necessary, intended to operate on Convoy No. 68.
    2) As the expected westbound convoy was not located the Group "Draufgänger" received the order at dusk, to operate on Convoy No. 68.  For further information see paragraph IVa of 8.12.
    3) According to a Radio Intelligence Report (X) proceeding from America to Capetown.  Traffic mainly W. and E. of St. Paul's Rocks.   After taking on supplies therefore, the following dispositions are ordered:  U 174 - 3437;  U 128 - 3453;  U 161 - 3275;  U 126 - 3237.  All grids in FC.  U 159 - ER 9949 and U 134 - ER 9932.  Depth for all boats id 40 sea miles.  U 176 occupies waters off Pernambucco.  Boats may use territorial waters, but entrance to harbors and roads is forbidden however.  U D 3 operates in area EH 98 and EJ 55.  Spasmodic northwest - southeast and east west traffic is expected here.
    4) New position for outbound boats U 410, 664, 621, 203, 409 and 356 is AK 60.  Formation of patrol channel is planned here.
    5) U 175 proceeds southwards to operate for several days in the waters of Dakar.  Traffic entering or leaving port is counted on here.
 
 
 
- 177 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    6) U 91 begins her homeward voyage from the patrol channel of Group "Westwall".  Boats to the N. of this move in to a southerly position.  U 463 has put out for CD 30 to refuel this group.
  c) 1) Supplied from U 460:  U 373, 445 and 663.
    2) U 510, 504 and U 257 patrol the waters N. of El Ferrol via BF 75 (upper third) to intercept the tanker "Antarktis" putting out from there on 8.12.
  d) According to Radio Intelligence Report (X) the appearance of a former German U-boat type VIIc (570) captured by the British is to be expected any time now.  Boats are again warned to be especially careful when meeting and passing other boats.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 600 1 ship
9,000 BRT
 
U 185 1 ship
5,476 BRT
 
U 524 2 ships
13,000 BRT
 
U 524 1 ship, 1 destroyer torpedoed, 1 further ship hit.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
8.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BF 51
U 164
-
DG 65
U 383
-
BF 46
U 569
-
Op(AL 10)
 
67
-
BD 87
167
-
AN 30
409
-
BF 54
591
-
AL 18
 
86
-
Op(CD 50)
172
-
Op(ER)
410
-
BE 67
600
-
Op(AL 10)
 
91
-
Op(CD 30)
174
-
Op(ER)
432
-
Op(DJ)
602
-
CG 90
 
92
-
Op(CD 50)
175
-
CF 97
435
-
Op(AK)
603
-
BF 50
 
103
-
Op(CD 20)
176
-
Op(ER)
439
-
Op(AK 10)
604
-
Op(AL 40)
 
105
-
DR 38
177
-
Op(KP)
441
-
BF 46
608
-
BF 50
 
106
-
Op(CD 20)
178
-
GF 31
445
-
BC 69
609
-
Op(AK)
 
109
-
DG 15
181
-
KZ 47
455
-
Op(AL 40)
610
-
Op(AL 10)
 
118
-
CF 37
183
-
BD 79
460
-
BD 69
611
-
Op(AK 10)
 
123
-
AN 34
185
-
Op(CD 60)
461
-
ER 29
615
-
Op(AL 10)
 
124
-
DF 93
203
-
BF 45
463
-
BE 48
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
126
-
Op(ES)
211
-
Op(AK 10)
465
-
Op(AK 10)
621
-
BE 69
 
128
-
Op(ER)
214
-
CF 84
504
-
CG 11
623
-
Op(AK 10)
 
129
-
EF 62
217
-
DE 62
505
-
BF 50
628
-
Op(AL)
 
130
-
Op(CD 20)
221
-
Op(AL 40)
507
-
DG 64
653
-
Op(CD 50)
 
134
-
Op(ER)
224
-
BF 57
508
-
Op(ED)
663
-
BD 71
 
135
-
Op(AK 10)
225
-
AN 34
510
-
BE 98
664
-
BF 44
 
154
-
Op(EE)
254
-
Op(AK 10)
513
-
CF 75
753
-
BF 90
 
155
-
Op(CD 20)
257
-
BF 91
515
-
Op(CD 20)
758
-
Op(AJ 60)
 
159
-
Op(FC)
262
-
BF 67
518
-
BE 51
D 3
-
Op(ER 50)
 
160
-
BE 96
301
-
CG 85
519
-
Op(CD 50)      
 
161
-
Op(ES)
336
-
AL 18
521
-
BF 50      
 
163
-
Op(EO)
356
-
BE 68
524
-
Op(AK 10)      
       
373
-
BD 47
552
-
DH 15      
             
553
-
Op(AL 10)      
             
564
-
Op(CD 50)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 160 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 224 - 262 - 383 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 521 - 552 - 603 - 608 - 753.
  Entered Port:  U 521 - Lorient;  U 753 - La Pallice;  U 167 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 706 - La Pallice;  U 626 - Bergen.
       
- 178 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For report on convoy No. 68 see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 178 had a circle runner and a miss on a freighter of 5,000 GRT, course 600 in CQ 5129 on 4.12.
    3) U 224 sighted (prematurely) a silhouette in BF 6779 which did not reply to request for recognition signal.  U 224 presumed it to be a German low speed U-boat type.  According to wireless bearing an English unit - probably a U-boat was in BF 9440 at 1849.
  b)  None.
  c) Aircraft U-boat sightings:  In AK 01, AK 1869, AK 2728 and 2592 (attack with aircraft armament), AK 1735, AK 2685, AK 2667, AK 2598, AK 1890 (depth charge attack), AK 2547, AK 2729 (presumably 9 hits with cannon).
    U-boat attack in EO 52.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 68:
    The operation on this convoy continues in a north-easterly wind strength 5 to 6 freshening, and medium visibility.  The convoy steers a course of 500 and still proceeds with a speed of 9 knots.  Contact was lost in the course of the afternoon by all 5 boats and was not reestablished until 1500 by U 610 in AK 1696 and at 1800 by U 553.
    Both boats are from Group "Draufgänger", which is further to the E. and is also put onto this convoy.  The 9 boats are U 610, 609, 604, 600, 615, 569, 553, 221, 455.
     Contact was reported once by U 610 and U 553.
     Further reports have not been received.  The boats do not appear to have been in contact with the convoy throughout the night either.  The Command takes it that owing to bad wireless conditions the W/T of the boats near this convoy dips, and the Command does not receive a clear picture of operations.
     Several boats reported air activity on the convoy on the afternoon of the 8th.  Altogether 11 Radio Intelligence reports were received during the night from which it appears that the boats were sighted by aircraft and variously attacked with depth charges and aircraft armament.  In addition, 5 boats reported being beaten off by the convoy protection.  There were no reports of successes.  U 221 reported ramming U 254 at 2225 in AK 2551 and having taken survivors on board.  It continued the search and intended to begin the return voyage after daylight.  No more survivors were found.  U 221 began her homeward voyage after dawn.
       
- 179 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) 1) After refueling U 373, 445 and 663 steered a course for AJ 90 at economical cruising speed.  There, with other boats they plan a patrol to intercept an HX convoy expected on the 12th.
    2) According to a Radio Intelligence report (X), an English unit or convoy is proceeding with an advancing speed of 7.3 to 10 knots via ES 3690, ER 1510, EO 1320 to Trinidad and should arrive there in the afternoon of 19.12.  U 172 and U D 3 received orders to operate on the line of route.  U D 3 intends to await the reported unit in ER 16.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Boats will be notified of the putting out of the tanker "Antarktis".
    2) In connection with the hydrophone gear U 178 had the same experience as U 181.  (See K.T.B. of 4.12. paragraph IVd.)  The boat reports the following as the possible causes:
     
a) Greater length of boat - therefore less favorable reaction to length of seaway;
b) Very sensitive balance results in less transverse stability;
c) Difficulty, above all in banking with and against the sea.  An effective solution by an adjustment of the hydroplanes can only be expected, if there is a great enlargement and higher hydroplane speed.  Better conditions have been confirmed as a result of increasing attack depth to one meter.
    3) U 254 was rammed by U 221 and was sunk.  For further information see report on convoy No. 68.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
    For the first time during a convoy operation a ramming has taken place between two U-boats, and thereby caused the loss of one of them.  As far as can be seen here, this accident took place on a dark night and in a rough sea, so that the ramming boat cannot be blamed.  The presence of so many U-boats on convoy operations has for a long time made this kind of damage a possibility.  Reflection on this matter shows that generally speaking, it is not practicable to have more than 13 to 15 boats on to one convoy.  Any tactical limitations in connection with the number of attacking boats, the time of the attack, the disposition for attack, by which such collisions could be avoided will be refused, as it is wrong with the difficulties of convoy warfare to apply even the smallest conditions.  With the difficulties of convoy warfare every chance of attack must be exploited to the utmost and the maxim impressed again and again on the boats, "on to the target as quickly as possible, attack as often as possible, utilize every chance of attack at once", may not be repudiated on the grounds of security.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 180 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
9.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 43
-
BF 61
U 164
-
DG 94
U 409
-
BE 48
U 564
-
Op(CD 50)
 
67
-
BD 87
172
-
ER 55
410
-
BE 55
569
-
Op(AK 20)
 
86
-
Op(CD 50)
174
-
Op(ER 50)
432
-
Op(DJ 20)
591
-
Op(AK 17)
 
91
-
CE 12
175
-
DH 24
435
-
Op(AK 90)
600
-
Op(AK 20)
 
92
-
Op(CD 50)
176
-
Op(ER 50)
439
-
Op(AK 20)
602
-
CG 90
 
103
-
Op(CD 20)
177
-
Op(KP)
441
-
BF 45
603
-
BF 52
 
105
-
DR 49
178
-
FU 71
445
-
BC 63
604
-
Op(AK 20)
 
106
-
Op(CD 20)
181
-
KY 91
455
-
Op(AK 20)
608
-
BF 65
 
109
-
DF 63
183
-
BD 87
460
-
BD 87
609
-
Op(AK 20)
 
118
-
CF 38
185
-
Op(CD 20)
461
-
ER 55
610
-
Op(AK 20)
 
123
-
AN 28
203
-
BE 69
463
-
BE 93
611
-
Op(AK 20)
 
124
-
DF 97
211
-
Op(AK 20)
465
-
Op(AK 20)
615
-
Op(AK 20)
 
126
-
Op(ER 50)
214
-
DG 32
504
-
BF 74
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
128
-
Op(ER 50)
217
-
DE 58
505
-
BF 50
621
-
BE 64
 
129
-
EF 33 )
221
-
Op(AK 20)
507
-
DG 83
623
-
Op(AK 20)
 
130
-
Op(CD 20)
224
-
BF 64
508
-
Op(ED)
628
-
Op(AK 20)
 
134
-
Op(ER 50)
225
-
AN 28
510
-
BE 96
653
-
Op(CD 50)
 
135
-
Op(AK 20)
257
-
BF 85
513
-
BF 57
663
-
BC 63
 
154
-
DQ 84
262
-
BE 68
515
-
Op(CD 20)
664
-
BE 65
 
155
-
Op(CD 20)
301
-
CG 90
518
-
BE 64
706
-
BF 91
 
159
-
Op(ER 50)
336
-
Op(AL 17)
519
-
Op(CD 50)
758
-
Op(AK 20)
 
160
-
BF 61
356
-
BE 55
524
-
Op(AK 20)
D 3
-
Op(ER 50)
 
161
-
Op(ER 50)
373
-
BC 63
552
-
CF 85
626
-
AF 79
 
163
-
DQ 88
383
-
BF 52
553
-
Op(AK 20)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 43 - 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 160 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 224 - 262 - 383 - 504 - 505 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 603 - 608.
  Entered Port:  U 383 - 603 - Brest;  U 43 - 160 - Lorient;  U 608 - 224 - St. Nazaire;  U 262 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 563 - Brest;  U 514 - 125 - Lorient;  U 182 - Horten.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For report on convoy No. 68 see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 508 Position:  Heavy isolated cargo traffic to Trinidad passes EO 5220 on a general course of 3100 so that ED 9950 will be reached at about 1200.  No surface, medium aerial activity, small amount of radar.  Sighted:  Argentinean tanker on course of 2600 in 1694 on 2.12.  Ship "Cabo Huertas" on course of 2900 in EO 2888 on 3.12.  Sunk:  "Solon 2" of 4,561 GRT carrying ore from Turkey, course 3000 in EO 5225 on 3.12.  "Nigerian" of 5,423 GRT carrying palm oil and nuts from Lagos, course 3100 on 9.12.  4 English officers were taken prisoner.
    3) U 519 had a double miss on a fast isolated ship zig-zagging strongly with a general course of 2700 in CD 5557.  Contact was lost in rain gusts and strong sea.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BC 44, CG 9555, BF 8423.
  d)  None.
       
- 181 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 68:
     In a northwesterly wind strength 5 to 6.  Seaway 4 to 5 and medium visibility up to 6 sea miles, the operation continues on this convoy now in AK 3515 at 1042.  In addition, the following 4 boats from the E., U 435, 628, 591, 336 are in action against the convoy.  U 553 again reported the convoy at 0927, after the night of the 9th, during which the boats were unable to contact the Command, apparently owing to W/T difficulties.  Four more boats established contact with the convoy during the afternoon.  Either the reporting discipline of the 20 boat strong group is bad or the signals did not reach the Command.  A significant warning W/T message will be sent to the boats.  U 553 reported this morning re the convoy that it consists of 40 ships including many tankers sailing far apart from one another.  This report appears to apply to the actual SC convoy, previously there was contact with a faster convoy section.  The supposition is confirmed by a report from U 615, who reports having been passed over by 2 different groups within an interval of 2 hours between each.  It is not possible to obtain a perfect fix of both groups, as the boats have an especially great difference in position.  The convoy's defence appears proportionally strong but ineffectual.  A number of boats report being beaten off by destroyers but without effective following up with depth charges.  In contrast to the preceding day, on the 9th the convoy had no aerial protection.
    Success reported:
    1) On the 9th at 0927, U 553 sank tanker of 7,000 GRT
    2) On the 9th at 2001, U 758 sank a ship of 5,000 GRT (2 hits probably sank)
    3) On the 10th at 0747, U 758 4 hits on motor ship 8,600 GRT
     
    on hit
5,000 GRT
 
    on hit
7,000 GRT
  torpedoed
     
 
  Total: 4 ships of
25,600 GRT
 
    1 ship of
7,000 GRT
  torpedoed
     The convoy operation continues with 19 boats.
  b) 1) The previously received course directions for the Trinidad positions from Radio Intelligence Reports (X) result in the following disposition instructions:
      The boats U 105, 124 and U 109 proceeding from Western France are to operate during the full moon period in channels S. of the upper edge of EE 90 and EF 70 as far as the coast and are to approach Trinidad more closely with the waning moon.
      The traffic artery presumably runs via FB 50, EP 29 and 53 along the coast to ED 99.
 
 
 
- 182 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) As side protection for the German tanker "Germania" which is putting out on 11.12., the following waiting areas are ordered:
      U 563, in BE 6899 from dawn on 13.12.;  U 706 in BE 9596;  U 409 in BE 5766 and U 513 in BE 3574 from dawn on the 14th.  Depth 40 sea miles.
      U 125 and U 514 both of which put out today are to be in BE 9580 and BE 6880 on the morning of 13.12. and to remain there until it is dark.  U 460, 67, 183 and U 91 are returning to support the tanker on (pencil query) 440 30' N.
  c) The following have taken on supplies from U 461:  U 172 for return voyage, and U 161 and U 159 for continuation of operations.
  d) 1) Attacks on isolated traffic in the "Route Anton" area from the S. is forbidden as follows:
      S. of 00 from 12.12;  S. of 100 N. from 14.12;  S. of 200 N. from 16.12;  S. of 300 N. from 19.12, closed completely from 22.12.  In effect from 0000.
      Closing of the northerly section of "Route Anton" owing to the putting out of our own tankers is to be expected sooner.
    2) U-boats will again be advised on the procedure to be adopted in the patrol channels.
    3) U 602 has passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and therefore comes under F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 508 2 ships
9,984 BRT
 
U 553 1 ship
7,000 BRT
 
U 758 2 ships
13,600 BRT
 
  2 ships
torpedoed.
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
10.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BD 87
U 164
-
DT 14
U 410
-
BE 46
U 553
-
Op(AL)
 
86
-
Op(CD 20)
172
-
ER 24
432
-
Op(DJ 20)
563
-
BF 55
 
91
-
CE 22
174
-
Op(ER 50)
435
-
Op(AK 14)
564
-
Op(CD 20)
 
92
-
Op(CD 50)
175
-
DH 57
439
-
Op(AL 10)
569
-
Op(AL)
 
103
-
Op(CD 20)
176
-
Op(ER 50)
441
-
BE 69
591
-
Op(AL 14)
 
105
-
DR 74
177
-
Op(KP)
445
-
BC 35
600
-
Op(AL 10)
 
106
-
Op(CD 20)
178
-
FU 76
455
-
Op(AL)
604
-
Op(AL)
 
109
-
DF 67
181
-
JJ 13
460
-
BD 87
609
-
Op(AL 10)
 
118
-
CG 11
182
-
AN 31
461
-
ER 50
610
-
Op(AL)
 
123
-
AF 79
183
-
BD 87
463
-
BE 91
611
-
Op(AL 10)
 
124
-
DR 28
185
-
Op(CD 20)
465
-
Op(AL)
615
-
Op(AL)
 
125
-
BF 54
203
-
BE 64
504
-
BF 73
618
-
Op(DJ)
 
126
-
Op(ER 50)
211
-
Op(AL 10)
505
-
BF 61
621
-
BE 54
 
128
-
Op(ER 50)
214
-
DG 28
507
-
DS 33
623
-
Op(AL 10)
 
129
-
DR 71
217
-
DE 84
508
-
Op(EO)
626
-
AF 72
 
130
-
Op(CD)
221
-
AK 39
510
-
BF 72
628
-
Op(AL 10)
 
134
-
Op(ER 50)
225
-
AF 79
513
-
CF 28
653
-
Op(CD 50)
 
135
-
Op(AL 10)
257
-
BF 75
514
-
BF 54
663
-
BC 32
 
154
-
DQ 59
301
-
CG 90
515
-
Op(CD 20)
664
-
BE 16
 
155
-
Op(CD 20)
336
-
Op(AL 10)
518
-
BE 66
706
-
BF 82
 
159
-
Op(ER 50)
356
-
BE 19
519
-
Op(CD)
758
-
AL 15
 
161
-
Op(ER 50)
473
-
BC 35
524
-
Op(AL)
D 3
-
Op(ER 50)
 
163
-
DQ 67
409
-
BE 66
552
-
CF 62      
 
       
- 183 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 504 - 505 - 508 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 758.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For Convoy No. 68 see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 618 situation report:  Very heavy air activity in DH 30.  Auxiliary cruisers (Bewacher) and patrol groups off Casablanca - no traffic.  Mehdia Roads empty.  Continual air activity during the day by Catalina, ineffective vertical Radar at night.  In view of its presence being known and the defence situation operations did not promise much success.  U 432 was asked for report on situation. This boat has the same assignments as U 618.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sighting by aircraft:  AL 2578, CH 7391, AL 1823, CG 88, AL 2570.
    2) U-boat attack in DM 1931.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 68:
     The weather conditions remain proportionally favorable in the convoy area.  The boats report north westerly wind, strength 3 to 4, medium swell and clear visibility during the day.  Wind freshening at night to strength 5 to 6.  Visibility variable.  The general course of the convoy is 100 to 1100, speed 8 knots.  At 1000 in the morning the convoy was in AL 1671.  Contact was reestablished by U 628.  U 610, 615, 623 also came up during the day.
    Towards the afternoon all the boats again lost touch.  In the evening at 2348 U 628 resumed contact and maintained it until morning.  Another boat reported contact during the night.  It appears from the boats' reports that the convoy has strong aerial protection and the boats are continually forced to submerge.  Many boats were beaten off by the escort without sustaining serious damage from depth charges.  It also appears from the boats' reports that the convoy consists of 2 groups.  Apart from this, various boats report they have no W/T contact during the two preceding nights from 2300 to 0600, which makes it more difficult for the Command to obtain a survey of the convoy operation.  As a result of the strong aerial activity on the 10th and the anticipated aerial activity owing to the proximating of the coast, the boats received orders to break off at dawn on the 11th.
       
- 184 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    Final summing up:
    The operation on the convoy from 6.12. to 11.12., from Grid AJ 91 to Grid AL 37 did not lead to the desired successful conclusion.  In all 22 boats were operating against the convoy, and for the most part there were 5 to 6 boats in contact with it by night and day.  In spite of this in the entire time only 6 ships with a total tonnage of 36,600 GRT were sunk, and 3 ships and one destroyer torpedoed.  The reason for the proportionately small success was probably due to the numerically strong defence, which was however of little use to direct U-boat warfare.  Probably not one boat was lost through enemy action.  U 254 was rammed and sunk by U 221 on a dark night in the convoy area.  The convoy consisted of 2 different groups, a fact that was several times reported by the boats.  It was impossible to obtain a perfect navigational division between the two groups owing to the boats' unreliable fixes.
  b) 1) The operational area for boats approaching the Trinidad area (see K.T.B. of 9.12. paragraph IV b1) will be extended westward according to the situation report of U 508.  The boats U 214 and U 217 who are also outward bound are to be assigned the same action area.
    2) As a result of the probable change in the former traffic line (cancelled in decyphered course instructions for merchant ships) the following new attack areas are to be occupied at economical cruising speed:
      U 174 - 7971;  U 128 - 7923;  U 161 - 8442;  U 126 - 8152;  U 159 - 5872;  U 134 - 5599.  Depth 40 sea miles.  All grids in FC.
    3) As the Group "Draufgänger" did not intercept the convoy expected on 6.12., 3 boats that were to have been assigned to this group are alone in area AJ 90.  These boats are to be detailed for operations on a convoy given in a Radio Intelligence Report (X) and have received orders to take up position in the following order:  U 663, U 373, U 445 in patrol channel from AJ 9274 to AJ 9538 at 0800 on 13.12.  It is estimated that the convoy will pass through this area after midday on 13.12.
    4) New position for U 463 is CD 90.
  c)  None.
  d) U 301 had passed through the Straits of Gibraltar and is therefore under F.O. U-boats, Mediterranean.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  B.d.U. stated the following in his report at the Naval High Command on 8.12. in Berlin:
  From 1.1 to 30.11.1942 the boats in action in the North Sea have sunk altogether 262,614 GRT.  These boats could certainly have sunk about 910,000 GRT in the Atlantic in the same period.  The grounds for the assumption are:  the number of boats assigned to the North Sea the degree of effectiveness in the individual months for the boats in the Atlantic, a proportion of 50:50 time in port to time at sea which is in fact more favorable to time at sea.
 
 
 
- 185 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Use of the North Sea boats in the Atlantic then could have brought an increase in tonnage sunk to 650,000 GRT, an amount that would have weighed heavily against the enemy.
  B.d.U. again expressed the view that the tonnage war must be considered the main task of the U-boats, but that this tonnage war suffers heavy losses with the deployment of boats in the Mediterranean, the North Sea and attacks on the Gibraltar supply route (Group "Westwall") as the the North Sea example shows.
  The Naval High Command has already ordered the examination of the question of the North Sea boats and states that he will order a detachment of the North Sea boats for the prosecution of the war in the Atlantic.
    In an order issued by the Naval War Staff Iu 2636/42 of 9.12.:
  1)  Concerning:  U-boats for the North Sea.  As the time of year makes expectations of successes slight, further, ice conditions caused the increased narrowing of the navigatable area Spitzbergen - North Cape and reports indicate the possible curtailment of enemy supplies to Russia as a result of the Africa operations, easing up of the deployment of U-boats in the North Sea is permissible.  Conditions for convoy warfare in the North Atlantic are at the moment particularly favorable, as convoy protection is weaker following withdrawal of forces for the African undertaking.  There are not enough U-boats available, however, to exploit this position.  On the other hand, dislocation of enemy supplies to Russia can be achieved directly by attacking convoys in the North Atlantic.
  2)  The following orders are therefore given:
     As previously, Group "Nord" will be designated 23 boats.  Of these boats, until further notice, 11 will be released for use by B.d.U. in the North Atlantic with these measures, that A)  Of the remaining 12 boats, 6 are to be ready for action and available (in the operational area) at any given time for Group "Nord".  B)  That the control in the North Atlantic is carried out in such a way as to assure deployment in the Norway Area if necessary, as the task of U-boats in this area also consists of coastal protection against enemy operations.  Interchange of boats, in some cases substitution by boats from home is left to B.d.U.
  3) The Naval War Staff (message also to Group "Nord") are to be continually notified in detail according to 2.) b) of the permanent numbers and alterations of the 11 U-boats held in readiness.
      Naval War Staff Operations.  Iu 2636/42 Most Secret.  S.O. Only.
     Suggested by Group "Nord" for operations in the North Atlantic:
    U 209, 334, 355, 376, 377, 403, 405, 456, 586, 601 which will be ready for deployment on 25.12.  B.d.U. is in agreement but proposes 592 instead of 355, as this boat has been deployed in the North Sea considerably longer than U 355.
     Pencil note:  Naval War Staff Communications concurs.
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 186 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
11.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BD 87
U 163
-
DQ 38
U 409
-
BE 67
U 552
-
CG 14
 
86
-
Op(CD 20)
164
-
DS 66
410
-
BE 17
553
-
Op(AL)
 
91
-
BD 98
172
-
ER 10
432
-
Op(DJ 20)
563
-
BF 49
 
92
-
Op(CD 50)
174
-
Op(ER 50)
435
-
Op(AL)
564
-
Op(CD 20)
 
103
-
Op(CD 20)
175
-
DH 87
439
-
Op(AL)
569
-
Op(AL)
 
105
-
EF 32
176
-
Op(ER 50)
441
-
BF 52
591
-
Op(AL)
 
106
-
Op(CD 20)
177
-
Op(KP)
445
-
AJ 90
600
-
Op(AL)
 
109
-
DF 85
178
-
FU 44
455
-
Op(AL 20)
604
-
Op(AL)
 
118
-
BF 74
181
-
GR 85
460
-
BD 87
609
-
Op(AL 20)
 
123
-
AN 23
182
-
AF 87
461
-
ER 50
610
-
Op(AL)
 
124
-
DR 45
183
-
BD 87
463
-
BE 84
611
-
Op(AL 20)
 
125
-
BF 73
185
-
Op(CD 20)
465
-
Op(AL)
615
-
Op(AL)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
203
-
BE 52
504
-
BF 61
618
-
Op(DJ 12)
 
128
-
Op(ER 50)
211
-
Op(AL)
505
-
DS 63
621
-
BE 18
 
129
-
DR 42
221
-
AL 45
507
-
EE 94
623
-
Op(AL)
 
130
-
Op(CD 20)
214
-
DG 46
508
-
BF 55
626
-
AF 47
 
134
-
Op(ER 50)
217
-
DP 32
510
-
CF 25
628
-
Op(AL)
 
135
-
Op(AL)
225
-
AN 23
513
-
BF 48
653
-
Op(CD 50)
 
154
-
DQ 37
257
-
CG 12
514
-
Op(CD 20)
663
-
AJ 90
 
155
-
Op(CD 20)
336
-
Op(AL)
515
-
BF 45
664
-
AL 78
 
159
-
Op(FC)
356
-
BE 11
518
-
Op(CD 20)
706
-
BF 75
 
161
-
Op(FC)
373
-
AJ 99
519
-
Op(CD 20)
758
-
AL 41
             
524
-
Op(AL)
D 3
-
Op(ER)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 504 - 505 - 508 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 441 - Brest;  U 504 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Operation on Convoy No. 68 discontinued.
    2) U 172 reports enemy convoy in ER 2422 on westerly course, speed 10 knots.  The convoy is probably the unit reported in K.T.B. of 8.12. under paragraph IVb 2), which has followed exactly the route given there.  U 172 received instructions to exploit chances of attack until 13.12., and then to continue the return voyage.  The boat attacked during the dusk and hit steamers of 8,000 and 4,000 with her two last torpedoes.  From the noise is it probable that they were sunk.  Depth charges:  no damage.  Last position of convoy at 0020 in ER 2421, course 273, speed 10 knots.  The boats U 105 and U 124 bound for the Trinidad area, are informed of another point of passage, through EP 1329, which should be reached on the evening of the 15th.  If the position appears favorable she is to operate.
    3) U 177:  Nothing sighted off Lourenco for 4 days. Town lit up, light blacked out.  "Saronikos" of 3,548 sunk in KP 61.  Course W.  Delayed return voyage.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  FC 81, AL 0192, AL 0226, AL 1498.
  d)  None.
       
- 187 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) As, apart from the three ships previously sunk in the patrol channel of Group "Westwall", no further contact with enemy has taken place, and the boats are so low in fuel that they must begin the return voyage in the next few days, the Group has received orders to proceed in lines of reconnaissance on an easterly course, days reckoning 140 miles at 2400 from 11.12.  A later deployment of the boats still fit for action in the north half of CF and for operations on the England - Gibraltar traffic is intended.  Further refueling is not possible owing to the shortage of tankers.
    2) The following waiting positions are to be occupied with a depth of 4 sea miles for protection and area reconnaissance for the tanker "Germania" putting out on 12.12.:  U 514 - BE 9326;  U 125 - BE 9629;  U 563 - BF 7116;  U 706 - BF 7442.
    3) The following boats are attached to the Group "Ungestüm" and distributed over the patrol channel from AL 1543 to AL 4446 in order to intercept an "ONS" convoy which according to its own dead reckoning is expected on 14.12.;  U 336, 628, 591, 455, 435, 569, 615, 524, 610, 611, 604, 623.  Positions must be occupied until 2000, 13.12.
      Another Group will be detailed to intercept an "ON" convoy expected on 15.12., in patrol channels from AL 4482 to 8584.  In the following order:  U 135, 600, 211, 465, 439, 609, 664, 356, 410, 621, 203, 409.  The boats from Group "Raufbold" and are to be in the ordered position at 14.12. at 0800.
  c) 1) U 460 has delivered the last of her fuel to U 67 and U 183 and begins her return voyage.
    2) Supplied from U 461:  U 126 - 174 - 128 - 134 and U 176.  Tanker homeward bound.
  d) 1) U 553 reports strong spray formation and difficulty in depth maintenance as a result of the construction of the new 2 cm "trough".  (Translator's note:  word given was Wanne - does this mean breakwater for streamlining?)  The boat was seen continually during an attack on a convoy and thereby deprived of success.  U 553 has been ordered to return at maximum speed and the adaptation of further boats discontinued in all shipyards.
    2) On the return of U 160, information will be given to the boats by the Commander, on the available experiences in the Trinidad area.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 172 2 ships
12,000 BRT
U 177 1 ship
3,548 BRT.
       
VI. General:
    The deployment of the Group "Westwall" (see IVb, 1.) has not led to satisfactory results, as the sinking of 4 ships cannot be regarded as such.  As warfare directly west of Gibraltar was no longer promising, there were no possibilities of intercepting English -
 
 
 
- 188 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  American supplies to Gibraltar and morocco.
  a)  Deployment W. of Portugal:  Successful convoy warfare could not be expected here, as the entire area in question lies within range of enemy air activity.  Isolated successes remained possible but depend a great deal on luck and opportunity.
  b) Operations moved to area free of air activity against American supplies, which is presumed to be on the Great Circle America - Gibraltar.  B.d.U. is in favor of the second possibility.  This deployment could be quite successful even if only one convoy was intercepted.  That did not in fact happen.  Radio Intelligence reports show rather that the enemy has used a route far more to the S., whereby it is difficult to see whether he uses it principally or exploits it in order to spread out as much as possible.  The former is possible.  The available "Westwall" boats cannot, however be used anymore on the southerly route, owing to insufficient fuel supply, and they are numerically too weak to be used for a search in other areas.  It therefore only remains to test the possibilities given under a) and to use the "Westwall" boats for this.  They are unequipped for cold areas which cuts out the possibility of sending these boats to the Newfoundland area and putting boats from Western France in the area W. of Portugal.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
12.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BD 97
U 163
-
DF 87
U 409
-
BE 59
U 553
-
Op(AK)
 
86
-
Op(CD 50)
164
-
EH 39
410
-
AL 87
563
-
BF 71
 
91
-
CF 13
172
-
ER 13
432
-
Op(DJ 20)
574
-
Op(CD 50)
 
92
-
Op(CD 20)
174
-
Op(ER 80)
435
-
Op(AL)
569
-
Op(AL)
 
103
-
Op(CD 20)
175
-
DT 39
439
-
Op(AL)
591
-
Op(AL)
 
105
-
EF 25
176
-
Op(ER 80)
445
-
Op(AJ 90)
600
-
Op(AL)
 
106
-
Op(CD 20)
177
-
Op(KP)
455
-
Op(AL)
604
-
Op(AL)
 
109
-
DR 16
178
-
FT 37
460
-
BD 97
609
-
Op(AL)
 
118
-
BF 73
181
-
CF 84
461
-
ER 50
610
-
Op(AL)
 
123
-
AF 76
182
-
AN 23
463
-
CF 21
611
-
Op(AL)
 
124
-
DQ 92
183
-
BD 97
465
-
Op(AL)
615
-
Op(AL)
 
125
-
BE 96
185
-
Op(CD)
505
-
BF 61
618
-
OP(DJ 20)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
203
-
BF 24
507
-
DS 92
621
-
AL 87
 
128
-
Op(ER 80)
211
-
Op(AL)
508
-
EE 66
623
-
Op(AL)
 
129
-
DR 12
214
-
DG 71
510
-
BF 61
626
-
AE 68
 
130
-
Op(CD 20)
217
-
DP 61
513
-
BE 89
628
-
Op(AL)
 
134
-
Op(ER 80)
221
-
AL 77
514
-
BE 93
653
-
Op(CD 50)
 
135
-
Op(AL)
225
-
AF 76
515
-
Op(CD 20)
663
-
Op(AJ 90)
 
154
-
DF 74
257
-
CG 17
518
-
BF 46
664
-
Op(AL 80)
 
155
-
Op(CD 20)
336
-
Op(AL)
519
-
Op(CD 50)
706
-
BF 74
 
159
-
Op(FC)
356
-
Op(AL)
524
-
Op(AL)
758
-
AL 71
 
161
-
Op(FC)
373
-
Op(AJ 90)
552
-
BF 99
D 3
-
Op(ER)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 505 - 508 - 510 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 505 - 510 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 440 - 659 - Brest;  U 757 - St. Nazaire;  U 384 - Kiel.
       
- 189 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 465 was attacked with depth charges in AL 5185 and left the patrol channel of the "Raufbold" Group on the return voyage owing to damage.  The boats to the S. therefore move up one position to the N.
    2) U 432 like U 618 sighted nothing off Mehdia.  She has moved off and is exploring new fields for reconnaissance off Casablanca.
    3) U 161 sank a British ship "Ripley" of 4,997 GRT, course 2250, in FC 5247.  The steamer steered a southerly course from Takoradi, then along the equator to the coast of South America, and further at a distance of 200 sea miles from the coast, to Trinidad.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  AL 0251, AL 0261, CA 87, AL 0228, CA 34, FC 8193, CA 8479, DB 7814, AL 5142, ED 6972.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Group "Ungestüm" is to be distributed in the ordered patrol channels in former disposition without U 553.
    2) Owing to the imminent closing of "Route Anton" in order to pass the area as soon as possible, U 507 and U 164 are making for grid FC 70 via ES 50.  U 175 received further orders for operations in the waters off Dakar.  As until now, no U-boats have approached this area and the boat has permission to attack French merchant and warships, there is possibility of initial success.
      U 155 requests freedom of movement in DG owing to adequate fuel supply and the breakdown of the "Q" tank.  She has received orders to remain in the reconnaissance channels of Group "Westwall" as 1) As nothing has been experienced in this area and 2) The operations of an isolated boat does not promise success.
    3) The following protection is ordered for the outward bound tanker "Germania":  U 514 and U 125 are to take up a position at dawn on the 14th, 30 seamiles ahead to port and starboard of the position of the tanker by dead reckoning in DF 71.  U 563 and U 706 close up at dawn and proceed ahead during the day, at night astern at the limit of certain visual signaling contact.  Task for U-boats on passing 30 W. cancelled.  Finally, U 125 and U 514 are to proceed to DG 80, U 563 and U 706 to BD 20.
  c)  None.
       
- 190 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) U 257 has entered on the return voyage owing to the illness of the Engineer Officer and the leakage of the stuffing box.  The boat was destined for the Mediterranean area.  Deployment and breakthrough by a substitute boat is not possible until the next new moon period.
       
       
Remark on K.T.B. of B.d.U. of 12.12.42 paragraph VI "General" by Iu.
       
For the outward voyage of the "Germania" for long-range protection on the route Anton from about 100 W to 300 W, the Naval War Staff have ordered 2 U-boats on both the northern and southern limits and further units to join forces with Group West.  Group West has in this connection requested the following disposition:  "Please dispose the four escort U-boats so that they have carried out an adequate reconnaissance on both sides of the route in area a) (see chart - daily distance) 24 hours before the entrance of the blockade runner into this area, and on the entrance of this ship into the area , to allocate 2 boats to it which will accompany it within visual signaling distance, while the other two boats patrol in a partial screen about 30 sea miles ahead."
    
To this B.d.U. gives the opinion expressed in paragraph VI of his K.T.B.
 
The Naval War Staff have made their stand point on this matter known to Group West and B.d.U., that close-range U-boat protection of a blockade runner as requested by Group West does not insure success.  Even if contact is maintained with the ship, the only use it could be put to would be the possible rescue of the crew after an attack.  If a suitable course was followed by homeward and outward bound boats on both sides of the incoming route, the same result could be achieved with the advantage that a special disposition of U-boats can then be avoided.
 
Also it is unlikely that U-boat long range protection would be able to hinder an attack of enemy forces on the blockade runner.  The effectiveness of this long range protection lies in the fact that it would be possible to give timely warning of enemy forces - in other words, in reconnaissance.
 
The disposition of the boats must take account of this task, and they must be so far forward as to be able to give timely reconnaissance reports so that practical alternative movements can be carried out.
       
       
   Delays due to transmission are to be taken into account.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 161 1 ship 4,997 GRT.
       
VI. General:
    Re blockade breaker "Germania" (see IVb 3).  The ordered disposition was carried out at the request of Group West. This is in
 
 
 
- 191 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    addition to the protection measures ordered by the Naval War Staff.  The Naval War Staff had only covered the deployment of 2 boats N. of the ship's route between 1- and 300 W.  This demand could be carried out with changing boats without noticeable time and therefore sinking loss.  The requested close range escort, on the other hand, has already cost several days in loss of time.
  B.d.U. though, does not consider the requested close range protection practical, as:
  a) In bad visibility and the small differences in fixes, a meeting does not come into the question, especially as the speed of the ship can only be incorrectly estimated and position reports from our own aircraft have proved from experience to be unreliable.  D/F signals are out of the question in this area.  It is therefore uncertain as to whether the boats concerned will find the ship.
  b) The U-boats must submerge at the approach of the first enemy aircraft.  The ship cannot return to the submerge point as is intended in far away areas, but must continue or return.  The contact is therefore lost.  A re-establishing of contact can only depend on an accident, owing to the deflection of the ship's movement.
  c)  The distance of 30 sea miles is too small.  With a speed of 10 knots and only 10 knots enemy speed, at the most there are 1 1/2 hours in which the ship must carry out evasive action.  This timing is insufficient in which to establish W/T communication to code, send, intercept, decode and visual signaling from contacting U-boats to the ship.
  d) According to previous experience the enemy carries out attacks on such ships at long range, probably because he reckons on U-boat escort.  The chances of the U-boat being able to attack are therefore nil.
    There remains the possibility of rescue by the escorting U-boats of the crew after an attack.
    These views have been formed before from experience of similar operations.  They have been repeatedly confirmed and have resulted in the present loose protection ordered by the Naval War Staff.  In spite of this B.d.U. have again attempted close range protection at the request of the Group.
  It must again be stressed that all special duties for U-boats detracts from their main object, the war on tonnage, and are therefore, on the whole, prejudicial to the prosecution of the war.
      
    Pencil note:  The 8,000 tons of rubber or fodder delivered, means more to the prosecution of the war than the same amount of enemy tonnage sunk.     1/SKL        1 K.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
 
 
 
- 192 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
13.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BD 99
U 172
-
EH 57
U 435
-
Op(AL)
U 609
-
Op(AL)
 
86
-
Op(CD)
174
-
Op(FC)
439
-
Op(AL)
610
-
Op(AL)
 
91
-
CF 21
175
-
DT 69
440
-
BF 55
611
-
Op(AL)
 
92
-
Op(CD 60)
176
-
Op(FC)
445
-
Op(AJ 90)
615
-
Op(AL)
 
103
-
Op(CD 15)
177
-
KZ 23
455
-
Op(AL)
618
-
Op(DJ)
 
105
-
EF 57
178
-
FM 89
460
-
BD 99
621
-
Op(AL)
 
106
-
Op(CD 20)
181
-
GR 48
461
-
ER 22
623
-
Op(AL)
 
109
-
DR 41
182
-
AF 76
463
-
CE 21
626
-
AE 83
 
118
-
BF 61
183
-
CE 33
465
-
Op(AL)
628
-
Op(AL)
 
123
-
AF 47
185
-
Op(CD 60)
507
-
EH 38
653
-
Op(CD 60)
 
124
-
EF 31
203
-
BE 13
508
-
EF 14
659
-
BF 55
 
125
-
BE 96
211
-
Op(AL)
513
-
BE 95
663
-
Op(AJ 90)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
214
-
DF 98
514
-
BE 93
664
-
Op(AL)
 
128
-
Op(FC)
217
-
DP 85
515
-
Op(CD 30)
706
-
BF 74
 
129
-
DF 81
221
-
BD 33
518
-
Op(DJ)
757
-
BF 65
 
130
-
Op(CD 20)
225
-
AF 47
519
-
Op(CD 60)
758
-
AL 77
 
134
-
Op(FC)
257
-
BF 94
524
-
Op(AL)
D 3
-
Op(EH)
 
135
-
Op(AL)
336
-
Op(AL)
552
-
BF 72      
 
154
-
DF 48
356
-
Op(AL)
553
-
AL 45      
 
155
-
Op(CD)
373
-
Op(AJ 90)
563
-
BE 71      
 
159
-
Op(FC)
384
-
AO
564
-
Op(CD 60)      
 
161
-
Op(FC)
409
-
BE 24
569
-
Op(AL)      
 
163
-
DF 49
410
-
Op(AL)
591
-
Op(AL)      
 
164
-
EH 93
432
-
Op(CG 87)
600
-
Op(AL)      
             
604
-
Op(AL)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 118 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 508 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 118 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 441 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 69, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 432 requests permission to attack large tanker with navigation light but without neutral identification in CG 8871.  Course 750.  As according to report the Spanish tanker "Campoamor" is in this area, U 432 was forbidden to attack.   The Naval War Staff is requested to be circumspect owing to visible identity of Spanish ships.
    3) U 126 was attacked with depth charges in FC 5768 and confirmed radar at night.
    4) Sinkings:
      U 159 sank the tanker "City of Bombay" of 7,140 GRT after a hunt lasting 18 hours and an inexplicable triple spread.  Course 1200.  Carrying armament and aircraft from New York to Capetown.
      U 177 sank British ship "Empire Gull" of 6408 GRT in KP 61 with torpedo and gunfire.  The ship steered a course of 2000 to KP 6257, then westwards.
      U 176 sank Swedish vessel "Scania" of 1,980 GRT in 2515.  Carrying skins and hides from Montevideo to Philadelphia.
       
- 193 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      The sinking took place after the crew had left it.
      U 103 achieved a hit on a large isolated unit in CE 1521.  Starting course 150, speed 16 knots.  After hit, course to Horta presumed contact lost.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  EH 5983, DC 3760, FP 4513, EB 36, FC 5799.
     Report of torpedoing:  from CE 1180 (U 103).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 69:
     The "HX" convoy was expected in Group "Büffet" consisting of the 3 boats U 373, 663 and U 445 at midday on the 13th.  Punctually at 1106 it was reported in AJ 9278 from U 373 stationed in the center.  U 373 maintained contact with the convoy until 1500 in a north-westerly wind, strength 6 and good visibility, but was then beaten off by 2 destroyers.  U 663 established contact at 1832 and maintained it until 0300.  She was beaten off by a destroyer, attacked with depth charges and was forced to return owing to considerable damage.  Contact with the convoy was lost.  According to dead reckoning the convoy proceeded at 7 knots and appeared to sail exactly over the assembly points deduced by the (X) Radio Intelligence Service.  These were known to the boats.  As the convoy route is most likely known, in spite of the slight chance of the 3 boats maintaining contact with the convoy, the Group "Ungestüm" which is stationed on the west edge of AL, was sent to intercept the convoy.  That means the 9 boats U 336 - 628 - 591 - 455 - 435 - 569 - 615 - 524 - 604.  They should intercept in a restricted reconnaissance channel - distance between boats 10 sea miles - on their daily patrol on the 15th in AK 01.
  b) After deployment of Group "Ungestüm" on Convoy No. 69, the boats low in fuel, U 611, 623, 610 join Group "Raufbold".  This group is now stationed in patrol channels from AL 4454 to AL 8831, in the following order:  U 611 - 623 - 610 - 135 - 600 - 211 - 439 - 609 - 664 - 356 - 410 - 621 - 203 and U 409.
  c)  Owing to the continually bad weather conditions (wind strength 9 to 10) the ordered supplying of U 91, 183 and U 758 is momentarily impracticable.  The boat has received instructions to remain stationary using the smallest possible amount of fuel in its present position.  The supplying of several boats in the Trinidad area and on the return voyage in ED 90 is therefore delayed for several days.  
  d)  Attacks on isolated vessels in the northern section of "Route Anton" will not be permitted in the following sections at 0000:  from 14.12. E of 300 W.; from 17.12. N. of 350 N.; from 19.12. complete closing of "Route Anton".
       
V. Reports of Success:
 
U 177 1 ship
6,408 BRT
U 159 1 ship
7,140 BRT
U 176 1 ship
1,980 BRT.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 194 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
14.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BE 75
U 172
-
EH 25
U 432
-
CG 88
U 569
-
Op(AL)
 
86
-
Op(CD 40)
174
-
Op(FC)
435
-
Op(AL)
591
-
Op(AL)
 
91
-
CF 21
175
-
EK 11
439
-
Op(AL)
600
-
Op(AL)
 
92
-
Op(CD 40)
176
-
Op(FC)
440
-
BF 45
604
-
Op(AL)
 
103
-
Op(CE)
177
-
KP 86
441
-
BF 55
609
-
Op(AL)
 
105
-
EF 19
178
-
FM 57
445
-
Op(AJ)
610
-
Op(AL)
 
106
-
Op(CD 10)
181
-
GQ 62
455
-
Op(AL)
611
-
Op(AL)
 
109
-
DQ 92
182
-
AF 48
460
-
BE 78
615
-
Op(AL)
 
123
-
AE 68
183
-
CE 12
461
-
EH 58
618
-
Op(DJ)
 
124
-
EF 52
185
-
Op(CD 40)
463
-
CF 21
621
-
Op(AL)
 
125
-
BE 74
203
-
Op(AL)
465
-
Op(AL)
623
-
Op(AL)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
211
-
Op(AL)
507
-
EH 93
626
-
AL 24
 
128
-
Op(FC)
214
-
DR 26
508
-
DQ 84
628
-
Op(AL)
 
129
-
DQ 28
217
-
EE 24
513
-
BE 94
653
-
Op(CD 60)
 
130
-
Op(CD 10)
221
-
BD 36
514
-
BE 93
659
-
BF 46
 
134
-
Op(FC)
225
-
AE 68
515
-
Op(CD 40)
663
-
Op(AJ)
 
135
-
Op(AL)
257
-
BF 90
518
-
Op(DJ)
664
-
Op(AL)
 
154
-
DF 49
336
-
Op(AL)
519
-
Op(CD 40)
706
-
BF 79
 
155
-
Op(CD 10)
356
-
Op(AL)
524
-
Op(AL)
757
-
BF 57
 
159
-
Op(EC 61)
373
-
Op(AJ)
552
-
BF 91
758
-
BD 36
 
161
-
Op(FC)
384
-
AN 30
553
-
AL 84
D 3
-
Op(EJ)
 
163
-
DF 27
409
-
BE 51
563
-
BF 71      
 
164
-
ES 12
410
-
Op(AL)
564
-
Op(CD 40)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 553 - 663 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 257 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 506 - 260 - Lorient;  U 406 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 69 see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 161 hunted freighter from FC 8715 to 7648.  Beginning course 3000, later change to 1700.  Well placed depth charges in FC 7675.  No contact.
    3) Sinkings:
      British ship "Orfor" of 6,578 GRT by U 105 after two misses in EF 6824, in EF 1952.  Course 3100.
      U 174 ship of type "Baron Belhaven" of 6,500 GRT course 1200 in FC 8185.  Presumably carrying munitions.  A number of depth charges were dropped after the torpedoing.
      U 177 British ship "Sawahloento: of 3,085 GRT, course 3100 proceeding from Beira to Durban, in KP 8990.  Shot up, homeward bound.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  FC 7356, FC 7732, AK 4512, AK 4519, CG 7941, AK 4424.
    U-boat attack:  FC 7350 - FC 7730.
- 195 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 69:
    Contact with the convoy was not reestablished.  Orders were received by U 445 and U 373 to continue the search as it is planned to deploy Group "Ungestüm".  Both boats report depth charge attacks, and U 445 was forced by destroyers to submerge, which proves that the boats are in the vicinity of the convoy.  The operation against the convoy continues.
  b) 1) New position for U 626 is AK 28.  Operation on Convoy No. 69 is intended.
    2) The boats off the Brazilian coast are to be redistributed owing to the probable direction of traffic to the S.W.  They are at present disposed in the following order:  U 135, 159, 126, 161, 128, 174 in patrol channels from FC 3471 to 7336.  Depth 60 sea miles.
  c) U 91 is stationed in CF 2167 and owing to damage incurred earlier and the momentary bad weather conditions and is greatly endangered when submerging.  She is making for CE 63 for repairs and refueling from U 155.
  d) The first of 4 U-boats of type IXc intended for renewed activity in the Cape Town area, U 506 has put out.  For further information see Operational Order "Seehund" (Appendix).
       
V. Reports of Success:
 
U 105 1 ship
6,578 BRT
  sunk
U 177 1 ship
3,085 BRT
  sunk
U 174 1 ship
6,500 BRT
  sunk.
       
VI. General:
    The adaptation of the first 10 boats for the use of the "F.A.T." torpedo also equipped with combined Radar/Radar detector has been proceeding since the middle of November.  For the most part there have been numerous unsupportable postponements in fitting the boats for action resulting from inadequate supply of constructional parts, so that the final completion of all 10 boats is not yet in sight.
    With reference to this question B.d.U. Most Secret 5552 to OKM Head of K and OKM.  Head of MND reports:
  1) The fitting out of 10 U-boats with Radar/Radar detector was requested in writing after a previous discussion with the Head of MND on 19.10.
  2) Although the time limit for construction was fixed for 14 days during the verbal discussion and the shipyard limit at the time of the constructional agreement lay between the 11th and 20th of November, the shipyard limit was fixed for up to 14 days later owing to the installation of the Radar/Radar detector apparatus.  At the time B.d.U. concurred with this delay.
 
 
 
- 196 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  3) Owing to the delay in the supply of structural parts, above all and the knock out blow, the electrical parts, the completion of the boats was delayed for a further 10 - 20 days.  The delay lasted then for only a few days and B.d.U. was only informed at short notice through the shipyard and flotilla reports.  These postponements are operationally insupportable and the disposition of the command impossible.  Difficulties in the disposal of the crew and completion of other boats are other accompanying results.
  4) Enquiries into this matter can only lead to partial and unsatisfactory revelations, as there is no actual department absolutely responsible for the execution of these measures.  The results of the telephone and written enquires were for this reason worthless to the practical administration.
  5)  B.d.U.  requests a single department and a single person to be responsible for the execution of this fitting out, concerned with all isolated details including ship construction, Radar and the supplying of individual ports and the name of the person concerned is to be made known to them.
  6)  As a result of these arrangements not being kept, U-boats ready for action have been frozen and our Naval Command thereby caused painful losses in the sinking of enemy tonnage.  This is, from this stand point, irresponsible and insufferable.  C-in-C U-boats Most Secret 5552.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
15.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BE 85
U 172
-
DS 86
U 410
-
Op(AL)
U 563
-
BE 83
 
86
-
Op(CE 50)
174
-
Op(FC)
432
-
Op(DJ 20)
564
-
Op(CE 50)
 
91
-
CE 19
175
-
Op(EK)
435
-
Op(AK 10)
569
-
Op(AK 10)
 
92
-
Op(CE 50)
176
-
Op(FJ)
439
-
Op(AL)
591
-
Op(AK 10)
 
103
-
Op(CE)
177
-
KP 25
440
-
BE 69
600
-
Op(AL)
 
105
-
Op(EF 43)
178
-
FM 19
441
-
BF 49
604
-
Op(AK 10)
 
106
-
Op(CE 20)
181
-
GQ 29
445
-
Op(AK 40)
609
-
Op(AL)
 
109
-
DR 16
182
-
AE 68
455
-
Op(AK 10)
610
-
Op(AL)
 
123
-
AE 83
183
-
CF 21
460
-
BE 88
611
-
Op(AL)
 
124
-
Op(EF)
185
-
Op(CE 50)
461
-
EH 53
615
-
Op(AK 10)
 
125
-
BE 83
203
-
Op(AL)
463
-
CF 21
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
211
-
Op(AL)
465
-
BE 21
621
-
Op(AL)
 
128
-
Op(FC)
214
-
DR 54
506
-
BF 54
623
-
Op(AL)
 
129
-
DE 99
217
-
EE 57
507
-
ES 12
626
-
AL 18
 
130
-
Op(CE 20)
221
-
BD 66
508
-
DQ 56
628
-
Op(AK 10)
 
134
-
Op(FC)
225
-
AE 83
513
-
BF 72
653
-
Op(CE 50)
 
135
-
Op(AL)
260
-
BF 54
514
-
BE 83
659
-
BF 47
 
154
-
DF 27
336
-
Op(AK 10)
515
-
Op(CE 20)
663
-
AJ 75
 
155
-
Op(CE 20)
356
-
Op(AL)
518
-
BF 61
664
-
Op(AL)
 
159
-
(FC)-Op
373
-
Op(AK 40)
519
-
Op(CE 50)
706
-
BE 83
 
161
-
Op(FC)
384
-
AN 31
524
-
Op(AK 10)
757
-
BF 72
 
163
-
DF 25
406
-
BF 67
552
-
BF 65
758
-
BD 68
 
164
-
ES 51
409
-
BE 16
553
-
BE 29
D 3
-
Op(EJ)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 518 - 552 - 553 - 663 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 518 - Lorient;  U 552 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 525 - 357 - Kiel.
       
- 197 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 69 and 70 see paragraph IVa.
    2) U D 3 hunted strongly zig-zagging tanker on a general course of 1400 speed 12 knots, from EH 9984 to EH 3681.  Contact lost after triple miss.
    3) U 124 sighted the convoy intercepted by U 172 on 12.12. in EP 2163.  Beginning course W., later a S.W. convoy turned on a course of 2500.  
      Boats according to dead reckoning in the vicinity, U 105 and U 217 had already received orders to operate if possible.  At 0500 the convoy was in EP 2187.
    4) U 159 sank "Star of Suez" of 4,999 GRT course 1200 in FC 3725.  Carrying motorcars and aircraft parts from New York to Alexandria.  This confirms the supposition that the traffic at the moment runs, greatly spread out over the area between St. Paul's Rocks and the Brazilian coast.   
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  AK 2959, AK 5190, FC 71, ER 7162, CB 8954, ED 6295, KZ 2250.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
      The Group "Ungestüm" ran into the convoy with a speed of 9 knots, course 2380 during the day on the 15th.  Distance between the boats is 10 sea miles as it is presumed that the route of the convoy is known (Radio Intelligence Service (X)) from the assembly points.  All the boats stationed in the southern half report heavy air activity in the afternoon.  Also, U 604 reported being forced to submerge at 1930.  It is obvious from this that the expected convoy passed by the boats to the S.  For this reason the Group received orders to proceeds eastwards at high speed at nightfall and to take up a position at dawn the new patrol channels from AK 2842 - AK 6434 on the 16th.  The Group were to try to intercept the convoy in the new patrol channels at dawn on the 16th.  U 373 and U 445 joined Group Ungestüm".  The entire Group now consists of 11 boats, of which 10 should be in the patrol channels on the 16th.  Only U 604, continued the search in the area from which she reported destroyers and screw noises, probably originating from the convoy.
    2) Convoy No. 70:
      The awaited "ON" convoy was intercepted by U 609 which was in a position in the center of the Group "Raufbold" at 1353 at midday on the 15th.  The Group consisted of the 13 boats U 609, 621, 439, 611, 600, 623, 135, 610, 410, 211, 356, 203, 664.  It received orders to operate on the convoy at high speed.  Contact was maintained until the following morning in a
       
- 198 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      southeasterly wind strength 9, rain and mist.  The convoy's general course was 1900, speed 7 knots.  U 621, U 356 and U 664 also came up to the convoy.  U 609 reports that the convoy consists of 16 - 20 steamers.  Operations on the convoy, which was in AL 7837 on the morning of the 16th, continue.
  b)  None.
  c) The supply situation is at the moment very tense, owing to the scarcity of tankers and the bad weather conditions.  Boats are warned that supplies can only be expected on the express orders of the Command.
  d) 1) The outward bound steamer "Germania" escorted by 4 U-boats ran into a northward bound convoy towards 1400 in about BE 9166.  As escape was not possible, the ship was scuttled by the crew of the escorting boats.  U 706 was in contact last.  Measures for the rescue of the crew are ordered.  Success, however, is questionable, owing to the weather predominating at the moment.  5 boats are searching the place of sinking for survivors.
    2) As there is no possibility of our own traffic being encountered in the northern section of "Route Anton" permission for attacks on isolated vessels N. of 300 N. is given, until 0000 on 19.12.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 159 1 ship
4,999 BRT
  sunk.
       
VI. General:
  With reference to the escort of "Germania"  (see IVd) 1)):
    Of the boats detailed for the protection of the "Germania" one was near the ship.  The sinking though, as anticipated, could not be prevented.  How the other 3 ships were placed in relation to the ship is not known.  In any case they were useless.  A real support for a blockade runner could only be formed by an all round screen at a distance of 50 - 60 sea miles from the ship.  With a range of visibility of 10 sea miles - a favorable supposition - 15 boats would be needed during the day, a number by no means available.  But even this protection is theoretical, as, owing to the necessity of submerging in the event of aircraft, differences in fixes, deterioration of visibility, the possibility of not being able to report the sighted enemy before submerging, and other incidents, the position could be changed entirely.
       
       
                                                                    (Signed):  DÖNITZ.
 
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
- 199 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   
Appendix to K.T.B.  B.d.U.
Most Secret
from 1-15.12.1942  
       
Operational orders for
U 443, U 621, U 602, U 301, U 258
Group "Taucher"
       
I. Assignment:
    Penetration to the Mediterranean through the Straits of Gibraltar in the new moon period in the first half of December.  Finally further deployment in the Mediterranean.  This task is only to be abandoned:
  1) In the event of engine trouble necessitating a return voyage.
  2)  Breakdown of Radar equipment.
  3)  If penetration is not achieved.
    U 258 is the reserve boat and received definite orders on putting out to break through.
       
II. General:
    Greatest secrecy is to be observed before officers and ratings especially in Flotilla circles until after the message containing the report of the breakthrough has been sent.  Chart equipment B 3 U from the Flotilla.
       
III. Execution:
  1)  Put out according to K.B. by the shortest route to Gibraltar regardless of fuel consumption.  The time of the breakthrough is left to the boat.
  2)  Breakthrough signal to be sent on 420 N.  No wireless restrictions, as the presence of our own boats W. and E. of the Straits is known.  After the breakthrough switch over to Mediterranean system on reaching 50 W., the report of the breakthrough is to be sent from 10 W. by sending the short signal "Yes".
  3) Permission to attack everywhere, also in the Straits of Gibraltar.
       
IV. Information for the breakthrough of the Straits:
    According to experience the route between the center of the Straits of Gibraltar and the 200 meter line are the quietest.  From time to time there a searchlight passes over the Straits from Gibraltar.  Medium amount of air activity, mostly with lights.  Pass through the Straits submerged in continual aircraft and land radar.  Current is noticeable to a depth of A plus 20 meters with a speed of 3 - 4 knots into the Mediterranean.  Look out for U-boats in the Straits.
       
V.   After changing over to the Mediterranean system the boats are under C.O. U-boats, Italy.  The receive W/T instructions for the first operational area on the Irish and Mediterranean system.
 
 
 
- 200 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  a)  Neutral traffic in the Mediterranean will be previously informed if possible.  Spanish and Red Cross vessels must be reckoned with.
  b) Heavy enemy traffic on the routes from Gibraltar to the E., as there is continuous traffic between Gibraltar and Malta, also the enemy's North African coast.
  c) The boats will be notified of the entrance points by W/T by the C.O. U-boats, Italy, before putting into Spezia and Messina.
  d)  Particulars of recognition signals of the Italian Navy for three months and W/T instructions for the Mediterranean are attached as an appendix.
       
VI.   All details according to verbal discussion with B.d.U.
       
       
                                                                    (Signed):  DÖNITZ.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 201 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Additional instructions to Operational Order No. 53
       
"S  E  E  H  U  N  D"
for U 509, U 516, U 506, U 511, comprising the Group "Seehund".  U 459 attached to the Group.
       
Assignment
  The dislocation of important supply traffic to Egypt, the Near East and India.  The interception of supply traffic in South Atlantic, and in the area round Cape Town outward and homeward bound.  Main operational area against this traffic on the eastern side of South Africa to the latitude of Madagascar.
       
Execution
  1.  The boats are to put out according to K.B. in the 2nd half of December.  To proceed at economical cruising speed via DT 10 to GG 50, where supplies are to be taken on from U 459.  After supplying the Group U 459 is to proceed northwards.  Group "Seehund" to area Cape Town.
     U 506 is to remain in the area ER ES, owing to earlier sailing and to operate there according to the traffic situation.  (See paragraph 3, c)
     U 511 is to proceed as the last boat, by the shortest route to the South Atlantic and will be the last boat to be supplied by the northward bound U 459.
    After operating in the appointed operational area in the Cape Town area the entire group is to return, according to the fuel situation, as no supplying is anticipated on the homeward voyage.  Supplying in Grid EH at the earliest, if necessary.
  2. Permission for attack in all areas except on isolated vessels in "Route Anton".  Permission to attack only given here if no sailing orders or by W/T, freedom to attack is given for a section of the route.
     In the Cape Town area attacks may be made inside the following boundaries:
     From 50 E. and 400 S. via 400 E. and 400 S. as far as the southern tip of Madagascar.  In the Mozambique Channel as far as 200 S.
  3. Traffic situation for the Southern Atlantic and the Cape Town area:
    a) Since about the 20th October to the end of November 1942 from Cape Town to about 200 S. in approximately 75 sea miles wide coastal channels to the N., then in a wide spread over the Atlantic S. and W. of the line from FN 30 to ES 20.
    b) Since the middle of October to the beginning of November 1942 also evasive movements from Cape Town to the S. (in one case as far as about 440 S.).
    c) Since the beginning of November, Freetown traffic in area EG 20 to EJ 20 as far as ER 20 to ES 20.
 
 
 
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    d) In the second half of November heavy traffic on the south coast of South Africa in Grid KP 50, 60, 80, 90 and KZ 20 and 30.  The traffic sails from Cape Town to Suez, to the Near East and to India.
      Coastal traffic between Cape Town, East London and Durban is presumably along the coast on the 200 meter line.
  4. Defence situation
    Slight surface patrol will be encountered in the whole of the South Atlantic, especially in the area round Freetown and Cape Town.  Aerial patrol in the vicinity of Freetown, near Ascension and Cape Town.  There is a well manned airfield.  As a result of the sinkings in the waters of KP 50, 60, 80, 90 and KZ 20 and 30 strong air activity may be anticipated.  In general, up to now, the air and surface patrol in the entire South Area is unpractical and ineffective.
       
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Appendix to Extra-Operational Order No. 53.
       
      Most Secret
       
A. Intelligence of the Enemy:
  1) There are warships in the West African area between Cape Town and Freetown. 
    In the Freetown area:  4 cruisers, 3 auxiliary cruisers, 4 destroyers.
     In the Cape Town area:  2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, several gun boats and U-boat chasers.
     The presence of Battleships, Aircraft Carriers and other escort craft must be expected.  This depends on important transport convoys which pass through this area.
    Only patrol boats may be expected to be stationed off the remaining harbors.
    The presence of American units has been confirmed in the whole area.  These also are connected with important convoys.
     Only 2 auxiliary cruisers have been lately confirmed as surface patrol.
  2)  Enemy merchant shipping in the Cape Town - Freetown area.
     Enemy tonnage in this area:
     Cape Town - Freetown direct:  143 ships with a total of 935,000 GRT.
    Through the Gulf of Guinea:  54 ships with a total of 239,000 GRT.
     Density of Freetown traffic:  Monthly passage in each of both directions approximately 106 ships.
    Density of Cape Town traffic:  About 201 ships in each of both directions.
     Apart from the valuable transport convoys, the traffic between Cape Town and Freetown consists of isolated vessels.
    Ships bound for England are formed into convoys in Freetown, those coming from England are mostly dispersed there.
 
 
 
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    The courses of isolated vessels proceeding from South Africa to America and back, lie to a small extent also inside the line of communication Cape Town - Freetown.  In this area, apart from Cape Town and Freetown, the following may be considered important ports:  Lagos, Tacordi, Lobito, Matadi, Point Noire, Duala, Whale Bay, there is no information regarding the density of traffic in these ports.
     Point Noire is said to be the port for American convoys.
  3) It appears from captured material, that when putting in to Cape Town, enemy merchant ships steer a course to a point on 340 14' 12" S., 170 38' E., from there on, with a course of 600 via a looked for route to 330 53' 00" S., 180 22' 00" E., further on a course of 900 to 330 53' 00" S., 180 25' 40" E., from there on a course of 1400 to 330 54' 00" S., 180 26' 40" E.
    This direction shows that enemy mines are present on both sides of this looked for route, apart from which enemy mines are known to exist in the area 20 sea miles in circumference from Island Lighthouse.
     All lights, light buoys and D/F'ing is discontinued without warning in an emergency.  According to an Italian report, the Route "R6" which has been in operation since the end of May 1942 has been ordered for the convoys and isolated traffic proceeding from Cape Town to the South Seas, and this runs through the following points:  340 10' S., 180 00' E., 370 35' 40" S., 190 45' E., 370 35' 40" S., 210 50' E., 340 00' S., 280 50' E., 310 50' S., 310 35' E., 300 50' S., 310 45' E.  The reverse convoys are to proceed in the Durban - Cape Town sector on the unknown "Route R5".
    Defence:
    According to an agent's report, patrol duties are carried out by 6 destroyers and several patrol boats in the Cape Town area.  This information is unconfirmed.
    Aerial and surface patrol must be expected along the entire west African coast.
    Enemy U-boats:
     The U-boat bases in this area are unknown and most probably unavailable.
    The passing of enemy U-boats in this area is likely.
       
B. 1) Our own mines off Cape Town within points:
     
a)
330 48' S
170 33.8' E.
b)
330 40' S
170 49.5' E.
c)
330 40' S
180 01.6' E.
d)
330 57' S
180 04.5' E.
e)
340 15' S
180 00' E.
f)
340 20.2' S
170 47.7' E.
  2)  According to a report of June 1940 enemy mines off Cape Town lie:
    Eastwards Longitude 180 10' E.
     North of Latitude 330 49.3' N. so that Robben Island lies in this minefield.
  3)  Before the laying mines in the area according to paragraph 7 a route led from point 330 54' S., 180 26.7' E. in the direction of 3200 1.3 sea miles.  From here in the direction 2700 22.5 sea miles to point 330 53' S., 170 59' E.  Latitude of the route 2 sea miles.
 
 
 
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  4)  Our own mines lie near Cape Agulhas with the points:
     
a)
350 47' S
190 14' E.
b)
360 58' S
200 18' E.
c)
360 21' S
220 23' E.
d)
350 10' S
210 20' E.
     and northwards to the coast between the longitudes 190 49' E and 200 30' E.
       
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