F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 31 December 1942

PG30314b

     
     
 
16.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BE 94
U 172
-
DS 65
U 410
-
Op(AL 70)
U 563
-
BE 91
 
86
-
Op(CE 60)
174
-
Op(FC)
432
-
Op(DJ)
564
-
Op(CE 60)
 
91
-
CF 19
175
-
Op(EK)
435
-
Op(AK)
569
-
Op(AK)
 
92
-
Op(CE 60)
176
-
Op(FC)
439
-
Op(AL 87)
591
-
Op(AK 10)
 
103
-
Op(CE 60)
177
-
KZ 43
440
-
BE 67
600
-
Op(AL 70)
 
105
-
Op(EE)
178
-
FE 59
441
-
BF 47
604
-
Op(AK)
 
106
-
CE 30
181
-
GJ 79
445
-
Op(AK)
609
-
Op(AL)
 
109
-
DR 44
182
-
AE 83
455
-
Op(AK 10)
610
-
Op(AL 70)
 
123
-
AL 32
183
-
CF 21
460
-
BE 95
611
-
Op(AL 70)
 
124
-
Op(EP 22)
185
-
Op(CE 60)
461
-
EH 31
615
-
Op(AK)
 
125
-
BE 94
203
-
Op(AL)
463
-
CF 21
618
-
Op(DJ)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
211
-
Op(AL)
465
-
BE 37
621
-
Op(AL)
 
128
-
Op(FC)
214
-
DR 72
506
-
BF 48
623
-
Op(AL 70)
 
129
-
DF 71
217
-
Op(EE)
507
-
ES 51
626
-
AK 37
 
130
-
Op(CE 34)
221
-
BE 44
508
-
DQ 37
628
-
Op(AK 10)
 
134
-
Op(FC)
225
-
AE 84
513
-
BF 49
653
-
Op(CE 60)
 
154
-
Op(AL 70)
260
-
BF 45
514
-
BE 97
659
-
BE 68
 
135
-
CD 23
336
-
Op(AK 10)
515
-
Op(CE 30)
663
-
Op(AK 87)
 
155
-
Op(CE 61)
356
-
Op(AL)
519
-
Op(CE 60)
664
-
Op(AL)
 
159
-
Op(FC 35)
357
-
AD
524
-
Op(AK)
706
-
BE 91
 
161
-
Op(FC)
373
-
Op(AK)
525
-
AO
757
-
BE 69
 
163
-
CD 90
384
-
AF 87
553
-
BE 65
758
-
BE 44
 
164
-
ES 49
406
-
BF 57      
D 3
-
Op(EH 77)
       
409
-
BE 15            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 129 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 552 - 553 - 663 - 758.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69 - 70, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 178 sighted 2 steamers on course 0f 2400 and 220 in FL 53.  Boat was on return journey and had no torpedoes left.
    3) U 217 contacted at 0930 in EP 1359 the convoy reported on the previous day by U 124, but was soon forced off again.  U 124 made an attack in EP 2177 and sank 2 tankers in ballast and 5 destroyers.  Contact lost.  Last course 2900, speed 11 knots.
    4) Further sinkings:  
      U 176 sank English ship "Observer" (5,881 GRT) in FC 8474, carrying iron from Capetown to Trinidad, course 3000.
      U 159 sank the English ship "East Wales" (4,358 GRT) in FC 2911, carrying war material from Trinidad to Alexandria.  Submarine sank a total of 7,372 GRT on this trip.
    5) Air escorted convoy - see paragraph IVa.
  b) None.
       
- 206 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) Two reports of torpedoing from unidentified position.  Probably Convoy No. 70.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) The G.A.F. sighted a convoy with aircraft carrier at 1415 in BE 8368, course 2100, high speed, while searching for survivors of the tanker "Germania".  Search for "Germania" was immediately broken off, as there was no prospect of success.  The boats that had been told off for this task - U 514 - 125 - 563 - 706 were instructed to attack the convoy.  U 563 reported that weather prevented his carrying out the order.  No further message was received by the morning.  Operation was continued.
    2) Convoy No. 69:
      The weather situation in the area where the convoy was, made the operation very difficult.  During the morning visibility was still good, but by the afternoon it worsened and the boats reported some fog visibility varying up to 2 miles, wind N.W. 8 - 9, freshening.
      At 1047 on 16.12. U 373 sighted a convoy on S.W. course.  It was not an HX convoy, but an ONS convoy running S.W.  Chances of attacking it seemed better than the HX.  Boats were ordered to stalk it at highest speed.  During the day and night another 3 boats contacted the convoy.  From reports from the submarines it appeared that there were 2 different convoy groups:  The second group, which U 524 and U 615 had contacted, was sailing 45 miles behind the first, which U 373 and U 445 had contacted.  U 524 reported that he thought his group was a dummy convoy, consisting of a steamer and several patrol vessels.  During the day he had seen 5 patches of smoke and some mast heads.  No remote escort.  Worsening visibility on the evening of 16.12. caused all boats to lose the convoy and they did not pick her up again by the morning of 17.12.
      No air escort for the convoy.  2 boats reported that they had been forced off by a destroyer.  The operation continued.  Convoy must have been somewhere in AK 58 on the morning of 17.12.
    3) Convoy No. 70:
      Weather also affected this operation.  At mid-day the boats reported SW6, seaway 5, good visibility.  Towards evening W 9 - 10 was reported, one boat reported "no action taken".
      U 609 maintained contact with the convoy until the evening of 16.  Another 4 boats came up with the convoy.  All boats lost contact by the morning of 17.12.
      Heavy weather from the W. prevented the convoy making more than 5 knots and during the afternoon it ran towards the W., probably because the tempest was veering from S.W. to W.  No reports were made about the escort of the convoy.  One boat reported merely that it had to submerge when sighted by a destroyer.
 
 
 
- 207 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Following successes were reported:
     
1) U 610 - 1 tanker "Briligh Confidence" class (8,449 GRT) sunk.
      1 freighter (5,000 GRT) sunk.
2) U 356 - 1 tanker (5,000 GRT) sunk.
3) U 621 - 1 freighter (5,000 GRT) 2 explosions observed.
4) U 664 - 1 freighter (4,000 GRT) probable hit, definite noise of sinking after 15 minutes.
5) U 211 - 1 2-funnelled destroyer sunk.
      All ships may be assumed sunk, as in such a storm and high seas any ship that had been hit would not have stood a chance.
      Convoy was in BE 1115 on evening of 16th and operation was continued.
  b) 1) In order to build up a new patrol strip AL 72 has been given as new area for U 440 - 659 - 757 - 441 - 260 - 406 - 123 - 225.
    2) Following order was given to Group "Westwall", which is calculated to be E. of the Azores:  U 103 - 653 - 91 - 92 - 130 to proceed to CE 6355 to take over radar interception gear or fuel from U 463.  U 155 and U 91 were to meet in CF 2711 to transfer fuel.  The other boats of the group were ordered to new attack areas:
      U 106 to CF 35 and 36;  U 183 to CF 37 and 38;  U 155 to CF 53 and 61;  U 519 to CF 62 and 63;  U 564 to CG 14 and 15;  U 515 to CF 39 and CG 17;  U 86 to CF 66 and CG 44.
    3) U 625 occupied square AK 3574 as according to a high grade radio intercept convoy No. 69 was expected in that position.
  c) None.
  d) Boats in the area of Route "Anton" have again been informed that it is restricted as the "Rhakotis" (Trans: blockade runner) was expected to pass the Equator about 16.12 on its way to the North.
       
V. Reports of Success:
 
U 124 2 tankers
14,000 GRT
  sunk
U 176 1 ship
5,881 GRT
  sunk
U 159 1 ship
4,358 GRT
  sunk
U 610 2 ships
13,494 GRT
  sunk
U 356 1 tanker
5,000 GRT
  sunk
U 621 1 ship
5,000 GRT
  sunk
U 664 1 ship
4,000 GRT
  sunk
U 211 1 destroyer
  sunk.
       
VI. General:
  Operations against both convoys were badly affected by bad weather.  The weather alone made very heavy demands on the boats.  As successes were scored despite this weather, the crews are to be highly commended.  The strength of the defences cannot be judged in the conditions obtaining.
 
 
 
- 208 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
17.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
 BE 96
U 172
-
 DS 36
U 409
-
 Op(BD)
U 563
-
 Op(CF)
 
86
-
Op(CE 20)
174
-
FC 40
410
-
Op(BD)
564
-
Op(CE 60)
 
91
-
CF 20 
175
-
Op(EK)
432
-
DJ-Op 
569
-
Op(AK 50)
 
92
-
Op(CE 60) 
176
-
Op(FC) 
435
-
Op(AK 50) 
591
-
Op(AK 50)
 
103
-
CE 63 
177
-
KZ 47 
439
-
BE 16 
600
-
Op(BD 30)
 
105
-
Op(EF) 
178
-
FE 51 
440
-
BE 55 
604
-
Op(AK 50) 
 
106
-
Op(CE 36) 
181
-
GH 93 
441
-
BE 67
609
-
Op(BD)
 
109
-
DQ 92 
182
-
AE 88 
445
-
Op(AK 50)
610
-
Op(BD)
 
123
-
AL 26 
183
-
CF 21 
455
-
Op(AK 50) 
611
-
AL 
 
124
-
Op(EP)
185
-
Op(CE 39) 
460
-
BF 71
615
-
Op(AK 50)
 
125
-
Op(CF)
203
-
Op(BD 30) 
461
-
DS 92 
618
-
Op(DJ) 
 
126
-
Op(FC) 
211
-
Op(BD) 
463
-
CF 21 
621
-
Op(BD)
 
128
-
Op(FC) 
214
-
EF 32
465
-
BE 66 
623
-
Op(BD)
 
129
-
DF 46 
217
-
Op(EP)
506
-
BE 93 
626
-
Op(AK 50)
 
130
-
CE 63 
221
-
BE 44 
507
-
ES 48 
628
-
Op(AK)
 
134
-
Op(FC) 
225
-
AL 33
508
-
DF 77 
653
-
CE 63
 
135
-
Op(BD 30) 
260
-
BE 66 
513
-
BF 55 
659
-
BE 56
 
154
-
CD 90 
336
-
Op(AK 50) 
514
-
Op(CF 30) 
663
-
BD 25
 
155
-
Op(CF)
356
-
Op(BD)
515
-
Op(CE 30) 
626
-
Op(BD)
 
159
-
Op(FC)
357
-
AN 36
519
-
CE 66 
706
-
Op(CF 30)
 
161
-
Op(FC) 
373
-
Op(AK 50) 
524
-
Op(AK 50) 
757
-
BE 67
 
163
-
CD 90 
384
-
AF 79 
525
-
AN 36 
758
-
BE 44
 
164
-
ES 77 
406
-
BF 48 
553
-
BF 40 
D 3
-
Op(EJ)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 103 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 519 - 553 - 653 - 663 - 758.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 436 - 575 - Lorient;  U 444 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69 and 70, see paragraph IVa; air escorted convoy paragraph IVb.
    2) To date U 128 had seen nothing in that part of the patrol strip NE Natal.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  BE 1148, DB 3628, DA 82, DO 69, FC 55, ED 95 - 98, FJ 3360, EO 6949, FJ 3629.
    2) U-boat attack in EE 6349. 
   d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
   a) 1)  Convoy No. 69:
      Weather in convoy area remained very stormy on the 17th - 18th with S.W. wind up to force 12.  Contact with convoy was not reestablished.  After all boats had reported their positions, it was obvious that all boats that had proceeded at low speed of 4 - 5 knots on account of the weather, and on the S.W. course taken by the convoy.  On evening of the 17th they were ordered to continue
       
- 209 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      to search on south to southwesterly courses, as Operational Control suspected that the convoy was farther S., somewhere around AK 84 or 85. 
    2) Convoy No. 70:  
      Even in BD the weather was most unfavorable for an attack on the S.W. bound "ON" convoy.  Boats reported westerly wind up to 9, variable visibility and some fog.  Reports made by boats gave the impression that the convoy had somewhat scattered because of the weather situation.  All day long U 609 kept reporting that he had contact first with 2, then with 3 steamers.  He reported them at mid-day in BD 3346 on a course of 2600, with a speed of 4 knots.  No other boat sighted this group.  U 609 reported that he had fired 6 unaccountable misses despite perfect firing data.  5 boats of the group reported air escort by Catalina and Consolidated flying boats.  The operation against the convoy was continued as Operational Control assumed that the convoy had largely scattered, thus giving the boats a chance to pick up single ships in the convoy area.
  b) 1)  As the convoy reported by plane had not been found and it was calculated that the boats set to look for it must be far astern and the heavy seas rendered a follow-up useless, the pursuit was given up.  U 125 and U 514 made for DG 80.  U 563 took CF 14 and 15 as attack area;  U 706 took CG 91 and 92.  Thus in about 2 days this area would be manned by 9 boats.  It was intended to attack the traffic running between England - Gibraltar which should run through this area. 
    2)  After U 159 returns to base, its position on the patrol strip N.E. Natal, which was fixed on 14.12., is to be taken by U 507.  U 164 was to extend the strip to the coast on the S.W. 
      So far the attack positions in this area have been very profitable, thus, it seems right to use new boats there.  A group of 6 medium-sized boats with one tanker are shortly to leave port for this purpose.
  c) None.  
  d) 1)  Boats have been informed that the enemy uses his location gear very cautiously and when he picks up a target he gradually reduces his signal strength to mask his approach. 
    2) U 611 operated within Group "Panzer" against Convoy No. 68.  Last report on 9.11. from about AK 20.  Convoy was followed for another 2 days, and after the operation was broken off the boats were requested to report their positions.  U 611 did not report.  Later calls were also unsuccessful.  Boat must be considered lost.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
 
- 210 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
18.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BF 72
U 172
-
DG 94
U 409
-
Op(BD 30)
U 553
-
BF 64
 
86
-
CE 63
174
-
Op(FC)
410
-
Op(BD 30)
563
-
BE 97
 
91
-
CF 20
175
-
Op(EK)
432
-
Op(GJ)
564
-
CF 50
 
92
-
CE 60
176
-
Op(FC)
435
-
Op(AK)
569
-
Op(AK)
 
103
-
CE 60
177
-
KY 86
436
-
BF 54
575
-
BF 54
 
105
-
Op(EP)
178
-
FD 93
439
-
BE 28
591
-
Op(AK 70)
 
106
-
CF 24
181
-
GH 56
440
-
BE 51
600
-
Op(BD)
 
109
-
EF 23
182
-
AL 32
441
-
Op(AK)
604
-
Op(AK)
 
123
-
AL 29
183
-
CF 21
444
-
AO
609
-
Op(BD)
 
124
-
Op(EP)
185
-
CF 20
445
-
Op(AK 70)
610
-
Op(BD)
 
125
-
CF 31
203
-
Op(BD)
455
-
Op(AK)
615
-
Op(AK 70)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
211
-
Op(BD 30)
460
-
BF 67
618
-
Op(DJ)
 
128
-
Op(FC)
214
-
EF 29
461
-
DT 41
621
-
Op(BD)
 
129
-
DF 27
217
-
Op(EP)
463
-
GF 21
623
-
Op(BD)
 
130
-
CE 60
221
-
BE 44
465
-
BF 44
626
-
AK 60
 
134
-
Op(FC)
225
-
AL 29
506
-
BE 94
628
-
Op(AK)
 
135
-
Op(BD)
260
-
BE 61
507
-
ER 99
653
-
CE 60
 
154
-
DF 27
336
-
Op(AK 70)
508
-
DF 49
659
-
BE 51
 
155
-
CE 60
356
-
Op(BD 30)
513
-
BF 61
663
-
BD 37
 
159
-
Op(FC)
357
-
AN 31
514
-
CF 31
664
-
Op(BD 30)
 
161
-
Op(FC 28)
373
-
Op(AK)
515
-
CF 20
706
-
CG 14
 
163
-
CD 90
384
-
AF 79
519
-
CF 50
757
-
BE 57
 
164
-
Op(FC)
406
-
BE 68
524
-
Op(AK)
758
-
BE 47
             
525
-
AN 31
D 3
-
Op(EJ)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 103 - 159 - 130 - 154 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 513 - 519 - 553 - 653 - 663 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 513 - Lorient;  U 553 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69, 70 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 432 situation report:  No shipping in DJ 20  Roadstead and harbor of Casablanca, Mehdia and Fedala empty.  No signs of landing of troops or material.  Busy neutral traffic between CG 9591 and DJ 1630.  Sunk:  steam trawler (500 GRT).  Boat requested a freehand to the W.
    3) U 563 sank a single ship "Cape St. Andrew" class (5,094 GRT) in BE 8691, course 200.  Subsequently submerged because of destroyer.  Several unaccountable misses at different depths.  Probably "Pi 39" pistol duds.
    4) U 175 was detailed to reconnoiter the Dakar area.  He reported no shipping in EJ 6960.  As this position was about 180 miles W. of the harbor, boat was requested to give further details.
    5) U 176 was bombed by a Consolidated when it surfaced in FJ 3632.  Boat was temporarily unable to dive because of empty batteries, and moved away from land at full speed.  Boat would soon be ready again for operations outside coastal waters.  Moderate seas in area and land-based plane reconnaissance to 150 miles from the
       
- 211 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      mainland.  Location at night.
    6) U 217 sank Swedish vessel "Etna" (2,619 GRT) in EF 35, course 1450, from New York to Monte Video.  Concentrated location by day and night since 16.12., but no planes sighted.  As area was from the coast and this frequent location appeared doubtful, the boat was informed that different electrically driven gear on board cause noises similar to location.
  b) None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  EE 71, AK 1229, FJ 3288, BE 6165, BE 3762.
    U-boat warning:  for EE 72.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 71:
      At 1326 U 441, which was on its outward journey, reported a convoy of 6 - 10 steamers in BE 5613, southerly course.  Boats in CF, CG and BE were ordered to stalk it.  But as no further shadower reports were received by 2000, the boats of Group "Westwall" which were in CF and U 514 - 125 - 563 - 766 were told to continue to operate, but the boats that are en route for AL to form a patrol strip there continued to that area.  The operation was continued with 10 boats. At 2200 U 441 reported that he had been forced to submerge from 1400 until dark.  No contact existed.  U 432 was directed to follow up from DJ 20, and therefore set course for CG 47.
    2) Convoy No. 69:
      Weather was still bad on 18.12. in the convoy area.  Boats reported wind S.W. 11 - 12, visibility up to 2 miles.  No other reports on the convoy were made by the boats.  No air or sea patrols sighted.  Operational Control was of the opinion that owing to weather conditions the convoy would hardly move and that some vessels would probably be hove to far astern.  On the evening of 18.12. boats were instructed to heave to for the night and at dawn on 19.12. search for stragglers so far as the weather permitted.  Position of convoy was completely unknown as no contact had been established after the afternoon of 16.12.
    3) Convoy No. 70:
      Operations against the southbound convoy were greatly hampered by the stormy weather.  At 1300 U 621 reported the convoy in BD 3453, but again lost contact at 1425 in BD 3455.  Another boat U 609, reported at 1400 that he had contacted 4 steamers, at 1500 he again reported a steamer, but lost contact again at 1630.  On the morning of 19.12., U 621 again established contact with the convoy in BD 2668, but lost it at 0700.  Thus, convoy had not even made 3 miles progress.  4 boats of Group U 600 - 609 - 610 and U 623 had to turn back because of lack of fuel.  3 other boats, U 409 - 410 and U 621 were ordered to break off
 
 
 
- 212 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      operation as they were to convoy a homeward bound vessel (Trans: blockade runner).  U 621 was again ordered to continue stalking the convoy which he had again picked up on the morning of 19.12.  6 boats were still stalking the convoy.
  b)  Until more boats reach the area to man the patrol strip, U 123 has been allocated AL 48 as temporary attack area, and U 225 AL 31.  U 128 was given the same attack area as U 507 in the patrol strip of the Natal boats, i.e. square FC 2950.
  c) U 183 took over fuel from U 463 and continued homeward journey.  U 463 proceeded to CF 5121 to hand over radar intercept cable.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 432 1 steam trawler
  sunk
U 563 1 ship
5,094 GRT
  sunk
U 217 1 ship
2,619 GRT
  sunk.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
19.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BF 49
U 172
-
DG 62
U 409
-
Op(BD)
U 563
-
BE 86
 
86
-
CE 60
174
-
Op(FC)
410
-
Op(BD)
564
-
CF 37
 
91
-
CF 51
175
-
Op(EK)
432
-
Op(DJ)
569
-
Op(AK 70)
 
92
-
CE 60
176
-
Op(FK)
435
-
OP(AK 70)
575
-
BF 46
 
103
-
CE 60
177
-
JJ 12
436
-
BF 48
591
-
Op(AK 70)
 
105
-
(EP)-Op
178
-
FD 62
439
-
BE 61
600
-
BD 39
 
106
-
CF 34
181
-
GH 27
440
-
BE 52
604
-
Op(AK 70)
 
109
-
EF 27
182
-
AL 33
441
-
BE 28
609
-
Op(BD)
 
123
-
AL 54
183
-
CF 21
444
-
AN 36
610
-
AL 78
 
124
-
Op(EP)
185
-
Op(CF 30)
445
-
Op(AK 70)
615
-
Op(AK 70)
 
125
-
BE 80
203
-
Op(BD)
455
-
Op(AK 75)
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
211
-
Op(BD)
460
-
BF 64
621
-
Op(BD)
 
128
-
Op(FC)
214
-
Op(EF)
461
-
DT 12
623
-
Op(BD 20)
 
129
-
CD 97
217
-
Op(EF)
463
-
CF 19
626
-
AK 30
 
130
-
CE 60
221
-
BE 47
465
-
BF 49
628
-
Op(AK 70)
 
134
-
Op(FC)
225
-
AL 48
506
-
CG 80
653
-
CE 60
 
135
-
Op(BD)
260
-
BE 38
507
-
Op(FC)
659
-
BE 27
 
154
-
CD 90
336
-
Op(AK)
508
-
DF 51
663
-
BE 41
 
155
-
CF 51
356
-
Op(BD 20)
514
-
BE 80
664
-
Op(BD 20)
 
159
-
ER 64
357
-
AN 23
515
-
CF 37
706
-
BE 80
 
161
-
ER 89
373
-
Op(AK)
519
-
CF 61
757
-
BE 80
 
163
-
CA 90
384
-
AF 72
524
-
Op(AK)
758
-
BE 47
 
164
-
Op(FC)
406
-
BE 80
525
-
AN 23
D 3
-
Op(EJ)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 103 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 460 - 461 - 465 - 600 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 758.
  Entered Port:  U 460 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 662 - 381 - St. Nazaire;  U 620 - La Pallice;  U 631 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 213 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69, 70 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 175 reported when asked that he had encountered no shipping since 16.12. in squares EJ 6560, 6950, 9670, 9690, 6990 and 6530.  He intended to operate closer to the coast when the moon is waning.  As the squares named were some 200 miles W. of Dakar, the boat was instructed to search nearer in-shore at once.  Boat had not operated as ordered.
    3) Of the Natal boats, U 126 and U 174 had to turn back because of lack of fuel.  5 boats remained in the area, but 2 had little fuel and another had been damaged.
  b) - d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
      No further reports were made on the convoy.  On evening of 18.12. boats were ordered to heave to in the area where they were, in order to try to pick up the convoy again.  On the evening of 19.12. the boats were informed that B.d.U. expected the convoy to be somewhere in the squares AK 74, 75, 77, 78, BC 33, BD 11 on the afternoon of 20.12.  thus, as there was still a chance of picking up the convoy or parts of it the operation was not closed despite rough weather from the W.  Boats were again reminded of daylight underwater attacks, which in some cases would be possible because of the enemy's low speed.
    2) Convoy No. 70:
      Weather still very unfavorable on 19.12.  During the afternoon wind force 11 - 12 was reported, poor visibility and very heavy swell.  On the morning of 20.12. a boat reported when requested that wind was 1 - 2, visibility over 10 miles.
      Convoy was reported in BD 2668 at 0500 on 19.12.by U 621, course 2400.  Boat lost contact again at 0700, at 1100 reported convoy again in BD 2691.  Boat intended breaking off pursuit as it had been directed to a new area in the meantime.  But an order was issued to maintain contact with the convoy, as it appeared to be the only boat stalking it.  At 2000 contact was made again in BD 2688. Boat reported course of convoy 2200 and stated that vessels were sailing as much as 9 miles apart.  No other boat picked up the convoy, probably because of the lack of fixes.
      On the morning of 20.12. when weather improved, the boats were ordered to continue searching and attempt to get fixes.  Above all Krushka was to correct latest enemy position by means of the new fix.  Operation was continued because of the improved weather.
       
- 214 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      U 135 turned back because of lack of fuel.  5 boats were still stalking the convoy - U 621 - 356 - 211 - 203 and U 664.
    3) Convoy No. 71:
      About 2000 U 106 heard rapid screw noises in CF 3619, in a direction of 3400.  Boat followed up, but did not establish contact.  If convoy was traveling at 10.5 knots, it might be the one that was reported on 19.12. by U 441.  But as this speed was unlikely in bad weather, the position could not be used as a basis for a directed operation.  The boats continued to search.
  b)  U 182 was proceeding to the S. outside the enemy air patrol area via CF 40, EJ 40, FM 20.  Operations in Capetown area were intended.
  c)  U 221 refueled U 758. Both boats continued on homeward journey.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
    The enclosed situation report was given to Naval War Staff.  It shows the results of Mediterranean and Morocco operations, the position of boats for convoy duties, and the situation at the time.  (Trans:  see appendix).
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
20.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BF 50
U 174
-
Op(FC)
U 410
-
Op(BD)
U 575
-
BF 47
 
86
-
CE 63
175
-
Op(EJ)
432
-
CG 72
591
-
Op(AK 70)
 
91
-
CF 27
176
-
Op(FC)
435
-
Op(AK 70)
600
-
BE 42
 
92
-
CE 63
177
-
GR 87
436
-
BE 69
604
-
Op(AK)
 
103
-
CE 63
178
-
FD 23
439
-
BF 44
609
-
BE 39
 
105
-
Op(EP)
181
-
GH 11
440
-
BE 16
610
-
Op(BD)
 
106
-
Op(CF)
182
-
AL 29
441
-
BE 24
615
-
Op(BD)
 
109
-
Op(EF)
183
-
BE 88
444
-
AN 31
618
-
Op(DJ 20)
 
123
-
Op(AL 48)
185
-
Op(CF 30)
445
-
Op(AK 70)
620
-
BF 91
 
124
-
Op(EP)
203
-
Op(BD 20)
455
-
Op(AK 70)
621
-
Op(BD)
 
125
-
Op(BE 80)
211
-
Op(BD 20)
461
-
DG 92
623
-
Op(BD)
 
126
-
Op(FC)
214
-
Op(EF)
463
-
CF 27
626
-
AK
 
128
-
Op(FC)
217
-
Op(EP)
465
-
BF 91
628
-
Op(AK 70)
 
129
-
CD 90
221
-
BE 49
506
-
Op(CF 30)
631
-
AO
 
130
-
CE 63
225
-
Op(AL 81)
507
-
Op(FC)
653
-
CE 63
 
134
-
Op(FC)
260
-
BE 25
508
-
DF 23
659
-
BE 13
 
135
-
Op(BD 20)
336
-
Op(AK 70)
514
-
Op(BE 80)
662
-
BF 24
 
154
-
CD 90
356
-
Op(BD 20)
515
-
Op(CF 30)
663
-
BE 46
 
155
-
CF 27
357
-
AF 76
519
-
Op(CF 30)
664
-
Op(BD 20)
 
159
-
ER 34
373
-
Op(BD)
524
-
Op(AK 70)
706
-
Op(BE 80)
 
161
-
ER 67
381
-
BF 58
525
-
AF 76
757
-
BE 24
 
163
-
CD 90
384
-
AF 47
563
-
Op(BE 80)
758
-
BE 47
 
164
-
Op(FC)
406
-
BE 24
564
-
Op(CF 30)
D 3
-
EJ 17
 
172
-
DH 11
409
-
Op(BD)
569
-
Op(AK 70)      
 
       
- 215 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 103 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 519 - 600 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 758 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 459 - 442 - St. Nazaire;  U 333 - La Pallice.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys Nos. 70 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 465 reported submarine in BF 6729 i.e. Route "Morgengebet".  Possibly it was one of our own outward bound boats.
    3) U 618 had again made a sortie to Casablanca.  No shipping, situation unaltered.  Boat was allotted CG 47 as new area.  It was intended that he should work with Group "Westwall".
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  DB 56.
     Submarine warnings and reports of torpedoing:  DB 6417, BD 5183, AK 4243, BD 4243, BD 1149, BD 5183.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
      Boats remained during 20.12. in the area reached the previous day, to try to pick up the scattered convoy.  Weather remained rough with wind up to 6 and poor visibility because of hail and snow showers.
      B.D.U.'s assumption was correct.  At 1200 U 336 reported a single ship with S.W. course in AK 7945.  At 1600 he contacted 2 ships in AK 7974 - again on a S.W. course.  He lost them again at 2000 through hail and driving snow.
      At 0400 on 21.12. U 591 reported that he had sunk "Montreal City" (3,066 GRT) in BD 1167.
      It certainly appears that the convoy had scattered during the bad weather and that the individual ships are only now entering the submarines' patrol area.  As there is a chance of contacting even more ships, the operation will continue.
    2) Convoy No. 70:
      Good weather was reported on the morning of 20.12. in the area where the convoy was:  Wind 1 - 2 good visibility over 10 miles.  Boats were instructed to search at higher speed while the sea was smoother.  It was pointed out that exact fixes when searching were most important.  At 1100 on 20.12. U 621 sighted a single tanker on a course of 2400, speed 4 knots, probably a straggler from the convoy.  Next morning he reported that he had sunk the vessel at 2030
       
- 216 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      on 20.12. in square BD 5262.  It was the tanker "Empire Brouce" (8,142 GRT).
      No further reports have been received.  The operation against the convoy is being continued, as there is still a chance of meeting single ships.  4 boats are still stalking, as U 621 has been told to break off the search and make for CD 33 to pick up the homeward bound vessel.
    3) Convoy No. 71:
      Direct contact with the convoy has not been established.  U 185 sighted single ships in CF 3886 and hunted them via CF 6223 to CF 6883.  He scored one hit there after a double and a triple miss.  No effect observed.  Freighter was "Mekambo" class (4,996 GRT).  U 706 reported one destroyer in CF 3519 and one in CF 3597.  Both on a S.E. course.  Possibly these were scattered members of a convoy.  No further details known.  Operation is continuing.
  b)  New attack positions have been ordered for the "ON" convoy expected on 23.12.  U 123 - 225 - 659 - 440 - 260 - 406 - 441 and U 757 form Group "Spitz" and at 0000 23.12. were on the patrol strip from AL 4845 to 8541.
  c) U 91 took over fuel from U 155 and radar interception cable from U 463 and is now continuing his homeward journey.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 185 1 ship
1 hit
 
U 591 1 ship
3,066 GRT
 sunk
U 621 1 tanker
8,142 GRT
 sunk.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
21.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 67
-
BF 61
U 174
-
FC 25
U 409
-
BD 53
U 564
-
Op(CF 30)
 
86
-
CE 63
175
-
Op(EK)
410
-
BD 28
569
-
Op(BD)
 
91
-
CF 51
176
-
Op(FK)
432
-
Op(CF 66)
575
-
BE 95
 
92
-
CE 63
177
-
GR 75
435
-
Op(BD 11)
591
-
Op(BD 11)
 
103
-
CE 63
178
-
ES 82
436
-
BE 92
600
-
BE 51
 
105
-
Op(EE)
181
-
FV 84
439
-
BE 69
604
-
Op(AK 11)
 
106
-
Op(CF 30)
182
-
AL 54
440
-
AL 88
609
-
BE 42
 
109
-
Op(EE)
183
-
BE 94
441
-
AL 97
610
-
BF 24
 
123
-
Op(AK 48)
185
-
Op(CF 63)
442
-
BF 67
615
-
Op(BD 11)
 
124
-
Op(EE)
203
-
Op(BD 28)
444
-
AN 23
618
-
Op(DJ 21)
 
125
-
Op(CF 30)
211
-
Op(BD 52)
445
-
Op(BD 11)
620
-
BF 82
 
126
-
ER 88
214
-
Op(EE)
455
-
Op(BD 11)
621
-
Op(BD 53)
 
128
-
Op(FC)
217
-
Op(EE)
459
-
BF 58
623
-
BE 42
 
129
-
CD 90
221
-
BE 58
561
-
DG 61
626
-
AK
 
130
-
CE 63
225
-
Op(AL 81)
463
-
CF 43
628
-
Op(BD 11)
 
134
-
Op(FC)
260
-
AL 88
465
-
BF 64
631
-
AN 36
 
135
-
BD 62
333
-
BF 91
506
-
CF 31
653
-
CE 63
 
154
-
CD 90
336
-
Op(AK 79)
507
-
Op(FC)
659
-
AL 88
 
155
-
CF 51
356
-
Op(BD 52)
508
-
CD 90
662
-
BF 49
 
159
-
EH 95
357
-
AF 48
514
-
Op(CF 30)
663
-
BE 55
 
161
-
ER 38
373
-
Op(AK 77)
515
-
Op(CF 30)
664
-
Op(BD 52)
 
       
- 217 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
 
163
-
CD 90
381
-
BF 81
519
-
Op(CF 30)
706
-
Op(CF 35)
 
164
-
Op(FC)
384
-
AE 68
524
-
Op(BD 11)
757
-
BE 11
 
172
-
CF 81
406
-
BE 52
525
-
AF 48
758
-
BE 58
             
563
-
Op(CF 30)
D 3
-
DT 78
 
  On Return Passage:  U 67 - 91 - 103 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 221 - 439 - 461 - 465 - 508 - 519 - 600 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 758 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 67 - Lorient;  U 465 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U D 5 - Lorient;  U 404 - St. Nazaire;  U 167 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69, 70 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 176 sighted a single destroyer in FK 3146 on 19.12., mean course 2400, speed 12 knots.  Boat had repaired the damage caused by bombs and was again serviceable.  He was given a free hand in FK as requested.   
    3) U 508 reported heavily armed freighter on course of 900, speed 12 knots, in DF 2556.  Boat had fired all torpedoes and was on its homeward voyage.  U 506, U 125 and U 514 which were in CF and making for the southwest, were ordered to stalk the ship that had been reported.  They were to proceed at cruising speed without consuming large quantities of fuel.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  CF 3849, EE 7423.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
      Group was still searching for the convoy or single ships on 21.12. westerly wind up to force 8, snow and hail.  At 1500 U 591 sighted a single steamer in BD 1424, course 2000, low speed.  At 1730 he reported that he had lost contact in snow squalls.  He made no further reports about the steamer.  At 2000 U 569 also sighted a steamer in BD 1179, course 700.   He chased her as far as BD 1219, then lost her.  This steamer, with a course of 700, probably did not belong to the convoy.
      No further reports of the convoy were received.  It was therefore decided to break off the operation on 22.12.  For summing up see 23.12.
    2) Convoy No. 70:
      At 2200 on 21.12. the operation was broken off as there was little chance of picking up the convoy with only 4 submarines.  Also these boats were urgently required for operations against the next ON convoy, for which only 8 boats were so far available.
       
- 218 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Summing-up - Convoy No. 70:
      In all, 13 boats were stalking the convoy.  Convoy was contacted according to plan in the center of the patrol strip at the expected time on 15.12.  The operation was hampered by the bad weather.  The boats had no fixes and finding and directing other boats was therefore considerably more difficult.  Contact with the convoy was maintained without a break only during the first two days.  After that, the convoy or single ships were reported only for short periods, mainly because of bad visibility.
      No new information was gained about the convoy's defences.  The naval escort was not able to attack the boats effectively because of the weather.  Unfortunately, the submarines could not profit as the seaway was too heavy to permit firing torpedoes.
      On 16.12. Consolidated and Catalina flying boats provided a strong air escort for the convoy.  The planes could not attack the submarines either, but their presence made shadowing more difficult.  6 0f the 14 submarines attacked the convoy and all were able to fire.  One boat had no success.  6 ships totaling 35,836 GRT and 1 twin-funneled destroyer were sunk of the convoy which had been reported as consisting of 16 - 20 steamers.
      No losses, no damage.
    3) Convoy No. 71:
      Apart from a steamer in CG 4186, course 140, and a destroyer almost out of sight, nothing was found by the submarines.  It is intended to break off the operation after first light on 22.12.  U 125 and U 514 are to operate off Trinidad and are already proceeding to that area.
  b) 1) U 86 was ordered to proceed at high cruising speed to CE 5186 and attack a large steamer that had been damaged.  According to a radio intercept it was anchored half a mile off Flores.  It may be the single ship that was torpedoed by U 103 on 13.12. in CE 1521.  U 86 is to try to send a dinghy alongside the ship in the dark without being observed, break the anchor chain and sink the ship after it has drifted outside the territorial waters.
    2) It is intended that U 436 - 575 - 381 - 620 and U 442 shall operate N.E. Natal.  For the time being they are to make for CF 78.  They will be refueled by U 463 in the vicinity of ER.
    3) The boats U 164 - 128 - 134 and U 507 at present in patrol area, have a free hand outside Route "Anton" up to the coast of Brazil.
  c)  None.
  d) U 626 - a boat on its first operational trip, last reported on 14.12. from AL 26.  The boat was then directed to attack a N.E. bound convoy, which, according to calculations it could hardly have reached.  The request for a position report on 16.12. remained unanswered, as have all subsequent requests.  The possibility of loss through sea damage exists. No details are yet known.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
 
 
 
- 219 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
22.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 86
-
CE 63
U 175
-
Op(EK)
U 410
-
BD 57
U 571
-
BF 80
 
91
-
CF 31
176
-
Op(FK 23)
432
-
Op(CG 40)
575
-
BE 97
 
92
-
CE 63
177
-
GQ 68
435
-
Op(BC 30)
591
-
Op(BC 36)
 
103
-
CE 63
178
-
ES 43
436
-
BE 97
600
-
BE 56
 
105
-
Op(EP)
181
-
FV 47
439
-
BF 48
604
-
Op(BC 30)
 
106
-
Op(CG 40)
182
-
AL 72
440
-
Op(AL 80)
609
-
BE 55
 
109
-
Op(EE)
183
-
BF 67
441
-
Op(AL 80)
610
-
BE 29
 
123
-
Op(AL 48)
185
-
Op(CG 40)
442
-
BF 81
615
-
Op(BC 30)
 
124
-
Op(EO)
203
-
Op(BD 50)
444
-
DH 14
618
-
CG 87
 
125
-
CF 52
211
-
Op(BD 50)
445
-
Op(BD 30)
620
-
BF 73
 
126
-
ER 56
214
-
Op(BD 54)
455
-
Op(BC 30)
621
-
BD 73
 
128
-
Op(FC)
217
-
Op(EP)
459
-
BF 81
623
-
BE 55
 
129
-
BE 55
221
-
BE 68
461
-
DH 14
628
-
Op(BC 30)
 
130
-
CE 63
225
-
Op(AL 40)
463
-
CE 63
631
-
AN 31
 
134
-
Op(FC)
260
-
Op(AL 80)
506
-
CH 61
653
-
CE 63
 
135
-
BE 55
333
-
BF 82
507
-
Op(FC)
659
-
Op(AL 40)
 
154
-
CD 90
336
-
Op(BC 30)
508
-
DF 32
662
-
BF 71
 
155
-
Op(CF)
356
-
Op(BD 27)
514
-
CF 67
663
-
BE 65
 
159
-
EJ 41
357
-
AE 69
515
-
Op(CG 40)
664
-
Op(BD 51)
 
161
-
EH 99
373
-
Op(BC 30)
519
-
Op(CG 40)
706
-
Op(CG 44)
 
163
-
CD 90
381
-
BF 72
524
-
Op(BC 39)
757
-
BE 20
 
164
-
Op(FC)
384
-
AE 83
525
-
AE 69
758
-
BE 68
 
167
-
AF 79
404
-
BF 58
563
-
Op(CG 48)
D 3
-
DT 49
 
172
-
CF 53
406
-
BE 24
564
-
Op(CG 40)
D 5
-
BF 54
 
174
-
ER 86
409
-
BD 83
569
-
Op(BD 13)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 103 - 106 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 211 - 221 - 439 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 529 - 600 - 604 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 758 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 571 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 257 - La Pallice;  U 266 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoys Nos. 69 and 71, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 161 - homeward bound, in EH 9654 - reported at 1344 convoy with westerly course.  Because of considerable damage from bombs, the boat was ordered to attack according to capability and if possible to ascertain the rate of progress of the convoy as a guide in directing the boats of the Trinidad area.
      U 161 attacked at dusk and fired a single miss at a destroyer.  Convoy consisted of about 6 steamers and 2 escorts.  After dark, course N.W., speed 8 - 5 knots.  Submarine was continuing on its homeward voyage.
  b) None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  FC 6210, BF 4558, BE 9142.
     U-boat attack in EH 95.
  d)  None.
       
- 220 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 69:
      As no further sightings have been made in the convoy area, the operation will be closed on the morning of 22.12., as planned.
      Summing-up - Convoy No. 69:
      On 13.12. the operation against the expected "HX" convoy was begun with 3 boats.  The convoy was picked up according to plan at mid-day on 13.12. in AJ 9278.  Owing to the few boats participating, contact was maintained only until the evening of 13.12.  The approach points for the convoy were known through high priority radio intercept, so despite the vagueness of contact with the convoy, 9 more boats, Group "Ungestüm" approaching from the E., were directed to the convoy.  They were to pick it up on 15.12. in a narrowed patrol strip.  The convoy was not located.  But U 173 reported a S.W. bound convoy, probably an "ONS", at mid-day on 16.12., in AK 6421.  All boats were directed to it.  On 16.12. two separate groups of this convoy were reported 45 miles apart. Contact was maintained only during this day.  The rest of the operation suffered from the heavy weather.  After 17.12., the convoy was not picked up again. Searching was continued as it was assumed that the convoy was further astern because of the bad weather, also the possibility of its being scattered had to be allowed for.  Later several single ships were reported that probably belonged to the convoy.  Unfortunately almost all were lost because of poor visibility.  The only sinking was:
      1 freighter (3,066 GRT) "Montreal City".
      Operational Control was unable to get any idea of the convoy's defences, as they hardly came into play.  None of the 12 boats was lost, nor did any report major damage.
    2) Convoy No. 71:
      As further search was fruitless, operation is being closed as intended.  For further operations of boats, see paragraph IVb.
  b) 1) After the attacks on Convoys 69, 70 and 71 had been broken off, the following orders were issued:  U 356 - 203 and U 664 joined Group "Spitz".  Until 0800 24.12. they manned the patrol strip from BD 3396 to BE 1451 in the given order.
      Group "Ungestüm" was on the patrol strip from BD 2271 to BD 5334 at 0800 on 25.12.  Order:  U 591 - 336 - 455 - 445 - 435 - 373 - 524 - 628 and U 615.  Both patrol strips were arranged as intercept position for a S.W. bound convoy expected on 23.12. somewhere about AL 40 - 80.  Several boats were short of fuel and could be used only as spotters.
      The following boats now belong to Group "Westwall", and they are distributed over the following attack areas:  U 563 - squares 35 and 36;  U 185 - squares 37 and 38;  U 155 squares 53 and 61;  U 519 - squares 62 and 63;  all CF.  U 564 - squares 14 and 15;  U 706 - squares 41 and 42 both CG.  U 515 - squares 39 and 17;  U 432 - squares 66 and 44, both CF or CG.
 
 
 
- 221 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) U 618 was operating against enemy traffic in sea area off Lisbon.  Boat is being kept informed of the present situation and attention drawn to neutral shipping.
      Because of possible diplomatic repercussions Naval War Staff has forbidden U 86 to penetrate the territorial waters of the Portuguese Island of "Flores".  If the ship is observed and shows signs of preparing to leave port, the boat is to wait outside the 3 -mile limit and close with the ship after she has left the restricted area.
  c)  U 92 has taken over radar interception parts from U 463 and has commenced homeward voyage.
  d) As the convoy reported by U 161 is the second westbound one in this area, it must be investigated whether the single ships coming from the S. assemble in Freetown and continue in convoy to Trinidad.  This arrangement would have a bad effect on future successes in comparison with former high sinkings in the Trinidad area.
     Further details must however be awaited.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
23.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 86
-
CE 51
U 175
-
Op(EK)
U 406
-
Op(AL)
U 564
-
Op(CG 10)
 
91
-
BE 96
176
-
Op(FK)
409
-
BD 87
569
-
BD 22
 
92
-
CE 63
177
-
GQ 53
410
-
BD 76
575
-
BE 89
 
103
-
CE 63
178
-
ES 12
432
-
Op(CF 66)
591
-
BD 15
 
105
-
Op(EP)
181
-
FU 37
435
-
BD 17
600
-
BE 66
 
106
-
CG 13
182
-
BE 11
436
-
CF 23
604
-
BD 19
 
109
-
Op(EE)
183
-
BF 61
439
-
BF 55
609
-
BE 64
 
123
-
Op(AL 48)
185
-
Op(CF 62)
440
-
Op(AL 80)
610
-
BE 62
 
124
-
Op(EO)
203
-
BD 37
441
-
Op(AL 80)
615
-
BD 17
 
125
-
CF 58
211
-
BD 64
442
-
BF 72
618
-
CG 57
 
126
-
ER 34
214
-
Op(EE)
444
-
AF 48
620
-
BE 96
 
128
-
Op(FC)
217
-
Op(EP)
445
-
BD 18
621
-
BD 78
 
129
-
DF 23
221
-
BD 65
455
-
BD 15
623
-
BE 64
 
130
-
CF 19
225
-
Op(AL 40)
459
-
BF 71
628
-
BD 17
 
134
-
Op(FC)
257
-
BF 91
461
-
CF 84
631
-
AN 23
 
135
-
BE 64
260
-
Op(AL 80)
463
-
CE 63
653
-
CE 63
 
154
-
CD 90
266
-
AO
506
-
CF 83
659
-
Op(AL 40)
 
155
-
Op(CF 53)
333
-
BF 72
507
-
Op(FC)
662
-
BE 68
 
159
-
DT 48
336
-
BD 15
508
-
CD 90
663
-
BF 44
 
161
-
EH 91
356
-
BD 34
514
-
CF 86
664
-
BD 37
 
163
-
CD 90
357
-
AE 91
515
-
Op(CG 17)
706
-
Op(CG 41)
 
164
-
Op(FC)
373
-
BD 17
519
-
Op(CG 60)
757
-
BF 57
 
167
-
AF 48
381
-
BE 95
524
-
BD 19
758
-
BF 48
 
172
-
CF 68
384
-
AE 87
525
-
AE 91
D 3
-
DT 27
 
174
-
ER 64
404
-
BF 81
563
-
Op(CG 30)
D 5
-
BF 48
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 92 - 103 - 106 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 183 - 211 - 221 - 439 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 569 - 600 - 604 - 609 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 757 - 758 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 183 - Lorient;  U 221 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 516 - 509 - Lorient;  U 71 - St. Nazaire;  U 572 - La Pallice.
       
- 222 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  U-boat sightings:  CG 4651, CG 4181, ED 65.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) As the expected "ON" convoy had not been found by dusk and visibility was very bad and it was wished to avoid the convoy passing undetected during the night, Group "Spitz", less U 356 - 203 and U 664, has been ordered to leave the area at 1900, course 2220, speed 5 knots.  At 1100 on 24.12. they are to remain in the new patrol area from AL 7145 to 7835.
    2) Now that the order for permanent operations by 12 boats against reinforcements for North Africa has been cancelled by Naval War Staff, the two boats with the most fuel  are to be sent N.  They are to approach AL 88 at economical cruising speed.  U 432 is to operate off Huelva.  All other boats of Group "Westwall" will remain in the previous area until fuel is exhausted.
    3) Trinidad boats have been ordered to push closer inshore as soon as possible when the moon begins to wane.  No details available about shipping in the area.
  c)  U 130 - 103 and U 653 have taken over fuel or radar parts.
  d) 1) As the rendezvous with the homeward bound "Rhakotis" (Trans:  blockade runner) has been moved 200 miles farther E., the boats detailed to form the convoy escort - U 410, 621 and 409 - have been ordered to be at the new position - CE 1388 - by 0800 on 26.12.
    2) U 435 and U 181 will take part in the Christmas greeting program of the German Radio.  Positions:  BD 20 and FN.  If situation permits, boats will send short non-confidential text.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  The cancellation of the order reserving boats to attack the Gibraltar reinforcements, will free boats from a rather thankless task for attacks in the North Atlantic.  This arrangement will take time to take effect as the boats at present attacking have almost finished their task.  Until it is actually finished they are to continue to operate there.
       
- 223 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
24.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 71
-
BF 58
U 174
-
ER 34
U 409
-
CD 33
U 564
-
Op(CG 10)
 
86
-
CE 53
175
-
Op(EK)
410
-
CD 33
569
-
BD 39
 
91
-
BE 96
176
-
Op(FK)
432
-
Op(CG 76)
571
-
BF 84
 
92
-
CF 22
177
-
GQ 24
435
-
BD 27
572
-
BF 91
 
103
-
CE 63
178
-
EJ 71
436
-
CF 25
575
-
CF 23
 
105
-
Op(EP)
181
-
FN 88
439
-
BF 52
591
-
Op(BD 22)
 
106
-
BF 74
182
-
BE 71
440
-
Op(AL 81)
600
-
BF 45
 
109
-
Op(EE)
185
-
Op(CF 30)
441
-
Op(AL 84)
604
-
BD 29
 
123
-
Op(AL)
203
-
Op(BE 14)
442
-
BE 95
610
-
BF 44
 
124
-
Op(EO)
211
-
BE 44
444
-
AE 69
615
-
BD 52
 
125
-
CF 79
214
-
Op(EF)
445
-
BD 27
618
-
Op(CG 55)
 
126
-
EH 94
217
-
Op(EF)
455
-
Op(BD 24)
620
-
BE 97
 
128
-
Op(FC)
225
-
Op(AL 48)
459
-
BE 95
621
-
CD 33
 
129
-
CD 90
257
-
BF 82
461
-
DG 39
623
-
BF 47
 
130
-
CE 18
260
-
Op(AL 81)
463
-
CE 63
628
-
BD 28
 
134
-
Op(FC)
266
-
AN 36
506
-
CF 87
631
-
AF 76
 
135
-
BF 44
333
-
BE 69
507
-
Op(FC)
653
-
CE 63
 
154
-
CD 90
336
-
Op(BD 25)
508
-
CD 90
659
-
Op(AL)
 
155
-
Op(CF 53)
356
-
Op(BD 33)
509
-
BF 54
662
-
BE 56
 
159
-
DT 24
357
-
AE 85
514
-
DH 12
663
-
BF 49
 
161
-
EH 62
373
-
BD 27
515
-
Op(CG 17)
664
-
Op(BE 14)
 
163
-
CD 90
381
-
BE 97
516
-
BF 54
706
-
Op(CG 41)
 
164
-
Op(FC)
384
-
AE 32
519
-
Op(CF 60)
757
-
BF 67
 
167
-
AE 69
404
-
BF 47
524
-
BD 28
758
-
BF 64
 
172
-
CG 39
406
-
Op(AL 81)
525
-
AE 85
D 3
-
DG 96
             
563
-
Op(FC 30)
D 5
-
BE 69
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 92 - 103 - 106 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 439 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 569 - 600 - 604 - 610 - 623 - 663 - 757 - 758 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 439 - Brest;  U 758 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 373 - 632 - Kiel;  U 117 - Lorient.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 461 reported convoy of about 10 steamers on S.E. course in DG 3677 at 2340.
    U 506 and U 514 were in the vicinity and were ordered to attack it.  U 461 continued to U 125 to hand over engine parts.  No further reports were received.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  EE 85, EO 56, CA 6111, EO 5623, FC 7793, BF 5767, DN 9172, BB 73, FJ 38, BB 63.
     U-boat attack:  EE 8590.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) Now that Route "Anton" is unrestricted, the boats U 128 - 176 and U 134, who have little fuel, have been given a free hand in
       
- 224 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    ER 50 - 80 - 60 - 90 and EC 40 and 70.
    U 164 and U 507 will move closer to the Brazilian coast when the moon wanes, and will search for shipping.  At present no details are known of the shipping in the area between Natal and Freetown.  Hence, order for all ships still in the area about unrestricted hunting in the new areas.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) Restriction on Route "Anton" being lifted, boats with little fuel have been given a free hand as follows:  U 128 - 176 and U 134 in ER 50 - 80 - 60 - 90 and ES 40 and 70.
      When the moon begins to wane, U 164 and U 507 will move closer to the coast of Brazil to seek for shipping.  For the present no details of shipping movements between Natal and Freetown.  Therefore, order for free-lance operation in the newly designated areas for all boats still in the area.
    2) After taking over a radar interception cable from U 463, U 86 operated off Ponta Delgada.  Although earlier commitment of boats was unsuccessful, another attempt is being made because it is suspected that there is some enemy traffic and that the harbor is being used as base for escort vessels.
    3) U 432 was on its way to Huelva and was to attack ore steamer traffic using that port.
    4) In order to form a new patrol strip and to operate against an "ONS" convoy, U 662 - 333 - 404 - 384 - 357 and U 525 were en route to AL 48.
    5) As the expected convoy was not discovered and it was assumed that the convoy had been delayed by heavy weather, Group "Spitz" moved away from the patrol strip at 1900 on a course of 2220, speed 6 knots.
      At 1100 on 25 December the whole group of 11 boats will move out patrol strip from AK 9671 to BE 1451 on a course of 400, speed 5 knots to meet the convoy.
  c)  U 86 took over radar interception cable from U 463.
  d) 1) Route "Anton" has been released for attacks on single ships from south to north as follows:
      From 24.12. as far as 150 N.
      From 26.12. as far as 300 N.
      Area N. of this area to remain closed for the time being.
    2) U 410 - 621 and U 409 have been issued with more precise instructions for the convoying lane of the blockade runner "Rhakotis".
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 225 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
25.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 71
-
BF 81
U 174
-
EH 91
U 409
-
CD 13
U 569
-
BE 19
 
86
-
CE 60
175
-
Op(EK)
410
-
CD 13
571
-
BF 75
 
91
-
BF 73
176
-
Op(FK)
432
-
CG 49
572
-
BF 82
 
92
-
BE 86
177
-
GG 97
435
-
Op(BD 25)
575
-
CF 28
 
103
-
CF 22
178
-
EJ 17
436
-
CF 54
591
-
Op(BD 22)
 
105
-
Op(EP)
181
-
FN 73
440
-
Op(AL 70)
600
-
BF 49
 
106
-
BF 73
182
-
AE 15
441
-
Op(AL 70)
604
-
BD 39
 
109
-
Op(EE)
185
-
Op(CF 30)
442
-
CF 33
610
-
BF 67
 
125
-
DG 32
203
-
Op(BE 14)
444
-
AE 91
615
-
Op(BD 53)
 
123
-
Op(AL 70)
211
-
BE 58
445
-
Op(BD 25)
618
-
CG 50
 
124
-
Op(EO)
214
-
Op(EF)
455
-
Op(BD 25)
620
-
CG 17
 
126
-
EH 65
217
-
Op(EF)
459
-
BE 89
621
-
CD 13
 
128
-
Op(FC)
225
-
Op(AL 40)
461
-
DG 33
623
-
BF 49
 
129
-
CD 90
257
-
BF 72
463
-
CE 56
628
-
Op(BD 29)
 
130
-
CF 21
260
-
Op(AL 70)
506
-
DH 17
631
-
AF 48
 
134
-
Op(FC)
266
-
AN 31
507
-
Op(FC)
632
-
AO
 
135
-
BF 64
333
-
BE 59
508
-
CD 90
653
-
CF 21
 
154
-
CD 90
336
-
Op(BD 25)
509
-
BF 84
659
-
Op(AL 70)
 
155
-
Op(CF 53)
337
-
AO
514
-
DG 38
662
-
BE 51
 
159
-
DG 96
356
-
Op(BD 33)
515
-
Op(CG 17)
663
-
BF 49
 
161
-
EH 33
357
-
AL 31
516
-
BF 48
664
-
Op(BE 14)
 
163
-
CD 90
373
-
Op(BD 29)
519
-
Op(CF 60)
706
-
BE 89
 
164
-
Op(FC)
381
-
CF 30
524
-
Op(BD 29)
757
-
BF 64
 
167
-
AE 91
384
-
AL 37
525
-
AL 32
D 3
-
DH 47
 
172
-
BE 99
404
-
BE 68
563
-
BE 81
D 5
-
BE 64
       
406
-
Op(AL 70)
564
-
Op(CG 14)
117
-
BE 54
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 92 - 103 - 106 - 126 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 569 - 600 - 604 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - 757 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 757 - 135 - St. Nazaire;
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 514 and U 506, who were set onto a convoy reported by U 461, found nothing despite careful search on different courses.  They continued to the approach points as ordered.
    2) U 92 sighted a destroyer and steamer on southerly course at high speed in BE 9738.  Boat was homeward bound.
    3) U 515 requested a free hand in area CG 88 to DH 34.   As commitment further afield was not possible because of lack of fuel, boat was given a free hand for the area requested.  U 155 was given the same permission.
    4) U 175 found no shipping off Dakar, moderate air patrolling, location observed once at night.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  EO 9333, ED 87, FK 3177, KK 2369.
  d)  None.
       
- 226 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  As it is still hoped that the expected convoy will be picked up from 1200 on 25.12., Group "Ungestüm" is to patrol on a course of 200, speed 4 knots. As U 445 is returning home, the strip will be narrowed by one position towards evening.
    Group "Spitz" which had gone out on a course of 400 at a speed of 5 knots to meet the convoy, reversed course about 1900 to 2000, speed 7 knots. Thus both groups overlap so as to cover an area of 300 miles, an if the convoy is still E. of the patrol strip, it should be contacted.
  c)  U 125 transferred supernumerary Engineer Officer to U 461.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
26.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 71
-
BF 72
U 174
-
EH 62
U 406
-
Op(BD 35)
U 563
-
BE 43
 
86
-
Op(CE 69)
175
-
Op(EK 45)
409
-
CD 13
564
-
Op(CF 30)
 
91
-
BF 52
176
-
Op(FC)
410
-
CD 13
569
-
BE 53
 
92
-
BE 98
177
-
GG 81
432
-
CG 82
571
-
CF 39
 
103
-
BE 85
178
-
DT 77
435
-
Op(BD 23)
572
-
BF 72
 
105
-
Op(EP)
181
-
FM 66
436
-
CF 73
575
-
CF 57
 
106
-
BF 61
182
-
BE 42
440
-
Op(BD 32)
591
-
Op(AK 89)
 
109
-
Op(EE)
185
-
Op(CF 30)
441
-
Op(BD 36)
600
-
BF 40
 
117
-
BF 48
203
-
Op(BD 39)
442
-
CF 53
604
-
BE 42
 
123
-
Op(AK 98)
211
-
BE 67
444
-
AE 85
610
-
BE 64
 
124
-
Op(EO)
214
-
Op(EF)
445
-
BD 39
615
-
Op(BD 26)
 
125
-
DG 30
217
-
Op(EF)
455
-
Op(AK 39)
618
-
Op(CG 50)
 
126
-
EH 36
225
-
Op(AK 98)
459
-
CF 31
620
-
CF 64
 
128
-
Op(ER)
257
-
BE 69
461
-
DG 30
621
-
CD 13
 
129
-
CD 90
260
-
Op(BD 32)
463
-
CE 48
623
-
BF 64
 
130
-
BE 85
266
-
AN 23
506
-
DG 69
628
-
Op(BD 26)
 
134
-
Op(ER)
333
-
BE 28
507
-
Op(FC)
631
-
AE 69
 
154
-
CD 90
336
-
Op(AK 99)
508
-
CD 90
632
-
AN 30
 
155
-
Op(CF)
337
-
AN 30
509
-
BE 93
653
-
BE 85
 
159
-
DG 76
356
-
Op(BD 36)
514
-
DG 68
659
-
Op(BD 32)
 
161
-
DT 48
357
-
AL 26
515
-
Op(CG 44)
662
-
BE 16
 
163
-
CD 90
373
-
Op(BD 23)
516
-
BE 93
663
-
BF 40
 
164
-
Op(FC)
381
-
CF 30
519
-
CG 11
664
-
Op(BD 39)
 
167
-
AE 85
384
-
AL 52
524
-
Op(BD 23)
706
-
BE 58
 
172
-
BF 72
404
-
BE 53
525
-
AL 33
D 3
-
DT 14
                   
D 5
-
BE 27
 
  On Return Passage:  U 91 - 106 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 569 - 600 - 604 - 610 - 623 - 653 - 663 - U D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 91 - Brest;  U 106 - Lorient; U 610 - 623 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 598 - 96 - St. Nazaire.
       
- 227 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
    2) Sightings:  U 604 observed single ship, course 700, speed 17 knots in BE 4816.  No chance to attack.  Same vessel was later reported by U 333 in BE 2481.
      U 260 observed smoke for a short time in BD 3641. Nothing sighted when boat followed-up, probably single ship.
      U D 3 sighted corvette in DS 3650, course 100, speed 8 knots.
    3) U 109: Between 1930 on 25.12. until 1000 on 26.12. U 109 fired double miss, single miss and triple miss in EP 2476 and EP 1559 at an armed independent ship (4 - 5,000 GRT). About 10 minutes after each torpedo attack vessel dropped 1 to 3 depth charges.  Boat suspected "Q" ship. Commander requested permission to return home because of his own nervous state. Was ordered to carry out operation whatever happened.
    4) U 463 sighted convoy of about 5 steamers in CE 7154, course 450. As no attack-boats were in the vicinity, boat was ordered to proceed to supply point ordered.
    5) U 357 outward bound from home, reported poorly defended convoy on easterly course in AL 3874. U 384 and U 525, who were near, were stalking the convoy off their own bat.  All boats were given a free hand.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BE 5767, BE 1662, AL 3898, BE 1838.
    Unidentified convoy unit:  was in exactly located somewhere about AM 1980 - 1990.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 72:
    The expected "ON" convoy was picked-up during the afternoon of 26.12. This delay must have been caused by late departure from port as well as by the bad weather.  The day the convoy was contacted the weather was favorable;  wind S. 1, long swell, visibility 8 miles.  At 1732 U 664 reported the convoy on a southerly course in BE 4131.  Thus the convoy had passed through 50 miles S. of the most southerly position of the patrol strip.  Both Groups, "Spitz" and Ungestüm" totaling 18 submarines, were directed to the convoy.  Contact was maintained until the next morning.  Besides U 664, U 662 reported sighting a convoy in broad formation at 1512, but had to submerge because of plane escort, so lost contact.  At 0044 on 27.12.  U 356 reported that he had contacted the convoy.  At 0400 U 441 also reported contact, but placed the convoy about 30 miles farther to the N.W., probably a very inexact fix. 0700 on 27.12.  U 664 reported convoy in BE 4445.  Convoy
       
- 228 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     was once reported to consist of 10 steamers, once 6 - 10 steamers.  Until midnight course was exactly 1800, then farther S.W. about 220 - 2400.  This change of course to the W. had previously been given to the boats as a probability.  The convoy operation is being continued.
  b) 1) As U 175 had sighted nothing off Dakar, he was ordered to proceed S. and search the sea area off Freetown for shipping.
    2) In order to get some idea of the hitherto completely unknown Trinidad traffic, the boats in the area have been newly distributed.  In the sector between the lines from ED 9855 to DP 9855 to ED 9955 to EP 1755, U 105 is to patrol the northern, U 214 the southern sector.   The sector N. of U 105 will be occupied by U 109, the sector S. of U 214 will be taken by U 124.
      U 217 has been given a free hand in the area round Aruba and Curacao.
    3) The submarines U 381 - 571 - 442 - 620 - 575 - 436, en route to the S. to undertake operations close inshore along the coast of Brazil, have been given the title Group "Delphin" and ordered to remain in square DH 10.  They have been ordered to be in the patrol strip from CF 7958 to DH 1755 by 1200 on 29.12., course 2800, speed 7 knots.  They are being committed in this area because traffic on the Great Circle between New York and the Canaries is suspected, this supposition is also supported by high-grade radio intercept intelligence.
  c)  U 564 took over radar interception spare parts from U 459.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  Naval War Staff agreed in the main with the opinion of B.d.U. on the subject of convoys for blockade runners (see War Diary of 12.12.).  Naval War Staff has therefore ordered that in future escort shall be carried out merely by having two boats available on each side of Route "Anton".  This will avoid the scattering of submarines which would have occurred if the far more extensive wishes of Group West had been complied with.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 229 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
27.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 71
-
BE 68
U 176
-
Op(FC 38)
U 410
-
CD 13
U 569
-
BE 65
 
86
-
Op(CE 69)
177
-
CG 41
432
-
Op(CG 91)
571
-
CF 64
 
92
-
BF 71
178
-
DT 48
435
-
Op(BD 23)
572
-
BE 69
 
103
-
BF 55
181
-
FM 34
436
-
DG 33
575
-
CF 75
 
105
-
Op(EE)
182
-
BE 72
440
-
Op(BD 30)
591
-
Op(BD 34)
 
109
-
Op(EP 19)
185
-
Op(CF)
441
-
Op(BE)
598
-
BF 91
 
117
-
BE 69
203
-
Op(BE)
442
-
CF 82
600
-
BE 60
 
123
-
Op(BD 30)
211
-
BE 69
444
-
AE 79
604
-
BE 49
 
124
-
Op(EE)
214
-
Op(EE)
445
-
BE 45
615
-
Op(BD 62)
 
125
-
DG 53
217
-
Op(EE)
455
-
Op(AK 47)
618
-
Op(CG 55)
 
126
-
DT 45
225
-
AL 17
459
-
CF 31
620
-
CF 83
 
128
-
Op(ER)
257
-
BE 64
461
-
CF 49
621
-
CD 13
 
129
-
CD 95
260
-
Op(BD 66)
463
-
CE 95
628
-
Op(BD 62)
 
130
-
BE 96
266
-
AF 72
506
-
DH 74
631
-
AE 91
 
134
-
Op(ER)
333
-
BE 24
507
-
Op(FC)
632
-
AN 29
 
154
-
CD 95
336
-
Op(AK 80)
508
-
CD 95
653
-
BE 92
 
155
-
Op(CF)
337
-
AN 29
509
-
CF 36
659
-
Op(BD 30)
 
159
-
DG 54
356
-
Op(BE)
514
-
DG 83
662
-
BE 44
 
161
-
DT 43
357
-
AL 19
515
-
Op(CG)
663
-
BF 40
 
163
-
CD 95
373
-
Op(BD 23)
516
-
BE 98
664
-
Op(BE)
 
164
-
Op(FC)
381
-
CF 61
519
-
BF 74
706
-
BE 27
 
167
-
AE 87
384
-
AL 19
524
-
Op(BD 23)
D 3
-
DS 89
 
172
-
BF 81
404
-
BE 24
525
-
AL 29
D 5
-
AL 97
 
174
-
EJ 11
406
-
Op(BD 30)
563
-
BE 16
96
-
BE 91
 
175
-
Op(EK)
409
-
CD 13
564
-
CF 31      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 103 - 126 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 172 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 569 - 600 - 604 - 653 - 663 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 172 - Lorient;  U 600 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  U 413 - Brest.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 164 observed a leak in the pressure hull under battery I, probably caused by corrosion.  Battery bilge made 1 1/2 tons water in 24 hours. It was not possible to repair the damage with materials available on board, boat was no longer capable of deep diving.  Boat was ordered to operate in remote areas, if capable of so doing, U 134 was given the same orders.
    3) U 507 sank British "Oakbank" (5,154 GRT) in ballast from Suez to Georgetown.
    4) U 384 and U 525, which had been stalking the convoy reported by U 357 did not sight it and proceeded to the approach point ordered. So far, no further reports have been received from U 357.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  EE 8799, EB 9398, EO 2130.
    U-boat attack:  EE 8780.
       
- 230 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 72:
    Weather in the convoy area on the morning of 27.12. was reported as:  Wind S.S.W. 5, misty, visibility up to 2 miles. It was misty all day and the convoy was not reported until the morning of 28.12. Visibility 5 miles.
    Until the night of 27.12. convoy maintained its S.W. course.  It was reported again for the first time at 1435 by U 225 in BD 6645, course 2600.  The same boat kept reporting the convoy until 2124.  He then reported that he intended attacking the convoy from this time as no proper shadower reports were received.  Between 2200 or 2300 2 boats reported flares, one boat reported hydrophone location, group noises.  The starshell appeared to be a result of an attack by U 225. At 2400, 0200 and 0400 hydrophone bearings were reported, all showing a southerly course for the convoy.  This caused Operational Control to suspect that boats had contacted a formation, either a smaller convoy formation or an anti-submarine formation, and that the convoy proper had maintained its southwesterly course since U 225's last report.  This possibility was pointed out to the boats. In order to try to carry out an organized search next day at dawn, all boats were requested to report their position.
    0700 U 260 reported the convoy again in BD 9347.  He reported 6 silhouettes.  This report did not make it clear whether it was the real convoy or only a dummy formation.
    Successes reported:
    U 441 sank damaged ship (5,000 GRT)
    U 225 scored a hit on tanker (8,000 GRT)
    The convoy hunt was continued.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U 459 handed over radar interception spare parts to U 185.
    2) U 159 and U 125 carried out their rendezvous to take over oil filter parts.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 507 1 ship
5,154 GRT
  sunk.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 231 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
28.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 71
-
BE 53
U 175
-
Op(ET)
U 406
-
Op(BD 60)
U 524
-
Op(BD 60)
 
86
-
Op(CE 69)
176
-
Op(FC)
409
-
CD 13
525
-
AL 63
 
92
-
BF 52
177
-
GF 35
410
-
CD 13
563
-
AL 87
 
96
-
BF 81
178
-
DS 99
413
-
BF 55
564
-
BE 96
 
103
-
BF 55
181
-
FE 98
432
-
Op(CG 91)
569
-
BF 93
 
105
-
Op(EE)
182
-
CF 13
435
-
Op(BD 90)
571
-
CF 86
 
109
-
Op(EP)
185
-
Op(CF)
436
-
Op(DH)
572
-
BE 61
 
117
-
BE 59
203
-
Op(BD 60)
440
-
Op(BD 90)
575
-
Op(DH)
 
123
-
Op(BD 60)
211
-
BF 54
441
-
Op(BD 60)
591
-
Op(BD 60)
 
124
-
Op(EE)
214
-
Op(EE)
442
-
CF 87
598
-
BF 81
 
125
-
DG 81
217
-
Op(ED)
444
-
AL 24
604
-
BE 56
 
126
-
DT 49
225
-
Op(BD 60)
445
-
BE 45
615
-
Op(BD 60)
 
128
-
Op(ER 55)
257
-
BE 54
455
-
Op(BD 60)
618
-
Op(CG 56)
 
129
-
CD 95
260
-
Op(BD 60)
459
-
CF 55
620
-
CF 88
 
130
-
BF 70
266
-
AE 89
461
-
CF 55
621
-
CD 13
 
134
-
Op(ER)
333
-
AL 88
463
-
CD 90
628
-
Op(BD 60)
 
155
-
CG 12
336
-
Op(BD 60)
506
-
DT 29
631
-
AE 85
 
154
-
CD 95
337
-
AF 87
507
-
Op(FB 66)
632
-
AF 79
 
159
-
DG 58
356
-
Op(BD 90)
508
-
CD 95
653
-
BF 54
 
161
-
DT 21
357
-
AM 10
509
-
CF 65
659
-
Op(BD 60)
 
163
-
CD 95
373
-
BE 17
514
-
DG 87
662
-
Op(BD 60)
 
164
-
Op(FC 35)
381
-
Op(CF 79)
515
-
Op(CG)
663
-
BF 40
 
167
-
AL 22
384
-
AL 39
516
-
CF 36
664
-
Op(BD 60)
 
174
-
DT 72
404
-
AL 87
519
-
BF 70
706
-
BE 13
                   
D 3
-
DG 91
                   
D 5
-
AL 68
 
  On Return Passage:  U 103 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 373 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 604 - 653 - 663 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 92 - Brest;  U 569 - La Pallice.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 86 situation report:  23.12. north, east and south coast of Flores thoroughly searched for torpedoed steamer. Apart from the gunboat "Velho" nothing was sighted.  From 25 -28.12. submarine was on the boundary of the territorial waters Ponta Delgada.  Sighted: 1 steamer on course of 1700, 2 coastal freighters entering port and 4 Swedish Red Cross ships.
      Boat requested permission for protracted return voyage.  He was ordered to start back via BD 98 and search the area for torpedoed vessels that have had to fall out of convoy.  Continue voyage according to fuel position.
    3) U 129 sighted large single ship with S.W. course, high speed, in CE 4884.  No contact.
    4) U 124 reported a small convoy of 2 tankers and 1 destroyer in ED 9689, course 500, speed 9 knots.
       
- 232 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    5) U 217 sank 6,000 ton steamer on 20.12. in EF 89, course 3500. On 29.12. he scored 2 hits on a vessel of "Martarva" class (12,390 GRT) course 3300, speed 15 knots.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  FC 6850, ED 96, EG 9379.
    1 submarine warning from unidentified position (probably Convoy No. 72).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 72:
     Weather on the morning of 28.12. was still unfavorable, wind only S.W. 2 - 3, but very hazy.  Fog was reported until nearly 1400.  It cleared up about 1600 and visibility became very good.  Boats were able to get fixes, which later enabled many boats to find the convoy.  On the morning of 28.12. the convoy was in BD 9347.  From 0700 U 260 kept reporting contact with the convoy.  At midday he was able to pick it up only by hydrophone bearings.   Then when it cleared during the afternoon, U 260 along with 9 other boats was able to maintain contact until dark.  The 9 boats were:  U 336 - 203 - 615 - 123 - 406 - 591 - 664 - 225 - 440.  During the night U 435 - 662 - 628 also picked up the convoy.   Until about 2200 the convoy maintained its course of 1800, with speed of 8 to 9 knots according to dead reckoning.  Then after the first attacks at dusk, it had apparently again divided into 2 formations, one on a westerly course, one on a southerly.  According to reports made on the morning of 29.12. the convoy appeared to have scattered by the submarines.  Several times single ships were reported.
    Successes:
     
    Sunk     Torpedoed
 
1) U 260 2 ships
9,000 GRT
  1 ship
4,000 GRT
 
2) U 225 3 ships
19,000 GRT
  3 ships
12,000 GRT
 
    1 ship
7,000 GRT
   
 
3) U 591 1 damaged vessel
5,000 GRT
  1 ship
5,000 GRT
 
     
 
sinking not observed because of defences
4) U 435 1 destroyer
   
 
5) U 628 1 damaged ship
5,000 GRT
   
 
    1 corvette
   
 
6) U 406 2 ships
11,000 GRT
  1 ship
 
    1 ship left sinking
6,889 GRT
   
 
7) U 123 1 damaged ship
5,000 GRT
  1 ship
9,419 GRT
 
            torpedoed by U 435
            (later sunk by another boat with gunfire)
    After comparing times and grid square details for the sinkings, and after making allowances for the torpedoed vessels and the damaged ships sunk, the total number of ships in the convoy which have been sunk so far amounts to 15 ships (totaling 84,000 GRT), 1 destroyer and 1 corvette, and 3 vessels torpedoed.
 
 
 
- 233 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    The great success achieved during the past night may be ascribed to the following circumstances:
     During the foggy weather the strong group of 18 submarines was not able to achieve any great success.  But as one boat was able to make constant shadower reports from the morning of 28.12. despite the cover of the fog.  After the fog lifted at about 1600 the boats had still 3 hours to pick up the convoy.   About 1730 the new boats were able to make a real surprise attack, and as the enemy escorts were operating at a great distance as remote escort, they had little time before darkness to attack the submarines effectively, or even to find them.   As none of the boats reported being forced away from the convoy, they appeared to have penetrated the remote escort.  During the night itself the close defences appeared to be as good as useless because of the surprising mass attack made by the boats, and they were greatly hampered in their defensive capacity by the continual rescue attempts they had to make.
    The convoy was in BD 9778 on the morning of 29.12.  The hunt continues.
  b) 1) Group "Falke", composed of  the following boats, were on the lookout for an "ON" convoy expected on 31.12.   From 0400 on 31.12. they manned the patrol strip AL 4882 to 9785, in the following order:  U 357 - 444 - 167 - 384 - 525 - 563 - 404 - 333 - 706 - 257 - 71 - 572 - 441.
    2) U 177 was making for square CE 20 to refuel Group "Spitz".
  c) The boats which had been waiting some 10 days in CD 90 for supplies, i.e. U 508 - 154 - 163 - 129 refueled from U 463 and are continuing their homeward voyage.
  d)  The homeward bound "Rhakotis" (Trans: Blockade runner) was picked up at 0900 in CE 1388 by the submarines U 410 - 409 - 621, who were waiting there.  Because of the nearby convoy the ship took a northerly course until 0400, then steered for point "Raummass".  For some inexplicable reason U 409 reported about 1900 that he had given up the convoy duty because of complete breakdown of radar interception gear and was operating against Convoy No. 72.  The commander will have to account for this arbitrary behavior on his return. U 659 was ordered to act as substitute, but could not reach the homeward bound vessel during the night.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 217 1 ship
6,000 GRT
  sunk 1 ship
12,390 GRT
  torpedoed
U 260 2 ships
9,000 GRT
  sunk 1 ship
4,000 GRT
  torpedoed
U 225 4 ships
26,000 GRT
  sunk 3 ships
12,000 GRT
  torpedoed
U 511 1 ship
5,000 GRT
  sunk 1 ship
5,000 GRT
  torpedoed
U 435 1 destroyer
  sunk  
 
U 628 1 ship
5,000 GRT
  sunk  
 
  1 corvette
  sunk  
 
U 406 3 ships
17,889 GRT
  sunk 1 ship
  torpedoed
U 123 1 ship
5,000 GRT
  sunk 1 ship
9,419 GRT
  torpedoed.
   
   
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
 
 
 
- 234 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
29.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 71
-
BE 25
U 176
-
Op(ER)
U 406
-
Op(CE 30)
U 524
-
Op(BD 90)
 
86
-
Op(CE 69)
177
-
FU 96
409
-
CE 25
525
-
AL 67
 
96
-
BF 48
178
-
DT 47
410
-
BD 83
563
-
AL 80
 
103
-
BF 60
181
-
FE 59
413
-
BF 48
564
-
BF 94
 
105
-
Op(EE)
182
-
CF 43
432
-
CG 91
571
-
Op(DH)
 
109
-
Op(EE)
185
-
BE 97
435
-
Op(BD 90)
572
-
BE 55
 
117
-
BE 57
201
-
BF 50
436
-
Op(DH)
575
-
Op(DH)
 
123
-
Op(BD 90)
203
-
Op(BD 90)
440
-
Op(BD 90)
591
-
Op(CE 30)
 
124
-
Op(ED)
211
-
BF 52
441
-
BE 18
598
-
BF 47
 
125
-
DG 88
214
-
Op(EE)
442
-
Op(DH)
604
-
BE 65
 
126
-
DT 27
217
-
Op(EO)
444
-
AL 51
615
-
Op(BD 90)
 
128
-
ER 29
225
-
Op(BD 90)
445
-
BE 55
618
-
Op(CG 56)
 
129
-
CE 48
257
-
BE 16
455
-
Op(BD 90)
620
-
Op(DH)
 
130
-
BF 40
260
-
Op(BD 90)
459
-
CF 84
621
-
BD 58
 
134
-
Op(ER)
266
-
AE 91
461
-
CF 73
628
-
Op(BD 90)
 
154
-
CE 47
333
-
AL 80
463
-
DF 22
631
-
AL 33
 
155
-
BF 74
336
-
Op(BD 90)
506
-
DT 56
632
-
Kristiansand
 
159
-
DG 34
337
-
AF 72
507
-
Op(FB)
653
-
BF 50
 
161
-
DS 33
356
-
Op(BD 90)
508
-
CE 48
659
-
Op(BD 90)
 
163
-
CE 71
357
-
AL 61
509
-
CF 58
662
-
Op(BD 90)
 
164
-
Op(ER)
373
-
BE 51
514
-
DS 24
663
-
BF 50
 
167
-
AL 28
381
-
Op(CF)
515
-
Op(CG 70)
664
-
Op(BD 90)
 
174
-
DT 46
384
-
AL 55
516
-
CF 61
706
-
Op(AL 30)
 
175
-
Op(ET)
404
-
AL 80
519
-
BF 60
D 3
-
DG 63
                   
D 5
-
AL 27
 
  On Return Passage:  U 103 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 130 - 174 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 211 - 373 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 519 - 524 - 604 - 653 - 663 - D 3.
  Entered Port:  U 653 - 201 - 211 - Brest; U 519 - 108 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 631 reported single ship (4,000 GRT) sunk in AL 2357, course 2900.
    3) U 124 tanker convoy last position ED 9694 at 0800 29.12., course 700, 11 knots.  Misses fired, contact lost when forced by plane to submerge.  No air or sea patrol in Tabaca.  Freighter entering port sunk in ED 9964 (4,000 GRT).
  b)  None.
  c)  U-boat sightings:  ED 9680, ED 59, ED 9968, AL 7559.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 72:
     Further successes on night of 27 - 28.12 :
       
- 235 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
 
Sunk:
 
U 435 "Empire Spackletor"
7,000 GRT
 
U 662 1 ship
5,000 GRT
 
  1 ship
  2 hits probably sunk
U 260 1 ship
4,000 GRT
  probably sunk (reported as torpedoed 28.12.)
     Contact was maintained.  Convoy was reported as 10 steamers in double line abreast.  U 260 was detected during a day attack.  U 455 fired a double miss.  U 591 was forced to move away.  Last report at 1830. Contact was lost through bad visibility.  During the night flares were reported several times.   Probably the flares were dropped by escort planes at some distance in order to mislead the submarines.
    Further successes:
    U 225 torpedoed tanker "President Francqui", ship was then sunk by U 336 with a finishing shot.
     U 435 sank single ship (6,000 GRT).
    U 225 reported miss fire at "Q-ship" with plane on board.
     U 615 fired 5 single shots at the same ship with no effect, torpedo nets presumed.   Ship employed plane and worked at night with a shallow M.T.B.
     Convoy hunt was continued.
  b) 1) U 681 joined Group "Falke" and was allocated the position AL 4882 in place of U 357.
    2) U 86 was ordered to make a protracted return via BD 98.  (Position of sinking by Group "Spitz").
  c)  U 659 - 410 - 621 operated according to plan.
  d) The loss of U 357 (last attacking homeward bound convoy in AM) and of U 356 (last attacking Convoy No. 72, Group "Spitz") must be assumed.  Boats have not replied to repeated call-ups.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 631 1 ship
4,000 GRT
 
U 124 1 ship
4,000 GRT
 
U 435 1 ship
7,000 GRT
 
U 662 2 ships
10,000 GRT
 
U 260 1 ship
4,000 GRT
 
U 225)  1 ship
5,000 GRT
 
U 336)  
U 435 1 ship
6,000 GRT.
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
 
 
- 236 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
30.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 71
-
BE 25
U 175
-
Op(ET)
U 409
-
Op(CE 10)
U 525
-
Op(AL 80)
 
86
-
Op(AL 90)
176
-
Op(ER)
410
-
BD 47
563
-
Op(AL 80)
 
96
-
BE 60
177
-
FU 44
413
-
BE 60
564
-
BF 52
 
105
-
Op(EE)
178
-
DT 18
432
-
Op(CG 91)
571
-
Op(CE 90)
 
109
-
Op(EE)
181
-
FE 27
435
-
Op(CE 20)
572
-
BE 24
 
117
-
BD 69
182
-
CF 48
436
-
Op(DG 30)
575
-
Op(CG 30)
 
123
-
Op(CE 10)
185
-
BE 96
440
-
Op(CE 10)
591
-
Op(BD 80)
 
124
-
Op(ED)
203
-
Op(CE 10)
441
-
BE 12
598
-
BE 60
 
125
-
DS 30
214
-
Op(EE)
442
-
Op(CE 10)
604
-
BF 55
 
126
-
DT 22
217
-
EO 19
444
-
Op(AL 48)
615
-
Op(CE 20)
 
128
-
EH 97
225
-
BD 98
445
-
BE 67
618
-
Op(CG 55)
 
129
-
CE 55
257
-
AL 88
455
-
Op(CE 20)
620
-
Op(DG 30)
 
130
-
BF 61
260
-
Op(CE 10)
459
-
DH 15
621
-
BE 47
 
134
-
Op(ER)
266
-
AE 88
461
-
BE 97
628
-
Op(CE 20)
 
154
-
CE 51
333
-
Op(AL 80)
463
-
DF 20
631
-
AL 25
 
155
-
BF 61
336
-
Op(CE 20)
506
-
DT 85
632
-
AN 28
 
159
-
CF 78
337
-
AE 69
507
-
Op(FB)
659
-
BE 47
 
161
-
DG 83
373
-
BE 56
508
-
CE 55
662
-
Op(CE 20)
 
163
-
CE 54
381
-
Op(CE 90)
509
-
CF 87
663
-
BF 55
 
164
-
Op(ER)
384
-
Op(AL 81)
514
-
DS 17
664
-
Op(CE 10)
 
167
-
AL 54
404
-
Op(AL 80)
515
-
Op(CG)
706
-
Op(AL 80)
 
174
-
DT 24
406
-
Op(CE 10)
516
-
CF 59
D 3
-
DH 14
             
524
-
Op(BD 90)
D 5
-
AL 33
 
  On Return Passage:  U 86 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 130 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 225 - 373 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 524 - 604 - 615 - 663 - D 3 - D 5.
  Entered Port:  U 130 - 155 - Lorient;  U 564 -Brest.
  Sailed:  U 584 - Brest;  U 594 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 214 sank 6,000 tonner in ED 9993, course 3300.
    3) U 71 fired 2 single misses at tanker in BE 2289, course 500, 9 knots.  Unsuccessful follow-up.
    4) U 217 Radar interception gear faulty, boat received the requested operational area EO 30 - 90.
    5) U 109 Commander no longer fully fit for duty.  Was ordered to continue operation.  If necessary to hand over the command to the 1st Watch Keeping Officer.
  b)  None.
  c) U-boat sightings:  BE 75, EE 7744, ED 99.
  d)  None.
       
- 237 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 72:
     At 1229 U 455 sighted the convoy in CE 1211.  At 1850 boat reported it in BD 7956 and finally at 2100 in BD 7943.  Contact was then lost for good.   The other boats did not pick it up, as they were operating on the more southerly course of the convoy.  At 0510 U 455 reported from BD 7878 a wide range hydrophone bearing in 2300.  Follow up had no results.  The hunt continued.
     U 435 sank the "Q" ship in CE 3178.  It had already been unsuccessfully attacked by U 225 and U 615 and was probably the "rescue ship" (Trans: English used in the original) of the convoy.  It was somewhat of the "Waldemar Kophamel" class, carrying a seaplane, strong armament and depth charge throwers.  Some 300 to 400 survivors (probably from steamers in the convoy that had been sunk) were drifting on overloaded rafts and in the water.  On account of the worsening weather conditions it must be assumed that a great many were lost.
  b) U 598 - 96 - 413 have been ordered to proceed to AJ 88 (Patrol strip off Newfoundland planned in cooperation with the boats of Group "Blitz" which are up to strength again).
  c)  U 659 - 410 - 621 operated according to plan.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 214 1 ship
6,000 GRT
 
U 435 1 ship
5,000 GRT.
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
31.December 1942.
 
 
 
I.
U 71
-
Op(AL 88)
U 177
-
FT 39
U 413
-
BE 64
U 563
-
Op(AL)
 
86
-
BD 98
178
-
DG 91
432
-
CG 46
571
-
Op(CE 80)
 
96
-
BE 59
181
-
ET 78
435
-
BD 94
572
-
Op(AL 97)
 
105
-
Op(EE)
182
-
CF 78
436
-
Op(DG 20)
575
-
Op(DG 20)
 
109
-
Op(EE)
185
-
BF 50
440
-
Op(CD 30)
584
-
BF 54
 
117
-
BD 94
203
-
CE 24
441
-
Op(AL 97)
591
-
BD 94
 
123
-
Op(BD 70)
214
-
Op(ED)
442
-
Op(CE 80)
594
-
BF 91
 
124
-
Op(ED)
217
-
Op(EO)
444
-
Op(AL)
598
-
BE 46
 
125
-
DS 27
225
-
CE 23
445
-
BF 47
604
-
BF 50
 
126
-
DH 79
257
-
Op(AL)
455
-
Op(BD 70)
615
-
CE 23
 
128
-
EH 68
260
-
Op(CD 30)
459
-
DH 44
618
-
Op(CG 55)
 
129
-
CE 37
266
-
AL 31
461
-
BF 71
620
-
Op(DG 20)
 
134
-
Op(ER)
333
-
Op(AL)
463
-
DF 20
621
-
BE 57
 
154
-
CE 34
336
-
BD 94
506
-
EJ 18
628
-
BD 94
 
159
-
CF 81
337
-
AE 83
507
-
Op(FB)
631
-
AL 42
 
161
-
DG 65
373
-
BE 66
508
-
CE 38
632
-
AN 26
 
163
-
CE 36
381
-
Op(CE 80)
509
-
DH 14
659
-
BE 57
 
164
-
Op(ER)
384
-
Op(AL)
514
-
DR 65
662
-
CD 33
 
167
-
Op(AL)
404
-
Op(AL)
515
-
Op(CG)
663
-
BF 50
 
174
-
DG 96
406
-
Op(CE 10)
516
-
CF 88
664
-
Op(CE 10)
 
175
-
Op(ET)
409
-
BD 97
524
-
BD 94
706
-
Op(AL)
 
176
-
Op(ER)
410
-
BE 57
525
-
Op(AL)
D 3
-
CF 84
                   
D 5
-
AM
 
       
- 238 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 86 - 126 - 128 - 129 - 154 - 159 - 161 - 163 - 174 - 177 - 178 - 181 - 185 - 203 - 225 - 373 - 445 - 461 - 508 - 524 - 604 - 615 - 663 - D 3 - D 5.
  Entered Port:  U 604 - 663 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 438 - Brest;  U 511 - 522 - Lorient; U 226 - 303 - 186 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 72, see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 174 sighted neutral Spanish vessel in DT 1134, course S.W., 9-10 knots.
    3) U 257 reported bombs in AL 8598 (area of patrol strip of Group "Falke").
    4) U 175 reported situation in ET 3710 - 40.  Single ship sighted in 3715, 900. When attack was made on a single destroyer boat was followed for 7 hours with hydrophones and Asdic.  No depth charges dropped.
  b) Air reconnaissance for homeward bound blockade runner "Rhakotis".
  c) U-boat sightings:  EN 33, ED 99, AL 8867.
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 72:
    Contact was not reestablished during the day. As only 5 boats still had sufficient fuel to continue operating the convoy hunt was broken off at dusk.  Intended schedule:  U 117 is to refuel the 5 boats with the most fuel in the sea area reached.  Later they are to operate in AJ with 3 boats en route to the area from Western France in order to pick up an "SC" convoy.
    For summing up see War Diary for 28.12.1942.
    No further information.
  b) 1) U 217 has been allocated operational area EO 10 - 60 as requested because of Radar interception gear breakdown.  U 214 has taken over "Reichenbach's" task, i.e. a sortie to Aruba.
    2) As the outward bound convoy was not picked up at the right moment, Group "Falke" was ordered to cruise in the patrol area from 1900, speed 7 knots, course 2250.
      Overlapping night formation. From 1.1.1943 at 1030 proceed on reversed course, 7 knots.
  c)  U 621 - 410 - 659 operated according to plan.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
       
                                                                    (Signed):  DÖNITZ.
       
       
- 239 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Enclosure in War Diary.
Situation Report 19.12.1942.
       
1)   As anticipated and already set out in the report dated 27.11., submarine successes during December have very slightly fallen off.  B.d.U. considers this fact and its causes of fundamental importance.
       
2) In addition to the effect of conditions in theaters of war on "tonnage war", the special tasks  which submarines have been called upon to fulfil have decisively limited submarine successes.
  a)  Mediterranean:  The situation has developed as anticipated in B.d.U.'s situation reports of 18.11 and 26.11.   Total successes since 26.11 amount to one cruiser, two destroyers and only one transport, also one possible destroyer.  Yet the submarines have done their utmost.  A report made by one of the best and most experienced Commanders sums up the matter:  "In the Western Mediterranean it is hardly possible to exist".  Thus it can be said that the extra boats sent to the Mediterranean served no purpose there, but dealt a heavy blow at the "tonnage war" in the Atlantic, especially because the boats handed over for Mediterranean operations were all commanded by exceptionally able men.  B.d.U. therefore requests that the order to send another boat there at the January new moon shall be cancelled.
  b) Attacks on supply lines to Gibraltar and Morocco:  Submarines first fought under very bad conditions immediately W. of Gibraltar and Morocco because they knew how vital the matter was.   But the enemy's defences forced them to leave the area.  Reports by Commanders who have returned confirm the necessity for this moving out of the area, the number of losses was entirely disproportionate to the successes.  The attempt to achieve success with single boats immediately outside the harbors was unsuccessful.   This was again only to be expected. Despite the sinking of 4 ships the operation W. of the Azores by Group "Westwall" is not considered a success.  Only chance successes may be expected from the intended operation W. of Portugal. The tying down of the "Westwall" boats for this operation has had a very bad effect on the "tonnage war" in the Atlantic and off Trinidad.
  c) The effect of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar operation on the enemy can be summed up as follows in the view of B.d.U.:
     The enemy has lost some 160,000 GRT in this area.  But to offset this, he has gained to the extent of the fall in sinkings in the main theaters of naval war.  This gain can be assumed as the difference between a normal monthly sinking figure to be expected for December, i.e. at least 300,000 GRT. Thus the enemy has gained a considerable amount of tonnage which he can use to strengthen the African front.
  d) Some easing of the situation in Northern Waters has been ordered, but this will not become apparent until the beginning of January, as the boats which have been released must undergo a dockyard period.  
 
 
 
- 240 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  e) As an addition to duties for which boats are diverted from the main theatres, convoy escorting is increasing, which if case "Elfenbein" should arise, would demand more boats than originally laid down by Naval War Staff.  (Ref:  IK 2666).  Attention is drawn to the assessment of the value of submarines for escort duties, which has already been submitted.  Effective use would certainly be achieved by submarines at a distance of about 50-60 miles.  This would require 15 boats if visibility was 10 miles.  Even this reconnaissance would not suffice at night, it would be useless as soon as the boats were forced to submerge by planes.  Then more boats would be needed for close escort, although it is highly improbable that they would be able to carry out these duties if need arose.  It is quite obvious that such a number of submarines cannot be supplied.  If numbers are less, the chances of  success are practically nil.  Even a few submarines represent a loss for the war on merchant shipping.  ("tonnage war").  One convoy duty from Point "Trosse" usually represents almost an entire commitment for each submarine that takes part, the flank defences on Route "Anton" cause considerable delays because of the uncertainty of times of the homeward or outward voyage.  Even if these duties occur "only two or three times a month", they represent a constant drain of 3 - 4 boats from operations, and yet this is not compensated for by a really efficient convoy for the ship.  Submarines are not capable of providing sufficient protection; there is no other protection.  Thus B.d.U. considers that the present situation for blockade runners is similar to that for surface supply at the time of the Bismark undertaking.
       
3)   All these duties make inroads on the submarine's main task: war on merchant shipping.  The weather during December has also had a bad effect.  The weather renders refueling in the North Atlantic almost impossible at this season.  It is all the more necessary to put more boats into the "tonnage war", now that most of the boats out in the North Atlantic will shortly have to return to base, although there are not sufficient reinforcements and although bad gaps have occurred and will occur in the successful areas off Trinidad and the coast of Brazil because of lack of boats.
  As an example of the effect caused by boats being withdrawn, only 3 boats could at first be sent on to the convoy "HX219", about which excellent radio intercept intelligence was available.  Had more boats been on hand successes would have been far greater.
       
4) The "tonnage war" is the main task for submarines, probably the decisive contribution of submarines to winning the war.  This war on merchant shipping must be carried out where the greatest successes can be achieved with the smallest losses.
  In order to achieve this, the present situation must be accepted with open eyes and determined efforts made to concentrate everything possible on the main task, while accepting the gaps and disadvantages this will cause elsewhere.
 
 
 
- 241 -