F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 October 1943

PG30333

     
     
 
1.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 CE 45
U 218
-
 CE 66
U 389
-
 AL 11
U 584
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
91
-
 BE 41
220
-
 BC 38
402
-
 Op(AK 36)
603
-
 Op(AK 38)
 
92
-
 BE 53
221
-
 BE 50
419
-
 Op(AK 36)
610
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
103
-
 BE 88
231
-
 BF 73
422
-
 BE 46
631
-
 Op(AK 63)
 
107
-
 BF 80
238
-
 BE 92
437
-
 BE 69
641
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
123
-
 Op(EE 80)
260
-
 Op(AK 36)
448
-
 Op(AK 38)
643
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
155
-
 CE 36
264
-
 BE 87
455
-
 CF 56
645
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
161
-
 Op(FJ 80)
270
-
 BE 82
460
-
 BD 97
666
-
 Op(AK 34)
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
275
-
 Op(AK 03)
470
-
 AF 72
667
-
 CG 15
 
170
-
 ER 43
279
-
 AK 22
488
-
 CE 45
731
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
177
-
 BF 68
305
-
 Op(AK 03)
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
758
-
 Op(AK 34)
 
181
-
 DG 96
309
-
 AE 68
532
-
 Op(LC 30)
762
-
 AF 72
 
183
-
 Op(LJ 80)
336
-
 Op(AK 34)
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
848
-
 AE 76
 
188
-
 MQ 27
377
-
 BE 52
536
-
 BB 40
952
-
 Op(AK 38)
 
214
-
 EC 67
378
-
 Op(AK 36)
537
-
 AF 87
964
-
 AO
 
196
-
 DT 43
386
-
 BE 59
539
-
 Op(AK 34)
969
-
 AO
 
  On Return Passage:  U 107 - 177 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 422 - 667.
  Entered Port:  U 177 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 631 reported on aircraft attack from AK 0364.
    2) U 402 beat off an aircraft attack in AK 0335.
      See para. IV.
  b) Our own aircraft sighted 17 - 19 merchant ships, 5 - 10,000 GRT, 5 escort vessels including 2 - 3 destroyers, probably one cruiser, course 3600, 7 knots at 1840 in BE 9719.
  c) 1) Enemy units located:  BF 2780, BF 5120, AK 8830.
    2) U-boat sightings:  KZ 8780, 2 sightings in undecyphered positions, probably North Atlantic (Group "Rossbach").
  d) 1) According to a radio message now deciphered, ONS 19 had instructions on 27.9. to be at the rendezvous AL 3884 on 29.9.
      The stragglers' route for the same convoy was also altered on 1.10.  Positions were not resolved.
      Stragglers between 20 and 350 W. were to go to Iceland if they could not reach the convoy assembly point.
    2) The following was radioed to ON 204 and stragglers.
      First rendezvous on 30.9. in AM 0189, second rendezvous on 1.10 in AL 3859.  Course from there 3040.  Stragglers which cannot reach the convoy should return to England.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) ONS 19, expected from 1400, has not so far appeared.  Taking into account the rendezvous in AL 3884 ordered for 29.9., and the course of 3040 steered by ON 204, it can be taken as
       
- 224 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     fairly certain that ONS 19 will also evade to the North.
    The course instructions for 3040 mentioned in paragraph III d) 2) would lead the convoy just north of the patrol line.  The latter was therefore transferred 60 miles bearing 3500.  Boats without Wanze (Trans. Note:  Radar interception gear) were moved so that the line was now from AD 8511 to AK 3834 in the following order:
    U 643 - 641 - 539 - 666 - 336 - 731 - 758 - 584 - 610 - 419 - 279 - 378 - 952 - 645 - 260 - 603 - 275 - 448 - 305 - 631 - 402.
    The air attacks on U 631 and 402 could have been made by the air escort of HX 258, which should be in the vicinity.  It is of course possible that ONS 19 is steering that far south contrary to all calculations. Group "Rossbach" was informed that ONS 19 (W-bound) might be expected anywhere in the area of the new and the old patrol line.  If an E-bound convoy was sighted boats were not to operate.  Use was however to be made of any chances arising.
  b)  U 91 and 437 are to steer for AK 80.  Boats are to operate against convoy traffic.
  c)  None.
  d)  U 279 has carried out her special operation, landing an agent in Iceland.  The order radioed on 21.9. not to land the agent was probably received too late, or possibly not at all, reception conditions being bad.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
2.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 CE 45
U 220
-
 BC 29
U 402
-
 Op(AK 38)
U 610
-
 Op(AK 34)
 
91
-
 BD 31
221
-
 BE 54
419
-
 Op(AK 34)
631
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
92
-
 BE 65
231
-
 BF 72
422
-
 BE 58
641
-
 Op(AD 88)
 
103
-
 CF 24
238
-
 BF 71
437
-
 BE 68
643
-
 Op(AD 80)
 
107
-
 BF 80
260
-
 Op(AK 36)
448
-
 Op(AK 38)
645
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
123
-
 Op(EE 80)
264
-
 BE 78
455
-
 CF 51
666
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
155
-
 CE 37
270
-
 BE 94
460
-
 BD 97
667
-
 CG 21
 
161
-
 Op(FJ 80)
275
-
 Op(AK 38)
470
-
 AF 47
731
-
 Op(AD 88)
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
279
-
 Op(AK 32)
488
-
 CE 45
758
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
170
-
 ER 73
305
-
 Op(AK 38)
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
762
-
 AF 74
 
181
-
 DH 41
309
-
 AE 59
532
-
 Op(LC 30)
848
-
 AF 78
 
183
-
 Op(LJ 80)
336
-
 Op(AK 32)
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
952
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
188
-
 MF 22
377
-
 BE 64
536
-
 BB 40
964
-
 AN 36
 
196
-
 DG 99
378
-
 Op(AK 34)
537
-
 AF 76
969
-
 AN 36
 
214
-
 EC 81
386
-
 BE 68
539
-
 Op(AK 32)      
 
218
-
 CE 67
389
-
 AL 11
584
-
 Op(AK 34)      
             
603
-
 Op(AK 36)      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 107 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 422 - 667.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 154 - 271 - 413 - Brest; U 608 - St. Nazaire;  U 424 - 849 - Kiel.
       
- 225 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter reconnaissance in outer Biscay and reconnaissance against ON convoys.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) According to U 68, U 488 sighted carrier-borne aircraft on her way north in DG 19 and CE 75.
  b)  Our own aircraft sighted 4 troop transports of up to 20,000 GRT, 3 destroyers, 4 escort vessels at 1143 in AM 8147, speed 10 - 14 knots, course 2100.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in CG 4720, BF 1470.
    2) U-boat sightings:  in CA 8775, LD 1760 (U 532).
  d) The stragglers' route for ON 204 was again altered on 30.9. and now lends through AD 7218.
     On 30.9. ONS 19 stragglers had been instructed to proceed via AD 8924 and AD 7726, this route also was changed at 1348 and now leads through AD 7219.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) According to the most recent Radio Intelligence (X) reports (see III d) the stragglers from ONS 19 and ON 204 will be passing approximately the same positions.  It is assumed therefore that both the convoys are on a very northerly route.  The patrol line was therefore moved 50 miles bearing 3500.  Boats left at 0000 at 7 knots.  When the new positions were reached the line extended from AD 8136 to AK 3629.
    If ONS 19 has chosen the northern route, as expected, it should arrive by P.M. 3.10., if it makes 6 knots (only in heavy weather).
     ON 204, at its normal speed of 9 knots, could be in the patrol line from 3.10.
     The following points are raised by the fact that the enemy is taking such unusually extensive avoiding action and constantly altering the stragglers' routes:
    1) It is possible that enemy air reconnaissance is still, unknown to the boats, detecting the patrol line (Cm radar) and the convoy is therefore drawn further north.
    2) Owing to the Italian treachery, the enemy has captured Radio Intelligence groups, who knew of the breaking of the English ciphers.  It is therefore not impossible that the enemy is making use of this information and is deliberately deceiving the German Radio Intelligence Service and U-boat Operational Control by making radio messages of convoy and stragglers' routes which are not actually to be used.
       
- 226 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      It is obvious again that the main problem in the U-boat war is the finding of convoys and that this problem will only finally be solved by constant operation of long-range aircraft.
  b)  U 91 is proceeding to AK 17 at economical cruising speed and is to operate against the expected convoy if necessary.
  c) U 422 is once more fully fit for operations and will refuel from U 460 on 4.10. in BD 9755 for further operation.  Next approach point is AK 85.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
3.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 DF 62
U 220
-
 BC 43
U 402
-
 Op(AK 38)
U 584
-
 Op(AD 88)
 
91
-
 AK 89
221
-
 BE 50
413
-
 BF 54
603
-
 Op(AK 34)
 
92
-
 AK 89
231
-
 BE 93
419
-
 Op(AK 32)
608
-
 BF 67
 
103
-
 CF 18
238
-
 BF 72
422
-
 BD 83
610
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
107
-
 BF 61
260
-
 Op(AK 34)
424
-
 AO
631
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
123
-
 Op(EE 80)
264
-
 BD 99
437
-
 BE 64
641
-
 Op(AD 85)
 
154
-
 BF 54
270
-
 BE 99
448
-
 Op(AK 36)
643
-
 Op(AD 95)
 
155
-
 CE 51
271
-
 BF 54
455
-
 CE 39
645
-
 Op(AK 34)
 
161
-
 Op(FJ 88)
275
-
 Op(AK 36)
460
-
 BD 97
666
-
 Op(AD 85)
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
279
-
 Op(AK 32)
470
-
 AE 66
667
-
 BF 78
 
170
-
 ER 79
305
-
 Op(AK 36)
488
-
 CE 42
731
-
 Op(AD 88)
 
181
-
 DH 12
309
-
 AE 83
518
-
 DM 19
758
-
 Op(AD 88)
 
183
-
 Op(LJ 80)
336
-
 Op(AD 88)
532
-
 Op(LC 30)
762
-
 AE 66
 
188
-
 MF 94
377
-
 BE 69
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
848
-
 AE 78
 
196
-
 DH 44
378
-
 Op(AK 32)
536
-
 BB 40
849
-
 AO
 
214
-
 EB 96
386
-
 BF 71
537
-
 AF 72
952
-
 Op(AK 34)
 
218
-
 CE 85
389
-
 AL 10
539
-
 Op(AD 85)
964
-
 AN 29
                   
969
-
 AN 35
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 107 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 422 - 667.
  Entered Port:  U 107 - Lorient.
  Sailed:  U 267 - 552 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) Report from U 275 and 610 see paragraph IVa.
  b) Our own aircraft sighted a convoy of 4 merchant ships up to 10,000 GRT, 1 tanker, 6 destroyers, course 2500, speed 10 knots, at 0951 in BE 3162.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in BE 9890, AL 6370, BE 9440, BE 2990, BE 6110.
    2) U-boat sightings:  AK 3411, ED 5599, ED 9494 (U 123).  1 sighting in an unresolved position.
       
- 227 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) An enemy aircraft reported from an undecyphered position (probably N. Atlantic):  U-boat sighted, but result of attack not observed.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  ONS 19 can no longer be expected.  The convoy is almost certainly already W. of the patrol line.  There is no clue to whether it skirted the patrol line or passed through it.  It is possible that the aircraft sightings by U 402 and U 631 on 1.10. were connected with ONS 19 and not HX 258.
     ON 204 may be expected in the patrol line from 1400.  It is likely to arrive later however owing to the prevailing weather (average of N.W. 5 - 6).
     At 1647 U 610 reported an attack by 2 or more aircraft from AD 8815.  According to Radio Intelligence another U-boat was also sighted at 1630 in AK 3411 (U 275).
    As this could have been the air escort of the expected convoy and there were sufficient boats north and south of the positions reported, Group "Rossbach" was left in a patrol line and ordered to keep a sharp lookout.  They were not ordered to proceed towards the convoy as passage by day seemed too dangerous in an area covered by strong air reconnaissance and would also have meant a certain loosening of the formation.
    Towards 0500 U 275 reported that she had been attacked at 1140 in AK 3416 by a Hudson flying out of the clouds without radar; aircraft had made a low-level attack with bombs and guns.  Boat was undamaged and was later able to dive unobserved.  At 0700 a corrupt message was received according to which a boat had been hunted with hydrophones at 1645 in AD 8511.  This message was made again at 1035/4 by U 666 and stated that the boat was heavily depth-charged after being hunted with hydrophones by an A/S group and had left her position owing to damage.
     Clearly therefore, the enemy must already have known a great deal by afternoon about the dispersion of the patrol line.  It is not known whether the A/S Group belonged to the convoy or what avoiding action the latter took after the patrol line had been detected, as so far the convoy has not been intercepted.
     It is regrettable that U 666's report was received too late for there to be any chance of obtaining any information on the A/S group or the convoy.
  b) 1) U 170 has freedom of action in the whole S. American coastal area N. of the latitude of GB 44, concentrating off Rio de Janeiro.
    2) U 68 is to make for FH 10.  She is to operate in the coastal area of Guinea Bay.
    3) U 536 has been ordered to report the situation, her position and the completion of her special operation, as soon as she has been discovered.  She is operating in the
 
 
 
- 228 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Gulf of St. Lawrence according to her fuel stocks and the A/S situation.
    4) U 389 will steer for AK 3680 to extend the "Rossbach" line.  She has not yet made a passage report. She has been ordered not to do so until told.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
    C. in C. Navy has ordered that 9 of the 21 boats operating in Northern Waters are to be withdrawn for Atlantic warfare.  They are U 212 - 586 - 629 - 625 - 269 - 960 - 956 - 302 - 355.  12 boats will remain with F.O. U/B Norway, i.e.:  U 703 - 277 - 307 - 713 - 601 - 387 - 737 - 360 - 255 - 354 - 636 - 711.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
4.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 DF 92
U 221
-
 BE 40
U 402
-
 Op(AK 36)
U 584
-
 Op(AD 85)
 
91
-
 AK 58
231
-
 BE 92
413
-
 BF 57
603
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
92
-
 BF 47
238
-
 BF 81
419
-
 Op(AD 88)
608
-
 BF 57
 
103
-
 CE 37
260
-
 Op(AK 32)
422
-
 BD 97
610
-
 Op(AD 88)
 
123
-
 Op(EO 10)
264
-
 BD 97
424
-
 AN 36
631
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
154
-
 BF 57
267
-
 BF 67
437
-
 BE 52
641
-
 Op(AD 81)
 
155
-
 CE 43
270
-
 BF 77
448
-
 Op(AK 34)
643
-
 Op(AD 81)
 
161
-
 Op(FQ)
271
-
 BF 54
455
-
 CE 31
645
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
275
-
 Op(AK 34)
460
-
 BD 97
666
-
 Op(AD 81)
 
170
-
 FC 19
279
-
 Op(AD 88)
470
-
 AE 68
667
-
 BF 84
 
181
-
 CF 83
305
-
 Op(AK 34)
488
-
 CE 43
731
-
 Op(AD 85)
 
188
-
 Op(MF 60)
309
-
 AE 82
518
-
 Op(DM)
758
-
 Op(AD 85)
 
183
-
 Op(LJ)
336
-
 Op(AD 85)
532
-
 Op(LC)
762
-
 AE 68
 
196
-
 DH 16
377
-
 BF 47
533
-
 Op(MP)
848
-
 AL 51
 
214
-
 Op(EL 20)
378
-
 Op(AD 88)
536
-
 Op(BB 40)
849
-
 AN 36
 
218
-
 CE 79
386
-
 BF 72
537
-
 AF 47
952
-
 Op(AK 32)
 
220
-
 BC 17
389
-
 AL 13
539
-
 Op(AD 81)
964
-
 AN 31
             
552
-
 BF 67
969
-
 AN 31
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 270 - 377 - 386 - 667.
  Entered Port:  U 964 - 969 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 256 - 516 - Brest;  U 953 - La Pallice;  U 540 - Bergen;  U 841 - Drontheim.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 455 reported an attack by a carrier-borne aircraft in BD 9753 (U 460's supply square).
    2) U 758 was observed by a Catalina at 0900 in the Group "Rossbach" patrol line and sighted a patrol vessel steering searching courses at 1100 in AD 8571.
       
- 229 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  None.
  c) 1) English unit was located in AM 4140.
    2) U-boat sightings:  AK 3224, AD 8544 and 7 sightings in undecyphered positions, 3 of them probably in the North Atlantic.
    3) Aircraft reported from AK 3228:  U-boat dived, result of attack not observed.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  Group "Rossbach" proceeded E. on a course of 900, speed 8 knots from 1000.  This was to make it as difficult as possible for the convoy to evade to the north or south, if it was still E. of the patrol line.
     At 1700 the following report was received from U 336:  "From first light aircraft every hour, course W, presume they belong to the convoy.  Yesterday 2100 destroyer in AD 8511, course W."  According to this report the convoy must presumably have passed the patrol line at 2100, at a time when the next boat, U 666, was forced to submerge because of an A/S group and heavily depth-charged.  U 336's destroyer was presumably part of the remote escort.  Why this extremely important report from U 336 was not made immediately will have to be explained when the Commanding Officer returns.
     One thing is certain:  because the reports from U 336 and U 666 (See War Log of 3.10.) were not received in time Operations Control had no knowledge of the so far most important information and the only correct order, to press on and search, could not be given.
    The whole operation therefore failed, in spite of some information provided by Radio Intelligence (X) Service which afterwards turned out to be right.
    It is useless now for Group "Rossbach" to press on, as the distance is too great and the weather is deteriorating, the Group has been cruising E. since 1000 at 8 knots.
    The Group has been ordered to remain in position line at 1700 as patrol line.
    All information on the expected convoys is after all, based only on guesswork and there is still plenty of time before Group "Rossbach's" next operation, so the boats will remain in their positions for the night to cover the last possibility; that so far only the ONS convoy has passed and ON 204 is still E. of the line.
    This operation has shown again how difficult it is to intercept a convoy on Radio Intelligence data if there has been no reconnaissance by our own forces.  Radio Intelligence data is uncertain in so far as:
 
 
 
- 230 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    1) the enemy's preliminary orders are subject to weather conditions and consequent delay of the convoy.
    2) it is never known for certain whether the enemy has already made an alteration in the route previously ordered.
     The only usable data for an operation is sighting reports or, failing this, more complete Radio Intelligence reports than can at present be obtained.  For the case in question reconnaissance results from aircraft, (Ju 290) which could have reached the area from Norway, would have been of decisive importance for the operation.
  b) After completing their special operations, U 220 is to steer for BD 80 to hand over her remaining fuel and U 214 to operate in the Caribbean sea area according to her fuel stocks and at her own discretion.
  c) Because of the appearance of carrier-borne aircraft (report from U 445) the supply rendezvous for U 460 - 422 - 264 and 455 has been transferred to BD 8135.
  d) U 221 has not made a passage report since leaving St. Nazaire on 20.9.  She must be presumed lost.  As there are no reports of air attacks it is possible that U 221 may have been destroyed by an enemy submarine.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
5.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 DS 11
U 238
-
 BF 82
U 419
-
 Op(AD 89)
U 584
-
 Op(AD 86)
 
91
-
 AK 51
256
-
 BF 55
422
-
 BD 85
603
-
 Op(AL 11)
 
92
-
 BF 48
260
-
 AL 11
424
-
 AN 31
608
-
 BF 49
 
103
-
 CE 51
264
-
 BD 85
437
-
 BE 43
610
-
 Op(AD 86)
 
123
-
 Op(EO 10)
267
-
 BF 57
448
-
 Op(AL 13)
631
-
 Op(AL 13)
 
154
-
 BF 48
270
-
 BF 76
455
-
 BD 85
641
-
 Op(AD 82)
 
155
-
 CE 43
271
-
 BF 45
460
-
 BD 85
643
-
 Op(AD 82)
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 20)
275
-
 Op(AL 13)
470
-
 AE 67
645
-
 Op(AL 11)
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
279
-
 Op(AD 89)
488
-
 CE 43
666
-
 Op(AD 84)
 
170
-
 FC 49
305
-
 Op(AL 13)
516
-
 BF 55
667
-
 BF 85
 
181
-
 CF 62
309
-
 AE 84
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
731
-
 Op(AD 75)
 
183
-
 Op(LJ 80)
336
-
 Op(AD 82)
532
-
 Op(LC 20)
758
-
 Op(AD 85)
 
188
-
 Op(MF 30)
377
-
 BF 48
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
762
-
 AE 67
 
196
-
 CF 91
378
-
 Op(AD 89)
536
-
 Op(BB 40)
841
-
 AF 58
 
214
-
 Op(EL 20)
386
-
 BF 81
537
-
 AE 69
848
-
 AL 57
 
218
-
 DF 36
389
-
 AK 36
539
-
 Op(AD 82)
849
-
 AN 31
 
220
-
 Op(BB 63)
402
-
 Op(AL 15)
540
-
 AF 87
952
-
 Op(AD 89)
 
231
-
 BE 91
413
-
 BF 48
552
-
 BF 58
953
-
 BF 67
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 270 - 377 - 376 - 667.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 226 - 592 - St. Nazaire;  U 219 - 967 - Kiel;  U 426 - 842 - 964 - 969 - Bergen;  U 963 - 966 - Drontheim.
       
- 231 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 270 sighted an unidentified silhouette in BF 6773 at 2315.  No reply to R/S challenge.
    2) U 848 reported:  short-time location transmission at night in AE 8674.  Subsequently depth-charges from surface vessel.
    3) Reports from Group "Rossbach" boats (U 305 - 666 - 731) see paragraph IVa).
  b) None.
  c) 1) English units were located in:  BE 3350, AK 6270, BE 6220, AK 98 - 99.
    2) U-boat sightings:  6 sightings in unidentified positions.
    3) Torpedo report and SSS from an unidentified steamer from MF 2562 (U 188 or Japanese boat?).
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) From 0800 Group "Rossbach" proceeded south, course 1950, days run 150 miles.
    It is intended to order a new disposition for 7.10. and proceed in the direction of an expected HX convoy.
    The following reports were received from "Rossbach" boats.  U 666 is able to dive to 80 meters and is having to start on her return passage on account of depth-charge damage (anti-submarine group).  U 731 was attacked and bombed 3 times by a Mitchell on 4.10.  This boat is also returning because the Commanding Officer and 5 others are wounded and she has suffered some damage.
    U 305 likewise reported damage so severe that there is no question of further operation.  She will return after delivering 10 cbm fuel to U 731.
    4 other boats (U 402 - 584 - 758 - 952) are so short of fuel that they will have to be replenished for further operations.  14 boats of the one-time Group "Rossbach" will therefore remain for the new disposition (including U 260).
  b) 1) U 91 is making for AK 97 at economical cruising speed.  She will join Group "Rossbach".
    2) U 231 has made her passage report and is proceeding on to AK 85.
       
- 232 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  U 264 reported:  After supplying from U 460 in BD 9755, attacked by several carrier-borne aircraft.  U 455 and 260 dived after fighting the aircraft for half an hour.  U 460 and 422 not observed diving.
    Later in BD 9761 another surprise attack at low level by 4 carrier-borne aircraft.  Damaged by bombs and guns.  Returning.  U 155 has been ordered to report the situation if U 460 has not arrived at the new rendezvous in BD 8135 by midday on 6.10.
  d)  Japanese U-boat (Flieder) sailed today for Japan.  She will proceed south from point Liere along the Spanish coastal route to CG 23.  From here she will steer W.S.W.  Boats have been informed.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
    In Serial Order No. 20 boats have been given the following information on rocket projectors in merchant ships:
    According to statements by prisoners, rocket firing gear is fitted on the poop in some English merchant ships.  There are two rocket units on a swivel platform, each with 12 rockets.  The trainer sits between the 2 units in a steel sugarloaf shelter.
  The rockets can be fired in groups of 4 up to 24 at a time;  the projectiles have adjustable time fuzes.  They are said to fan out after being fired.  The range is small, about 2,000 - 3,000 meters.  They are used mainly against aircraft, but can be used against attacking U-boats and S-boats.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
6.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 DS 27
U 238
-
 BF 82
U 424
-
 AN 31
U 610
-
 Op(AK 34)
 
91
-
 AK 55
256
-
 BF 54
426
-
 AF 87
631
-
 Op(AK 03)
 
92
-
 BF 57
260
-
 Op(AK 38)
437
-
 BE 17
641
-
 Op(AD 32)
 
103
-
 CE 43
264
-
 BD 74
448
-
 Op(AK 34)
643
-
 Op(AD 88)
 
123
-
 Op(EO 10)
267
-
 BF 49
455
-
 BD 81
645
-
 Op(AK 38)
 
154
-
 BF 72
270
-
 BF 64
460
-
 BD 81
666
-
 AL 13
 
155
-
 CE 43
271
-
 BF 44
470
-
 AE 83
667
-
 BF 82
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 20)
275
-
 Op(AK 03)
488
-
 CE 83
731
-
 AK 35
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
279
-
 Op(AK 39)
516
-
 BF 67
758
-
 Op(AK 34)
 
170
-
 FC 79
305
-
 Op(AK 03)
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
762
-
 AE 83
 
181
-
 CG 18
309
-
 AE 79
532
-
 Op(LC 20)
841
-
 AF 57
 
183
-
 Op(LJ 80)
336
-
 Op(AK 32)
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
842
-
 AF 87
 
188
-
 Op(MF 30)
377
-
 BF 81
536
-
 BB 91
848
-
 AL 74
 
196
-
 CF 69
378
-
 Op(AK 36)
537
-
 AE 67
849
-
 AN 31
 
214
-
 Op(EL 20)
386
-
 BF 82
539
-
 Op(AK 32)
952
-
 Op(AK 36)
 
218
-
 DF 61
389
-
 AK 36
540
-
 AF 76
953
-
 BF 67
 
219
-
 AO
402
-
 Op(AK 63)
552
-
 BF 49
963
-
 AF 58
 
220
-
 Op(BB 63)
413
-
 BF 47
584
-
 Op(AK 34)
964
-
 AF 87
 
226
-
 BF 91
419
-
 Op(AK 36)
592
-
 BF 91
966
-
 AF 58
 
231
-
 BE 57
422
-
 BD 81
603
-
 Op(AK 38)
967
-
 AO
             
608
-
 BF 48
969
-
 AF 87
 
       
- 233 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 260 - 264 - 305 - 377 - 386 - 666 - 667 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 270 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 709 - Brest;  U 575 - St. Nazaire;  U 373 - La Pallice;  U 281 - 844 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 539 shot down a Landcaster on 4.10. in about AD 85 and beat off an attack by a Hudson.  Boat is continuing her operations.  14 battery cells cracked.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Enemy units located in BE 2460, CG 7360, BF 1810, ED 2430.
    2) U-boat sighting in MF 26 (U 188).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  U 91 and 437 have joined Group "Rossbach".  The group has orders to form a reconnaissance line by 0000/8/10 from AK 3972 to AK 9291, course 2200, speed 5 knots, in the order:  U 643 - 641 - 539 - 336 - 448 - 610 - 419 - 279 - 378 - 645 - 260 - 603 - 275 - 631 - 91 and 437.
     HX 259 is expected to arrive after 8.10.  There is no information on the convoy's route and none is to be expected, as the Radio Intelligence (X) service has not yet broken the cipher.  The group has ordered to keep radio silence except for messages of tactical importance.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U 305 will deliver about 10 cbm fuel to U 731 on 10.10. in BD 3355.  Both boats will then return.
    2) U 402 - 952 - 584 - 758 are making for BD 37 to replenish.
    3) U 455 did not encounter U 460 and U 422 in the supply position in BD 8135 (see War Log of 5.10. IVc).  Neither of the boats have so far reported their position as ordered.
  d)  U 389 left Trondheim on 19.9. through the Iceland Passage for the Atlantic.  She has not reported despite several orders to do so.  There is no definite information about her loss, but it is probable that she was picked up by the unusually strong air reconnaissance on 2 and 3.10. in AD 80 or AE 70 and was destroyed.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 539                1 aircraft.
       
- 234 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
7.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 DS 57
U 256
-
 BF 49
U 437
-
 BD 32
U 631
-
 AK 65
 
91
-
 AK 67
260
-
 AK 63
448
-
 AK 39
641
-
 AK 35
 
92
-
 BF 52
264
-
 BE 76
455
-
 BD 87
643
-
 AK 35
 
123
-
 Op(EO 10)
267
-
 BF 48
460
-
 BD 81
645
-
 AK 63
 
154
-
 BE 96
271
-
 BE 66
470
-
 AE 82
666
-
 AL 19
 
155
-
 CE 43
275
-
 AK 65
488
-
 CE 43
667
-
 BF 80
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 20)
279
-
 AK 03
516
-
 BF 49
709
-
 BF 54
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
281
-
 AF 87
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
731
-
 AK 03
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 30)
305
-
 AK 66
532
-
 Op(LC 20)
758
-
 AK 38
 
181
-
 CG 21
309
-
 AE 78
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
762
-
 AE 82
 
183
-
 Op(LJ 80)
336
-
 AK 37
536
-
 Op(BB 80)
841
-
 AF 49
 
188
-
 Op(MF 30)
373
-
 BF 91
537
-
 AE 59
842
-
 AF 76
 
196
-
 CG 18
377
-
 BF 80
539
-
 AK 35
844
-
 AF 87
 
214
-
 Op(EL 20)
378
-
 AK 03
540
-
 AF 73
848
-
 BD 33
 
218
-
 DF 58
386
-
 BF 80
552
-
 BF 48
849
-
 AN 23
 
219
-
 AN 36
402
-
 AK 69
575
-
 BF 67
952
-
 AK 63
 
220
-
 Op(BB 63)
413
-
 BE 69
584
-
 AK 38
953
-
 BF 49
 
226
-
 BF 83
419
-
 AK 02
592
-
 BF 57
963
-
 AF 57
 
231
-
 BE 45
422
-
 BD 81
603
-
 AK 65
964
-
 AF 76
 
238
-
 BF 80
424
-
 AN 24
608
-
 BF 47
966
-
 AF 57
 
103
-
 CE 43
426
-
 AF 76
610
-
 AK 03
967
-
 AN 36
                   
969
-
 AF 76
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 181 - 196 - 238 - 260 - 264 - 305 - 377 - 386 - 666 - 667 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 92 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 190 - Brest;  U 843 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) For destroyer sightings by U 731 and Group "Rossbach" boats see paragraph IVa.
    2) U 188, the first Far Eastern boat, reports the situation as follows:  Convoy traffic on courses of 350 and 2150 from MF 8635 to 8865 and further 30 miles off along the 200 meter line.  Surface escort untrained and weak, twin-engined land-based aircraft by day.  Convoy assembly point and dispersal point believed to be in MF 2929.  Spasmodic heavy single ship traffic at night from there to the inner Gulf, course 3100.  Numerous sailing vessels in inner Gulf.  Aircraft only observed in MF 2272, except for convoys.  Radar suspected.  No night air activity.  3 escort vessels off Maskat.
      Sunk:  21.9 in MZ 8916 American type C3, 8,000 GRT course 1800, speed 13 knots.  5.10. in MF 2642 tanker "Britannia" 9,977 GRT, course 3100, speed 12 knots.  28.9. in MF 7826 convoy proceeding in broad formation attacked.  6 explosions heard.  Running times 8 - 10 minutes.  Hits may have been scored in distant columns, but
       
- 235 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      nothing was observed except a large oil patch.  End-of-run detonator presumed.  Since 25.8. electric torpedo acid level around zero millimeters.  Boat is proceeding to Penang for overhaul of boat and torpedoes.
      Altogether 10 end-of-run detonators.
  b) None.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in BE 7590, BE 9890, BF 1860, AL 4170, BD 6450, AL 4150, AK 7560.
    2) U-boat sightings:  EC 1543 and one sighting in an undecyphered position (probably Biscay).
  d) None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 44:
    U 731 sighted a destroyer E-bound in AK 6196 at 1613/7.  The order was then given for her to shadow if possible and for boats in the vicinity to operate at maximum speed in order to establish if this was a single destroyer or several.  The other boats of Group "Rossbach" were ordered to proceed E. on the same course at cruising speed.
    At 2000 U 448 reported another destroyer in AK 6272.  U 378 reported an aircraft attack at 2111 in AK 5589.  U 758 reported 2 destroyers in AK 6258.  Operations Control then assumed that this was the escort of an E.-bound convoy.  SC 143 and HX 259 were both expected.  According to present experiences both convoys should be in the same sea area.
    Group "Rossbach" was ordered to operate on the destroyer reports.  The following 20 boats operated against the convoy:  U 309 - 762 - 643 - 641 - 539 - 336 - 448 - 610 - 419 - 279 - 378 - 645 - 260 - 603 - 275 - 631 - 91 - 437 and 758.
    Weather in the area of the destroyer sightings was reported at 2000 as N.W. 5 and variable visibility.  Towards morning visibility deteriorated and was given as 2 miles at 0700.
    During the night 8 boats made contact with destroyers which, according to reckoning, were proceeding N.E. at slow speed.  The convoy was not sighted, but it can be assumed that these destroyers were the remote escort of a convoy in the vicinity.
     According to boats' reports the convoy had slight air escort at dawn and by night.
    Successes:  U 758 reported the sinking of a destroyer at 2155 in AK 6258.
     U 610 reported an explosion after 8 minutes after an attack on 2 destroyers at 0331 in AK 6371.  Hit probable.
     U 378 reported a J class destroyer sunk at 0705 in AK 6238.
 
 
 
- 236 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    As it seemed most likely that a convoy was nearby the operation  was continued after daybreak.
    U 260 broke off because of personnel casualties.  U 731 to continue on her way to supply and U 437 because she was too far off to operate against the convoy.
  b) 1) U 848 is to make for square GZ.  She will operate in the Capetown area or the Indian Ocean.
    2) U 309 and 762 have joined Group "Rossbach" and will occupy positions AK 3914 and AK 3941 respectively to extend the reconnaissance line to the north.  (These boats will also operate against the destroyers reported).
    3) U 271 is proceeding on to BD 38.  She is converted to a Flak boat and is to take over Flak protection of U-tanker 486.
    4) U 455 cannot refuel owing to the disappearance of U 460 and is proceeding on to AK 95.
    5) U 488 is being withdrawn to the north and will make for BD 37.  Next supply operation is planned in approximately this area.  She is to proceed surfaced by night and remain submerged by day.  She has been warned of carrier-borne aircraft.
  c) U 460 and 422 have not yet given their positions.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success: 
 
U 188 2 ships 17,977 GRT  
U 758 1 destroyer    
U 378 1 destroyer    
U 610 1 destroyer probably hit.  
       
VI. General:                Admonitory Radio message
  1)  During supply operations the most important thing is to protect the tanker.  On her depends the fighting efficiency of numbers of operational boats and thus the continuation of convoy operations with as many forces as possible.
  2) In case of surprise aircraft attacks on supplying boats the main object of all defensive action must be to protect the tanker, to provide her with a good opportunity to dive and to screen her diving.
  3)  The following is therefore ordered:
    a) Boats not in supply will form an all-round screen around the tanker, distance of 500 meters.
    b) Tanker is to dive at the first opportunity in case of air attack.  Remaining boats are to screen her diving by all means and at full risk to themselves.  They may only dive when the tanker has reached a safe depth.
 
 
 
- 237 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
8.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 DS 85
U 260
-
 AK 93
U 455
-
 BD 52
U 643
-
 AK 61
 
91
-
 AK 92
264
-
 BF 85
460
-
 BD 81
645
-
 AK 65
 
103
-
 CE 43
267
-
 BF 47
470
-
 AE 64
666
-
 AL 45
 
123
-
 Op(EO 10)
271
-
 BE 64
488
-
 CE 43
667
-
 BF 80
 
154
-
 BE 95
275
-
 AK 65
516
-
 BF 72
709
-
 BF 54
 
155
-
 CE 43
279
-
 AK 69
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
731
-
 AK 69
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 20)
281
-
 AF 76
532
-
 Op(LC 20)
758
-
 AK 63
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
305
-
 AL 71
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
762
-
 AK 39
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 30)
309
-
 AK 28
536
-
 Op(BB 80)
841
-
 AF 44
 
181
-
 BF 78
336
-
 AK 61
537
-
 AL 22
842
-
 AF 73
 
183
-
 Op(LJ 80)
373
-
 BF 83
539
-
 AK 63
843
-
 AO
 
188
-
 MG 17
377
-
 BF 80
540
-
 AF 48
844
-
 AF 76
 
190
-
 BF 55
378
-
 AK 03
552
-
 BF 47
848
-
 BD 38
 
196
-
 CG 21
386
-
 BF 64
575
-
 BF 83
849
-
 AF 79
 
214
-
 Op(EL 20)
402
-
 AK 96
584
-
 AK 63
952
-
 AK 69
 
218
-
 DF 72
413
-
 BE 65
592
-
 BF 49
953
-
 BF 48
 
219
-
 AN 31
419
-
 AK 63
603
-
 AK 91
963
-
 AF 49
 
220
-
 Op(BC 41)
422
-
 BD 81
608
-
 BE 69
964
-
 AF 72
 
226
-
 BF 81
424
-
 AN 24
610
-
 AK 03
966
-
 AF 49
 
231
-
 BD 63
426
-
 AF 73
631
-
 AL 74
967
-
 AN 31
 
238
-
 BF 52
437
-
 AK 95
641
-
 AK 62
969
-
 AF 73
 
256
-
 BF 47
448
-
 AK 63            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 188 - 196 - 238 - 260 - 264 - 305 - 377 - 386 - 666 - 667 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 230 - Brest;  U 386 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  1)  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
  2)  Reconnaissance against Convoy No. 44.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 183 was off Mombassa for 10 days and sighted nothing except a destroyer and 2 small patrol vessels.  No air activity.  Boat is at present operating against Aden - Capetown traffic.  Owing to considerable damage the C.O. does not consider the boat fully fit for operations and suggested proceeding to Penang for repairs.  He has been ordered to proceed there at high speed.  It is intended to relieve the Commanding Officer by the ex-Commanding Officer of U 511.
    2) U 373 was attacked by an aircraft in BF 8230.  This is the first instance for some time of English aircraft attacking so far east.
    3) U 536 chased a Liberty ship, course 2600, 17 knots in vain in CC 53.
  b)  Our own aircraft sighted:
    1) Convoy No 44 in AL 4138.
    2) Convoy of 52 merchant ships, 10 escort vessels, 1 destroyer, course 3600, speed 6 knots at 1645 in CF 9122 and
       
- 238 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      at 1650 in CF 9233 convoy of 17 merchant ships, 4 guard boats, 1 cruiser, course 3600, speed 7 knots.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in AM 1750, AL 54/55.
    2) U-boat sightings in CA 8489, DJ 2197, DJ 24, AK 6696, also 7 sightings in undecyphered positions (probably North Atlantic, Convoy No. 44).
    3) U-boat attacked or was attacked in CA 5481.
    4) Enemy transport aircraft reported a ship on fire in DN 6794 (U 518?).
  d) 1) According to a Radio Intelligence (X) Report the stragglers' route for SC 143 is via 540 44' N. - 340 59' W., 560 02' N. - 220 58' W.
    2) Stragglers from HX 259 which cannot reach the convoy are to return to St. Johns.  The route for these ships is via 510 04 N. - 340 59' W., 520 01' N. - 250 02' W., 550 30' N. - 100 01' W.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 44:
    Weather in the convoy area was clear, visibility good, during daylight on the 8th, but towards 1800 one boat reported a deterioration in visibility, which continued throughout the night.   On the morning of the 9th visibility was less than 300 meters.
    No reports of the convoy were received on the 8th or during the night of 8/9. U 91 sighted 2 destroyers at 2340 and attacked one unsuccessfully with TV.  At 0535 U 645 reported propeller noises bearing 350 true from AL 5231.  There were no further enemy reports from the boats.
     According to Radio Intelligence there were altogether 7 enemy aircraft with the convoy, not more than 3 at a time.  2 boats reported air attacks, U 762 suffering slight damage. Our own air reconnaissance flown by a BV 222 sighted the convoy at 1340 in AL 4138, course 90, speed 7 knots. It must be assumed that the data given in the aircraft report was not exact. As the aircraft was over the convoy 1 1/2 hours sooner than intended the boats were not yet on D/F reception ad could not therefore pick up the beacon signals which the aircraft made for only 15 minutes; had they been able to do so this would have been of much more value for the operation, than the navigationally inexact square data given by the reconnaissance aircraft.  Furthermore, the transmission of beacon signals would have been successful if the aircraft had just made the signal: "Am sending beacon signals", as ordered. This signal was never made, so that the boats did not know that beacon signals signals were being sent.  This fact has contributed very largely to the failure of the operation.
 
 
 
- 239 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    The operation was broken off at first light on the 9th, as no further information on the convoy had been received by the morning of the 9th and boats were nearing inshore waters and the area of increased activity by land-based aircraft.  It is also possible that these groups of destroyers were independent and that the convoy was proceeding further S.  See also final remarks on 10.10.43.
  b) 1) The two Flak boats which have left W. France will occupy the following attack areas:  U 953: area between 14 and 200 W., 43 and 480 N.  U 256:  area between the points AL 4897 - 6579 - 9919 - BE 1261.
    2) U 437, 455 and 231 are to make for AK 50. They are to await further orders in this area, keeping their fuel consumption at a minimum.
    3) U 537 is proceeding on according to her special orders.  She is to lay weather gear in about AH 25.
    4) The Far Eastern boats U 168 and 533 have freedom of action to attack in U 188's area if this seems more promising than their own.
  c) U 488 has supplied U 103 and 155.  The 2 operational boats are proceeding S. the tanker N.
  d) 1) Boats have been informed that there is believed to be an aircraft carrier within a radius of 250 miles from BD 96.
    2) U 460 and 422 have not replied to the order to give their positions. They must be assumed lost due to attack by carrier-borne aircraft in BD 9755 on 4.10.
      (See U 264's report on 5.10.)
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 240 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
9.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 EH 26
U 260
-
 AK 99
U 470
-
 AE 79
U 645
-
 AL 52
 
91
-
 AL 51
264
-
 BE 94
488
-
 CE 16
666
-
 AL 72
 
103
-
 DG 14
267
-
 BE 68
516
-
 BE 93
667
-
 BF 80
 
123
-
 Op(EO 10)
271
-
 BE 56
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
709
-
 BF 45
 
154
-
 BE 94
275
-
 AL 50
532
-
 Op(LC 20)
731
-
 AK 96
 
155
-
 CE 76
279
-
 AL 50
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
758
-
 AL 52
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 20)
281
-
 AF 73
536
-
 Op(CC 53)
762
-
 AL 41
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
305
-
 AL 77
537
-
 AL 25
841
-
 AE 66
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 60)
309
-
 AK 03
539
-
 AL 50
842
-
 AF 48
 
181
-
 BF 79
336
-
 AL 50
540
-
 AE 66
843
-
 AN 36
 
183
-
 Op(LJ 80)
373
-
 BF 81
552
-
 BE 69
844
-
 AF 73
 
188
-
 MG 45
377
-
 BF 52
575
-
 BF 81
848
-
 BD 68
 
190
-
 BF 57
378
-
 AL 50
584
-
 AL 44
849
-
 AF 76
 
196
-
 CG 22
402
-
 AL 48
592
-
 BF 48
952
-
 AK 95
 
214
-
 Op(EL 20)
413
-
 BE 64
603
-
 AK 62
953
-
 BF 71
 
218
-
 DF 78
419
-
 AL 50
608
-
 BE 68
963
-
 AF 44
 
219
-
 AN 24
424
-
 AN 24
610
-
 AL 50
964
-
 AF 48
 
220
-
 BC 40
426
-
 AF 48
631
-
 AL 50
966
-
 AF 44
 
226
-
 BF 48
437
-
 AK 99
641
-
 AL 52
967
-
 AN 24
 
231
-
 BD 31
448
-
 AL 50
643
-
 AL 50
969
-
 AF 48
 
256
-
 BE 69
455
-
 BD 26            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 188 - 196 - 260 - 264 - 305 - 377 - 666 - 667 - 731.
  Entered Port:  U 219 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 505 - Lorient; U 420 - Brest; U 648 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) Convoy No. 44 see paragraph IVa).
    2) U 123 attacked a convoy of tankers and Liberty ships by day on 21.9. in EP 44.  She scored two definite and 3 possible hits.  Submerged at night because of aircraft.  28.9. in EP 44 likewise air activity at night.  Boat suspects that traffic is only in convoys with constant air escort near the 200 meter line or the Great Circle.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sighting in DJ 2188.
    2) English units were located in AL 5240, AL 6130 and AM 4510.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 44:
     U 645 reported later that she had fired an air driven torpedo at a steamer in AL 0279 at 0715/9/10 and heard a detonation after 10 minutes 55 seconds (probably end-of-run detonator).
       
- 241 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     10 minutes later she hit a steamer of 6,500 GRT.  After diving she heard loud sinking noises.  (See final remarks on 10.10.)
  b) 1) U 183 has been ordered to make use of any chance coming her way in spite of damage.
    2) The attention of U 161, 123 and 518 has been drawn to the Kommandantenhandbuch (Trans. Note:  Handbook for Commanding Officers) paragraph 534, i.e. boats should move away if operation in the area ordered is impossible owing to strong enemy activity.
    3) "Rossbach" boats will move off as far as the longitude of 290 W. and will wait there for further orders.  U 378 and 641 will proceed to BD 37 to supply.  U 631 has requested a remote operations area as the Commanding Officer has a wrist injury and quadruple mounting is out of action.
    4) U 966 - 963 - 964 - 969 - 426 - 842 - 841 - 540 - 844 - 281 and 849 have been ordered to report their position after passing through the Iceland Passage, i.e. on entering AL.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 645 1 ship
6,500 GRT
 
U 123 1 ship
5,000 GRT
  
   
(5 probable hits accepted)
 
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 242 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
10.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 EH 64
U 264
-
 BE 98
U 470
-
 AL 22
U 645
-
 AL 51
 
91
-
 AL 41
267
-
 BE 67
488
-
 BD 56
648
-
 BF 58
 
103
-
 DG 41
271
-
 BE 55
505
-
 BF 55
666
-
 BE 13
 
123
-
 Op(EP 17)
275
-
 AL 42
516
-
 BE 92
667
-
 BF 67
 
154
-
 BE 87
279
-
 AL 40
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
709
-
 BF 44
 
155
-
 DG 47
281
-
 AF 47
532
-
 Op(LC 20)
731
-
 BD 33
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 20)
305
-
 BD 33
533
-
 Op(MP 60)
758
-
 AL 48
 
168
-
 Op(MH 70)
309
-
 AK 60
536
-
 Op(CC 60)
762
-
 AK 60
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 60)
336
-
 AL 40
537
-
 AK 33
841
-
 AE 67
 
181
-
 BF 87
373
-
 BF 48
539
-
 AL 19
842
-
 AF 47
 
183
-
 LK 82
377
-
 BF 42
540
-
 AE 68
843
-
 AN 31
 
188
-
 MG 84
378
-
 AL 48
552
-
 BE 65
844
-
 AF 47
 
190
-
 BF 73
402
-
 AL 74
575
-
 BF 73
848
-
 CE 23
 
196
-
 BF 79
413
-
 BE 56
584
-
 AK 96
849
-
 AF 73
 
214
-
 Op(EL 20)
419
-
 AL 40
592
-
 BF 47
952
-
 AL 78
 
218
-
 DQ 31
420
-
 BF 55
603
-
 AK 60
953
-
 BE 69
 
220
-
 BC 41
424
-
 AF 85
608
-
 BE 55
963
-
 AE 69
 
226
-
 BF 47
426
-
 AE 69
610
-
 AL 41
964
-
 AE 69
 
231
-
 AK 94
437
-
 AK 91
631
-
 AK 68
966
-
 AE 69
 
256
-
 BE 68
448
-
 AL 42
641
-
 AL 45
969
-
 AE 69
 
260
-
 BE 11
455
-
 AK 85
643
-
 AL 40
967
-
 AN 24
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 260 - 264 - 275 - 305 - 641 - 645 - 666 - 667 - 731 - 952.
  Entered Port:  U 377 - Brest.
  Sailed:  U 405 - St. Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 267 sighted an unidentified steamer in BE 5470, which afterwards turned out to be the Irish "Irish Willow".
  b)  None.
  c) 1) English unit was located in AL 63.
    2) U-boat sightings in CG 2178 and ED 5966.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Final Remarks on Convoy No. 44:
     The operation against SC 143 lasted from PM. 7th to AM 9th.  The boats operated from AK 6196 to AL 0279.  Weather conditions were favorable all the time, W. winds and clear visibility on the whole.   The poor visibility which set in PM on the 8th about 3 hours before dark may have had a bad effect on the operation, if the convoy was in fact in the boat's area.  During the operation destroyers only were reported, except for the sighting of 2 steamers, so that it is doubtful whether the convoy was in the destroyer's area at all.  The destroyer
       
- 243 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    sightings, of which there were very many on the first day and during the first night, indicate the presence of a strong group of destroyers. The appearance of aircraft, which according to Radio Intelligence were escort aircraft for the SC convoy, proves that the convoy itself must have been in the vicinity.
     The only definite report of the convoy was received from an aircraft, which reported it at 1340/8, comprising 26 units, in AL 4138.  This aircraft report cannot have been exact however and it is quire possible that the convoy may have been further south.
    The attempt to bring the boats up by beacon-signals, which would have served to compensate for the error in E.P., failed because of circumstances already mentioned in the War Log of the 8th.
     It must be assumed that the boat's fixes were good in view of the good weather.
    It seems therefore that the convoy must have been approximately in the area of the operation, because of the destroyer groups and the aircraft report, but that it must have passed out of range of the searching boats after the latter had been deliberately diverted by the destroyers and aircraft.
     It is most probable that the convoy was proceeding further south and the destroyers diverted the boats to N.E. at the beginning of the operation.  Our own aircraft reported much earlier than was expected which indicates that the BV sighted the convoy S.E. of the expected position.  The route of the HX convoy which followed soon after skirted the area of the operation hauling out to the south.
    As no further information has been received on the convoy route the question of where the convoy actually was remains unsolved.
     The results of the operation were 2 destroyers sunk, one probably sunk, one 6,500 GRT ship sunk.
     2 boats were lost for certain, U 610 and U 419.  It is presumed that U 610 was sunk by air attack, as her last report was "air attack".  The fate of U 419 in not known.
     3 other boats have not reported, but they had not done so during the whole operation, so that it can be assumed that they were already lost before the operation began.  They are U 336, U 643 and 279.   See War Log of 13.10.
     Nothing in particular was learnt from this operation.  There were only 2 depth charge hunts, which seems to show that the depth charge danger has decreased.   This was also the case in the first Zaunkönig convoy and is presumably due to the fact that the enemy is already taking greater precautions.
     4 air attacks reported show that the danger to boats from the air escort is as great as ever (loss of U 610).
 
 
 
- 244 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b)  U 608, 413, 267, 552 are to make for square AK 84.  U 154 and 516 are provisionally to steer for DG 70.
  c) 1) U 762 will rendezvous with U 645 at 1200/11/10 in AL 4495 to transship wounded men.
    2) From 1800/11/10 U 402, 758, 584, 378 and 603 will refuel to 85 cbm from U 488 in BD 2685.  (It may be necessary to start later owing to bad weather).
    3) U 214 reported minelay off Colon carried out.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
11.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 EH 92
U 264
-
 BF 77
U 470
-
 AL 21
U 645
-
 AL 44
 
91
-
 AK 60
267
-
 BE 46
488
-
 BD 26
648
-
 BF 57
 
103
-
 DG 71
271
-
 BE 54
505
-
 BF 57
666
-
 BE 27
 
123
-
 Op(EO 10)
275
-
 AL 45
516
-
 BE 97
667
-
 BF 64
 
154
-
 CF 24
279
-
 AL 40
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
709
-
 BE 66
 
155
-
 DG 77
281
-
 AE 69
532
-
 Op(LC 20)
731
-
 BD 33
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 20)
305
-
 BD 33
533
-
 Op(MP 10)
758
-
 AL 74
 
168
-
 Op(MH 60)
309
-
 AK 60
536
-
 Op(CC 10)
762
-
 AL 44
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 60)
336
-
 AL 40
537
-
 AK 25
841
-
 AE 59
 
181
-
 BF 88
373
-
 BF 47
539
-
 AK 60
842
-
 AE 68
 
183
-
 LK 68
378
-
 AK 96
540
-
 AE 67
843
-
 AN 24
 
188
-
 MR 26
402
-
 BD 31
552
-
 BE 64
844
-
 AE 69
 
190
-
 BF 72
405
-
 BF 57
575
-
 BF 74
848
-
 CE 52
 
196
-
 BF 84
413
-
 BE 43
584
-
 AL 44
849
-
 AF 48
 
214
-
 Op(EL 20)
419
-
 AL 40
592
-
 BE 69
952
-
 BE 15
 
218
-
 DQ 52
420
-
 BF 57
603
-
 AK 60
953
-
 BE 68
 
220
-
 BC 41
424
-
 AF 83
610
-
 AL 40
963
-
 AE 68
 
226
-
 BE 69
426
-
 AE 68
631
-
 AK 68
964
-
 AE 68
 
231
-
 AK 59
437
-
 AK 59
641
-
 AL 57
966
-
 AE 68
 
256
-
 BE 64
448
-
 AK 60
643
-
 AL 40
969
-
 AE 68
 
260
-
 BE 16
455
-
 AK 58
608
-
 BE 43      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 260 - 264 - 275 - 305 - 641 - 645 - 666 - 667 - 731 - 952.
  Entered Port:  U 424 - Drontheim; U 667 - St. Nazaire.
  Sailed:  U 212 - 967 - Bergen.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 608 reported a south-bound steamer in BE 4648 (possibly Irish).
    2) U 532 situation:  close inshore off the Indian coast lively single-ship and convoy traffic, surface patrol, day reconnaissance once, Radar not observed so far.
       
- 245 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      Fast single-ship traffic in the 80 and 90 Channel.  Sunk so far:  Fort Longueil and one 8,000 tonner (probably "Diplomat").   From convoy:  1 6,000 tonner and one auxiliary warship, 9,000 GRT, with nets and magnetic gear.  Also 3 misses with good firing data.
  b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  FQ 2485, MQ 42, EB 3330, FK 13.
    2) U-boat attack in FQ 5474.
  d) According to a Radio Intelligence (X) report ONS 20 against which the next operation is planned, has received the following instructions: probable rendezvous 1300/11/10 in AM 5166, 1300/12/10 in AM 1949.
       
IV. Current Operation:
  a) A Radio Intelligence group taking passage in U 584 has reported the following observations on the last convoys intercepted:
    1) Convoy R/T wave heard up to a distance of 200 miles.
    2) According to bearings of the R/T wave ON 203 passed the patrol line to the north close inshore during the night 28/29/9 and ON 204 during the night 3/4/10.
    3) ON and ONS did not proceed in company.
    4) No impression formed of Zaunkönig successes, but spirits were very low on the day after the battle with the large convoy (Group "Leuthen").
    5) Good cooperation between aircraft and escort vessels.   At least 3 land-based aircraft with ON convoys day and night. Aircraft remain with the convoy in fog.
    6) Only 2 escort groups with the SC convoy with remaining escort from the ON convoy of 229. No more massing.
  b) 1) 5 of the former "Rossbach" boats must be taken as lost.  (See War Log of 13.10.)  4 boats (U 584 - 603 - 378 - 402) are proceeding to supply and will refuel for further operations, 3 will refuel for return passage to W. France (U 641 - 758 - 731).  7 boats (U 539 - 275 - 645 - 305 - 952 - 260 - 666) are returning directly partly owing to damage and partly because of supply difficulties.  6 boats (U 437 - 91 - 309 - 448 - 631 - 762) remain for the proposed operation against ONS 20.  They will be joined by 6 others, at present on outward passage (U 455 - 231 - 470 - 608 - 267 - 413), so that altogether there will be 12 boats available to form the patrol line. They are not to cross the latitude and longitude of AK 5110 to the north and west and are to remain in the area AK 50 and 60.
      It is intended to order a boat proceeding west to make several radio messages in about AJ 20 in order to simulate a U-boat group there (U 537 has received orders accordingly).
 
 
 
- 246 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      The possible evasive action which the expected convoy can take should be restricted by this.
    2) A general traffic situation summary compiled from experiences of boats which have been there has been radioed for U 68 and 103 which are to operate in the Gulf of Guinea.
  c) 1) U 220 has successfully carried out minelaying operation St. John's (See appendix).   The boat will now be used as tanker.
    2) U 214 has been ordered to lay the remaining periscope mines inside the passage passed on her way back.
    3) U 305 has not been able to deliver fuel to U 731 owing to heavy weather.  U 731 is therefore proceeding on to the tanker, U 305 to W. France.
    4) Owing to the tanker situation the boats operating in the Southern area, U 518 - 123 - 161 and 170 have been ordered to start their return passage accordingly.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success: 
  U 532               4 ships               30,000 GRT.
       
VI. General:
    New instructions for supply operations have been issued as follows in Serial Order No. 24:
  1) In the area south, north and west of the Azores our supply groups have recently several times been picked up by carrier-borne aircraft and attacked by surprise.   In order to avoid such attacks the following orders are given:
  2)  Supply boat and boats about to supply are to proceed submerged on the day of the rendezvous and arrange to reach the rendezvous position 2 hours before sunset.  Then surface and contact the tanker in daylight.
  3) As a general rule, supply will only be carried out at night.  Careful with lights.  Morse signaling with blue lamp.  Only Officers and Petty Officers detailed by the Commanding Officer may carry dimmed torches.  Boats in waiting should join on the side of the tanker from which supply is not being carried out.
  4) The tanker will always remain submerged in the area by day and will be at the rendezvous again by sunset.
  5)  If there is heavy weather, or the night is so dark that distances cannot be safely kept, supply may have to be carried out by day.  In these weather conditions carrier-borne aircraft are not, on the whole, to be expected.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
- 247 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
12.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 EJ 77
U 260
-
 BE 52
U 470
-
 AL 20
U 645
-
 AL 44
 
91
-
 AK 50
264
-
 BF 78
488
-
 BD 26
648
-
 BF 82
 
103
-
 DG 77
267
-
 BE 17
505
-
 BF 49
666
-
 BE 52
 
123
-
 Op(EP 10)
271
-
 BE 50
516
-
 CF 25
709
-
 BE 65
 
154
-
 CF 43
275
-
 AL 81
518
-
 Op(DM 10)
731
-
 BD 34
 
155
-
 DS 24
279
-
 AK 40
532
-
 Op(LC 30)
758
-
 BD 32
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 60)
281
-
 AE 68
533
-
 Op(MQ 21)
762
-
 AL 44
 
168
-
 Op(MG 62)
305
-
 BE 15
536
-
 Op(CC 16)
841
-
 AE 59
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 90)
309
-
 AK 50
537
-
 AJ 33
842
-
 AE 68
 
181
-
 BF 86
336
-
 AK 40
539
-
 AK 03
843
-
 AF 85
 
183
-
 LL 48
373
-
 BE 69
540
-
 AE 59
844
-
 AE 68
 
188
-
 MR 61
378
-
 AK 98
552
-
 BE 56
848
-
 CE 82
 
190
-
 BF 74
402
-
 BD 26
575
-
 BE 96
849
-
 AE 47
 
196
-
 BF 88
405
-
 BF 83
584
-
 AK 93
952
-
 BE 27
 
212
-
 AF 87
413
-
 BE 18
592
-
 BE 68
953
-
 Op(BE)
 
216
-
 EC 54
420
-
 BF 49
603
-
 AK 95
963
-
 AE 67
 
218
-
 DQ 59
426
-
 AE 68
608
-
 BE 41
964
-
 AE 67
 
220
-
 BC 55
437
-
 AK 50
610
-
 AK 40
966
-
 AE 67
 
226
-
 BE 65
448
-
 AK 50
631
-
 AK 50
967
-
 AF 87
 
231
-
 AK 50
455
-
 AK 50
641
-
 AL 74
969
-
 AE 67
 
256
-
 BE 53
419
-
 AK 40
643
-
 AK 40      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 220 - 260 - 264 - 275 - 305 - 641 - 645 - 666 - 731 - 758 - 952.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 129 - St. Nazaire;  U 193 - La Pallice; U 280 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 592 reported a searching group, consisting of 3 units, in BE 5656.
    2) U 516 sighted 2 destroyers in CF 6416.  No course given.
    3) U 256 (Flak boat) beat off an aircraft attack on 8.10. in BF 4516.  Hit observed on aircraft.
    4) U 608 fired 2 F.A.T. torpedoes at a 6,000 GRT motor vessel course 2350, speed 15 knots, in BE 1776.  Effect not observed.  Boat did not press on owing to seaway.  (This is not understood, as she only reported N.W.4).
    5) U 536 sank a 9,000 GRT ship, course 2600, in CC 52.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings: BE 9363, BF 4712, EC 5128, FQ 1633, one other sighting in unidentified position (probably Biscay).
    2) SSS and attack report from an unidentified American steamer from MH 7680.
       
- 248 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) An English unit was located in AM 0130.
  d) Stragglers from ONS 20 which could not reach the convoy rendezvous at 290 W. are to return to England.
    The stragglers' route has also been altered and now leads through AK 6516.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) U 218 will have freedom of action within a coastal strip 400 miles wide between 52 and 630 W. before and after her special operation (minelay off Trinidad).
    2) U 220 is to steer for BD 16, U 552, 592, 709, 226, 373 and 575 for AK 82.  U 220 is to be used as tanker;  the remaining boats will operate against one of the next convoys according to the situation.
    3) U 103 is proceeding on for minelaying operation Takoradi.   Afterwards, she is to operate in that sea area according to the traffic situation.
    4) Operations area for U 154 and 516 see paragraph VI.
    5) Contrary to present orders, U 256 will steer for BD 6195.  She is there to take over Flak defence together with U 271.
  c) 1) Because of the aircraft sightings mentioned in paragraph d) the rendezvous for U 488's supply group has been changed to BD 6195.  Boats have been warned of carrier-borne aircraft.
    2) U 762 has not been able to hand over her wounded to U 645 owing to heavy seas.  U 762 has therefore hauled off to the west for further operations.  The wounded were treated on board and U 645 is continuing on her return passage.
  d) U 731 was bombed by an aircraft in BD 3423 at 1814. She reported at 1835 from BD 3426:  "Am heavily damaged, boat sinking."  Boats in the vicinity were immediately ordered to her assistance.  These measures were cancelled at 2400 however, as U 731 reported that she was fully serviceable.
     In approximately the same area U 402 was observed by an aircraft in BD 2685 and U 488 was unsuccessfully attacked by a land-based aircraft in BD 2685.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 536                1 ship                9,000 GRT.
       
VI. General:
  The occupation of the Azores by the Allies will presumably mean heavier traffic in that area.  2 boats on passage south have therefore been ordered there, with the following instructions:
 
 
 
- 249 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  1)  U 154 is to occupy the area off Ponte Dalgada, U 516 the area off Horta.
  2)  They are to attack enemy warships and merchant vessels, but only outside territorial waters.  For the present Portuguese warships and merchant ships are to be treated as neutrals as hitherto.  They may be attacked if the Portuguese take the initiative.  Incidents are to be avoided.
  3) Caution against carrier-borne and land-based aircraft. If air or surface vessel activity is too strong, move away to the south and report.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
13.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 ES 16
U 256
-
 BE 22
U 455
-
 AK 50
U 645
-
 AL 57
 
91
-
 AK 50
260
-
 BE 56
470
-
 AK 02
648
-
 BF 73
 
103
-
 DS 27
264
-
 BF 79
488
-
 BD 37
666
-
 BE 67
 
123
-
 Op(EE 90)
267
-
 BD 35
505
-
 BF 73
709
-
 BE 61
 
129
-
 BF 67
271
-
 BE 18
516
-
 CF 56
731
-
 BD 34
 
154
-
 CF 72
275
-
 AK 69
518
-
 DL 39
758
-
 BD 31
 
155
-
 DS 54
279
-
 AK 40
532
-
 Op(LC 30)
762
-
 AK 66
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 60)
280
-
 AO
533
-
 Op(MQ 20)
841
-
 AE 82
 
168
-
 Op(MG 60)
281
-
 AE 67
536
-
 Op(CC 52)
842
-
 AE 67
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 90)
305
-
 BE 27
537
-
 AJ 31
843
-
 AF 91
 
181
-
 BF 83
309
-
 AK 50
539
-
 AL 41
844
-
 AE 67
 
183
-
 LL 43
336
-
 AK 40
540
-
 AE 82
848
-
 CE 42
 
188
-
 MR 69
373
-
 BE 65
552
-
 BE 51
849
-
 AE 69
 
190
-
 BE 99
378
-
 BD 26
575
-
 BE 92
952
-
 BE 55
 
193
-
 BF 67
402
-
 BD 37
584
-
 AK 98
953
-
 Op(BE)
 
196
-
 BF 89
405
-
 BF 82
592
-
 BE 56
963
-
 AE 59
 
212
-
 AF 76
413
-
 BD 35
603
-
 BD 23
964
-
 AE 59
 
214
-
 EC 56
419
-
 AK 40
608
-
 BD 39
966
-
 AE 59
 
218
-
 DQ 71
420
-
 BF 48
610
-
 AK 40
967
-
 AF 76
 
220
-
 BC 62
426
-
 AE 59
631
-
 AK 50
969
-
 AE 83
 
226
-
 BE 64
437
-
 AK 50
641
-
 BD 32      
 
231
-
 AK 50
448
-
 AK 50
643
-
 AK 40      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 220 - 260 - 264 - 275 - 305 - 539 - 641 - 645 - 666 - 731 - 758 - 952.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 274 - 714 - Drontheim.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) U 402 reported an aircraft attack at 1000 in BD 2685 and at 1300 in BD 2923.
    2) U 575 sighted a group of patrol vessels with an aircraft, course 2100, speed 7 knots in BE 8237.   Boat picked up a short time location transmission of 600 cycles with her Naxos set (first report of this from the Atlantic).
       
- 250 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  b) None.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in:  BD 3990, BF 1960, AK 2780, AM 7720, BE 3120.
    2) One U-boat sighting in an unresolved position.
  d) According to a Radio Intelligence (X) report ON 205 was E. of 400 W at 23/13/10. The stragglers' route for this convoy was changed and now leads through AJ 6351.  A rendezvous was ordered in AJ 3958 at 1300/14/10 course 2150 for stragglers not going to Reykjavik.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) None.
  b) 1) It is intended to intercept ON 20, which, according to Radio Intelligence (X) is to be in AM 5166 at 1300/11/10 and in AM 1949 at 1300/12/10, with the following disposition:  2 more boats, coming from home ports, which made their passage reports last night, have joined the 12 already available.  Order:  U 844 - 964 - 470 - 631 - 437 - 309 - 762 - 231 - 91 - 488 - 455 - 267 - 413 - 608 will form Group "Schlieffen" and be in patrol line from AK 2877 to AK 6754 at 0000/16/10.  Boats are to approach their positions in the line unnoticed, i.e. submerged by day and at high cruising speed by night.  A loss of speed of 2.5 knots is probable owing to the bad weather conditions, which are likely to be S.W. 6 - 8 during the period 11 - 14.10. according to various reports.  The convoy may therefore be expected to reach the patrol line after AM 16.10.
      The line is so disposed that the stragglers' rendezvous in AK 6516 is covered 60 miles to the south.
      The 2 boats fitted with intermediate wave D/F gear, U 621 and 413, are stationed in the northern and southern sector of the line so that any evasion of the line will be recognized in time.
    2) U 505 and 190 are to steer provisionally for square DG.  They are to operate in the S. area.
  c) U 402 has several times been sighted by aircraft on her way to the supply rendezvous and the rendezvous is thus to a certain extent compromised.  The following order has therefore been given:
     Boats must approach the supply points undetected at all costs so that supply operations may be carried out unhindered. Boats are therefore to proceed submerged only by day and above water by night at a correspondingly higher speed.
  d) 1) At 0130 the following war emergency signal was received on the Irland frequency without signature:
      "Attack by surface forces (except MTB's) square 1550".
      This could refer to the large squares CC, BD or BE and the boats U 536, 220 and 256.
 
 
 
       
- 251 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      It is however possible that the message was not made by a U-boat at all, but broke through on Irland from another frequency.
    2) 5 boats did not report again after Group "Rossbach's" last operation 7 - 9.10.  3 of them (U 336, 643 and 279) were most probably lost in the positions occupied to intercept ON 204.
     
Last reports: U 336 at 1638/4/10 from AD 85.
  U 643 at 1320/25/9 from AL 2541.  She was afterwards ordered to take up her position in the patrol line (AK 26).
  U 279 at 1810/1/10 from AK 2467.  Position in the patrol line was AK 26.
 The loss of these 3 boats was probably due to the very strong aircraft and surface reconnaissance in the northern sector of the line.
  U 610 and 419 were definitely sunk while searching for SC 143.
  U 610 was attacked by an aircraft at 1122/8/10 in AL 4171 and did not report again after this.
  U 419 sighted 2 destroyers, course N.E., at 1036/8/10 in AK 6267. She did not report again.  It is not known whether her loss was due to aircraft or surface forces.
None of these 5 boats has reported again in spite of several orders to do so.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  Boats have been informed that the Cape Verde Islands may also be placed at the disposal of the Allies. Orders remain that Portuguese territorial waters, including those of the occupied islands, are to be respected as hitherto.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 252 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
14.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 ES 28
U 231
-
 AK 50
U 455
-
 AK 50
U 648
-
 BF 48
 
91
-
 AK 50
256
-
 BE 16
470
-
 AK 50
666
-
 BE 68
 
103
-
 DS 55
260
-
 BE 68
488
-
 BD 61
709
-
 BE 52
 
123
-
 Op(EE 50)
264
-
 BF 88
505
-
 BF 72
714
-
 AF 59
 
129
-
 BF 83
267
-
 AK 95
516
-
 CF 81
731
-
 BD 37
 
154
-
 CE 93
271
-
 BD 63
518
-
 Op(DM 20)
758
-
 BD 61
 
155
-
 DS 84
274
-
 AF 59
532
-
 Op(LC 30)
762
-
 AK 64
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 60)
275
-
 AL 75
533
-
 Op(MF 32)
841
-
 AE 84
 
168
-
 Op(MF 21)
280
-
 AN 35
536
-
 Op(CC 19)
842
-
 AE 59
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 90)
281
-
 AE 59
537
-
 AJ 34
843
-
 AF 59
 
181
-
 BF 92
305
-
 BE 56
539
-
 AL 75
844
-
 AL 31
 
183
-
 LL 28
309
-
 AK 50
540
-
 AE 84
848
-
 CE 48
 
188
-
 MS 72
373
-
 BE 56
552
-
 BE 51
849
-
 AE 67
 
190
-
 BE 98
378
-
 BD 61
575
-
 BE 52
952
-
 BE 59
 
193
-
 BF 83
402
-
 BD 61
584
-
 BD 34
953
-
 Op(BE 83)
 
196
-
 BF 86
405
-
 BF 49
592
-
 BE 43
963
-
 AE 82
 
212
-
 AF 72
413
-
 AK 95
603
-
 BD 37
964
-
 AE 82
 
214
-
 BC 62
420
-
 BF 47
608
-
 AK 98
966
-
 AE 82
 
218
-
 DP 98
426
-
 AE 82
631
-
 AK 50
967
-
 AF 72
 
220
-
 BD 17
437
-
 AK 50
641
-
 BD 34
969
-
 AE 82
 
226
-
 BE 52
448
-
 AK 50
645
-
 AL 85      
 
  On Return Passage:  U 181 - 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 220 - 260 - 264 - 275 - 305 - 539 - 641 - 645 - 666 - 731 - 758 - 952.
  Entered Port:  U 181 - Bordeaux.
  Sailed:  U 211 - 306 - Brest; U 343 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  
  1)  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
  2) Reconnaissance against England - Gibraltar convoy traffic.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) U 533 found no traffic in the Gulf of Aden and U 168 none in the same area off Bombay.  According to positions given both these boats are on passage to the Gulf of Oman as ordered.  (U 188's previous operations area).
  b) Our aircraft sighted a convoy of 60 merchant ships, 12 escort vessels, 1 cruiser, course 1800, speed 6 knots, at 1035 in CF 3121.
  c) 1) An English unit was located in AK 6460.
    2) U-boat sightings:  BE 6934, BE 6669 (U 420).
    3) An enemy unit reported an attack on a periscope in EC 2799 (U 214?).
  d)  According to a Radio Intelligence (X) report stragglers from ONS 20 received orders to make for a rendezvous in AL 1965. Course from there 2150. This order was cancelled.
       
- 253 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     At 2233 and a new rendezvous ordered for 1330/15 in AL 2955.  The course to be steered then was altered to 2900.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  Group "Schlieffen" is on its way to the patrol line ordered.  The line has had to be shortened by one position owing to the absence of U 455 (see paragraph d).
  b)  None.
  c)  U 220 and U 455 are steering for BD 61.  U 455 is to deliver her remaining fuel to U 220.
     U 220 is also to take over U 488's remaining fuel, so that the tanker will be able to return as soon as possible and be prepared for her next operation.
  d)  U 455 was rammed by another U-boat during darkness in sea 9 in AK 5255.  She will have to return owing to damage to her starboard compensating tank and No. 2 diving tank.
     According to a later report the boat which rammed her was U 631, all 4 of whose tubes were rendered unserviceable.  She will however, stay in the patrol line until the expected convoy is picked up.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
15.October 1943.
 
 
 
I.
U 68
-
 ES 65
U 231
-
 AK 53
U 437
-
 AK 53
U 641
-
 BD 61
 
91
-
 AK 56
256
-
 BE 41
448
-
 AK 56
645
-
 BE 21
 
103
-
 DS 83
260
-
 BE 69
455
-
 AK 52
648
-
 BF 47
 
123
-
 Op(EE 84)
264
-
 BF 64
470
-
 AK 29
666
-
 BE 69
 
129
-
 BF 82
267
-
 AK 67
488
-
 BD 61
709
-
 BE 50
 
154
-
 Op(CE 69)
271
-
 BD 61
505
-
 BE 96
714
-
 AE 57
 
155
-
 EH 24
274
-
 AE 57
516
-
 CE 96
731
-
 BD 61
 
161
-
 Op(FQ 60)
275
-
 BD 31
518
-
 Op(DL 29)
758
-
 BD 61
 
168
-
 Op(MG 29)
280
-
 AN 24
532
-
 Op(LC 30)
762
-
 AK 53
 
170
-
 Op(FJ 90)
281
-
 AL 31
533
-
 Op(MF 86)
841
-
 AE 79
 
183
-
 LL 35
305
-
 BE 67
536
-
 Op(CC 11)
842
-
 AL 24
 
188
-
 MS 87
306
-
 BF 55
537
-
 AJ 20
843
-
 AF 59
 
190
-
 CF 33
309
-
 AK 53
539
-
 BE 16
844
-
 AL 16
 
193
-
 BF 82
343
-
 AO
540
-
 AL 32
848
-
 CD 69
 
196
-
 BF 83
373
-
 BE 52
552
-
 BE 18
849
-
 AE 59
 
211
-
 BF 55
378
-
 BD 61
575
-
 BE 49
952
-
 BE 68
 
212
-
 AF 47
402
-
 BD 61
584
-
 BD 61
953
-
 Op(BE)
 
214
-
 ED 17
405
-
 BD 61
592
-
 BE 19
963
-
 AE 84
 
218
-
 EE 26
413
-
 AK 67
603
-
 BD 61
964
-
 AL 16
 
220
-
 BD 27
420
-
 BE 65
608
-
 AK 91
966
-
 AE 84
 
226
-
 BE 27
426
-
 AE 84
631
-
 AK 53
967
-
 AF 47
                   
969
-
 AE 84
 
  On Return Passage:  U 183 - 188 - 196 - 214 - 220 - 260 - 264 - 275 - 305 - 539 - 641 - 645 - 666 - 731 - 758 - 952.
  Entered Port:  U 264 - St. NAzaire.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
- 254 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
II. Air Reconnaissance:  Fighter sweeps in outer Biscay.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) Convoy report from U 844 see paragraph IVa.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) Enemy units were located in AM 41, AM 4390, BE 6610, AL 2970.
    2) U-boat sightings:  BF 5449, BF 4639? and EC 6333 (U 214).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) Convoy No. 45:
     U 844 sighted a destroyer at 2117 in AL 1689.  At 2147 this boat reported a W-bound convoy, speed up to 8 knots, in AL 1822.  U 844 was ordered to do her utmost to shadow.  Boats in the vicinity, U 841, 281, 426, 842, 540, 964 were to operate against the convoy.   Group "Schlieffen" was not yet ordered to take action as it seemed very unlikely that U 844 could shadow as long as that.  The patrol line was ordered to be in position from AK 2477 to AK 6117 by 2200/16/10.  Towards 2400 U 844 was forced to dive by escort vessels and was hunted with depth charges for 3 hours.  After surfacing again, she reported the convoy's last position as AL 8141, course 2700.  The convoy was not sighted again by morning.  U 841 had reported that she was operating against it.
    Weather conditions improved considerably during the last 24 hours and can be regarded as favorable - SW 4 and moderate visibility.
     It is not possible to say yet whether this is the expected ONS 20 or ON 220.  As the westerly gale of the last few days must have delayed both convoys and the speed reported is still below 8 knots, it should be ONS 20.  Also, the last position reported by U 844 is only 25 miles north of the route given in the Radio Intelligence (X) report (convoy was to steer 2900 from the rendezvous in AL 2955).  U 844 has been ordered to report the exact time of the last position and the reliability of her own fix.
  b) 1) Group "Schlieffen" was ordered at 1126 to be in patrol line from AK 2897 to AK 6817 at 0000/17/10 in the new order:  U 844 - 964 - 631 - 470 - 437 - 309 - 762 - 231 - 91 - 448 - 267 - 413 - 608.
    2) U 155 is to make for FB 60.   She is to search for traffic off the North coast of Brazil.
       
       
       
       
- 255 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) 1) U 220 is on her way to U 488's supply group in BD 6195 and is there to act as tanker.  After the refueling so far ordered has been completed it will be decided whether U 488 is to give her remaining fuel to U 220.
    2) U 256 and 271 will take over the Flak protection of U 488.  Boats are to remain surfaced, one on each side, at a distance off of about 500 meters and act in accordance with Serial Order No. 24.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
VI. General:
  The following new orders have been given for the protection of the tankers:
  a) If supplying has to be carried out by day, the most important thing is to protect the tanker at all costs, provide her with an opportunity to dive and screen her diving at full risk to the other boats.
  b) Boats not supplying will form an all-round screen around the tanker, distance 500 meters. If the tanker has Flak boats, these will occupy the positions abreast the tanker.
  c) In the case of air attacks the tanker is to dive at the first opportunity.  The remaining boats are to screen her diving with every available means and at full risk to themselves.  They may only dive when the tanker has reached a safe depth.
       
       
                                                                             (Signed):  GODT.
                                                                                    Chief of Operations Department
                                                                                                for B.d.U.
 
 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 256 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U. Op.
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 435 ING.
     
8 October 1943.
       
U-boats as of 1 October 1943.
       
I
In Commission on 1 September 1943 :  
393
Commissioned during September  
22
   
415
     
Paid off (U 180, 195) 2
Lost in September:  
       on operations 8
       at home 2
   
12
   
403
   
       Taken back from the Italians  
9
       Plus foreigners  
8
       So far handed over to the Japanese (U 511)  
1
       
II
Losses during September :      
Atlantic:
Type VII:
 U 634, 341, 338, 669, 229, 221
6
Mediterranean:
Type VII:
U 617
1
Northern Waters: Type VII: U 639
1
Home: Type VII: U 346, 983
2
 
 
10
  For details of losses see appendix.
       
III. Distribution of boats:
 
II
VIIa
VIIb/c
VIId
VIIf
IXb/c
IXd1
IXd2
Xb
XIV
Total
On Operations:
6
-
126
2
-
32
-
6
1
2
175
On Trials:
-
-
  119  
-
4
25
-
7
2
1
158
Training:
33
3
     39    
-
-
  4
-
-
-
-
79
 
  39  
3
285
2
4
61
-
13
3
3
412
       
  In September :
 
Became operational   +
18
Total number increased by   +
19
Number of operational boats increased by   +
10
Number of training boats increased by   +
9
Number of training boats remained the same    
-
  Note:  The 9 boats taken back from the Italians are included in the above figures.
       
 
 
 
- 257 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
IV. Distribution of operational boats on 1.10.1943:
 
Atlantic
135
 
Mediterranean
13
    
Northern Waters
21
    
Black Sea
6
    
175
       
V. In the Atlantic during September :
 
Daily average at sea:
60
Of these, in operations areas:
9.5
On passage:
50.5
Of the latter, on return passage :
12.5
       
VI. Sailed for the Atlantic during September:
 
From home waters
18
From France
32
       
       
                                                                    (Signed):  GODT.
                                                                         Chief of Operational Division
                                                                                for B.d.U.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
- 258 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Appendix to Naval War Staff (2nd Division) / B.d.U. Op.
  Most Secret S.O. Only 435 ING.
   
  Appendix to II (Details of losses):
   
 
U 634 Experienced boat.  Last report 29.8. E. of the Azores.  Loss may have been due to A/S formation.
   
U 341 Second patrol.  Last report passage report 8.9.  Cause of loss aircraft attack.
   
U 338 Experienced boat.  Last report 20.9. S.E. of Greenland.  Lost at convoy.
   
U 669 Second patrol.  No report.  Loss due to Biscay patrol.
   
U 229 Experienced boat.  Last report 21.9. S.E. of Greenland.
   
U 221 Experienced boat.  No report.  Loss probably due to Biscay patrol.
   
U 617 Experienced boat.  Last news was that on 21.9. she had been beached W. of Melille and blown up.  Loss due to aircraft.
   
U 639 Experienced boat.  Last report 21.8 near the Ob-estuary.  Loss may have been due to a mine.
   
U 346 Diving accident off Hela.
   
U 983 Rammed by U 988.
       
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Supreme Command of the Navy
Naval War Staff (2nd Division) / B.d.U. Op.
Reg. No. Most Secret S.O. Only 193 A 2
     
11 May 1943.
       
Operations Order St. Johns for U 220.
       
I. Operation:
  The convoy routes off St. Johns are to be extensively fouled with mines.
       
II. Enemy situation:
  According to Radio Intelligence and observations made by U-boats regular convoy and warship traffic is to be expected inward and outward bound.
  1) St. Johns is the home port for relieving escort vessels and auxiliary aircraft carriers used for the Atlantic convoys.  Vessels relieve about 200 miles S.E. of St. Johns.
  2)  Part convoys (about 4 a month) proceed to the convoy rendezvous for America - England traffic.  The assembly point is the same as the relief point in 1) above.  On the same route 4 part convoys enter port coming from England.
  3)  One coastal convoy enters or leaves in a southerly direction every 4th or 5th day.  Port of destination is Halifax.
  4)  A convoy of 5 - 8 steamers sails for Greenland and back every 7 - 9 days.
  5) U 513 (Ruggenberg) reported on 1.10.42:
     "There may be mines immediately off the main harbor.  One patrol vessel (old type) constantly off the main harbor.  Strong air activity by day, lately coastal night air activity, no aircraft Radar.  Strong variations in water density (3 tons had to be pumped out from 30 meters to periscope depth).  When vessels are about to enter or leave the inner bay is covered every 10 - 20 minutes by a strong searchlight."
       
III. Material:
  1)  66 SMA with 400 meters mooring rope, time setting 80 day, safety device to flood within shortest period, delay clockwork 12 hours, depth setting minus 15 meters, P.D.M. one actuation.
  2) Maximum depth at which mines may be laid is 350 meters, minimum 50 meters, distance apart of mines 400 meters.
       
IV. Execution:
  1)  Boat to sail as soon as at war readiness.  Before the minelaying operation she will be used as a tanker.  Boat will be dismissed in time for the mines to be laid during the new moon period.
 
 
 
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  2)  Geographical boundaries are:
    The mines are to be laid in groups of 6 - 8 in number between 470 26' N., 470 40' N. and 520 21' W. and the coast.  Individual minefield sections are to be 3 - 4 miles apart as far as possible, so that only one section at a time can be covered in enemy sweeping operations.  A diagram is attached for the boat as a guide to the distribution of the mines.
  3)  Modifications may be made at the Commanding Officer's discretion according to the enemy situation observed.  The time of laying is left to the Commanding Officer after reconnoitering the area.
  4) For barrages and lights extinguished see Standing War Order No. 491.
       
V. Reporting:
    A report is to be made by short signal as soon as possible after the laying has been completed, but from at least 100 miles away.  The group AFKP will mean:  Have carried out minelaying off St. Johns.
       
VI.   When the mines have been laid further orders will be given by Radio.
       
       
                                                                    (Signed):  GODT.
                                                                         Chief of Operational Division
                                                                                for B.d.U.
       
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