U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30348

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 June 1944

PG30348

1.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CD 43	U 292	-	AE 67	U 541	-	CD 46	U 853	-	Op(BD 83)
	129	-	FK 64	294	-	AN 29	543	-	ET 93	857	-	AL 01
	155	-	DT 56	385	-	BF 86	547	-	ET 21	859	-	FD 73
	181	-	KQ 85	477	-	AF 87	548	-	CC 21	860	-	ER 92
	183	-	LY 43	490	-	AL 19	549	-	DG 97	861	-	CD 75
	190	-	EJ 35	505	-	DT 23	671	-	AF 49	862	-	AF 35
	196	-	KR 24	516	-	DF 98	675	-	AE 83	955	-	BE 59
	198	-	FM 83	530	-	CG 18	719	-	AE 59	988	-	AE 67
	233	-	AN 23	534	-	Op(AK 16)	767	-	AE 68	1191	-	AE 67
	241	-	AL 16	537	-	JJ 21	843	-	LY 64	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	247	-	AN 24	539	-	DD 81	851	-	KG 83

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 385 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 290 - Egersund.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a) -	b)	None.
	c)	1)	25 aircraft of 19 Group confirmed to be operating in Bay of Biscay.
		2)	U-boat sightings:
			Submarine attacking in DN 9556 (no boat in the vicinity).
		3)	ASV (anti-surface vessel) locations:
			Gibraltar: one ASV location in unspecified position.
		4)	English units located in: AM 9480 - 9310 - 5740 - 4934 - 1820 - BE 4936 - 4363. One English unit lay in BE 4733 at 1240. (Control of English steamer).
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	U 857 sent first weather report from AL 01, 3 weather boats now in reporting area.
	c)	None.

- 314 -

	d)	1)	U 294 - 241 - 675 - 292 and U 490 (supply vessel) were ordered to make for ports on west coast of France for installation of Schnorchel and radar apparatus, as it seems no longer possible to keep boats in operational area unless equipped with this apparatus At present boats still outward bound in Iceland Passage.
		2)	U 473 must be regarded as lost. On 24.4. boat sailed from Lorient installed with "Picket" equipment. Came on eastbound convoy on 3.5. and fired T 5 at destroyer which missed. Last position report on 4.5. from BE 2518. Finally boat was given freedom of movement in area AL 60. Since then no further report in spite of repeated requests. Cause of loss unknown.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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2.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CD 44	U 290	-	AN 23	U 539	-	DD 76	U 851	-	KH 68
	129	-	FK 37	292	-	AE 83	541	-	CD 52	853	-	Op(BD 53)
	155	-	DT 29	294	-	AN 23	543	-	EU 72	857	-	AL 01
	181	-	KO 83	385	-	BF 54	547	-	ET 28	859	-	FD 88
	183	-	LY 11	477	-	AF 84	548	-	CC 23	860	-	ER 99
	190	-	DT 97	490	-	AK 83	549	-	DT 11	861	-	DF 11
	196	-	KR 23	505	-	DH 74	671	-	AF 48	862	-	AF 35
	198	-	FN 98	516	-	DR 31	675	-	AE 85	955	-	BE 67
	233	-	AF 87	530	-	CF 17	719	-	AE 83	988	-	AE 83
	241	-	AL 16	534	-	Op(AK 10)	767	-	AE 67	1191	-	AE 83
	247	-	AF 87	537	-	KY 94	843	-	LY 63	1222	-	Op(BB 70)

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 385 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	At 2118/30/5 U 547 fired FAT 2 spread on single freighter of 5,000 GRT in ET 6115 which was cruising without lights on easterly course speed 10 knots. Steamer lighted up after 5 minutes, was hit after 9, explosion heard after 17 minutes and steamer sank. Possibly this was a neutral ship which set regulation lights too late. (Dark commenced at 2109 hours).
	b)	None.

- 315 -

	c)	1)	25 aircraft of 19 Group confirmed to be operating in Bay of Biscay. Little activity, no sighting or ASV locations.
		2)	Great activity on part of 44 aircraft of 18 Group confirmed. A total of 7 periscope or submarine sightings in waters off Norwegian coast.
		3)	English units D/F'd in: AL 8738 - 6510 - 5212 - AM 5280 - 6970 - BE 2223 - CD 57.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	None.
	b)	1)	Operations area positions for U 107 and U 539 were sent by radio message.
		2)	U 181 - 196 - 851 received orders not to stay any longer in present operations area in case no opportunity for attack presented itself, but to continue passage to square LC.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 547 1 ship 5,000 GRT.

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3.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CC 65	U 292	-	AE 82	U 539	-	DD 78	U 851	-	KH 41
	129	-	FK 32	294	-	AF 87	541	-	CD 37	853	-	Op(BD 51)
	155	-	DT 26	385	-	BF 54	543	-	EU 84	857	-	Op(AL 57)
	181	-	KQ 68	473	-	Op(AL 63)	547	-	ET 61	859	-	FL 13
	183	-	LN 93	477	-	AF 81	548	-	BC 79	860	-	FD 17
	190	-	DT 86	490	-	AK 86	549	-	DS 38	861	-	DF 41
	196	-	KG 79	505	-	DH 47	671	-	AE 69	862	-	AF 35
	198	-	FU 36	516	-	DR 28	675	-	AE 87	955	-	BE 68
	233	-	AF 84	530	-	CF 63	719	-	AE 85	988	-	AE 85
	241	-	AL 18	534	-	Op(AK 20)	767	-	AE 59	1191	-	AE 85
	247	-	AF 81	537	-	KY 92	843	-	LZ 19	1222	-	Op(BB 70)

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 385 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 958 - 980 - Bergen; (U 862 - Narvik).

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

- 316 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)-	b)	None.
	c)	1)	25 aircraft of 19 Group confirmed in Bay of Biscay. Slight activity, no sighting or ASV location.
		2)	42 aircraft of 18 Group, very lively activity.
		3)	English units located in: AM 9190 - 9328 - AL 6637 - 9565 - BE 5433 - BC 2964 - BF 1251 - 1230.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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4.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CC 56	U 292	-	AE 85	U 543	-	EU 94	U 857	-	Op(AL 58)
	129	-	FD 75	294	-	AF 84	547	-	EU 72	859	-	FC 27
	155	-	DT 23	385	-	BF 61	548	-	BC 88	860	-	FD 45
	181	-	KQ 65	477	-	AF 49	549	-	DS 64	861	-	DF 47
	183	-	LN 61	490	-	AK 88	671	-	AE 68	862	-	AB 98
	190	-	DT 83	505	-	DH 44	675	-	AL 32	955	-	BE 69
	196	-	KG 84	516	-	DR 51	719	-	AE 88	958	-	AF 87
	198	-	FV 41	534	-	Op(AK 27)	767	-	AL 24	980	-	AF 87
	233	-	AF 81	537	-	KY 69	843	-	LZ 29	988	-	AE 84
	241	-	AL 19	539	-	DO 15	853	-	BD 57	1191	-	AE 84
	247	-	AF 49	541	-	CD 33	851	-	KH 15	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	290	-	AN 23	530	-	CF 65

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: U 385 - Lorient.
	Sailed: U 1000 - Egersund; U 673 - Drontheim.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	In message, time of origin 1748, U 490 reported eastbound convoy in AK 8868 at 1330. As no other boat was in the vicinity and U 490 a supply ship, she received orders to continue southward passage.
	b)	None.

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	c)	1)	14 aircraft of 19 Group confirmed in Bay of Biscay. The very small activity in Biscay during the last few days shows that the enemy is aware of the empty Bay. On the other hand very lively air activity against boats on passage to the Atlantic off the Norwegian coast.
		2)	One U-boat sighting by 19 Group at 0315 in 45⁰ 30' North, course 50⁰, 14.5 knots (U 955?).
		3)	One ASV location, cancelled.
		4)	One English unit located in AM 9320.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	U 767 occupying AK 90 - AL 90 as operations area.
	b)	U 548 on return passage from coast of New Caledonia reports situation. Boat sighted 2 sections of convoys and 2 single ships in area 80 miles south of Halifax. No attack made. Comparatively small defence, observations roughly coincide with last reports from U 1222.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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5.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CC 57	U 292	-	AE 84	U 547	-	EU 76	U 859	-	FL 56
	129	-	FD 47	294	-	AF 87	548	-	BC 88	860	-	FD 73
	155	-	DG 97	477	-	AF 48	549	-	DS 59	861	-	DF 74
	181	-	KR 17	490	-	AK 88	671	-	AE 67	862	-	AB 89
	183	-	LN 26	505	-	DH 17	673	-	AF 58	955	-	BE 69
	190	-	DT 55	516	-	DR 45	675	-	AL 33	958	-	AF 84
	196	-	KG 83	530	-	CF 58	719	-	AL 32	980	-	AF 84
	198	-	FV 45	534	-	Op(AK 37)	767	-	AL 27	988	-	AL 37
	233	-	AF 49	537	-	KZ 45	843	-	LZ 39	1000	-	AN 31
	241	-	AL 19	539	-	DO 17	851	-	KH 21	1191	-	AE 87
	247	-	AF 48	541	-	CD 36	853	-	Op(BD 57)	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	290	-	AF 87	543	-	EU 96	857	-	Op(AL 84)

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: - . -

- 318 -

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

U 955 reported air attack at 0107 in BE 8333.

None.

No report on air activity in Biscay (Communication interrupted).

U-boat sightings:

19 Group: At 0046 and at 0058 surfaced submarines in unspecified positions; at 0130 surfaced submarine in unspecified position, course 40⁰, speed 10 knots.

3 ASV locations in unspecified positions.

Enemy units located in: AL 6570 - AM 4329 - 7390 - BE 8270 - BF 2290 - 2610.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

a)	0305.	report from I. German Naval Staff.
		Large numbers of parachute troops and freight carrying gliders landed west of Trouville and in western Normandy. (First report to 2 German Naval Staff about commencement of main landing in west). Therefore at
	0310.	telephoned to F.O. Submarines West ordering immediate readiness of Group "Landwirt" and at
	0343.	radio message ordering same for Group "Mitte".
	0351.	The 7 boats on passage to the Atlantic and still lying to the east of Iceland (U 477 - 247 - 294 - 980 - 958 - 290 - 1000) were ordered to remain in present area for time being, while
	0532.	the 5 Schnorchel boats freshly arrived in Atlantic (U 767 - 988 - 719 - 1191 - 671) to make for Western France at maximum continuous speed, submerged during day.
		In the meanwhile news of enemy landing in Seine Bay was broadcast on all frequencies to boats at sea.
	0531.	Cypher according to key-word order "Venus" came into force on program Diana (Landwirt" boats).
		Intentions of landing had become clear in the meanwhile, so the 7 Schnorchel boats lying in Brest (U 764 - 441 - 269 - 821 - 984 - 275 - 953) received orders at 0800 to put to sea as soon as ready.
		With the above, all possible (for the present) and necessary measures were completed. It is intended to bring Schnorchel boats stationed in Atlantic (see under 0351) as near as possible to the scene of the landing, while it must be realized

- 319 -

		that operation in the Channel for boats without Schnorchel is exceptionally difficult.
		For the time being boats lying east of Iceland to remain where they are until it becomes clear whether landings in Norway - Denmark will be attempted. A state of "immediate readiness" seems to be sufficient for Group "Mitte" at present. Although key-word "Wallenstein" has not yet been ordered, Capt. Schultz, Flag Officer Submarines "Mitte" to be, has been ordered to Kiel as precaution.
		Sailing orders are still withheld for boats of Group "Landwirt" without Schnorchel, this time is not being lost as boats will not be ready to put to sea until midday.

b) -

None

Reports of Success: None.

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6.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CC 48	U 292	-	AE 79	U 547	-	Op(EV 80)	U 860	-	FD 88
	129	-	FD 44	294	-	AF 49	548	-	BC 97	861	-	DQ 33
	155	-	DG 93	477	-	AF 47	549	-	DS 86	862	-	AB 76
	181	-	KR 16	490	-	BD 16	671	-	AE 83	955	-	BE 83
	183	-	Op(LC 88)	505	-	DH 14	673	-	AF 57	958	-	AF 81
	190	-	DT 52	516	-	DQ 59	675	-	AL 26	980	-	AF 81
	196	-	KG 65	530	-	CF 84	719	-	AL 33	988	-	AL 81
	198	-	FU 73	534	-	Op(AK 39)	767	-	AL 01	1000	-	AN 29
	233	-	AF 48	537	-	KZ 51	843	-	KA 15	1191	-	AL 31
	241	-	AL 19	539	-	DN 63	851	-	Op(BD 58)	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	247	-	AF 47	541	-	CE 14	857	-	Op(AL 75)
	290	-	AF 81	543	-	Op(EV 70)	859	-	FL 91

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed:
	U 714 - 650 - 281 - 228 - 985 - 260 - 255 - 270 - 608 - 437 - 445 - 758 - 766 - 382 - St Nazaire
	U 993 - 981 - Lorient.
	U 621 - 989 - 821 - 441 - 984 - 413 - 953 - 256 - 764 - 275 - 740 - 269 - 963 - 629 - 415 - Brest.
	U 212 - 333 - 262 - 970 - La Pallice.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

- 320 -

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

Air attacks on boats of Group "Landwirt" while putting to sea:

U 333	0105	in	BF 6874
963	0139	in	BF 5213
	0223	in	BF 5212
	0325	in	BF 5133
981	0437	in	BF 5232	(report after attack)
	0615	in	BF 5232
212	0732	in	BF 9132	(report after attack)

None.

Directly after sailing of "Landwirt" boats, jump up in numbers of operational aircraft belonging to 19 Group.

Submarine sightings by 19 Group ("Landwirt" boats):

1850	6 torpedo boats and 5 submarines in BF 2877.
0135	2 submarines, position unspecified (U 963).
0230	surfaced submarine, unspecified position, course 260⁰, 12 knots (U 963).
0313	surfaced submarine in BF 2875.
0400	surfaced submarine in BF 2783
0425	surfaced submarine in BF 2876.
0433	surfaced submarine, position unspecified, course west, 15 knots.
0510	surfaced submarine in BF 2782, course 50⁰, speed 15 knots.
0514	surfaced submarine in BF 2871, course North, 15 knots.
0630	diving submarine in BF 2879, course 80⁰.

Unspecified positions:

At 2021 diving submarine; 0005 submerged boat; 0120 in 46⁰ 21' North, degree of longitude unspecified; 0207 surfaced submarine; 0229 surfaced submarine (U 963?); 0213 surfaced submarine; 0253 and 0305 surfaced submarines.

Submarine sighting at 0750 in ED 1247 (U 539?). Course north, speed 6 knots.

18 Group: 1050 surfaced submarine in AF 4864, course north, speed 6 knots.

ASV locations: One location in area LE/LP. Aircraft of 15 Group in 52⁰ 30' North, longitude not given. Finally cancelled.

Enemy units located in AL 8783 - 9424 - AM 4845 - BE 7749

None.

- 321 -

IV.

Current Operations:

Boats halted before approach to Iceland Straits received orders at 1821 to occupy following waiting positions at a depth of 25 miles:

U 477	-	AF 7225;	U 247	-	AF 4325;
U 294	-	AF 8156;	U 980	-	AF 7622;
U 958	-	AF 8447;	U 290	-	AF 8746;
U 1000	-	AN 2391.

Boats to remain at least 30 miles distant from coast, and are ordered to report any enemy movements which might concern landing operations at once and at all costs, since there is not sufficient air reconnaissance.

b) -

None.

Group "Landwirt":

This morning Commander-in-Chief of the Navy ordered whole of Group "Landwirt" to sea and all-out operations. As issues of invasion will have decisive effect on the war, all boats lying in Brest, both with and without Schnorchel put into Channel. For those boats without Schnorchel this means the last operation. By 0015/7/6 35 of the 36 boats had put to sea.

Location:

Schnorchel boats:

U 212 - 269 - 275 - 441 - 621 - 764 - 953 - 984 steering for BF 3184. If boats can penetrate thus far, operation seems possible towards the east and in the Seine Bay because they will be difficult to locate and attack in among the probably heavy invasion traffic.

Brest boats without Schnorchel:

U 740 - 821 - 629 - 413 - 415 - 256 - 963 detailed to operations area between lines of longitude BF 2555 and 2613. Focal point in north and northeast of this area, U 989 operations area between Scilly Isles and Lizard Head.

Rest of the boats (without Schnorchel) from Lorient and St. Nazaire to form reconnaissance net roughly along 200 meter line.

Positions: (all in BF)

U 981	-	1957;	U 993	-	4318;	U 333	-	4359;
260	-	4622;	608	-	4399;	228	-	5441;
255	-	5458;	985	-	5462;	262	-	5498;
270	-	4372;	281	-	5424;	970	-	5573;
758	-	5818;	445	-	5826;	766	-	5886;
650	-	9158;	714	-	9277;	382	-	9571;
437	-	6774.

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		All boats on passage in Channel to proceed surfaced at night at high speed. But as 6 boats reported 9 air attacks during the night and 18 radio intercept reports received concerning submarine sightings or attacks, boats left free to proceed submerged at will. (Compare III a) and c)).
		U 256 was damaged by air attack and had to put in to port again. Boat shot down one Liberator during attack. Apart from which U 989 also put in again on morning of 7.6. (Commander wounded) and U 415 on account of bomb damage sustained during attack by 2 Liberators. One shot down.
		There are therefore 32 boats of Group "Landwirt" at sea.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 256 1 aircraft
	U 415 1 aircraft

VI.	General:
	The putting to sea of boats from Western France called forth, as was to be expected the strongest possible air counter measures on the part of the enemy. The enormous numbers of locations and attacks show with what high stakes even the massed sailings are connected.

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7.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CB 69	U 290	-	Op(AF 87)	U 548	-	BD 78	U 859	-	FL 97
	129	-	FD 17	292	-	AL 22	549	-	EH 22	860	-	FL 12
	155	-	DG 66	294	-	Op(AF 81)	608	-	BF 6756	861	-	DR 17
	181	-	KR 22	333	-	BF 6874	621	-	BF 2798	862	-	AA 96
	183	-	Op(LC)	382	-	BF 6755	629	-	BF 5136	953	-	BF 2794
	190	-	DT 25	413	-	BF 5248	650	-	BF 6759	955	-	BE 68
	196	-	KH 41	415	-	BF 2799	671	-	AE 82	958	-	Op(AF 84)
	198	-	FV 87	437	-	BF 2764	673	-	AF 47	963	-	BF 5132
	212	-	BF 9132	441	-	BF 2786	675	-	AL 28	970	-	BF 3933
	228	-	BF 6759	475	-	BF 6764	714	-	BF 6758	980	-	Op(AF 76)
	233	-	AF 47	477	-	Op(AF 72)	719	-	AL 23	981	-	BF 5232
	241	-	AL 19	490	-	BD 19	740	-	BF 5132	984	-	BF 2794
	247	-	Op(AF 73)	505	-	DH 11	758	-	BF 6761	985	-	BF 6753
	255	-	BF 6758	516	-	DQ 94	764	-	BF 2786	988	-	AL 28
	256	-	BF 2798	530	-	CF 87	766	-	BF 6761	989	-	BF 5224
	260	-	BF 6753	534	-	Op(AK 28)	767	-	AL 55	993	-	FB 5526
	262	-	BF 9136	537	-	KZ 28	821	-	BF 5133	1000	-	Op(AN 23)
	269	-	BF 2796	539	-	DN 64	843	-	KA 25	1191	-	AL 24
	270	-	BF 6713	541	-	BD 58	851	-	LW 83	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	275	-	BF 2794	543	-	Op(EV 80)	853	-	Op(BD 56)
	281	-	BF 6767	547	-	Op(EU 80)	857	-	Op(AK 96)

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: U 256 - 415 - 963 - 989 - Brest.
	Sailed: U 373 - Brest; U 735 - 637 - Kiel to Group "Mitte".

- 323 -

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

Air attacks ("Landwirt" boats):

1807	U 963	in	BF 5212
2223	U 212	in	BF 9122	damaged by gunfire.
2346	U 382	in	BF 9137
2351	U 270	in	BF 5892
0158	U 413	in	BF 5271	by a number of aircraft.
0206	U 413	in	BF 5271
0232	U 413	continuous attacks (later boat reported attacks unsuccessful)
Apart from which U 1000 reported air attack at 0239 in AN 2391.

None.

Later confirmed: On 6.6. operational strength of 19 Group 97 aircraft against "Landwirt" boats. This is the highest number to date.

U-boat sightings:

Morning in LD 4273, no Japanese boat in area, probably U 183.

19 Group:

2333	in BF 5895, course 270⁰, at
2340	same aircraft reported: "attacked with depth-charges, no hits observed".
2236	periscope in BF 2247, course north, 10 knots.
2348	in BF 9141.
0030	diving boat in BF 2498, course 240⁰, 10 knots.
0030	diving boat in BF 9145 upper left corner.
0033	diving boat in BF 2588 course 240⁰, 10 knots.
0143	in BF 5241
0143	in BF 2879, course 270⁰, 8 knots.
0152	in BF 5252.
0202	in BF 5275.
0230	in BF 2814 and 2822 and BF 5222.
0245	in BF 2755, course 270⁰, 12 knots.
0250	in BF 2795, course 295⁰, 8 knots.

U-boat sightings in unspecified positions:

0810	in 48⁰ 27' North, longitude not given.
0925	boat on westerly course dived after being in action.

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2327	in 45⁰ 45' North, longitude not given.
0030	in 49⁰ 17' North, longitude not given.
0203	in 52⁰ 18' North, longitude not given.

No ASV locations.

Enemy units located in: AL 7554 - 9549 - 6186 - AK 4453 - AM 5550 - 2577 - 4644 - BE 2180 - BF 3381 - 5470.

IV.

Current Operations:

None.

U 107 detailed to operations off coast of Nova Scotia on ground of experiences of U 1222 and U 548, U 549 off north coast of Brazil. Both boats receive a detailed account of the situation.

Contrary to previous orders U 247 to proceed to North Minch (via northeast entrance) and U 719 to North Channel. Both boats equipped with Schnorchel. Surprise successes possible, as on account of landings in the west there will probably be only slight patrol here. Object of operation to upset enemy and tie down forces.

None.

Group "Landwirt":

U 373 as last boat to put to sea, to occupy operations area originally detailed to U 989 (Scilly's - Lizard Head).

Entered port on account of further heavy air attacks: (vide III a)

U 963:	stern hydroplane out of order.
U 413:	boat unable to dive in BF 5271. At 0248 2 patrol vessels started to the rescue of boat which was still being attacked, and in addition 5 minesweepers to take up escort at 1330/8/6.
U 212:	Return passage on account of damage sustained by gunfire. 30 boats still in operation.

On return U 963 reported observing 3 aircraft shot down by other boats. 2 of these are known (U 415 and U 256). Confirmation after report of Commander.

- 325 -

		4)	The risky operation of boats in the Channel, above all those without Schnorchel had to be undertaken in this decisive situation. Whether Schnorchel boats on arrival in operations area will be able to penetrate into the Seine Bay, and how far boats without Schnorchel will be able to operate in Channel remains to be seen.
			The operation is especially difficult for boats without Schnorchel. The return of 6 of these boats already is no evidence to the contrary, since they put to sea on the surface in order to reach operations area quickly and were bombed in so doing.
		5)	At 1832 a meteorological aircraft sighted a convoy of 2 cruisers, 15 destroyers and 4 large troop transports in BF 1278.
			No great importance was attached to this report, apart from which Naval Group West reported position as BF 3298.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

8.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CB 67	U 290	-	Op(AF 87)	U 547	-	Op(EU 80)	U 853	-	Op(BD 59)
	129	-	FD 11	292	-	AL 23	548	-	BD 84	857	-	Op(AK 94)
	155	-	DG 63	294	-	Op(AF 81)	549	-	EH 27	859	-	FT 11
	181	-	KG 78	333	-	BF 6772	608	-	BF 6777	860	-	FL 43
	183	-	Op(LD 42)	373	-	BF 2765	621	-	BF 2577	861	-	DR 44
	190	-	DT 22	382	-	BF 9137	629	-	BF 2584	862	-	AA 97
	196	-	KH 15	413	-	BF 5271	650	-	BF 9154	953	-	BF 2581
	198	-	GG 36	437	-	BF 6778	671	-	AE 84	955	-	BE 69
	212	-	BF 9122	441	-	BF 2577	673	-	AE 47	958	-	Op(AF 84)
	228	-	BF 9121	445	-	BF 6775	675	-	AL 29	970	-	BF 6775
	233	-	AE 69	477	-	Op(AF 72)	714	-	BF 9161	980	-	Op(AF 76)
	241	-	AL 19	490	-	BD 45	719	-	AL 27	981	-	BF 5534
	247	-	Op(AF 72)	505	-	DH 11	740	-	BF 2576	984	-	BF 2573
	255	-	BF 5894	516	-	DQ 88	758	-	BF 9116	985	-	BF 5899
	260	-	BF 5896	530	-	DH 11	764	-	BF 2558	988	-	AL 54
	262	-	BF 6778	534	-	Op(AK 02)	766	-	BF 9122	993	-	BF 5526
	269	-	BF 3578	537	-	KZ 35	767	-	AL 81	1000	-	Op(AN 23)
	270	-	BF 5892	539	-	EC 33	821	-	BF 2576	1191	-	AL 22
	275	-	BF 2582	541	-	BD 67	843	-	KA 34	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	281	-	BF 6771	543	-	Op(EV 80)	851	-	LW 64

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: U 212 - La Pallice.

- 326 -

Sailed: U 678 - 999 - 677 - 971 - 1001 - Kristiansand; U 715 - 397 - 242 - 975 - Stavanger; U 243 - Flekkefjord.

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

Air attacks ("Landwirt" boats):

0809 U 413 in BF 5271 by a number of aircraft

0032 U 993 in BF 5427

0134 U 269 in BF 2824

during night heavy bombardment of U 970 in BF 9135.

One of our own meteorological aircraft picked up a convoy at 1832/7/6 in BF 1288 on southerly course, consisting of 2 cruisers, 4 transports and 20 destroyers. At 0600/8/6 presumably same convoy in BF 4382, course 240⁰ in same formation as on previous evening although only 15 destroyers were seen. Further large units were not visible on account of weather conditions. Later at 1800 5 destroyers and 4 transports were sighted by meteorological aircraft in BF 1988, on course 120⁰, speed 10 knots. At 2200 specially dispatched reconnaissance reported 5 destroyers in BF 4334. Presumed to be anti-submarine units.

U-boat sightings:

19 Group:

1510	in BF 2228 surfaced submarine course 180⁰, 4 knots.
1637	in BF 2819.
2336	in BF 2247, course north, 12 knots.
0037	in BF 5415.
0056	in BF 5855
0058	in BF 5825, course 330⁰, 10 knots.
0200	in BF 5427, course 60⁰, 10 knots.
0200	in BF 2733, course 10⁰, 15 knots.

Enemy units located in: AL 4538 - 2874 - AM 6120 - 5270 - 3980 - 5290 - 6160 - 4982 - 7740 - 9480 - 4218 - AN 7920 - 7660 - BE 1424 - BD 6620 - BF 3288 - 3634 - BF 2620 - 3640 - 2142 - 3180 - 4342.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Atlantic:

U 477, Schnorchel boat of Group "Mitte" lying in most northerly attack area off Norway, and schnorchel boats now on passage from north

- 327 -

	Atlantic to Western France U 767 - 671 - 1191 and 988 received orders to make for Channel via BE 15 at maximum continuous speed and as far as possible on the surface. The 3 boats without Schnorchel at present on passage from North Atlantic to Western France detailed to BF 63 via BE 60. It is intended to station these boats in waiting area south of Group "Landwirt".
b) -	c)	None.
d)	Group "Landwirt":
	1)	Heavy enemy air activity against submarines putting to sea continues. 2 reported attacks 8 sightings according to radio intercept (see also III c) 1) and 2)):
		Losses to date:
		U 373. At 0000 boat was released from convoy and at 0130 sighted radar equipped fishing smack. During third run in to attack with machine-gun fire, was attacked by on-coming aircraft. Four hits scored, and boat sank in 4 minutes. Aircraft was shot down during attack. Towards 0700 crew was picked up by fishing smack, apart from 6 missing, and landed near Donarnenez at 1500.
		Naval Group West making investigations as to whether fishing smack had really been equipped with radar.
		U 190. sank on night of 8.6. in BF 9135 after being hit by bomb. Commander, First and Third Watch Keeping Officers and 11 of the crew were rescued by aircraft of air/sea rescue service after 23 hours in the water - rest of the crew went down with the boat. Apart from these, by morning of 9.6. 6 boats were so damaged they had to enter port (U 212 - 256 - 413 - 415 - 963 - 989). Of the other 28 boats no further reports received.
	2)	On grounds of 1800-report from meteorological aircraft (see III b) concerning 5 destroyers in BF 1988, course 120⁰, speed 10 knots, presumably convoy, Flag Officer Submarines formed Group "Tiger" (U 993 - 981 - 970 - 260 - 255 - 608 - 288 - 985 - 262 - 281) which was to steer for BF 5190 until receipt of further reconnaissance report.
		At 2200 specially detailed reconnaissance craft sighted in BF 4334 only 5 destroyers. Presumably anti-submarine units. Operation of group therefore unnecessary. Group "Tiger" to be dispersed.
	3)	So that boats can come up more quickly in the case of an invasion of Western France, 19 of the Biscay boats to occupy attack area roughly along 100 meter line, same tactical disposition as before.

- 328 -

		Schnorchel boats to operate on traffic running from Catherine Point and Owners light ship to the south and southeast roughly as far as latitude of Barfleur.
		Focal points:
		U 275 - 764 - 441 - BF 3610 and southwards, other boats in the north.
		U 621 joined up with schnorchel boats (no. now 7).

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 373 1 aircraft.

VI.	General:
	Reconnaissance reports west of Brest show the unreliability of these reports. It is very likely that at best submarine chaser units were concerned, perhaps only fishing boats. All the more so since similar false reports were received simultaneously from aircraft in Channel area.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	CB 61	U 292	-	AL 25	U 543	-	Op(EV 80)	U 853	-	Op(BD 62)
	129	-	ES 74	423	-	AO 48	548	-	BD 94	857	-	Op(AK 91)
	155	-	DH 14	477	-	AF 72	549	-	EH 46	859	-	FT 18
	181	-	KG 84	490	-	BD 48	671	-	AE 87	860	-	FL 55
	183	-	Op(LD)	505	-	CF 79	673	-	AE 69	861	-	DR 72
	190	-	DG 96	516	-	EF 24	675	-	AL 52	862	-	AE 21
	196	-	KG 60	530	-	DG 36	678	-	AN 35	955	-	BF 47
	233	-	AE 68	534	-	Op(AK 29)	715	-	AN 43	975	-	AN 28
	241	-	AL 19	537	-	KZ 33	719	-	AL 52	980	-	Op(AF 76)
	243	-	AN 46	539	-	EC 35	767	-	AL 85	999	-	AN 35
	247	-	AF 74	541	-	BD 68	843	-	KA 35	971	-	AN 37
	198	-	GH 61	547	-	Op(EU 80)	851	-	LW 70	988	-	AL 58
		-			-		1191	-	AL 27	1222	-	Op(BB 70)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 242	-	AN 28	U 294	-	Op(AF 81)	U 958	-	Op(AF 84)	U 999	-	AN 35
	276	-	Op(AN 43)	397	-	AN 43	975	-	AN 28	1000	-	Op(AN 23)
	290	-	Op(AF 87)	677	-	AN 34	980	-	Op(AF 76)	1001	-	AN 35

	Group "Landwirt":
	U 228	-	BF 5810	U 281	-	BF 5570	U 608	-	BF 5810	U 764	-	Op(BF 26)
	255	-	BF 5490	333	-	BF 5570	621	-	Op(BF 25)	766	-	Op(BF 58)
	260	-	BF 5730	382	-	BF 9460	629	-	Op(BF 25)	821	-	Op(BF 25)
	262	-	BF 5850	413	-	BF 5270	650	-	Op(BF 91)	953	-	Op(BF 26)
	269	-	BF 2824	437	-	Op(BF 67)	714	-	Op(BF 92)	981	-	BF 4390
	270	-	BF 5730	441	-	Op(BF 25)	740	-	Op(BF 25)	984	-	BF 2618
	275	-	BF 2619	445	-	Op(BF 58)	758	-	Op(BF 58)	985	-	BF 5570
										993	-	BF 5427

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.

- 329 -

Entered Port: U 413 - 984 - Brest.

Sailed: U 319 - 299 - 370 - 479 - Kiel to Group "Mitte"; U 423 - Kiel.

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

Air attacks on boats of Group "Landwirt":

(Biscay/Channel):

0214	U 621	in	BF 2765;	0441	U 608	in	BF 5555;
0419	U 985	in	BF 5597;	0751	U 981	in	BF 5146.

Own reconnaissance aircraft reported at 0100 5 destroyers and one merchant ship of 10,000 GRT patrolling in BF 4334. Boats did not operate as no further reconnaissance reports were received.

U-boat sightings:

19 Group:

0926 in BF 2933, course 80⁰, speed 10 knots.

2354 in BF 5552 submarine damaged on surface.

0415 in BF 5821 course 175⁰, speed 10 knots.

0455 in unspecified position, speed 5 knots.

American steamer reported submarine in LN 5390 at 1035. Also American steamer reported gunfight with submarine in LX 5619 at 1219.

Enemy units located in: AM 4990 - 2830 - 5190 - 6760 - BE 2673 - 3980.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Atlantic boats: none.

None.

For handing over of German liaison officer etc. to Japanese submarine "Tanne" U 530 instructed to rendezvous after sunset on 22.6. in EG 2597. Arrangements made for "Tanne" to put in to port on west coast of France or alternatively to Bergen if invasion situation makes this necessary. After execution U 530 to proceed to operations area EP.

Loss of U 241 must be reckoned with. On 16.5. boat sailed from Bergen en route for North Atlantic, since then no report received. Boat probably fell victim to air reconnaissance of 18 Group which was out in considerable strength at the time.

- 330 -

	e)	Boats in the West:
		During night 4 aircraft attacks reported (see para. III a)) and 3 sightings from radio intercept reports. U 984 entered Brest. Reasons not given.
		At 2354 enemy aircraft reported damaged submarine on surface in BF 5552. As no attack report had been received from any boat at this time, boat concerned was requested to send position report. No report received. Submarines within 20 mile range and 5 minesweepers were ordered to go to the rescue (sighting position). Search was broken off at 2300/10/6, no results.
		No exact information concerning position of schnorchel boats. Position of U 621 during air attack only comprehensible if boat had remained stationary for 2 days on outward or return passage. No information as regards boats without schnorchel operating in Channel. Apart from boats which have put back into port U 740 - 821 and 629 still at sea, and no report has been received from these since sailing. Boats on reconnaissance in Bay of Biscay should have reached attack positions by morning of 10.6.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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10.June 1944.

I.	Atlantic:
	U 107	-	CB 29	U 292	-	AL 32	U 547	-	Op(EU 80)	U 853	-	Op(BD 53)
	129	-	ES 47	423	-	AN 36	548	-	BD 96	857	-	Op(AK 83)
	155	-	DH 11	477	-	AF 47	549	-	EH 48	859	-	FT 54
	181	-	KG 83	490	-	BD 74	671	-	AL 36	860	-	FT 39
	183	-	Op(LD)	505	-	CF 84	673	-	AE 67	861	-	DR 79
	190	-	DG 69	516	-	EF 19	675	-	AL 62	862	-	AE 18
	196	-	KH 17	530	-	CG 62	678	-	AN 35	955	-	BF 48
	198	-	GH 48	534	-	Op(AK 18)	715	-	Op(AN 43)	971	-	Op(AN 37)
	233	-	AE 91	537	-	KQ 77	719	-	AM 19	988	-	AN 74
	241	-	AL 19	539	-	Op(EC 37)	767	-	BE 31	1191	-	AL 69
	243	-	Op(AN 46)	541	-	BD 69	843	-	KB 14	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	247	-	AF 74	543	-	Op(EV 80)	851	-	LW 70

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 242	-	Op(AN 28)	U 294	-	Op(AF 81)	U 958	-	Op(AF 84)	U 999	-	Op(AN 35)
	276	-	Op(AN 43)	397	-	Op(AN 43)	975	-	Op(AN 28)	1000	-	Op(AN 23)
	290	-	Op(AF 87)	677	-	Op(AN 34)	980	-	Op(AF 76)	1001	-	Op(AN 35)

	Group "Landwirt:
	U 228	-	Op(BF 55)	U 281	-	Op(BF 64)	U 621	-	Op(BF 25)	U 764	-	Op(BF 23)
	255	-	Op(BF 64)	333	-	Op(BF 52)	629	-	Op(BF 25)	766	-	Op(BF 92)
	260	-	Op(BF 55)	382	-	Op(BF 96)	650	-	Op(BF 93)	953	-	Op(BF 23)
	262	-	Op(BF 67)	437	-	Op(BF 92)	714	-	Op(BF 95)	981	-	BF 5244
	269	-	BF 2627	441	-	Op(BF 23)	740	-	Op(BF 25)	985	-	Op(BF 64)
	270	-	BF 5244	445	-	Op(BF 92)	758	-	Op(BF 67)	993	-	Op(BF 52)
	275	-	Op(BF 23)	608	-	Op(BF 52)


- 331 -

On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 995.

Entered Port: - . -

Sailed: U 295 - 286 - 679 - 1163 - Kiel for Group "Mitte"; U 480 - Bergen; U 763 - Brest.

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

Air attacks on boats in the West:

0913 U 333 in BF 5549

2325 U 985 in BF 5872

2331 U 269 in BF 2597

0154 U 333 in BF 5554

0441 no signature in BF 5591.

During the night U 243 shot down approaching Ju 88 in AN 2911. Reason: too late in replying with recognition signals. Aircraft flew over boat at a height of 40 meters. Without a doubt fault was that of aircraft pilot.

None.

U-boat sightings:

0915	surfaced submarine
0915	diving submarine in BF 5554, 40⁰, 6 knots.
1205	in BF 2874
1215	in BF 2842
1220	in BF 2876, course 6⁰, 4 knots.
2306	in BF 9196
2325	in BF 2598
2350	in BF 2548

Enemy units located in: AL 3767 - 4853 - AM 9883 - 5178 - AN 4810 - BE 6161 - BF 8348 - 9525.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

a) -

None.

As reported retrospectively, U 673 put out into North Atlantic from Drontheim on 4.6. for turret trials.

- 332 -

	e)	Boats in the West:
		1)	U 763 (schnorchel boat) and U 214 (for minelaying operation off Falmouth) put to sea.
		2)	5 boats reported air attacks, U 333 2 attacks, signature to one message unreadable (see para. III a)), U 984 entered port on account of bomb damage. Boat reported in retrospect, submarine chaser unit consisting of 3 destroyers on 7.6. in BF 2769. Fired 3 T 5, one missed, one detonated too soon, one probable hit after 7 minutes. Presumed sunk.
		3)	On account of the great number of air attacks, above all on boats without schnorchel, and the extensive damage caused thereby, for the present further sailing of these boats has been stopped. Apart from which boats at sea without schnorchel received the following orders:
			In Channel: Free to make return passage if enemy defences prove too strong.
			In the Bay of Biscay: Lay on the bottom as far as possible in order to shorten re-charging time. Sacrifice of reconnaissance involved fully realized.
			Recalling of these boats to port would appear incorrect as in the case of a landing on the Biscay coast boats could be prevented from sailing by heavy air attacks on ports and harbor entrances, and large minelaying operations.
			Schnorchel boats will continue to be stationed in Channel.
		4)	At 1300/10/6 U 821 was sunk by 4 aircraft (Mosquitoes and Liberators) 8 miles north of Quessant. Battle Headquarters Quessant eye-witnessed the incident. Air/sea rescue boat also sunk.
			Escort which should have picked up U 821, searched for survivors and during night of 11.6. recovered a wounded Chief Petty Officer and 4 dead. Further search broken off on account of enemy air activity. According to reports there were probably no other survivors.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 984 1 destroyer.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- 333 -

11.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	Op(CB 26)	U 477	-	AE 68	U 548	-	BE 74	U 853	-	Op(BD 52)
	129	-	ER 63	480	-	AF 76	549	-	EG 96	857	-	Op(AK 58)
	155	-	CF 87	490	-	CD 23	671	-	AL 63	859	-	GG 45
	181	-	KG 65	505	-	CF 82	673	-	AE 83	860	-	FU 49
	183	-	Op(LD)	516	-	EF 41	675	-	AL 68	861	-	EG 24
	190	-	DG 66	530	-	DG 64	678	-	AN 23	862	-	AE 17
	196	-	KH 13	534	-	Op(AK 01)	715	-	AN 23	955	-	BF 49
	198	-	GH 84	537	-	KQ 76	719	-	AL 01	971	-	AN 84
	233	-	AE 83	539	-	Op(EC 52)	767	-	BE 33	988	-	BE 32
	247	-	AE 99	541	-	BE 47	843	-	KB 15	1191	-	AM 77
	292	-	AL 65	543	-	Op(EV 80)	851	-	LW 54	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	423	-	AN 36	547	-	Op(EU 80)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 242	-	Op(AN 28)	U 397	-	Op(AN 43)	U 975	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1000	-	Op(AN 23)
	276	-	Op(AN 43)	677	-	Op(AN 34)	980	-	Op(AF 76)	1001	-	Op(AN 37)
	290	-	Op(AF 87)	745	-	Op(AN 35)	982	-	Op(AN 34)	1007	-	Op(AN 35)
	294	-	Op(AF 81)	958	-	Op(AF 84)	999	-	Op(AN 37)	1165	-	Op(AN 46)

	Western Boats:
	U 228	-	Op(BF 55)	U 281	-	Op(BF 64)	U 621	-	BF 2559	U 764	-	BF 3192
	255	-	Op(BF 64)	333	-	Op(BF 55)	629	-	BF 2520	766	-	Op(BF 92)
	260	-	Op(BF 55)	382	-	Op(BF 96)	650	-	Op(BF 93)	953	-	BF 3191
	262	-	Op(BF 67)	437	-	Op(BF 92)	714	-	Op(BF 95)	981	-	BF 5244
	269	-	Op(BF 25)	441	-	BF 3181	740	-	Op(BF 25)	985	-	Op(BF 58)
	270	-	BF 5244	445	-	Op(BF 67)	758	-	Op(BF 67)	993	-	BF 2797
	275	-	BF 3192	608	-	BF 5297

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: U 243 - Bergen; U 843 - Batavia.
	Sailed: U 214 - Brest; U 763 - La Pallice.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	Air attacks on boats in the West:
		0005 U 993 in BF 5134
		0230 U 333 in BF 5554.
	b)
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings:
			Annapolis broadcast following radio intercept report: At 0900 tanker "Casandra" (Dutch tank steamer of 2,701 GRT) was attacked by machine-gun fire from surfaced submarine in EC 9615. 2 men wounded, and 3 lost in an attempt to let down float. Ship was undamaged. This was probably U 539 which was en route for operations area off Panama Canal.

- 334 -

2 sightings in unspecified positions. One periscope sighting in 49⁰ 22 North, longitude not given, at 1045.

ASV location in BF 3150.

Enemy units located in: AL 8120 - AM 8960 - AN 9787 - 4370 - BE 6523 - CF 1328.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Boats in the West:

After first air attack U 333 reported Sunderland shot down at 0230. Radar and 3.7 cm. out of order, oil track. Boat received orders to return to Lorient.

According to radio intercept report submerged boat (hydrophone effect) in BF 3248, course 105⁰, speed 4 knots. The entry of the first schnorchel boats into operations area according to dead reckoning is hereby corroborated.

The toughness and difficulty of the submarine operations is apparent from the short reports made by boats which have entered port in the meanwhile apart from the continuous reports of air attacks. Enemy is attempting to prevent boats sailing from western ports and reaching operational areas by heavy air and anti-submarine operations.

Boats without schnorchel are especially endangered as following comparison shows:

Air attacks from 6.6. - 11.6.
	Reported attacks	Total loss	Entered port on aircraft damage	Reported after attack	No report

8 boats with Schnorchel	4	0	2	-	2
28 boats without Schnorchel	15	3	5	1	6

Total:	19	3	7	1	8

It is therefore certain that other boats have been attacked, whose reports have not been intercepted, or have made no report. A survey is therefore not possible of whether all boats reckoned to be at sea, are, in fact, still operating.

- 335 -

	b)	1)	According to radio intercept on 9.6. or 10.6. Portuguese steamer "Marianela" was torpedoed in CB 88 in the Philadelphia roads. U 107, reckoned to be in this area was ordered to send details if torpedoing took place.
		2)	Attention of boats on return passage is drawn to very heavy air activity in the inner Bay of Biscay.
		3)	A corrupt message was received from U 671 giving position AK 38. Rest of contents could not be decyphered. Boat received orders to make for Channel at highest possible speed, as position at present not understood. A repetition of message was requested.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 333 1 aircraft.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

12.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	Op(BB 70)	U 423	-	AN 31	U 543	-	Op(EN 80)	U 851	-	LW 38
	129	-	ER 35	477	-	AE 85	547	-	Op(EU 80)	853	-	Op(BD 83)
	155	-	CF 84	480	-	AF 76	548	-	BE 72	857	-	Op(AK 54)
	181	-	KG 63	490	-	CD 29	549	-	EQ 32	859	-	GG 57
	183	-	Op(LD)	505	-	CF 59	671	-	AL 69	860	-	FU 85
	190	-	DH 41	516	-	EE 65	673	-	AE 83	861	-	EG 52
	196	-	LW 85	530	-	DG 59	675	-	AL 96	862	-	AD 56
	198	-	GQ 32	534	-	Op(AK 18)	678	-	AF 76	955	-	BF 57
	233	-	AE 85	537	-	KQ 85	715	-	AF 76	971	-	AF 73
	247	-	Op(AM 32)	539	-	Op(EC 43)	719	-	AM 43	988	-	BE 32
	292	-	AL 68	541	-	BE 49	767	-	BE 33	1191	-	AL 93
										1222	-	Op(BB 70)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 242	-	Op(AN 28)	U 397	-	Op(AN 43)	U 980	-	Op(AF 76)	U 1001	-	Op(AN 37)
	276	-	Op(AN 43)	677	-	Op(AN 34)	982	-	Op(AN 34)	1007	-	Op(AN 35)
	290	-	Op(AF 87)	745	-	Op(AN 35)	999	-	Op(AN 37)	1165	-	Op(AN 46)
	294	-	Op(AF 81)	958	-	Op(AF 84)	1000	-	Op(AN 23)
				975	-	Op(AN 28)

	Boats in the West:
	U 214	-	BF 5186	U 275	-	BF 3610	U 608	-	Op(BF 52)	U 764	-	Op(BF 36)
	228	-	Op(BF 55)	281	-	Op(BF 64)	621	-	BF 2620	766	-	Op(BF 92)
	255	-	Op(BF 64)	333	-	Op(BF 55)	629	-	Op(BF 25)	953	-	BF 3240
	260	-	Op(BF 55)	382	-	Op(BF 96)	650	-	Op(BF 93)	981	-	Op(BF 27)
	262	-	Op(BF 67)	437	-	Op(BF 92)	714	-	Op(BF 95)	985	-	Op(BF 64)
	269	-	BF 2630	441	-	BF 3610	740	-	Op(BF 25)	993	-	Op(BF 51)
	270	-	Op(BF 52)	445	-	BF 9923	758	-	Op(BF 67)


- 336 -

On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.

Entered Port: U 333 - La Pallice.

Sailed: U 804 - 858 - 998 - Kiel; U 310 - 318 - Kiel to Group "Mitte"; U 984 - Brest; U 212 - La Pallice.

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

Air attacks on boats in West:

2245 U 437 in BF 9276

2259 U 445 in BF 9223

None.

U-boat sightings in West:

1206	aircraft over submarine in BF 2241.
2000	diving submarine in BF 3195 sighted by aircraft, finally operation by 2 antisubmarine vessels.
2100	periscope in same position.
2304	aircraft report of suspicious object (patch of oil) in BF 2244.
0159	destroyer ("Whitshed") in contact with probable submarine in BF 3246.

U-boat sightings of boats in Atlantic:

0945	submerged submarine in BF 1542, course 90⁰, 6 knots. Probably one of the boats entering the Channel from the North Atlantic.
18 Group: great activity on the part of 25 aircraft.
2057	over submarine in AF 7143.
2055	over submarine in AF 7198.
0320	in probably AF 75.

An unspecified ASV location at 0959, finally cancelled.

Colombo repeated aircraft report at 0751/11/6: Am in position over submarine. No details as to position.

Merchant ship reported contact and being struck by torpedo at 1926 in DN 7656 (improbable, no boat in the vicinity).

- 337 -

		6)	Enemy units located in: AK 6535 - AM 3940 - 2953 - 0279 - 4437 - BF 2567.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Boats in West:
		1)	All boats without schnorchel in the Bay of Biscay ordered to put in to bases. Reason: heavy enemy air activity will lead in the long run to high losses and heavy wear and tear, which would only be bearable if an immediate enemy landing was expected along the Biscay coast. This is not an acute danger at present. Submarines to remain at readiness under bunkers.
		2)	U 953 sent short signal at 2036 (1st group corrupt), 3 destroyers in BF 2739. Boat reckoned to be already in operations area (schnorchel boats in Channel). Position possible if boat on return passage.
		3)	After sailing of U 212 - 984 (both entered port on account of damage) and U 763, only 3 boats with schnorchel from western ports en route for Kiel.
	b)	Atlantic:
		U 196 reported position LN 12 in reply to request. As in the last few days radio intercept reports have been received concerning appearances of submarines it is possible successes have been achieved by this boat. No report from U 851 or U 181, also reckoned to be in this area.
	c)	Boats lying in operations area off America and Africa or on passage thereto, (U 539 - 549 - 530 - 516 - 543 - 547 - 107 - 1222) received instructions to commence return passage in good time so that Bergen could be reached in case of need, should such an order be given. If this is already impossible send report within next 5 days.
	d)	Great anxiety is caused by U 392 and U 675. Both boats are en route for the Bay of Biscay, without schnorchel, and so far have not sent passing report or answered any calls.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- 338-

Appendix to Diary of 12.6.1944

Submarine Group "Mitte" (6. - 12.6.1944)

(For numbers see positions of submarines,

diaries from 7.6.1944)

6.6.44:

Key word "Wallenstein" for for submarine group was given at 1200. At the time group consisted of 22 type VIIC boats. As key word was given as precaution on account of Channel invasion, there were no special measures ordered for boats. 6 hour readiness (during day) and 3 hour readiness (at night) was altered to state of immediate readiness.

7.6.44:

Nothing special to report.

8.6.44:

As further landings outside the Channel area were expected, sailing and occupation of following positions were ordered:

U 715	grid	4398;	U 243	grid	4665;	U 678	grid	3727;
U 242	grid	2829;	U 975	grid	2982;	U 397	grid	4338;
U 1001	grid	3572;	U 999	grid	3585;	U 480	grid	3478;
U 971	grid	3764;	U 677	grid	3465.

All naval grid square AN. Boats to remain submerged in positions.

6.6.44:

Boats halted while en route for Atlantic and lying in position in southern Arctic, U 477 - 294 - 958 - 1000 - 980 and U 290 were placed under command of Flag Officer Submarines "Mitte" as from 0800. (For positions see Diary 7.6. Atlantic boats). All schnorchel boats were ordered to Atlantic from Group "Mitte", and thereby U 715 - 243 - 678 - 971 - 480 and 477 leave the command of Flag Officer Submarines "Mitte". Vacant positions were filled by U 677 grid 3475, U 1001 grid 3727, U 999 grid 3764.

10.6.44:

Anti-submarine patrol off Skudesnes and Lister suspended by order of Senior Officer Submarines, and instead U 276 to take up position AN 4398. Following to put out from operational ports and take up positions:

U 1007 square 3585, U 982 square 3465, U 745 square 3572 and U 1163 square 4665 - all naval grid AN.

Submarine Group "Mitte" has been made up to 30 boats coming from home, 16 of which are at sea. U 294 reported air attacks at 1332 and 2127.

3 hour readiness ordered for boats in operational ports and state of immediate readiness between 2200 and 0700.

- 339 -

11.6.44:	U 980 reported air attack at 1515. According to orders of Commander-in-Chief Navy in future only boats without schnorchel to join Group "Mitte".
12.6.44:	2 boats joined Group "Mitte" from home.













- 340 -

13.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	Op(BB 70)	U 477	-	AL 11	U 548	-	BE 73	U 857	-	Op(AK 90)
	129	-	EH 98	480	-	AF 72	549	-	EQ 37	858	-	AO 48
	155	-	CF 82	490	-	CD 55	671	-	AL 93	859	-	GG 82
	181	-	KH 17	505	-	CF 64	673	-	AE 85	860	-	FU 82
	183	-	Op(LD)	516	-	EE 67	675	-	BE 23	861	-	EG 91
	190	-	DH 18	530	-	DG 85	678	-	AF 72	862	-	AD 58
	196	-	Op(LN 12)	534	-	Op(AK 25)	715	-	AF 72	955	-	BF 57
	198	-	GQ 33	537	-	KQ 83	719	-	Op(AM 50)	971	-	AF 48
	233	-	AE 87	539	-	Op(EC 80)	767	-	BF 15	988	-	BE 33
	247	-	Op(AM 35)	541	-	BE 57	804	-	AO 48	998	-	AO 48
	292	-	AL 95	543	-	Op(EV 80)	851	-	LW 33	1191	-	BE 31
	423	-	AN 33	547	-	Op(EU 80)	853	-	Op(BD 55)	1222	-	Op(BB 70)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U242	-	Op(AN 28)	U 397	-	Op(AN 43)	U 975	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1000	-	Op(AN 23)
	276	-	Op(AN 43)	677	-	Op(AN 34)	980	-	Op(AF 76)	1001	-	Op(AN 37)
	290	-	Op(AF 87)	745	-	Op(AN 35)	982	-	Op(AN 34)	1007	-	Op(AN 35)
	294	-	Op(AF 81)	958	-	Op(AF 84)	999	-	Op(AN 37)	1165	-	Op(AN 46)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	BF 6477	U 270	-	Op(BF 52)	U 608	-	Op(BF 52)	U 763	-	BF 5869
	214	-	BF 5473	275	-	Op(BF 36)	621	-	Op(BF 31)	764	-	Op(BF 36)
	228	-	Op(BF 55)	281	-	Op(BF 64)	629	-	Op(BF 25)	766	-	Op(BF 92)
	255	-	Op(BF 64)	382	-	Op(BF 96)	650	-	Op(BF 93)	953	-	Op(BF 32)
	260	-	Op(BF 55)	437	-	Op(BF 92)	714	-	Op(BF 95)	981	-	Op(BF 27)
	262	-	Op(BF 67)	441	-	Op(BF 36)	740	-	Op(BF 25)	984	-	BF 2792
	269	-	Op(BF 31)	445	-	Op(BF 92)	758	-	Op(BF 67)	985	-	Op(BF 64)
										993	-	Op(BF 27)

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 218 - Brest.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	Air attacks on boats in west:
			0250 U 214 in BF 2794.
		2)	U 181 sank British steamer (probably "Benavon" 5,872 GRT) on south course in FS 59. At the same time boat reported air activity at dusk in this area.
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	2337 aircraft over submarine in BF 5135
			1731 aircraft over submarine in BF 5866
			1735 submarine diving, course 110⁰, speed 8 knots.

- 341 -

Sightings of boats in the West:

0908	submarine sighted in MR 5550.
1012	aircraft of 18 Group reported: Submarine probably in AF 4784. Aircraft finally sent SOS, possibly it was shot down.

ASV locations in BF 3379 (no submarine), BF 2162, BF 2129.

Enemy units located in: AL 3591 - AM 5540 - BE 2120 - BF 1170 - 3620 - 3650.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Boats in the West:

In order to prevent boats on return passage from the Bay having to radio for escort, at certain times between 14. and 17.6. convoys will stand off entrances to Lorient, St. Nazaire and La Pallice, wait an hour and then proceed with boats which have by then arrived.

U 218 put out for minelaying operation off Lands End (15 SMA on convoy route).

U 275 entered St. Peter Port (Guernsey) to recharge battery. Boat sent short signal which shows essentially the great difficulties of operations in the Channel even for boats with schnorchel.

Boat left Brest on 6.6. and was shadowed from the start, even in convoy. Enemy aircraft before reaching point 3426, commenced submerged passage. Picked up by anti-submarine unit on 8.6. in BF 2735. One destroyer apparently equipped with noise buoy, a high buzzing tone which drowned engine and propeller noises. Audible over whole boat. Hydrophone and depth charge hunt till 1600.

At 0135/9/6 in BF 2576 after 10 minutes sailing on schnorchel, boat was probably located. Gun fire observed. Finally depth charge hunt by 4 aircraft until 0515. Was not able to execute sailing on schnorchel. In BF 2579 2 destroyers seen making off through periscope. Continuously depth charged again until 1100 - no damage. Retired to south in order to continue passage along coast.

On 12.6. sank destroyer in BF 2639 with T 5. Anti-submarine unit in the vicinity commenced strong depth charge hunt after an hour. Boat hunted and forced southwards until 0500/13/6. Was picked up immediately when attempt to schnorchel was made. Entered St. Peter Port on account of dead battery. Schnorchel could

- 342 -

			not be ventilated during day because of the amount of enemy air activity observed through periscope. It is very easy for the enemy to pick up a boat on hydrophones while schnorchel sailing. Commander considered task of recharging in operational area (BF 32/36) extremely hazardous. (Addition: present view is that on account of the great number of hydrophone bearings in operations area schnorchel sailing should be quite possible.
	b)	Group "Mitte":
		One of our own patrol boats sighted surfaced submarine at 1407 in AO 4143, course 45, which did not answer recognition signal. As 4 boats were en route for Kristiansand as well as boat in readiness off Larvik and Valo conclusion of German Naval Command (MOK) that boat was one of our own, was justified. (Boats in operational ports received permission with the approval of appropriate Sea Defence Commandants to carry out further training of crew every day at sea). Patrol boat was ordered not to attack unless boat could be identified as enemy beyond all shadow of a doubt. At 1541 patrol boat reported: "Submarine out of sight, up to date no further observations". Later evidence showed this was not a friendly boat. Consequently enemy submarine or faulty observation.
	c)	Atlantic:
		In accordance with yesterday's orders to commence return passage so that Bergen could be reached in case of necessity, U 543 started return passage from Guinea coast.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 181 1 ship 5,872 GRT
	U 275 1 destroyer.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	Op(BB 70)	U 477	-	AM 15	U 548	-	BE 82	U 857	-	Op(AK 45)
	129	-	EH 92	480	-	AF 47	549	-	EQ 64	858	-	AN 36
	155	-	CF 83	490	-	CD 58	671	-	AL 54	859	-	GG 94
	181	-	KG 44	505	-	CF 61	673	-	AE 87	860	-	FU 89
	183	-	Op(LD)	516	-	DO 97	675	-	BE 26	861	-	EG 96
	190	-	DH 12	530	-	DG 87	678	-	AF 71	862	-	AK 17
	196	-	Op(LC)	534	-	Op(AK 26)	715	-	AF 47	955	-	BF 57
	198	-	GR 17	537	-	KQ 68	719	-	Op(AM 50)	971	-	AE 69
	233	-	AL 31	539	-	Op(EC 82)	767	-	BF 16	988	-	BF 14
	247	-	Op(AM 35)	541	-	BE 58	804	-	AN 36	998	-	AN 36
	292	-	AL 98	543	-	EU 88	851	-	LN 40	1191	-	BE 32
	423	-	AF 76	547	-	Op(EU 80)	853	-	Op(BD 28)	1222	-	Op(BB 70)


- 343 -

Group Command "Mitte":
U 242	-	Op(AN 28)	U 397	-	Op(AN 43)	U 975	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1000	-	Op(AN 23)
276	-	Op(AN 43)	677	-	Op(AN 34)	980	-	Op(AF 76)	1001	-	Op(AN 37)
290	-	Op(AF 87)	745	-	Op(AN 35)	982	-	Op(AN 34)	1007	-	Op(AN 35)
294	-	Op(AF 81)	958	-	Op(AF 84)	999	-	Op(AN 37)	1165	-	Op(AN 46)

Western Boats:
U 212	-	BF 6774	U 269	-	Op(BF 32)	U 445	-	BF 6858	U 763	-	BF 5576
214	-	BF 5133	270	-	BF 5276	608	-	BF 6173	764	-	Op(BF 36)
218	-	BF 2795	275	-	BF 2693	621	-	Op(BF 32)	766	-	BF 6767
228	-	BF 6454	281	-	BF 6461	629	-	Op(BF 25)	953	-	Op(BF 25)
255	-	BF 6456	382	-	BF 9377	650	-	BF 9229	971	-	BF 5133
260	-	BF 6177	437	-	BF 6794	714	-	BF 9256	984	-	Op(BF 28)
262	-	BF 6792	441	-	Op(BF 36)	740	-	Op(BF 25)	985	-	BF 6439
						758	-	BF 6489	993	-	BF 5133

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 543 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: U 214 - 993 - Brest; U 608 - Lorient.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1)	At 2257 U 270 reported shooting down Liberator in BF 5244.
		2)	At 1508 U 290 (boat belonging to Group "Mitte").
		3)	At 0525 U 766 attacked by aircraft in BF 6473 (West boat).
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings in West:
			19 Group: Aircraft "SCY 13" reported without time of origin. Submarine in BF 2693, course 180⁰, speed 6 knots. Attacked, results not observed. 0212 diving boat in BF 6785, course 98⁰, speed 8 knots. 0225 in BF 6752. 0420 surfaced submarine in BF 9313, course 110⁰, speed 10 knots, 0435 in BF 6885.
		2)	0244 ASV location in BF 6178.
		3)	Aircraft of 18 Group sighted submarine probably in AF 4786.
		4)	Enemy units located in AM 1986 - 4210 - 5360 - BE 7815 - BF 7543 - 2360 - 1120 - 2380.
	d)	None.

- 344 -

IV.

Current Operations:

Boats in the West:

U 275 sailed from St. Peter Port (island of Guernsey). According to intercept report (see also III c) 1)) was attacked by aircraft while leaving port. No report from submarine. U 269 entered St. Peter Port during night to recharge batteries.

1715 air attack on St. Peter Port by 12 Typhoons, 2 patrol boats damaged. U 275 remained undamaged.

In order to get schnorchel boats on passage to Channel spread out as much as possible, boats were ordered to proceed along following routes:

U 988	-	671	from BF 2450	to	BF 2620
U 763	-	212	from BF 2480	to	BF 2650
U 767	-		from BF 2720	to	BF 2680
U 1191	-		from BF 2751	to	BF 2852

From there along French coast at a range of about 15 miles. All boats to steer roughly for BF 3180.

U 270 reported retrospectively air attack during night of 14.6. in which a Liberator was shot down. Boat now on return passage to Lorient with damaged radar apparatus and stern torpedoes out of action.

U 212 again on return passage, hollow shaft thread of forward hydroplane stripped. Rudder jammed hard up in diving position.

U 333 sent short report: Boat attacked by aircraft 5 times. During evening of 12.6. until 0110 surfaced in order to recharge batteries in preparation for possible submerged attacks. After location plane came in to attack with red search light, altitude 50-80 meters. Fought it off with 2 cm. as 3.7 cm. was out of action. Sunderland crashed blazing into sea 100 meters from boat. Other aircraft with radar continuously shadowed. Out-maneuvered aircraft for nearly an hour by cruising around among 20 Aphrodites previously dropped. Confirmed by means of flares that a signal strength of 5 on "Fleige" corresponded roughly to a distance of 3 - 4,000 meters.

Up to date 14 of the 17 boats without schnorchel have entered port from the Bay of Biscay.

- 345 -

	b)	Group "Mitte":
		U 290 reported air attack at 1508 in AF 8746, finally one Mosquito probably shot down. 8 wounded on board, boat ordered to put in to Bergen.
	c)	Atlantic boats:
		U 671 (on passage from Group "Mitte" to Channel) sent passing report from AM 77. Starboard diesel out of order for 90 hours, can probably be righted.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 270 1 aircraft.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

15.June 1944.

I.	U 107	-	Op(BB 70)	U 477	-	AL 03	U 548	-	BE 83	U 858	-	AN 31
	129	-	EH 68	480	-	AE 69	549	-	EQ 91	859	-	GG 99
	155	-	CF 59	490	-	CD 85	671	-	AM 77	861	-	EQ 33
	181	-	KG 43	505	-	CF 38	673	-	AL 31	860	-	GG 12
	183	-	Op(LC 60)	516	-	ED 23	675	-	BE 37	862	-	AK 43
	190	-	CF 88	530	-	DS 26	678	-	AE 69	955	-	BF 57
	196	-	Op(LC)	534	-	Op(AK 28)	715	-	AE 68	971	-	AE 67
	198	-	GR 43	537	-	KR 44	719	-	Op(AM 50)	988	-	BF 15
	233	-	AL 24	539	-	Op(EC 73)	804	-	AN 31	998	-	AN 31
	247	-	Op(AM 35)	541	-	BE 59	851	-	Op(LN 40)	1191	-	BE 36
	292	-	BE 23	543	-	EU 76	853	-	Op(BE 53)	1222	-	Op(BB 70)
	423	-	AN 24	547	-	Op(EU 80)	857	-	Op(AK 72)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 242	-	Op(AN 28)	U 397	-	Op(AN 43)	U 975	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1000	-	Op(AN 23)
	276	-	Op(AN 43)	677	-	Op(AN 34)	980	-	Op(AF 76)	1001	-	Op(AN 37)
	290	-	AF 8746	745	-	Op(AN 35)	982	-	Op(AN 34)	1007	-	Op(AN 35)
	294	-	Op(AF 81)	958	-	Op(AF 84)	999	-	Op(AN 37)	1165	-	Op(AN 46)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	BF 5587	U 270	-	BF 6171	U 621	-	Op(BF 32)	U 764	-	Op(BF 36)
	218	-	BF 2811	275	-	Op(BF 26)	629	-	Op(BF 25)	766	-	BF 6493
	228	-	BF 6461	281	-	BF 6463	650	-	BF 6851	767	-	BF 2448
	255	-	BF 6462	382	-	BF 9223	714	-	BF 6874	953	-	Op(BF 26)
	260	-	BF 5293	437	-	BF 6488	740	-	Op(BF 25)	981	-	BF 5282
	262	-	BF 6852	441	-	Op(BF 36)	758	-	BF 6453	984	-	Op(BF 25)
	269	-	Op(BF 32)	445	-	BF 6853	763	-	BF 5199	985	-	BF 6463

	On Return Passage: U 129 - 155 - 190 - 505 - 541 - 543 - 548 - 955.
	Entered Port: U 650 - La Pallice; U 228 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: U 743 - Kiel; U 243 - Bergen; U 546 - Lorient.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

- 346 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)-	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings in West:
			1640 in BF 1632 (boat on passage to Atlantic U 988?).
			1643 in BF 2626, periscope, speed 7 knots.
			1939 surfaced submarine in BF 2824, course 270⁰, speed 5 knots.
			2021 in BF 2386, suspicious object, probably submarine.
		2)	U-boat sighting in AF 7723 at 2217, (Boat on passage to Atlantic).
		3)	1 ASV location at 2255 in BF 3521. At 0300 location in unspecified position.
		4)	Enemy units located in: AL 5489 - AM 7160 - BE 7572 - BE 6310 - BF 3320 - 3646.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Boats in West:
		1)	Up to today 14 of 17 boats in the Bay of Biscay have entered port. One further boat requests will enter port today.
		2)	At 0925 and 0950 2 fighter-bomber attacks on St. Peter Port. U 269 not damaged, patrol vessel 205 sunk. Damage to harbor inconsiderable.
	b)	Group "Mitte": Nothing to report.
	c)	Atlantic boats:
		U 673 (trial boat turret VI) ordered to make for west coast of France.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

- 347 -

U-boat Situation on 1 June 1944

In service on 1 June 1944:
In service on 1 May	448
Freshly commissioned	19
Back in service (U 195)	1
	468
Losses: front:	21
home: (U 1015)	1
Out of service: (U 108 - 1234 - 1102)	3
In service in 1 June 1944	443
Also foreign boats: front:	2
home:	6
Given over to Japan up to date:	2
U 123 from front to training.

II.

Losses in May:
Atlantic and Indian Ocean:	Type VII	U 311 - 473 - 731 - 765 - 960 (en route for the Mediterranean)	5
	Type IX	U 66 - 188 - 193 - 550 - 846 - 856	6
	Type IXD2	U 852	1
Mediterranean:	Type VII	U 371 - 453 - 616	3
Northern Waters:	Type VII	U 277 - 240 - 476 - 674 - 959 - 990	6
			21
Home:	Type VII	U 1015	1
			22

III.

Distribution of boats:

	II	VII	VIIb/c	VIId	VIIf	IXb/c	IXD1	IXD2	Xb	XIV	XVII	Total	Foreign

Front	6	-	128	2	3	28	2	9	2	1	-	181	2
Trials	-	-	135	-	-	27	-	8	1	-	4	175	-
Training	31	3	49	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	87	6

	37	3	312	2	3	59	2	17	3	1	4	443	8

- 348 -

In May 1944

Joined front:	+	39	(+17)
38 from home, 1 (U 195) in Bordeaux back in service
total number decreased:	-	4	(+ 4)
Number of front boats increased:	+	17	(-2)
Number on trials decreased:	-	23	(+6)
Number in training increased:	+	1	(+/-0)

IV.

Distribution of front boats on 1.6.44:

Atlantic including "Landwirt" (40 boats)	108	(100)
Mediterranean	11	(14)
Northern Waters: on operations (including boat on turret trials):	33	(27)
Group "Mitte":	21	(15)
Torpedo supply ship:	2
Black Sea:	6
	181	(164)

In Atlantic during May:

Daily average at sea	43	(57)
In operations area	8	(16)
On passage	35	(41)
Of these, on return passage	8	(19)

VI.

Sailed during May:

From home waters for Atlantic	4
for Northern Waters	0
for Group "Mitte"	34
From Norway: for Atlantic	11
From France: for Atlantic	10
From Group "Mitte" for Northern Waters	12

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Details to monthly survey

U 311	2nd patrol. Last report on 2.4. west of Ireland. Cause of loss unknown.

U 765	1st patrol. Last report on 7.5. between Newfoundland and the Bay of Biscay. Cause of loss unknown.

U 473	2nd patrol. Last report on 4.5. west of the Bay of Biscay. Cause of loss unknown.

U 960	Experienced boat. Last report on 22.4. from the Bay of Biscay. Cause of loss probably Gibraltar aircraft.

U 193	Experienced boat, new Commander. No report. Probably lost through Biscay air patrol.

U 846	2nd patrol. Last report on 3.5. from the Bay of Biscay. Cause of loss unknown.

U 550	1st patrol. Last report on 20.3. east of Newfoundland. Cause of loss unknown.

U 856	1st patrol. Last report on 25.3. southwest of Newfoundland. Cause of loss unknown.

U 66	Experienced boat. Last report on 6.5. west of Cape Verde. Loss probably due to carrier formation.

U 188	Experienced boat. Last report on 13.5. South Atlantic. Loss probably due to carrier formation.

U 852	1st patrol. Last report on 8.5. from Indian Ocean. Loss probably through air attack.

U 371	Veteran boat. No report. Loss probably through sea patrol.

U 453	Experienced boat. No report. Cause of loss unknown.

U 674	Experienced boat. No report. Cause of loss unknown.

U 990	Experienced boat. Last report on 25.5. from Northern Waters. Loss through aircraft.

U 476	1st patrol. Last report on 25.5. from Northern Waters. Loss through aircraft.

U 240	1st patrol. No report. Loss probably due to air attack.

U 616	Experienced boat. No report. Cause of loss unknown.

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Submarine situation 1.6.1944

I.	General Course of battle 1.3. - 31.5.1944:
	1)	General:
		In period just passed the course of battle has again been in the realm of enemy defence, and especially in that of air radar; their improvements both in quantity and quality led to an increase of losses on our side and decrease in successes. The battle of endurance alone, in operational area without actual contact with the enemy or targets to attack, was extremely hard and occasioned the order for limiting the duration of operations for type VIIC boats to 8 weeks. This measure was intended to prevent too great a burden being put on the crew which would cause a drop in the necessary tension needed for battle.
		The job of "tying down enemy forces" has so far succeeded, shown by observations from boats, agents' reports and radio intercept reports. The number of enemy aircraft in operation, and the number of vessels on escort duty, anti-submarine patrol and in carrier formation has increased rather than decreased.
		For the submarine men themselves the job of conducting a war for the purpose of tying down the enemy is especially difficult. More so than any other sphere, success, till now, has been the personal reward of the whole crew, and gave them the special zest for attack, and vigor and tenaciousness in the teeth of enemy defence. Chances of success are now only slight, and the prospects of not returning from enemy patrol on the other hand very great, in the last few months only 70% of the boats which sailed per month returned from their patrols.
		That the crews managed at all in this last year of heaviest loss and smallest success to come through untouched in their morale, will to fight and desire for attack is a wonderful proof of soldierly courage, a proof of the quality of the human material involved, a reward for the thorough training, and result of the determination of the submarine weapon.
	2)	North Atlantic:
		a)	Course of battle:
			On 22.3. order was given for dispersal of Group "Preussan". From this time on, boats were stationed singly, first in smaller attack areas and then on wide patrol lines. These were left free, according to state of moon and defence, to approach nearer to the English coast or further to the west. Only a few enemy contacts were made.

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The expeditions of U 621 - 586 - 413 and 744 fell outside the framework of this general submarine operation. To these boats was given the job of operating close in the the English coast and off Iceland. The following operational area were occupied:

U 621	-	Minch,	U 586	-	North Channel,
U 413	-	Scilly's	U 744	-	Reykjavik.

Of these boats U 744 did not reach his operations area, but was lost presumably on passage. The rest of the boats managed to remain in operational area for a few days, though only under great difficulties. Apart from sinking a destroyer or escort vessel apiece they had no successes, since it was impossible to remain on the surface on account of strong patrol, or to approach under water because of their own low speed submerged.

The number of boats stationed in operations area in North Atlantic grew steadily smaller between 1 March and 1 June, as more and more of them had to be recalled to home waters and the west as counter invasion measures. (See also under c)).

Measures to counter invasion:

Group "Landwirt":

As signs of an Allied landing in strength on the Continent in the near future intensified as the year progressed, the order was given on 22.3. for the establishment of 15 boats in the West as Group "Landwirt" to be kept at immediate readiness. Otherwise the arrival of boats from the Atlantic in the case of an invasion and a given air situation in the Bay of Biscay could not be reckoned on in under 8 - 10 days. The original number of 15 boats was increased, and finally all boats of type VIIC becoming ready for service in the West were detailed to Group "Landwirt". After the execution of deep diving trials boats returned to their operational port at 6 hours readiness. Dockyard period to be used for training of crew and when possible for exercises, schnorchel installed on a number of boats. All these boats were provided with detailed instructions concerning operational possibilities in the Channel by Flag Officer Submarines West, who was proposed as Director of Operations in the case of an invasion.

5 schnorchel boats were sent to the Western Channel for a few days, in order to operate against cruiser and destroyer formations there. The boats made no contact with the enemy but were able to collect valuable experience for the execution of their future duties, especially with regard to schnorchel sailing. These experiences were, as others, not unfavorable. For even when the schnorchel was located and in isolated cases an accurate attack developed, at least it proved that boats with Schnorchel could operate in areas where boats without certainly could not do so.

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Group "Mitte".

At the same time boats in Norwegian ports were formed into Group "Mitte" and their number increased to 20. Decisive for this was the number of ready berths in the small isolated harbors between Oslo and Bergen.

Figures:

Corresponding to the increase in number of boats set apart for defence against the invasion, the number of type VIIC boats in the Atlantic decreased.

Numbers were as follows:

ATLANTIC - INDIAN OCEAN
	1.3	16.3	1.4	16.4	1.5	16.5	1.6
Total at sea	66	70	65	56	47	40	44

No. of type VIIC	34	32	28	24	10	9	13

SET APART FOR INVASION
Group "Mitte"	3	10	10	10	17	20	22

Group "Landwirt"			5-10	17	30	37	37

Successes in North Atlantic:

March: 1 patrol vessel, 7 destroyers, 7 steamers together 13,000 GRT.

April: 2 destroyers, 2 steamers together 14,000 GRT.

May: 1 destroyer.

Distant operations areas including Indian Ocean:

Course of battle:

The decisive factor governing the distribution of boats was the attempt to tie down enemy air and escort forces as far as possible in all areas. Situation in detail was as follows:

Coast of North America, Newfoundland:

Traffic, apart from a few fast single ships entirely in convoy, which were extremely difficult to approach on account of strong enemy air patrol. Defence consisted mostly of daylight patrols, slight night activity, radar equipped. Day and night patrols strengthened when submarine was spotted (on an average 2 - 3 boats in operations area).

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Caribbean:

A large number of fast tankers sailing independently apparently only on day journeys, during which continuous air escort was provided. In spite of good listening conditions submerged approach was rarely possible on account of too low a speed.

Defence: Medium to strong day air patrol in whole Caribbean area, slight and unpracticed sea patrol by patrol craft off harbors and focal points of traffic. Strong patrol put on after presence of submarine confirmed, and systematic hunt carried out over a number of days, so that boat was finally forced to surface to recharge batteries and had to rely on anti-aircraft defence. (1 boat in operations area in April).

Guinea Coast:

Favorable operations area, especially in March with regular convoys along the coast, also unscheduled small convoys and isolated cases of ships sailing independently. Sea patrol slight and unpracticed, air patrol regular. From time to time traffic only slight, so that sometimes boats lay there without achieving any success. (From March to May an average of 2 boats in the Atlantic).

Indian Ocean:

Good possibilities of success in Gulf of Aden and along the Indian coast, but which could not be exploited on account of shortage of boats. Defence at first inexperienced, but strengthened with passage of time leading to the loss of one boat in the Gulf of Aden. (In March 2 boats in operations area, in April one).

Successes:

	Middle-South Atlantic	Indian Ocean
March:	4/22,000 GRT	11/78,000 GRT
April:	5/49,000 GRT
May:	3/16,000 GRT

II.

Enemy defence and its results:

Enemy air:

There is more to report with regard to the aircraft side of enemy defence. This is specially shown by the operational figures of Groups 19 and 18.

19 Group:

Operational figures for March averaged between 40 and 50 a day, and remained at this level in April in spite of decrease in number of boats. Between 1 and 15 May operational figures suddenly rose to between 50 and 60 and on one or two days reached a peak hitherto

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		unknown. From 15 May to 1 June the figures dropped to 20 to 30 machines a day.
		Comparison between these, and especially the earlier figures and the number of our own submarines on passage in the Bay show that the enemy is, in general, well in the picture as regards the submarine situation and regulates the strength of his operations accordingly. It must be considered probable that the enemy is informed of at least the times and numbers of boats sailing from west through his agents and directs his attacks especially against them. Proofs of this are in evidence.
		Between 25 and 27.3. there were 3 cases of boats entering port being attacked by a large number of aircraft while at convoy assembly point or even while in convoy. (See also diary for 27.3.). These attacks were not repeated. Presumably in the face of the high losses in the first attacks the enemy decided against renewing them.
		18 Group:
		Operational figures have risen since the beginning of May from an average of 10 - 15 to 25 - 30. Enemy has confirmed the heavy traffic of our own boats along the Norwegian coast mainly by the stream of boats outward bound for the Atlantic and strengthened his anti-submarine patrols accordingly. As far as is known 2 Arctic boats fell victims to this patrol west of Drontheim. As a number of radio intercept reports have been received not yet confirmed by boats (reports about attacks on submarines or submarine sightings by enemy aircraft), it must be reckoned possible that some of the Atlantic bound boats have fallen victim to these attacks. This cannot be confirmed until 1 June.
	5)	Sea forces:
		By entering all locations and sightings of English anti-submarine and escort units on a plot is was shown that in February 1944 there was an especially strong concentration of anti-submarine units in the areas AL 70-80 and BE 10-20 and 40, i.e. on the southwesterly route of the England-America convoy traffic. After a number of unexplainable losses had occurred in this area, boats were forbidden entry to BE 10-30 during March. The location and sighting picture in April and May showed a loosening-up of units in the northwest, and in fact this operational area split up between AK 60 and BE 20; this was probably evidence that enemy transferred back to the shortest England-America convoy route (Great Circle) when the submarine danger decreased. Instructions prohibiting entry into BE 10-30 were therefore lifted.
		The effectiveness of submarine chaser units has increased. Probably on account of the use of heavier bombs and depth-charges and numerous large-scale operations a great number of submarines were destroyed by systematic submarine hunts, as has been shown by press

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reports and statements made by officers taken prisoner.

No information has yet been received with regard to the use of new secret weapons (e.g. "Oskar", see appendix 3 to diary of 1.6.). As a great number of prisoners from a varying assortment of boats have been reported recently, it cannot be concluded that the loss of these boats was caused by such a weapon (in the use of which only total loss could have occurred and no prisoners taken) but rather by a systematic hunt and starving out of submarines.

Losses:

Type	Bay of Biscay	On passage	Op. area	Convoy	Iceland Passage	Cause of loss

			MARCH			F = air attack
VII-C	976 F	575 F	+ 257 (U)	709
		625 F	+ 358 U			T = carrier-borne aircraft
			653
			603			U = anti-submarine unit or convoy escort
			+ 91 U
IX-C		801 F		+ 845 U		TU = combined carrier-borne aircraft and anti-submarine unit

			APRIL			G = Gibraltar passage
VII-C	962	392 G	986		961
			302			S = Enemy submarine
		+744 F	342		974 S
			+448 U			+ = prisoners reported
IX-C		68 (TU) 515 (TU)X
XIV-C		488 TU				X = Sinking of boat announced by enemy, prisoners to be expected

			MAY			( ) = probable cause of loss
VII-C	765	731 G	311
		960 G	473
IX-C	193 (F)	66 TU	550 UX
	846		856 X
IX-D			852FX

From this it can be seen that the direct responsibility of the enemy air force for our losses is very high. Also in the cases where the submarine was destroyed by anti-submarine units aircraft must have taken an important part in locating boat and leading units to it.

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III.	Our own Technical measures:
	7)	Operationally the described situation imposed a heavy reserve. The decision was eased by the necessity of preparing forces for the threatened invasion. At the same time all efforts were made to make the old boats battleworthy and capable of holding out until the new types appeared at the front.
	8)	In the first place here was the introduction of the schnorchel (see I 2) b)). The air superiority of the enemy forced submarine activity below the surface, turning "diving boat" into "under water boat". This transformation was carried out thoroughly with the new types XXI and XXIII. Until these could be brought into operation we had to attempt to improve the old boats in this direction as well as possible by introduction of the schnorchel. This certainly only improved the resistance of the boat - substantial improvement in attacking power could only be brought by increased speed submerged.
	9)	Equipment of boats with improved radar intercept ("Fleige", "Tunis") and radar ("Gema" and "Hohentwiel") is making good progress. The radar location set especially has shown substantial improvement. The radar intercept set is only capable of showing whether aircraft with radar is in the vicinity, giving no range or definite bearing. Boat is therefore forced to dive even when aircraft flies past at a considerable distance. Certainly the inaccurate D/F possibilities of "Fleige" have sufficed in many cases when the boat had to remain on the surface, to train the guns approximately, thereby improving anti-aircraft defence.
		Radar location on the other hand gives accurate bearing and range and makes a clear decision possible as to whether aircraft is flying towards boat and whether diving is possible or not. In this way the whole working was smoother and put defence on a firm basis as regards whether to dive, or remain on the surface and fight it out with anti-aircraft armament.
	10)	In the torpedo section the introduction of the "LUT" is a substantial innovation. By 30.5. 35 boats had been equipped with it. No reports have yet been received.
	11)	In the realms of anti-aircraft defence an increasing number of boats have been equipped with improved 3.7 cm., even though the results are nowhere near satisfactory. Work goes on towards improvement of this weapon which is still subject to frequent disorders.
	12)	In general it remains to be seen whether the manufacturing situation is promoting and executing these technical improvements with as much speed as could be desired.

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IV.	Summary and deduction:
	13)	The present successes and those attainable in the future with the old submarine types do not alone justify the high expenditure in labor, armament and material on submarine warfare at home, and especially the high toll of life in the battle of the Atlantic.
		Operation and expenditure are nevertheless unavoidable for various reasons.
	14)	The submarine war cannot be allowed to cease, since once it has finally succumbed it would not be possible to take it up again. To parry with the enemy is, although a proverb, a tactical, technical, and above all a psychological necessity. The submarine arm has shown itself capable of withstanding the most difficult times. Once again she must carry her self-assertion into the battle with new weapons, - even in the face of heavy loss, and without having abandoned the cause even temporarily.
	15)	It has established beyond doubt that the enemy has thrown in a total of many thousand aircraft and many hundred escort vessels - from destroyers to trawlers for the protection of merchant shipping against submarines. (See appendix 1 and 2).
		To relinquish the submarine war would mean:
		a)	that a large number of aircraft, among them many 4-engined bombers for operational air warfare against Germany, and also many aircraft with well trained naval crews for operation against our own coastal shipping, would be released for other duties in the whole European area;
		b)	that the section of Allied aircraft industry set apart for the building of anti-submarine aircraft (flying boats, bombers, torpedo-carrying aircraft and carrier-borne aircraft) as well as aerodromes, ground staff etc. would be available for the reinforcement of the operational enemy air forces;
		c)	That a large number of destroyers and other light escort forces would be freed for operation against our own coastal shipping lanes;
		d)	that in the case of invasion these air and sea forces would be brought into battle against our own coasts.
			The value of this diversion must not be underestimated. Certainly it would only cease to be effective to its full extent if all submarine operations were abandoned.
	16)	The continuous development of enemy defence, especially the improvement of above and below surface radar location apparatus, alterations in methods of tracking

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	down and fighting submarines must be taken into consideration when equipping the new boats, training the crews, as well as in the developing of new submarine tactics. This can only be done if submarines continue to collect experience from day to day battle, so that our own apparatus as well as attack and defence weapons are up to date when the war with the latest types of boat commences.
17)	Following conclusions are inescapable:
	a)	The submarine war must be carried on with materials to hand. Losses, at present out of proportion to the successes achieved, must be accepted, bitter though they may be.
	b)	The greatest part of the armament program devoted to building of submarines will be employed on the building of type XXI and XXIII boats. The building series of types to date will be discontinued. The fact must also be faced that the supply of old type submarines from home to replace losses at the front will cease before the new type submarines are ready for disposal.
	c)	In training and in the appointment of submarines under command of Senior Officer Submarines everything must be done to achieve a high standard in the quality and quantity of the new boats. The limitation of present fighting power imposed by the withdrawal of good, experienced commanders, officers and members of the crew must be consciously accepted. The withdrawal of complete crews with front experience for type XXI boats and the simultaneous de-commissioning of old type VIIC boats will probably be necessary and carried into execution.

- 359 -

Appendix I to diary of 1.6.1944.

Coastal Command

Situation 1.6.1944.

Group				Land-based

	Liberator	Fortress	Halifax	Beau-fighter	Hudson	Stirl. Hampt.	Mosquito	Wellington

15	60	20	60	20	20	-	20	-
16	20	-	-	100	20	-	60	-
18	40	-	40	140	20	-	80	-
19	140	40	80	60	40	-	120	100

	260	60	180	320	100	-	280	100

Group	Sea-based

	Sunderland	Natal

15	60	20
16	-	-
18	10	20
19	40	-

	110	40

15. Group 200 aircraft 80 flying boats.

16. Group 200 aircraft 80 flying boats.

18. Group 320 aircraft 30 flying boats.

19. Group 580 aircraft 40 flying boats.

Coastal Command: 1300 aircraft 150 flying boats.

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Appendix 2 to diary of 1.6.1944.

Supply and disposal of British - North American war vessels

from destroyers downwards according to estimated

situation on 1.4.1944.

All vessels mentioned are used for escort purposes and are thrown in according to necessity.

For high seas convoys and general escort duty
		Destroyers		Escort Destroyers		Escort Vessels		Total

A.	English Home Fleet	English	50		-	-		50
B.	English Coastal Forces	English	40		60		180	280
C.	Atlantic and E. American Waters	Eng. 50		50		360
		USA 110	60	80	130	90	450	740
D.	Mediterranean	Eng. 30		20		40
		USA 110	40	5	25	-	40	105
E.	Indian Ocean	English	35		30		60	125

			325		245			1300

For coastal convoy work and stationary submarine defence.
		Smaller escort vessels		Submarine Chasers			Total

A.	English Home Fleet		-		-		-
B.	English Coastal Forces	English	750		450		1200
C.	Atlantic and E. American Waters	Eng. 50		50
		USA 290	340	290	340		680
D	Mediterranean	Eng. 30		20
		USA 20	50	50	70		120
E.	Indian Ocean	English	20		20		40

			1160		880		2040

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Addressed:
	Admiral Commanding Submarines
	Flag Officer Submarines West
	Flag Officer Submarines Norway
	Flag Officer Submarines Mediterranean
	Flag Officer Submarines East
	Flag Officer Submarines Training Division
	1., 2., 3., 4., 5., 6., 7., 8., 9., 10., 11., 12., 13., 20., 21., 22., 23., 24., 25., 26., 27., 29., 30., 31. Submarine Flotillas.
	1., 2. and 3. Submarine Instructional Divisions.
	Higher Command for Submarine Training.
	Submarine Training Group.

Accompanying survey on the situation of enemy submarine defence, May 1944, is sent to all submarine officers for information and instruction. Attention is drawn to the fact that many details have been supplied by spy and POW reports which have not been confirmed by observation at the front. Often they are only conjectures or verbal reports, but nevertheless give a clue to the direction developments on the enemy side are taking.


		For Senior Officer Submarines
		Chief of Operations Division
		(Signed): GODT.

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State of enemy submarine defence May 1944

I.	Surface location.
	A.	Aircraft:
		1.	The greater part of the aircraft on anti-submarine patrol is equipped with Rotterdam apparatus. Normal range against submarines 20-50 miles. Target can be measured right up to point of flying over.
		2.	Use of apparatus using 3 cm waves is suspected, but has not yet been confirmed on account of lack of suitable set for making observations. However this must be reckoned with, as 3 cm apparatus has been captured from aircraft shot down over Germany.
		3.	ASV apparatus has also been installed, especially in North Atlantic. Many boats have observed in air attacks that ASV and Rotterdam have been used in quick succession, probably from one and the same aircraft. This conjecture is confirmed by the fact that a Liberator aircraft which made emergency landing in Portugal was equipped with both ASV and Rotterdam. In approaching very near to the target ASV has a blind spot, and only visual bombing is possible. The Rotterdam apparatus has probably been installed to fill this gap. Many reports from boats indicate this connection between ASV and Rotterdam.
		4.	Aircraft operate to a great extent economically with all apparatus i.e. apparatus is turned on for 1 minute at 2-4 minute intervals.
	B.	Vessels:
		1.	A large number of the anti-submarine vessels are equipped with centimeter apparatus with searcher worked either automatically or by hand. Range same as that of optical vision. Recently ASV apparatus has not been observed.
		2.	All anti-submarine units suspected to be equipped with infra-red searchlights with weak filters. Advantage over normal searchlight: Rays only visible from target on which beam is trained and not from the side.

II.	Underwater location.
	A.	Aircraft:
		1.	3 buoys are dropped in a triangle around the spot where boat is supposed to be, with which the boat is to be located. There are 3 methods of proceeding:
			a) the buoys have microphones and pick up the noises from boat.

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b)	Every buoy is fitted with 10 meter line and cracker which is then ignited and running time of echoes measured.
c)	Sound or electrical pulses are sent out and the echo received, the time between the two being measured.
	Those measurements are calculated by the buoy and results radioed to aircraft. Procedure is called ERSB. The great number of reports concerning it show that a solution is being energetically worked out, though no definite observations have been made of its use at the front. In April 1943 boat reported being hunted by aircraft with explosive sounding device.

According to spy reports aircraft are able to radar submerged submarines to a depth of 30 meters. This is a technical possibility but there are no reports from boats about it yet.

Airships or helicopters trail listening buoys. Confirmed by spy reports and submarine report from American coast. Operations with helicopter did not prove satisfactory.

Strong searchlight (Leigh-searchlight) is supposed to make submerged boat visible at a depth of 20 meters, once the position of boat is known. Procedure very dependent on weather conditions. Success a matter of luck. No observations yet made.

Vessels:

Some anti-submarine vessels are equipped with excellent hydrophone gear. Apparatus mostly built in or extensible, can be used at speeds between 21-24 knots. Towed hydrophone gear serves for a rough range estimation under certain circumstances. Range 4-5,000 meters. Effectiveness is doubtful.

Hydrophone gear is still the principal method of establishing the presence and rough position of a submerged submarine. Merchant ships, especially when sailing independently are usually equipped with torpedo warning apparatus. This is a simple hydrophone apparatus with rough D/F possibilities.

Search gear(Asdic).

Probably installed in all anti-submarine units, range slight, normally from 200-3,000 meters, under favorable conditions up to 5,000 meters.

Supersonic location gear.

According to a great number of press and spy reports this American discovery is installed on all American anti-submarine units and since January 1944 on English units too. Works as search gear with ultra

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			acoustic waves. Cannot be confirmed with materials to hand at the front. Up to date only one observation apparatus on trials in the Mediterranean. Ultra acoustic pulses observed. Further observations necessary before explanation can be made.
		4.	Location by explosive soundings.
			From anti-submarine units fitted with special cannons a number of small explosive bodies are fired, and by the comparison between the time of direct crack and that of the echo reflected by boat the position of submarine is deduced and marked on the surface of the water by smoke shells of various characteristics, then a cloud of depth-charges are dropped. Explosive sounding location only used for very close locations. P.O.W. reports confirm those from boats.
		5.	Electro-magnetic location.
			Information only very inexact. According to spy reports a new kind of wave (not sound waves) is being used for underwater location. Very great ranges are supposed to be attainable. (No proof of this).
			It is possible that this has some connection with the noise reported by boats described as similar to that of a bumble bee. In some cases submerged boats have been approached by destroyers with this humming noise from a great distance without having been previously located, and accurately depth-charged.

III.	Noise buoys.
	Recently a great number of reports have been received. They can be distinguished by tone and supposed object in view:
	A.	Deception buoy: A noise is made similar to that of propeller and asdic of anti-submarine unit. Buoy is presumably dropped by sea or air units escorting convoy in order to hold boat under the water, at the same time being able to maintain escort of convoy. Characteristics of this noise: true bearing steady, signal strength remains constant, which would rise and fade if it were a vessel. Close examination of the source of this noise which would involve running over it and surfacing is only rarely possible on account of enemy defence.
		Two boats in the Arctic probably sighted such a noise buoy. Black casings in the form of a mine without lead caps, and just one perpendicular horn. Propeller and low asdic noises were heard in connection with these buoys. Nothing seen on surface.
		Noises which sound like deception buoys are often caused by shoals of fish especially porpoises. Noises and characteristics are very similar (rhythmic beating and roaring and squeaking similar to that of search gear,

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bearing steady, signal strength constant). Buoys noticed in mid Atlantic without presence of convoys and searched for by the hour, crossed over and nothing sighted, were probably shoals of fish.

Rattling buoys:

A rattling, hammering noise has been observed in the presence of anti-submarine units, especially after they have located submarine. After playing of record of German noise buoy, submarine commander identified this as same. Propeller noises are completely swamped, and noise cannot be D/F'd close to, only at a considerable distance. Whether the source of the noise is carried by destroyer or trailed after has not been established. This is probably a counter-measure against T 5. This has been concluded from the date of introduction - one month after the first use of T 5, and from the method of employment. The effect of these buoys on T 5, even after a misfire, cannot yet be established in any way from boats' reports. On the other hand 2 boats (U 413 and U 445) fired on destroyers which turned on noise-buoy shortly before and shortly after the shot respectively. Both destroyers were sunk.

Singing saws:

From about the same time as the introduction of the rattling buoy, a noise was observed which from a distance sounded like a humming bee, changing to that of an insect during approach, and finally, close to, a high singing tone. Here it is not clear whether the apparatus is a new kind of location gear or a noise buoy. This noise has also only been noticed in connection with anti-submarine vessels.

IV.

Weapons of attack.

Depth-charges:

Aircraft:

Aircraft on submarine patrol usually drop depth-charges, though aircraft bombs are sometimes used.

a)	Usual depth-charge. Weight 112.5 kilograms depth-setting between 7.5 and 120 meters possible, set mostly between 7.5 and 30 meters. Fired by hydrostatic pressure. Destructive radius of about 6 meters, radius of damage about 16 meters.
b)	270 kilogram anti-submarine bomb. Depth-setting 10.5 meters, destructive radius 8.5 meters, radius of damage 42 meters. Usually patterns of 4 bombs dropped. Lowest height for dropping 180 meters.
c)	15 kilogram anti-submarine bomb. Dropped in packets of 4, distance (between each) 4.5 meters.

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d) It is endeavored to drop bombs at exact intervals and a deadly distance apart.

Vessels:

a)	Normal depth charge 180 kilograms, depth setting 15-150 meters, destructive radius about 11 meters, radius of damage about 20 meters. Fired by hydrostatic pressure.
b)	Extra heavy depth charges. Available from 250-340 kilograms. According to doubtful spy report depth charge of 270 kilograms capable of being set to 180 meters. Falling speed accelerated by propeller. Possibly the 270 kg. anti-submarine bomb is referred to (Para. I b)).
c)	U 986 reports being accurately depth charges while at depth of 2 A plus 30 meters (blisters on pressure hull).
d)	"Killer". Depth charge for great depths (figures unknown), weight 450 kilograms, rolled over deck.
e)	"Hedgehog". This is a firing platform for 24 little depth charges, mounted singly or is pairs on the forecastle of anti-submarine vessel. Stabilized against thrusting movements. Depth charges have rocket propulsion and are fired electrically. Launching range about 360 meters. They are set for various depths. Double ignition by hydrostatic or magnetic pressure. Effective radius 66 meters or 75 meters with the larger kind. Employment confirmed by observations from boats. Reports concerning various kinds of weapons for underwater attack have been received from spies and the press, all under the name of "Hedgehog" The one described above is the most probable, as is has been obtained from captured English document on submarine counter-measures which included a photograph. It is possible that the name "Hedgehog" is also used for other weapons at the front.
f)	Launching. Depth charge chutes on stern. Compressed air propelled mortars, launching range 80 meters, possible to fire salvoes every 50 seconds. With rocket propulsion launching range 245 meters.
g)	Firing. Normally by hydrostatic pressure. By addition of auxiliary antenna ignition caused by presence of metal body at a range of 150 meters. Acoustic and magnetic firing devices are presumed, though no definite observations.

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	B.	Homing weapons:
		It is well known that the enemy has information concerning our homing torpedoes and is working in this field himself. He apparently has no such weapons for use at the front. All observations which could throw light on this matter are important.

V.	Attacking methods.
	A.	Aircraft:
		See Standing War Orders No. 181 and Current Orders No. 9
	B.	Vessels:
		See Standing War Orders No. 172.

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