U-boat Archive - BDU KTB PG30350

F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

1 - 15 July 1944

PG30350

1.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BC 73	U 396	-	AF 47	U 543	-	DT 65	U 858	-	AL 23
	129	-	CF 81	478	-	AF 48	546	-	CG 21	859	-	KZ 49
	154	-	CF 23	480	-	BF 16	547	-	EU 97	860	-	KZ 14
	181	-	Op(LC 88)	490	-	ER 12	549	-	Op(FB 80)	861	-	FR 31
	183	-	LP 48	505	-	BF 82	673	-	Op(AK 25)	862	-	DF 74
	196	-	Op(MS 90)	516	-	Op(EC 90)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	865	-	AE 69
	198	-	KR 24	530	-	Op(EP 44)	802	-	BE 92	1062	-	LE 27
	233	-	BC 77	534	-	Op(AK 73)	804	-	AL 22	1222	-	BD 66
	243	-	AM 74	537	-	LD 42	853	-	BF 81	1225	-	AE 85
	247	-	Op(AM 36)	539	-	Op(EB 80)	857	-	Op(BD 67)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1001	-	Op(AN 43)
	745	-	Op(AN 38)	994	-	Op(AF 87)	1165	-	Op(AN 34)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	BF 5515	U 309	-	BF 2814	U 740	-	BF 2798	U 971	-	Op(BF 32)
	214	-	BF 2577	441	-	BF 2795	763	-	Op(BF 36)	984	-	Op(BF 36)
	218	-	Op(BF 24)	671	-	Op(BF 32)	767	-	Op(BF 32)	988	-	Op(BF 32)
	269	-	Op(BF 36)	672	-	BF 6517	953	-	Op(BF 31)	1191	-	Op(BF 36)
	390	-	Op(BF 26)	678	-	BF 2484

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 183 - 396 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 802 - 853 - 1062 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 214 - Brest; U 672 - St. Nazaire.
	Sailed: U 855 - Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a) -	b)	None.
	c)	1)	1 ASV location in unresolved position.
		2)	Enemy units were located in: AK 5619 - AM 5380 - 4350 - 6410.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Western boats:
		1)	U 953 - 678 have been allocated operations area S. of Portsmouth, U 390 N. of Seine Bay.
		2)	U 214 entered Brest. Flag Officer U-boats radioed the boat that 5 destroyers had been sighted at 0043 in BF 5246.

- 411 -

		3)	The few U-boats sightings must be due to the fact that aircraft have made only few sorties owing to bad weather over S. England.
		Group Command "Mitte":
		Nothing to report
		Atlantic boats:
	b)	U 865 is returning because of damage. Boat has been ordered to go to Trondheim.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

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2.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BC 82	U 396	-	AF 81	U 546	-	CG 16	U 858	-	AL 14
	129	-	CF 58	478	-	AE 69	547	-	EU 85	859	-	KZ 55
	154	-	CF 22	490	-	ER 19	549	-	Op(FB 10)	860	-	JA 13
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	505	-	BE 82	673	-	Op(AK 10)	861	-	FR 39
	183	-	LP 51	516	-	Op(EC 90)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	DR 11
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	EO 62	802	-	BE 93	865	-	AE 69
	198	-	Op(KR 93	534	-	Op(AK 82)	804	-	AL 23	1062	-	LF 53
	233	-	BB 99	537	-	Op(LD 40)	853	-	BF 82	1222	-	BE 44
	243	-	AM 77	539	-	Op(EB 80)	855	-	AD 44	1225	-	AE 87
	247	-	Op(AM 36)	543	-	ET 38	857	-	Op(BD 55)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1001	-	Op(AN 43)
	745	-	Op(AN 38)	994	-	Op(AF 87)	1165	-	Op(AN 34)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	BF 2870	U 390	-	Op(BF 23)	U 678	-	Op(BF 25)	U 953	-	Op(BF 32)
	218	-	Op(BF 24)	441	-	BF 2795	740	-	BF 2798	971	-	Op(BF 32)
	269	-	Op(BF 36)	480	-	BF 2440	763	-	Op(BF 36)	984	-	Op(BF 36
	309	-	Op(BF 25)	671	-	Op(BF 32)	767	-	Op(BF 32)	988	-	Op(BF 32)
										1191	-	Op(BF 36)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 183 - 396 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 802 - 853 - 865 - 1062 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 1062 - Penang.
	Sailed: U 1192 - 397 - 975 - Kristiansand. Boats transferred to 23 and 24 flotillas.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

- 412 -

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	U 547 reported at 0130 that she had sunk the Dutch S.S. "Bodegraven" (route Cape Town-Freetown) in EU 7278, captain a prisoner (freighter of 5,593 GRT).
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings:
			2004 surfaced U-boat sighted by aircraft of No. 19 Group in unresolved position.
			0900 U-boat sighted by American steamer in LN 5940.
		2)	3 ASV locations in unresolved positions.
		3)	Enemy units were located in: AL 9853 - AM 6140 - 0340 - 0547 - 4760 - BF 2630.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Western boats:
		1)	The U-boat situation in operations area Seine Bay is still not clear, as boats have not reported. Also there have been no U-boat sightings in this area for the past week. There is therefore the possibility that there have been very heavy losses, especially as a broadcast from the Calais propaganda transmitter speaks of the sinking of 10 boats in the Channel area. (So far this station's reports of U-boat losses have always been accurate). According to dead reckoning there should be 10 Schnorchel boats in this operations area. The new boats arriving, U 480, 243, 678 (from home) and U 309 and 212 from W. France, have been ordered to make for Brest. They will not be sent into the Channel until the situation there is known
			As repeated orders to the Channel boats to report the state of affairs have not been answered, the boats which have been there longest, U 984, U 269, 988, 767 and 1191 have been ordered to return. (U 988, 767 and 1191 have been at sea already for 6 weeks and 2 weeks in the Channel).
			Only when the experiences of these boats are known can it be decided whether or not any more boats should be sent to the Seine Bay.
		2)	U 214's short report shows that it is quite possible to proceed through the W. Channel and operate in Plymouth Sound. No action whatever was taken against the boat during

- 413 -

		her outward passage, while she was laying mines or on her way back. Little patrol in Plymouth Sound.
		Sightings: red searchlight once in periscope, without boat being observed, 1 destroyer, one inward-bound convoy. Also on 23.6. in BF 2297 1 destroyer, 4 patrol vessels and 8 steamers, some of them with noise boxes, and 2 destroyers with noise boxes. No sighting of aircraft in periscope during the whole patrol. Location transmissions picked up in Borkum off both coasts. Boat surfaced only once to report execution.
		Group Command "Mitte":
		After giving up their operational equipment, 3 boats (U 397, 975 and 1192, intended for 23 and 24 U-flotilla) left Kristiansand for Kiel.
		Atlantic boats:
	b)	Because of the air situation, U 855 is proceeding off the Norwegian coast along the inner leads to Trondheim, and will sail into the Atlantic from there through the Iceland Straits, avoiding the area particularly endangered by aircraft.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 547 - 1 ship 5,593 GRT.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

3.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BC 83	U 396	-	AF 73	U 546	-	CG 18	U 857	-	Op(BD 52
	129	-	CF 55	478	-	AE 68	547	-	EU 72	858	-	AL 15
	154	-	BE 78	490	-	ER 51	549	-	Op(FA 30)	859	-	KZ 37
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	505	-	BF 82	673	-	Op(AK 29)	860	-	KG 86
	183	-	LP 26	516	-	Op(EC 90)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	861	-	FS 45
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EO 20)	602	-	BF 72	862	-	DR 18
	198	-	KG 87	534	-	Op(AK 83)	804	-	AL 14	865	-	AE 69
	233	-	BB 97	537	-	Op(LD 40)	853	-	BF 58	1222	-	BE 16
	243	-	BE 32	539	-	Op(EB 80)	855	-	AN 36	1225	-	AE 79
	247	-	Op(AM 36)	543	-	DT 31

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1001	-	Op(AN 43)
	745	-	Op(AN 38)	994	-	Op(AF 87)	1165	-	Op(AN 34)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	BF 2870	U 390	-	Op(BF 31)	U 678	-	BF 2480	U 971	-	Op(BF 32)
	218	-	Op(BF 24)	441	-	BF 2795	763	-	Op(BF 36)	984	-	Op(BF 36)
	269	-	Op(BF 36)	480	-	Op(BF 27)	767	-	Op(BF 32)	988	-	Op(BF 32)
	309	-	BF 2810	671	-	Op(BF 32)	953	-	Op(BF 32)	1191	-	Op(BF 36)


- 414 -

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 183 - 243 - 396 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 802 - 853 - 865 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 853 - Lorient; U 396 - Bergen.
	Sailed: U 863 Kiel.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1925 aircraft attack, no position given (via U 198).
	b)	None.
	c)	1)	One U-boat sighting in LN 5860.
		2)	Enemy units were located in: AL 9730 - AM 3430 - 4880 - 7122.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Western boats:
		1)	5 boats were yesterday ordered to return and to report the situation in their area. Of these U 984 has reported entering Brest. The boat made by short signal: heavy traffic, little or no sea patrol, so far sunk 15,000 GRT.
			Here we have another definite report on the operations area. Report from one more boat will be awaited. If this is also favorable, all Schnorchel boats which have put into W. France ports and are ready for operations, will be used in the Seine area.
		2)	U 218 has completed her mine-laying operation, 15 SMA on the convoy route S. of Landsend, and is returning.
		3)	U 740 must be presumed lost. The boat left on 6.6., without Schnorchel, and was to operate in the Portsmouth area together with U 629. Nothing has been heard of the boat the whole time, not even through Radio Intelligence. On 24.6. therefore, she was ordered to return; she has not entered port.
			The boat was probably probably lost by air attack during the night 6/7 or 7.6. Boats' reports and Radio Intelligence show that on this night strong enemy air forces attacked boats putting to sea.

- 415 -

		Group Command "Mitte":
		11th U-Flotilla has been ordered to give sailing orders to U 299 for AN 3171, U 319 for AN 3444, U 286 for AN 3738.
		Atlantic boats:
	b)	U 198 situation: 9 June in GH 8941 miss at freighter, 120⁰, 16 knots. Radar on Naxos frequency.
		From 14 - 25 June operated between GR 22 and 53 on the 500-meter line. Freighter of 5,000 GRT sunk on 16.6. in GR 2978, course 160⁰, speed 10 knots. Otherwise nothing sighted. Bombs by day. Aircraft at night twice without Radar, using searchlight. Location transmissions in Naxos from shore stations in GR 5328 - 5352 - 5680. (Most of the radio message corrupt).
		1925 short signal received from U 860: Am being attacked by aircraft, no position given. Boat requested an operations area in KZ which was allocated.
		Boat requested an operations area in KZ which was allocated.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 198 - 1 ship 5,000 GRT.

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4.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BC 92	U 478	-	AE 67	U 546	-	CG 41	U 858	-	AK 56
	129	-	CF 53	490	-	ER 58	547	-	ET 68	859	-	KZ 36
	154	-	BE 77	505	-	BF 82	549	-	Op(EP 98)	860	-	KQ 91
	181	-	Op(LC 50)	516	-	Op(EC 90)	673	-	AK 28	861	-	FS 82
	183	-	LE 94	530	-	Op(EO 28)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	DR 46
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	534	-	Op(AK 91)	802	-	BF 73	863	-	AO 44
	198	-	KZ 36	537	-	Op(LD 40)	804	-	AL 15	865	-	AF 49
	233	-	BB 89	539	-	Op(EB 80)	855	-	AN 31	1222	-	BE 54
	243	-	BF 36	543	-	DH 75	857	-	Op(BD 28)	1225	-	AF 49
	247	-	Op(AM 36)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1001	-	Op(AN 43)
	745	-	Op(AN 38)	994	-	Op(AF 87)	1165	-	Op(AN 34)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	BF 2870	U 390	-	Op(BF 36)	U 678	-	BF 2870	971	-	Op(BF 32)
	218	-	Op(BF 24)	441	-	BF 2795	763	-	Op(BF 36)	984	-	BF 2586
	269	-	BF 2523	480	-	BF 2799	767	-	BF 8189	988	-	BF 8188
	309	-	BF 2870	671	-	Op(BF 32)	953	-	Op(BF 32)	1191	-	BF 3526


- 416 -

On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 183 - 243 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 802 - 865 - 1222.

Entered Port: U 212 - 984 - Brest.

Sailed: U 475 - Kiel (East boat); U 518 - Lorient.

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

0157 air attack on U 984 in BF 5113.

None.

U-boat sightings:

No. 16 Group:

0942 periscope believed sighted in 52 02' N., longitude not resolved. According to Radio Intelligence U 539 torpedoed a tanker at 1745 in EC 2395.

Enemy units were located in: AL 9239 - AM 3480 - BF 2420.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Western boats:

U 984 made another short signal on the situation in the Seine area: Little enemy anti-submarine activity and patrol. Consider enemy situation definitely favorable. Contrary to her first report, boat said that she would enter Brest that night. At 0151 she was attacked by an aircraft, but made a signal half an hour later and requested beacon signals from escort vessels.

In view of this favorable report U 309 was ordered not to enter port, but to make for BF 3184. U 984's experiences were communicated to her by radio. U 212 was ordered to sail again as soon as she had exchanged experiences with U 984.

U 309 reported by short signal that she had sunk a destroyer of the AJ class. The third group of the signal gave the area, but was corrupt. According to dead reckoning it must have been BF 27, E. half or BF 28 W. half.

- 417 -

		Group Command "Mitte":
		U 1001, 1165 and 745 have been ordered to return to Bergen. On 5.7. U 319 and 299 will leave Stavanger and U 286 Flekkefjord, and they will occupy the following attack areas: U 319 - AN 3444, U 229 - AN 3171, U 286 - AN 3738.
		U 1192, 397 and 975 have entered Kiel and will join the 23rd and 24th U-Flotillas.
		U 481, 1193 (Baltic boats) have been ordered to leave Reval at once and to go to Emsalö and Kejfsaloe and to be at 6 hours' notice.
		Atlantic boats:
		Nothing to report.
	b) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 309 - 1 destroyer.

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5.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BC 93	U 478	-	AE 33	U 546	-	CG 44	U 858	-	Op(AK 28)
	129	-	CF 37	490	-	ER 86	547	-	ET 64	859	-	JA 18
	154	-	BD 99	505	-	BF 82	549	-	Op(FA 22)	860	-	KQ 93
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	516	-	Op(EC 90)	673	-	AK 34	861	-	FS 94
	183	-	LE 89	518	-	BF 55	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	DR 84
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EO 16)	802	-	BF 81	863	-	AN 36
	198	-	Op(KZ 31)	534	-	Op(AK 94)	804	-	AL 23	865	-	AF 83
	233	-	BB 88	537	-	Op(LD 40)	855	-	AN 24	1222	-	BE 54
	243	-	BE 39	539	-	Op(EB 80)	857	-	Op(BD 63)	1225	-	AL 23
	247	-	Op(AM 36)	543	-	DH 72

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)	U 1001	-	AN 43
	745	-	AN 38	994	-	Op(AF 87)	1165	-	AN 34

	Western Boats:
	U 218	-	BF 2736	441	-	BF 2795	763	-	Op(BF 36)	971	-	Op(BF 32)
	269	-	BF 2636	480	-	BF 2799	767	-	BF 3511	988	-	BF 3511
	309	-	Op(BF 28)	671	-	Op(BF 32)	953	-	Op(BF 32)	1191	-	BF 2639
	390	-	Op(BF 36)	678	-	BF 2870

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 183 - 243 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 802 - 865 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 671 - Boulogne (West boat); U 865 - Trondheim; U 863 - Horten; U 1001 - 1165 Bergen (Group "Mitte").

- 418 -

	Sailed: U 741 - 212 Brest (West boats); U 319 - 299 - Stavanger (Group "Mitte"); U 286 - Flekkefjord (Group "Mitte")

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a) -	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings:
			Gibraltar aircraft reported one U-boat in an unresolved position.
			English steamer reported U-boat attack E. of Cape Wrath (North Minch, U 247).
		2)	Enemy units were located in: AM 5170 - AM 3660 - 3520 - 3350 - BF 3712 - BD 5895.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Western boats:
		1)	U 984, short report:
			12.6. left Brest.
			14.6. fired a L.U.T. double fan at a searching group. Tube runner. Group out of sight. Sighted twice again but no opportunity to fire.
			On the way out Schnorchelled until hydrophone bearings reached signal strength 2, but nevertheless battery was so low by 19.6. that it was necessary to put into St. Peter Port to charge.
			21.6. sailed, with battery not full, as charging continually interrupted by air attacks.
			22.6. BF 2662 3 destroyers in line ahead. T5 hit astern at foremost destroyer, T5 miss at another destroyer which came up.
			In the Seine area from 28.6. Heavy traffic with little escort by day, no traffic observed at night.
			29.6. BF 3532 and 33 attacked loaded convoy in 2 columns at 1500. L.U.T. double fan at port column. Hit on 8,000-tonner.

- 419 -

			Other torpedo missed this column and hit a 7,000-tonner in the starboard column. Latter sank slowly, former after finishing shot. T5 at another steamer of 9,000 GRT. Hit astern. Finishing shot missed.
			All torpedoes used. returning.
			The Commanding Officer reports his general experiences as follows:
			The difficulty was on the way out. Bottoming only possible when head very heavy and with slight negative buoyancy. Very good experiences with Schnorchel. Starboard Diesel passage at 280 revs. with subsidiary charging. Port Diesel charging at only 400 revs. No anti-submarine activity to speak of in operations area. Anti-submarine forces' underwater location gear not very effective. Attack on anti-submarine groups not to be recommended because of slow speed and "smoking". Best chances of success on lines of traffic, wait for big ships. No traffic observed at night. Patrol strenuous for crew. Perfect health essential, otherwise there are casualties on the way.
			The Commanding Officer explains the lack of anti-submarine activity in his operations area by the fact that listening and searching conditions are difficult for the enemy and suspects that the enemy often assumes torpedo hits to be mine hits.
		2)	U 671 (Schnorchel boat from the Atlantic) entered Boulogne early on 5.7. The boat was bottomed at 62 meters on 2.7. in BF 3259 and was surprised and depth-charged by a searching group of destroyers. Main periscope top bent, aerial assembly partly smashed, No. 2 inner fuel tank crack to battery compartment, air conduits to No. 4 and 2 diving tanks torn below upper deck. The boat fired 3 T5, but the report does not make it clear whether before or after the depth-charge attack. The boat was constantly pursued by the searching group on her way to Boulogne. As Boulogne dockyard can do no work, owing to air attacks, Flag Officer U-boats is sending a detachment of 30 specialist workmen from St. Nazaire to examine and repair U 671.
		3)	U 212, 741 sailed for operations in the Channel. U 480 and U 309 reported entering Brest.
		4)	According to Radio Intelligence an English aircraft located a mine in BF 2532 left lower edge. This may be an SMA laid by U 218.

- 420 -

		Group Command "Mitte":
		U 1001 and U 1165 entered Bergen. U 299, U 319 and U 286 are on passage to their positions.
		Group Command Baltic:
		1)	U 748 sailed from Reval and is on her way to Emsalö.
		2)	Admiral Eastern Baltic has been requested to investigate waiting positions E. of "Seeigel".
		Atlantic boats :
		Nothing to report.
	b)	U 804 and U 1224 are making for BC 30.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 984 - 1 frigate
	- 2 ships 15,000 GRT 1 ship torpedoed.

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6.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BD 72	U 247	-	Op(AM 36)	U 539	-	Op(EB 80)	U 855	-	AF 59
	129	-	CF 35	478	-	AE 85	543	-	DH 42	857	-	Op(BD 54)
	154	-	BD 97	490	-	FC 31	546	-	CF 66	858	-	Op(AK 25)
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	505	-	BF 82	547	-	ET 32	859	-	JA 24
	183	-	LF 17	516	-	Op(EC 90)	549	-	Op(FA 22)	860	-	KR 48
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	518	-	BF 57	673	-	AL 13	861	-	FQ 79
	198	-	Op(KZ 30)	530	-	Op(EO 16)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	EG 22
	233	-	Op(BB 87)	534	-	Op(AK 86)	802	-	BF 81	1222	-	BE 55
	243	-	BF 17	537	-	Op(LD 40)	804	-	AL 16	1225	-	AL 16

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 745	-	AN 3430	U 994	-	Op(AF 87)
	299	-	Op(AN 31)	319	-	Op(AN 34)	771	-	Op(AN 28)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	BF 28	U 390	-	Op(BF 36)	U 741	-	BF 28	U 971	-	Op(BF 32)
	218	-	BF 2789	441	-	BF 2877	763	-	Op(BF 36)	988	-	BF 2652
	269	-	BF 2651	480	-	BF 2877	767	-	BF 2628	1191	-	BF 2654
	309	-	Op(BF 25)	678	-	BF 2878	953	-	Op(BF 32)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 183 - 243 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 802 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 480 - 309 - Brest.
	Sailed: U 672 - St. Nazaire; U 982 - 999 - Kristiansand and Kiel (East boats).

- 421 -

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

a) -

None.

U-boat sightings:

No. 19 Group:	0535	boat in unresolved position. English unit reported action with 2 U-boats and 2 M-boats without giving position (U 741 and U 212).
	0625	U-boat sighted by aircraft "KPQ 36" 49⁰ 41' N., longitude not resolved.
	0650	same aircraft reported periscope, course 60⁰, speed 1 knot.
	1058	U-boat in 49⁰ 08' N., longitude not resolved.
	1124	periscope sighted in BF 2735.
	1313	periscope sighted, course 150⁰, speed 2 knots. The sighting aircraft was located in AN 1190 (presumably U 247).
	1514	U-boat in 50⁰ 02' N, longitude not resolved
	1543	same aircraft reported: Have attacked with depth-charges, hits not known.
	0030	ASV location by aircraft of No. 16 group in BF 3386.
Simonstown area:	1020)	by aircraft "FWGB" in unresolved position.
	1025)	by aircraft "FWGB" in unresolved position.
	1027	same aircraft sighted 4 dinghies, position not given.

One ASV location at 0315 in AN 8758. Cancelled at 0340.

Enemy units were located in: AL 8119 - 9482 - 6894 - AM 2440 - 3360 - AN 1830 - BD 3391 - BF 3170 - 3160 - 3171.

English steamer in DT 7630 made "ZZZ" and "am being fired on" at 1453 to 2 unidentified stations.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Western boats:

During the last few nights a number of enemy warships have assembled off Brest. During the night

- 422 -

5/6.7. an outward-bound U-boat escort (see paragraph III a) 1) was attacked by 4 destroyers. U 741, 212 were able to continue on their outward passage, M-boats turned back. One patrol boat sank, another was stranded. Two enemy destroyers set on fire.

Countermeasures for U-boats:

a)	Escorts to be dispersed E. and W.
b)	U-boats under escort to have a T5 ready to fire.
c)	Not all Schnorchel boats to put into Brest. U 269 and U 988 have been ordered to put into Lorient.

U 309 and U 671 short reports:

U 309 no new experiences of importance. Boat heard 2 circular saws at 0028/3/7 on her return passage in BF 2564, then sighted 2 V and W class destroyers standing on and off, course N.W., S.E., in sharp quarterline. T3 L.U.T. fired at foremost destroyer, explosion after 9 minutes 15 seconds. Then only one circular saw could be heard, only one destroyer distinguished at periscope depth. T5 fired at this latter, track followed in hydrophones, no explosion. Commanding Officer suspects the circular saw is an anti-T5 measure. In BF 2798 the boat received the order not to put into port. Commanding Officer decided nevertheless to put in to supply with torpedoes.

U 671. The boat left Kiel on 13.5 and Bergen on 28.5. Iceland Passage and Atlantic: nothing to report. 25.6. reached operations area N. of the Seine Bay. Up till then boat had not been detected when charging with Schnorchel at night.

U 671 proceeded from the W. entrance to the Channel to her operations area in the N. of the Channel and during this only once sighted a destroyer. Otherwise only frequent, distant, explosive soundings, circular saws, bomb explosions and propeller noises heard. As all the boats proceeding via the southern sector had great difficulty in charging due to interference by searching groups and hydrophone bearings and U 671 has been able to proceed almost unhindered in the N. Sector, this latter seems the better route for later boats. These experiences were radioed to the boats.

- 423 -

			Frequent sightings in the operations area, but no chances to fire either because of inclination or range. The boat Schnorchelled 3 times by day, once for 20 minutes, and then for 2 hours 20 minutes, and 2 hours 40 minutes, until she had to give the alarm because of destroyers or aircraft. At 1740/30/6, while schnorchelling, 3 destroyers approached at very low speed. No hydrophone bearing at 2000 meters. Destroyers approached to 500 meters and circled the boat at very low speed. Two hours after sighting 2 series of depth-charges at periscope depth. No damage. T5 fired, gyroscope failed, presumably because of previous depth-charging. On 1.7. boat surfaced to charge, as battery empty. She discharged 30 - 40 Aphrodite and was able to charge for 2 hours until 2 destroyers were sighted. After alarm one well-placed depth-charge, no damage of importance. On 2.7. the boat was depth-charged while bottomed by a group of searching destroyers. She was presumably detected by a trace of oil, which may have been due to depth-charges on 1.7. In spite of heavy damage, she fired 2 T5 at 20 meters by hydrophone bearing. Both failed, attributable to depth-charges.
			For further details see War Log of 5.7. paragraph IV a) 2).
			The report indicates further that searching groups off the landing area are unpracticed and do not persevere.
			The boat had no successes, as she was continually hunted owing to an oil trace and driven out of her operations area.
		Group Command "Mitte":
		U 276 and U 677 entered Kiel and will join the training flotilla.
		Group Command Baltic:
		U 679 left Kiel and U 475 Reval, both to operate in the Gulf of Finland. U 1193, U 481 and U 748, on way to waiting position Emsalö, were ordered to proceed straight on to about 28⁰ E. They are to report their arrival there and if they are equipped with sufficient documents (mines, navigation and situation of own and enemy forces) to operate immediately N.W. of Lavansarö, Björkö and in AE 3355 right upper edge.

- 424 -

		Atlantic boats:
	b)	U 107 reports, with regard to the T5 fired at a destroyer on 19.6., that a hit was seen after 16 minutes. Destroyer therefore probably sunk. So far B.d.U. has not accepted the report, as the running tome was too long.
	c)	Japanese U-boat "Föhre" (formerly "Tanne") has been ordered not to use Piening's route, but to proceed just outside it and to avoid actions in Spanish territorial waters at all costs.
	d)	1)	The Commanding Officer of U 188, which has entered port, was captured by terrorists near Limoges while on his way to make his report. All material for his report fell into enemy hands. U-boat base Penang and U 183 were informed of this and ordered to take every precaution for U 183, as the approach route is probably compromised.
		2)	Serial Order No. 3 was radioed to all boats (Appendix 1).
		3)	New additional note to Serial Order No. 20 (Appendix 2).

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -









- 425 -

Appendix 1 to War Log of 6.7.44.

Serial Order No. 3

Capture of Secret Documents

It is of the utmost importance to capture English or American secret codes (code book) and other secret material for our own Radio Intelligence Service. The following is therefore ordered:

If there is a chance to board sinking vessels escort vessels (destroyers or corvettes) or other warships, make every effort to get these documents out of the radio room or chart house. Otherwise do all you can to get them by other means, for instance from lifeboats. U-boats must take a certain amount of risk, boarding parties must be prepared for anything.

If at all possible, individual important members of the crew of the above-mentioned ships to be taken prisoner. See also Standing War Orders Nos. 511 and 513 and the old Serial Order No. (figures illegible).

	Naval War Staff (2nd Div.) B.d.U. Op.
	Most Secret 00721/Fs.









- 426 -

Appendix 2 to War Log of 6.7.44.
New additional note to Serial Order No. 20.

According to to latest experiences of Channel boats (Type VIIc) shortest charging time for battery, contrary to "Schnorchelvorschrift" (Translator's note: Schnorchel operating instructions):

Starboard Diesel passage at 280 revs. with subsidiary charging, port Diesel charging only.

Valid only for boats without adapted spring coupling for blower. Other boats to proceed according to own experience.


















- 427 -

7.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BD 73	U 478	-	AE 84	U 543	-	DH 19	U 857	-	Op(BD 84)
	129	-	CF 33	490	-	FC 39	546	-	CF 66	858	-	Op(AK 25)
	154	-	BD 89	505	-	BF 82	547	-	ET 27	859	-	JA 23
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	516	-	Op(EC 90)	549	-	Op(EP 87)	860	-	KR 51
	183	-	LF 64	518	-	BF 81	673	-	AL 12	861	-	Op(GB 22)
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EO 11)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	EG 29
	198	-	Op(KZ 21)	534	-	Op(AK 88)	802	-	BF 57	1222	-	BE 56
	233	-	Op(BB 79)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	804	-	AL 17	1225	-	AL 23
	247	-	Op(AM 36)	539	-	Op(EB 80)	855	-	AF 55

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 745	-	AN 2920	U 994	-	Op(AF 87)
	299	-	Op(AN 31)	319	-	Op(AN 34)	771	-	Op(AN 28)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	Op(BF 28)	U 441	-	BF 2795	U 763	-	Op(BF 36)	U 971	-	Op(BF 32)
	218	-	BF 2797	672	-	BF 6759	767	-	BF 2595	988	-	BF 2592
	269	-	BF 2595	678	-	BF 2796	953	-	Op(BF 32)	1191	-	BF 2597
	390	-	Op(BF 36)	741	-	Op(BF 28)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 183 - 243 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 802 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 183 - Penang; U 745 - Bergen (Group Command "Mitte").
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a) -	b)	None.
	c)	1)	No U-boat sightings.
		2)	Enemy units located in: BF 8410 - 2920 - BD 3690 - CF 6999.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Western boats:
		1)	Owing to the appearance of enemy warships off Brest (see War Log of 6.7. paragraph IV a) 1)) F.O.I.C. Western Defences can no longer provide escort for U-boats from and to point 342 or 344, but only as far as point B 1 (immediately off Brest). Patrol position

- 428 -

			can also no longer be occupied, as heavy losses are likely to be incurred in every action with the enemy and patrol vessels are only a hindrance to coastal artillery, which is the only effective means of action against these units.
			By way of experiment, Flag Officer U-boats West has sent 2 non-Schnorchel boats to attack these units. Prospects of success are certainly small, but the attempt must be made, as there is no other means of attacking them outside the range of coastal artillery.
			If the boats are not in too much danger from air in the first operation, more will be sent. It is intended to dispose them at point 342 and 3 miles N.W. of this. Boats will lie on the bottom by day and will remain submerged, receiving on very long wave, at night. They will surface on the orders of Flag Officer U-boats West if enemy units are located, or if they themselves have hydrophone bearings.
		2)	U 441 must be presumed lost. This boat sailed on 6.6 from Brest and was to have operated in the Seine area. In spite of several calls, she has not reported since she left. On 24.6. she was ordered to return. According to dead reckoning she should have been in by now. Cause of loss is unknown. Boat may have been sunk by aircraft on the night 6/7 (compare losses of U 629 and U 740).
		3)	U 480 reported, after her return, that she had shot down a Catalina after a depth charge attack on 13.5. in AF 4995. Slight damage.
		Group Command "Mitte":
		U 745 entered Bergen.
		Group Command Baltic:
		It is intended to operate 2 boats in the area AO 3373 - 3381 - 3385 when they have been supplied with necessary navigational and mining documents, about 8.7. A third boat will remain in readiness for the present in Emsalö. Boat will be ready for operations about 9.7.
		U 475 will remain in Helsinki for the present in close contact with the 9th Defence Division and will also keep in constant touch with Flag Officer U-boats.
		Atlantic boats:
		Nothing to report.
	b -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success:
	U 480 - 1 aircraft.


- 429-

8.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BD 81	U 490	-	FD 44	U 546	-	CG 27	U 857	-	Op(BD 84
	129	-	BE 98	505	-	BF 82	547	-	ET 12	858	-	Op(AK 23)
	154	-	CE 13	516	-	Op(EC 90)	549	-	Op(EP 76)	859	-	KQ 98
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	518	-	BF 75	673	-	AL 21	860	-	KR 26
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EN 33)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	861	-	Op(GB 22)
	198	-	Op(KZ 16)	534	-	Op(AK 87)	802	-	BF 55	862	-	EG 64
	233	-	Op(BB 75)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	804	-	AK 03	1222	-	BF 64
	247	-	Op(AM 36)	539	-	Op(EB 80)	855	-	AF 51	1225	-	AL 23
	478	-	AE 87	543	-	DH 13

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)
	299	-	Op(AN 31)	319	-	Op(AN 34)	994	-	Op(AF 87)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	Op(BF 25)	U 390	-	Op(BF 36)	U 763	-	Op(BF 36)	U 971	-	Op(BF 32)
	218	-	BF 2797	672	-	BF 5826	767	-	BF 2813	988	-	BF 2813
	243	-	BF 4637	678	-	BF 2796	953	-	Op(BF 32)	1191	-	BF 2815
	269	-	BF 2812	741	-	Op(BF 25)

On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 802 - 1222.

Entered Port: U 802 - Lorient.

Sailed: U 92 - 989 - Brest.

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

A corrupt short signal was received from U 802 at 0316. Probable content: Aircraft attack in BF 6173, as she should have picked up escort at 0300 at point "Leben".

None.

U-boat sightings:

No. 19 Group:	0820	U-boat in BF 2912
	0825	U-boat in BF 2912
	1435	U-boat in unresolved position
	1445	U-boat in unresolved position, course 350⁰, 8 knots.
	1500	U-boat in unresolved position
	1529	periscope 49⁰ 27' N., longitude not resolved, course 350⁰, 4 knots.

- 430 -

	0210	U-boat diving, 49⁰ 22' N., longitude not resolved, course E., 5 knots.
	0325	U-boat in BF 2618, course E., 15 knots.

An English unit sighted a U-boat at 2225 in the sea area N. of Bayeux, course 0⁰, speed 20 knots.

One ASV location by aircraft of No. 16 Group 50⁰ 05' N., longitude not resolved.

Enemy units were located in: AL 6610 - 7843 - 3752 - AK 3939 - AM 2810 - AN 5231.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Western boats:

U 92 and U 989 sailed to attack enemy units off Brest (see War Log of 6.7. and 7.7. paragraph IV a) 1)). These boats will form Group "Räuber" and will take up attacking positions in BF 5216 center and BF 5213 center. Commanding Officers received information on the situation from 3rd Defence Division before they sailed. The boats will enter port again on 10.7.

U 218 entering Brest. Boat took 6 days to return from her operations area in BF 2430.

Group Command "Mitte": Nothing to report.

Group Command Baltic:

U 479 left Kiel, the 6th boat. From 8.7. Group Command Baltic will be subordinate to the 9th Defence Division for operations.

U 481 will be in operations area AO 3373/AO 3381 by 000/9/7. U 748 and U 1193 are moving further E.

Atlantic boats:

b) -

c) None.

because of U 853's experience in the weather reporting areas, weather boats have been warned of carrier-borne aircraft and have been ordered to dive after each report and move off submerged. (U 853 was attacked by carrier-borne aircraft in AK 85 and BD 65 after making weather reports.

- 431 -

		Afterwards a searching group).

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BD 83	U 490	-	FD 48	U 543	-	CF 89	U 857	-	Op(BD 85)
	129	-	BE 98	505	-	BF 82	546	-	CG 19	858	-	Op(AK 30)
	154	-	CE 12	516	-	Op(EC 90)	547	-	EK 74	859	-	KR 71
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	518	-	BF 55	549	-	Op(EP 72)	860	-	KR 32
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EN 33)	673	-	AE 79	861	-	Op(GB 19)
	198	-	Op(KZ 16)	534	-	Op(AK 78)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	EG 92
	233	-	Op(BB 75)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	804	-	AK 39	1222	-	BE 65
	247	-	Op(AM 36)	539	-	Op(ER 80)	855	-	AF 18	1225	-	AL 16
	478	-	AL 31

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)
	299	-	Op(AN 31))	319	-	Op(AN 34)	994	-	Op(AF 87)

	Western Boats:
	U 92	-	BF 2876	U 269	-	BF 2756	U 763	-	Op(BF 36)	U 971	-	Op(BF 32)
	212	-	Op(BF 26)	390	-	Op(BF 36)	767	-	BF 2761	988	-	BF 2761
	218	-	Op(BF 27)	672	-	BF 5541	953	-	Op(BF 32)	989	-	BF 2879
	243	-	BF 5457	678	-	BF 2878	741	-	Op(BF 26)	1191	-	BF 2756

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 518 - Lorient; U 92 - 989 - Brest.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a) -	b)	None.
	c)	1)	No U-boat sightings.
		2)	Enemy units were located in: AM 4274 - 8120 - 5760 - 2917 - 2590 - 2880.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Western boats:
		U 92 and U 989 (Group Räuber") and U 218 entered Brest, the latter after a minelaying operation.

- 432 -

Group Command "Mitte": Nothing to report.

Group Command Baltic:

U 370 left Kiel for the Gulf of Finland.

U 481 back from operations area.

U 478 sailed for her operations area AO 3355.

Atlantic boats:

U 859 reported: 5.7. at midday air attack in KZ 34, 1 man killed. No traffic encountered on passage in the Cape area. Boat requests LB and LC as operations area.

U 247 situation from North Minch:

a)	18.6. triple miss at ship of King George class with 2 destroyers, course S.
b)	5.7. AM 3682 T5 miss at "Agathe" (escort vessel). Shot missed because speed too slow. Double T1 avoided by trawler. "Noreen May" (207 GRT) sunk with flak. Finishing shot T3 failure.
c)	On 6.7. auxiliary carrier with 3 destroyers in AM 3539. Observed by aircraft at 1313.

The boat neither sighted convoys nor heard them in her hydrophones. A few small independently-routed ships. Boat has been ordered to return to W. France.

c) -

None.

Reports of Success:

U 247 - 1 ship 207 GRT.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

10.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BD 91	U 478	-	AL 35	U 543	-	CF 94	U 857	-	Op(BD 82)
	129	-	BE 96	490	-	FD 84	546	-	CF 41	858	-	Op(AK 23)
	154	-	CD 33	505	-	BF 82	547	-	EK 47	859	-	JA 27
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	516	-	Op(EC 90)	549	-	Op(EP 47)	860	-	KG 94
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EN 33)	673	-	AE 49	861	-	Op(GB 41)
	198	-	Op(KZ 16)	534	-	Op(AK 74)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	EG 99
	233	-	Op(BB 75)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	804	-	AK 91	1222	-	BE 66
	247	-	Op(AM 35	539	-	Op(EB 80)	855	-	AF 14	1225	-	AL 16

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)
	299	-	Op(AN 31)	319	-	Op(AN 34)	994	-	Op(AF 87)


- 433 -

Western Boats:
U 212	-	Op(BF 23)	U 390	-	Op(BF 36)	U 763	-	Op(BF 36)	U 953	-	Op(BF 32)
243	-	BF 5544	672	-	BF 5166	767	-	BF 2799	971	-	Op(BF 32)
269	-	BF 2899	678	-	BF 2789	953	-	Op(BF 32)	988	-	BF 2777
									1191	-	BF 2798

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 1222.
	Entered Port: - . -
	Sailed: U 863 - Horten.

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	b)	None.
	c)	1)	U-boat sightings:
			1635 U-boat in BF 5436.
			At 0045 an unidentified station broadcast that a U-boat had been sighted at 2235 in EJ 6523 (U 547?).
		2)	Enemy units were located in: AM 5350 - 3960 - 9870 - 3710 - 7590 - 2557 - 3850 - 1664 - BF 3576.
	d)	None.

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Western boats:
		1)	U 971 has been given permission to return at her discretion, as she has been 33 days at sea (operations area Channel).
		2)	The Commanding OFficers of U 92 and U 989 (Group Räuber) consider that operation of non-schnorchelling boats off Brest is promising. Therefore U 963 and U 415 will sail for the same operation on the evening of 11.7.
		3)	No reports received yet from the Channel boats ordered to return, or from U 678. Considerable anxiety is felt for U 678, as she made a passage report in the Atlantic on the same day as U 480, also for U 269 which is believed to have been bombed

- 434 -

			off Guernsey (see War Log of 18.6. paragraph IV a) 2)).
		Group Command "Mitte": Nothing to report.
		Group Command Baltic:
		U 1193 is relieving U 748 in the operations area. 2 more boats will be withdrawn from the Gulf of Finland for the training flotilla. B.d.U. has left it to the Flag Officer U-boats, to decide which boats and to issue the orders.
		Atlantic boats:
	b)	U 859 has been ordered to operate in MZ/LA W. half, as shipping will probably haul out to the south because of the S.W. monsoon. If weather is unfavorable, operation in southern half and LK northern half.
	c)	U 537 will put into Djakarta on her return passage to deliver a propeller to U 168.
	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

11.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BD 92	U 490	-	FL 12	U 546	-	CF 44	U 858	-	Op(AK 30)
	129	-	BF 74	505	-	BF 82	547	-	EJ 44	859	-	JA 26
	154	-	CD 34	516	-	Op(EC 90)	549	-	Op(EO 69)	860	-	KR 73
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	530	-	Op(EN 33)	673	-	AE 84	861	-	Op(GA)
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	534	-	Op(AK 72)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	ER 14
	198	-	Op(KZ 16)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	804	-	AK 55	863	-	AN 36
	233	-	Op(BB 75)	539	-	Op(EB 80)	855	-	AE 33	1222	-	BF 54
	247	-	AM 26	543	-	CF 91	857	-	Op(BD 52)	1225	-	AL 23
	478	-	AL 37

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)
	299	-	Op(AN 31)	319	-	Op(AN 34)	994	-	Op(AF 87)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	Op(BF 31)	U 390	-	Op(BF 31)	U 741	-	Op(BF 31)	U 953	-	Op(BF 32)
	243	-	BF 5272	672	-	BF 2785	763	-	Op(BF 36)	971	-	Op(BF 32)
	269	-	BF 5544	678	-	BF 2789	767	-	BF 2799	988	-	BF 5544
										1191	-	BF 2798

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 247 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 1222.

- 435 -

Entered Port: - . -

Sailed: U 963 - 415 Brest; U 348 - 242 - Kiel (Eastern boats).

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

At 1839 2 enemy destroyers were detected in BF 2877, course S.

Air attack on U 963 at 0425 in BF 5216.

None.

U-boat sightings:

No. 19 Group:	0711	U-boat in 59⁰ 55' N., longitude unresolved.
	1145	U-boat in 47⁰ 20' N., longitude unresolved. Cancelled at 1207.
	1350	U-boat in BF 5547.
	1513	U-boat in BF 2556, course E., speed 4 knots.
	-	Without T.O.O. U-boat in BF 5274, course 310⁰, speed 3 knots.
No. 15 Group:	0705	periscope sighted in unresolved position, 300⁰, speed 3 knots.
	0706	periscope sighted in 58⁰ 48' N., longitude not resolved, course 300⁰, speed 3 knots.
	0715	U-boat in unresolved position.

ASV locations by aircraft of No. 16 Group:

0200	in 02⁰ 44' E., latitude unresolved.
0220	in AN 9671.
0305	in AN 8812.

Enemy units were located in: AM 3550 - 2680 - 2580 - 3710 - 2714 - 2990 - BE 5750.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Western boats:

U 212 and 741 have been allocated an attack area in the Channel between the longitudes 00⁰ 35' W. and 01⁰ 30' W.

- 436 -

and are to operate against the Plymouth-Seine Bay supply traffic.

U 963 and 415 left Brest. Boats form Group "Pirat" and occupy BF 5213 left edge center and BF 5216 center as attack areas. They will enter port during the night 12/13. At 0314 they were ordered to surface, as at 0247 several enemy surface targets had been located in BF 5212, course 90⁰, speed 12-15 knots. The units made off to the west, however, and were outside the radar measuring range, and the boats were ordered to dive again at 0442.

General review of Western boats:

a)	At sea: 13 Schnorchel boats, of which 6 on return passage.
	2 non-Schnorchel boats (Group "Pirat").
b)	In harbors: 8 boats with Schnorchel, of which all will be at war readiness this month, except one, which will be ready by 4.8.
c)	6 boats fitting Schnorchel. 3 of these will be ready in July, the remaining 3 by 12.8.
d)	15 non-Schnorchel boats at 6 hours readiness, one more boat will be at war readiness on 13.7.
e)	Total strength of Western boats therefore: Schnorchel boats: 27 (of which 6 fitting)
	non-Schnorchel boats: 18.

Group Command "Mitte":

U 771 and U 317 have been ordered to return, the former to Bergen, the latter to Stavanger. They are being relieved by U 295 (Stavanger) and U 1163 (Flekkefjord). Attack areas: U 295 - AN 2386, U 1163 - AN 2865.

Group Command Baltic:

U 1193 relieved in operations area by U 481. U 242 and U 348 left Kiel, proceeding to Gulf of Finland.

Atlantic boats:

As there has been no news for some time of the boats in the Caribbean and on the north coast of Brazil, they have been reminded of the

- 437 -

			order to report the situation and position as soon as observed.
		2)	There have been several locations near the presumed location of U 247, indicating that her yesterday's situation report was D/F'd and that strong anti-submarine forces have been sent out.
	c) -	d)	None.

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

12.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BD 93	U 478	-	AL 02	U 543	-	CF 65	U 857	-	Op(BD 28)
	129	-	BF 75	490	-	FL 27	546	-	CF 49	858	-	Op(AK 25)
	154	-	CD 26	505	-	BF 82	547	-	EJ 39	859	-	JA 32
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	516	-	Op(EC 90)	549	-	Op(EO 68)	860	-	KR 55
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EN 33)	673	-	AE 83	861	-	Op(GA)
	198	-	Op(KZ 16)	534	-	Op(AK 73)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	ER 18
	233	-	Op(BB 75)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	804	-	AK 57	863	-	AN 31
	247	-	AM 25	539	-	Op(EB 80)	855	-	AE 35	1222	-	BF 58
										1225	-	AL 23

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 317	-	AN 2890	U 771	-	AN 2820
	299	-	Op(AN 31)	319	-	Op(AN 34)	994	-	Op(AF 87)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	Op(BF 32)	U 415	-	Op(BF 52)	U 763	-	Op(BF 36)	U 971	-	Op(BF 32)
	243	-	BF 2799	672	-	BF 2499	767	-	BF 2799	988	-	BF 6411
	269	-	BF 6411	678	-	BF 2797	953	-	Op(BF 32)	119	-	BF 2798
	390	-	Op(BF 36)	741	-	Op(BF 32)	963	-	Op(BF 52)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 247 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 763 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 963 - 415 - Brest.
	Sailed: - . -

II.	Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.	Reports on the Enemy:
	a)	1555 one light cruiser and 3 destroyers on varying courses in BF 2878.
	b)	None.

- 438 -

U-boat sightings:

No. 15 Group:	0830	U-boat in unresolved position (U 247?).
	0835	periscope sighted, course 275⁰, 3 knots, believed to be sea area N.W. Ireland.
No. 19 Group:	0430	U-boat probably in BF 5284, course 110⁰, speed 8 knots.
	0912	U-boat in BF 6517.
No. 18 Group:	1353	U-boat in unresolved position. The sighting aircraft was located in AF 8770.

Enemy units were located in: AE 8957 - AK 5342 - AL 9292 - AM 1970 - 1760 - 2670 - 5490.

None

IV.

Current Operations:

Western boats:

U 763 reported 24 hours off Brest. This boat sank a destroyer, torpedoed 3 ships in a convoy and probably torpedoed another destroyer. In her short radio message the boat also stated: U 984's experiences confirmed, but stronger opposition.

Group "Pirat" (U 963 and U 415) was ordered to surface at 0158 and to operate against a radar target in BF 5224 right half. Apparently nothing sighted or attacked. At 0428 Flag Officer U-boats West ordered the boats to break off and enter port.

U 309 sailed from Brest for the Seine Bay operations area.

U 269 must be presumed lost. The boat sailed from Brest on 6.6. for her operations area in the Channel. On 17.6. she had to put into St. Peter Port to charge her battery. After she had left, aircraft bomb explosions were observed from Guernsey (see War Log of 18.6). According to dead reckoning, this could have been an attack on U 269, causing her loss. On 3.7 the boat was ordered to return and should have entered port by now. Calais propaganda transmitter has given a description of the loss of this boat.

- 439 -

Group Command "Mitte":

Because the sailing of U 295 and U 1163 has been delayed U 317 and U 771 will not return until 14.7.

Group Command Baltic:

U 475 is relieving U 481 in operations area AO 3355 right top. U 679 is in operations area 3373, 3381 and 3385.

If it is necessary to relieve boats in the Gulf of Finland after about 24 hours, as they have to remain submerged on the way there and back while operating.

Atlantic boats: Nothing to report.

b) -

None.

Reports of Success:

U 763	2 destroyers torpedoed
	1 steamer torpedoed
	1 steamer 4,000 GRT sunk.

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13.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BE 71	U 490	-	FL 55	U 546	-	CF 92	U 858	-	Op(AK 30)
	129	-	BF 76	505	-	BF 82	547	-	EJ 32	859	-	KR 74
	154	-	CD 27	516	-	Op(EC 90)	673	-	AE 67	860	-	KR 37
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	530	-	Op(EN 33)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	861	-	Op(GA)
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	534	-	Op(AK 81)	804	-	AK 73	862	-	ER 46
	198	-	Op(KZ 16)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	855	-	AE 37	863	-	AN 24
	233	-	Op(BB 75)	539	-	Op(EB 80)	857	-	Op(BD 53)	1222	-	BF 61
	247	-	AM 16	543	-	CF 62	549	-	Op(EO 64)	1225	-	AL 16
	478	-	AL 02

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 317	-	Op(AN 28)	U 771	-	Op(AN 28)
	299	-	Op(AN 31)	319	-	Op(AN 34)	994	-	Op(AF 87)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	Op(BF 32)	U 672	-	BF 2556	U 763	-	BF 2786	U 971	-	Op(BF 32)
	243	-	BF 2799	678	-	BF 2797	767	-	BF 2799	988	-	BF 6178
	309	-	BF 2769	741	-	Op(BF 31)	741	-	Op(BF 32)	1191	-	BF 2798
	390	-	Op(BF 36)

	On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 247 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 1222.
	Entered Port: U 863 - Bergen.

- 440 -

Sailed: U 319 - Brest; U 300 - 1229 - Kiel; U 295 - Stavanger and U 1163 Flekkefjord (Group Command "Mitte").

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

2022	U 771 air attack in AN 2833
1625	in BF 5112 3 vessels, believed destroyers, sighted, course E.
0625	in BF 2878 9 vessels, course 25⁰ )	believed destroyers.
	in BF 2877 3 vessels, course 225⁰)

None.

U-boat sightings:

No. 18 Group:

2023

in 04⁰ 06' E, latitude not resolved, course 240⁰, 5 knots. U 771 (see also III a)).

ASV location in BF 3387 by aircraft of No. 16 Group.

Enemy units were located in: AL 9330 - AM 1670 - 1850 - 1738 - 3930 - 1876 - 0167 - 3930 0 0260 0 BC 4368.

IV.

Current Operations:

Western boats:

U 963 and U 415 (Group "Pirat") reported their experiences. While on their way out under escort the boats were attacked by 13 fighter bombers, no gunfire. Non damage. Operations on both nights against enemy units picked up and reported by shore-based radar showed that the locations were very inaccurate. The boats sighted nothing. In one case the boat herself was in the position reported as the enemy's and she saw nothing. After diving only faint circular saw heard in the distance. Return passage without incident. The Commanding Officers suspect that the targets are further west than reported by the radar stations, successes are a matter of luck. Own listening set is better than shore-based radar.

This operation will be continued, as, apart from the possibility of chance of successes, it provides a good opportunity for training

- 441 -

		the crews of non-Schnorchel boats which have been in port for a long time
	2)	U 763 reported that she would not be entering Brest until 15.7.
	3)	U 672 reported her position from BF 27.
	4)	The British radio announced the names of 51 captured German U-boat men. They belong to U 971. Nothing is known as yet of position and cause of loss.
	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 771 reported an air attack in AN 2833 at 2022. There is a Radio Intelligence report of a U-boat crash-diving at that time (see also paragraph III a) and III c)).
	Group Command Baltic:
	U 1193 and U 481 in operations areas.
	Atlantic boats:
b)	U 534 (weather boat) reports: Intend to start return passage on 20.7.
c)	None.
d)	1)	There is cause for concern about U 1222. The boat reported 48 hours off Lorient rendezvous on 11.7. and has not yet arrived there.
	2)	There have been numerous locations of enemy units and various unresolved U-boat sightings in the area of No. 15 Group during the last 3 days, indicating that a sharp anti-submarine hunt is being carried out for U 247, returning from North Minch to W. France.
	3)	Serial Order No. 21 (July 1944 issue) was radioed to all boats (see appendix).

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -






- 442 -

Serial Order No. 21
July 1944 issue
Work on torpedoes during Schnorchel passage.

In view of the peculiar pressure conditions obtained during passage with Schnorchel, the following is ordered, in order to avoid torpedo failures and trouble with torpedoes due to pressure below atmosphere or wide variations in pressure:

1)	Before loading the torpedoes into the tubes, always ventilate the depth-gear pocket at atmospheric pressure or at a normal pressure of 1013 millibars. See that the discharge tube is gas-tight after loading. During passage with Schnorchel the equalizing valve must be set at "fire".

2)	After schnorchelling, when normal pressure conditions have been re-established in the boat, set the equalizing valve at "ventilate tube".

3)	As considerable variations in pressure may be expected due to possible dipping of Schnorchel, avoid additional charging of the electric torpedo batteries, as there is danger that the battery acid may leak out.

4)	It is known that in some cases covers for the battery openings of electric torpedoes are laid loose on the opening for the purpose of independent ventilation of electric torpedoes in reserve stowage. This is forbidden, as this too may lead to the battery acid leaking and a reduction of the insulation values. In future the battery openings are to be closed tight and the electric torpedoes ventilated only by means of continuous ventilation.


		Naval War Staff (2nd Division)/B.d.U. Op.
		Secret 8483 W.











- 443 -

14.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BE 72	U 478	-	AL 55	U 546	-	CF 87	U 858	-	Op(AK 29)
	129	-	BF 81	490	-	FL 91	547	-	DT 98	859	-	KR 49
	154	-	CD 18	505	-	BF 82	549	-	Op(EO 56)	860	-	KR 36
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	516	-	Op(EC 90)	673	-	AE 68	861	-	Op(GA)
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EN 33)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	ER 81
	198	-	Op(KZ 16)	534	-	Op(AK 82)	804	-	AK 75	1222	-	BF 61
	233	-	Op(BB 75)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	855	-	AE 64	1225	-	AL 15
	247	-	AM 15	539	-	Op(EB 80)	857	-	Op(BD 59)	1229	-	AO 48
	300	-	AO 48	543	-	CF 39

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 299	-	Op(AN 31)	U 319	-	Op(AN 34)	U 944	-	Op(AF 87)
	309	-	Op(AN 23)	317	-	AN 3120	771	-	AN 2470	1163	-	Op(AN 28)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	Op(BF 32)	U 390	-	Op(BF 36)	U 741	-	Op(BF 31)	953	-	Op(BF 32)
	243	-	BF 2799	672	-	BF 2732	763	-	BF 2780	988	-	BF 6178
	309	-	BF 2796	678	-	BF 2797	767	-	BF 2790	1191	-	BF 2798

On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 247 - 505 - 543 - 547 - 673 - 1222.

Entered Port: U 763 - Brest.

Sailed: U 250 - Kiel (Baltic boat).

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

0208 U 763 air attack in BF 5221. Boat afterwards entered Brest.

Enemy sightings:

1531 in BF 5212 4 enemy destroyers, course S.

2045 in BF 5211 4 " " " course N.E.

2230 in BF 5216 4 enemy cruisers and 3 destroyers.

None.

U-boat sightings:

No. 19 Group:	1210	U-boat in BF 2555.
	1212	periscope sighted in 48⁰ 57' N., W. latitude not resolved, course 0⁰, speed 4 knots.

- 444 -

	1353	U-boat in 49⁰ 15' N., latitude not resolved.
	0230	surfaced U-boat in BF 5221, course 45⁰, 6 knots. At 0326 the same aircraft reported: Have attacked with impact fuse bombs. This is U 763 (see also paragraph III a)).

Enemy units were located in: AL 9257 - 5446 - AM 9240 - 0129 - 0250 - 3510 - BE 9362 - BF 1416.

None.

IV.

Current Operations:

Western boats:

U 741 reported 24 hours off Le Harve. She did not report why she was coming in; it is presumed that she needs repairs. As Le Harve is greatly endangered from the air and the dockyard has been severely damaged by air attacks, the boat is to go to Brest or, if this is not possible, use Boulogne as an emergency port.

Boas were informed of S-boats' experiences of convoy routes: Enemy convoys cross the channel in daylight and arrive at the invasion coast between 1400 and 1800. Main supply traffic leaves from Portsmouth. There is also daily traffic from the Thames Estuary, passing the area between Dover and Dungeness between 000 and 0300, and from the Bristol Channel, arriving in the Selsey Bill area daily between 0300 and 1000.

Cherbourg is not yet being used as a supply port for scheduled convoys.

The enemy sightings off Brest mentioned in paragraph III a) 2), which again include cruisers, lead one to suspect that the enemy is laying mines in this area. There are no clues or observations.

U 415 struck a mine in Brest harbor 50 meters outside the net barrage. The boat was grounded onto the mole opposite and capsized after about an hour. 3 men are missing, 7 others and the Flotilla Engineer of the 1st U-Flotilla are badly injured.

Route "esibär" (approach route to Brest) can no longer be used, as F.O.I.C. Western Defences cannot keep it swept owing the the appearance

- 445 -

			of enemy units and his own lack of forces. Brest boats will enter and leave via route "Eisleben" (approach route to Lorient) and from and to there will use coastal route "Harz".
		Group Command "Mitte":
		U 771 reported, concerning the air attack on 13.7: Have been attacked without result.
		Group Command Baltic:
		U 1193 reports fairly lively activity by patrol vessels in her operations area (North of Björkosund). Boat received 6 inaccurately placed depth-charges at periscope depth and on her way back was attacked by 2 fighters. No damage reported. U 679 was attacked by 3 motor torpedo boats at 0016 on her way to relieve U 1193. She observed gun hits on 2 M.T.B.s. U 679 received one hit and has 3 men slightly wounded. Boat returned to waiting position. At 0726 she reported a further attack by motor torpedo boats.
		Atlantic Boats:
	b)	U 804 reports her experience of the Iceland Passage: No air activity, only groups of patrol vessels and individual patrol boats encountered. As U 534 is returning (on 20.7.), U 804 has been ordered to occupy the S. half of AK as attack area and to report weather. Her attention was called to the probable constant patrol by carrier-borne aircraft and searching groups.
	c)	None.
	d)	1)	New approach route to Penang was radioed to all "Monsoon" boats, which repeatedly sighted aircraft in the whole of squares LO and LP 50.
		2)	U 763's short report summarized (see appendix).

V.	Reports of Success: None.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -



- 446 -

Appendix to War Log of

14.7.1944.

Summarized short report from U 763.

11.6.	left La Pallice.
18.6.	entered Brest to repair periscope. Aircraft attack while being escorted in.
20.6.	left Brest.
22.6.	1926 BF 2579, while ventilating boat with Schnorchel, aircraft sighted in periscope, Schnorchel alarm, then propeller noises increasing in strength - searching group.
	2240 T5 at destroyer, miss, enemy speed misjudged.
23.6.	0030 BF 2584 single T5 fired at approaching destroyer by hydrophone bearing, miss, range too great.
	0454 BF 2588 little moonlight, slight sea, 4 aircraft bombs while schnorchelling. Nothing observed previously in periscope. Hunted with hydrophones and depth-charges the whole day.
24.6.	BF 2589 Schnorchel alarm because of radar intercept.
25.6.	At night BF 2647 cloudless, no moon, calm sea, Schnorchel alarm because of searchlight. A few seconds later 4 aircraft bombs in the vicinity. 3 more later on and at 0408 bombs again while schnorchelling.
	During passage onward to the E. up to 29.6. Schnorchel alarm 6 times because of searchlights or bombs nearby.
29.6.	0426 reached operations area ordered (BF 2615).
	0538 2 destroyers, course W., with circular saw.
30.6.	After another Schnorchel alarm because of aircraft sighted in periscope, searching group of 4 destroyers at 1854 in BF 3622. No chance to fire, as range too great.
	1902 15 twin-engined aircraft. Alarm.
	1940 4 depth-charges nearby in BF 3622. Probably from a small motor vessel.
1.7.	BF 3289 Schnorchel alarm because of loud continuous location. 1 depth-charge a very short distance away from the boat, then propeller noises. Boat bottomed. Searching group active up above.
3.7.	Schnorchel alarm 5 times because of white lights and searchlights.
4.7.	Telemotor system out of order.
5.7.	After 3 Schnorchel alarms because of locations, search light and propeller noises, destroyer

- 447 -

	in sight at 1640 in BF 3533. Then 4 more. No chance to fire because range too great.
	1728 convoy a long way off.
	1803 L.U.T. triple fan at several overlapping ships. 1 hit after 3 minutes 42 seconds heard in hydrophones. Nothing seen because of dipping. After 40 minutes wreckage observed in periscope. Convoy formation in disorder.
	2145 T5 at freighter of 4,000 GRT. Hit heard after 6 minutes 28 seconds.
	2200 T5 at destroyer. Explosion after 10 minutes 30 seconds. Then a vessel approaching from astern and the start of a hydrophone and depth-charge hunt lasting nearly 30 hours, during which 550 depth-charges were dropped.
7.7.	Land in sight. Boat had unwittingly drifted into Spithead roads. No patrol or minefields noticed. Everything as in peacetime. Ships at anchor were in St. Helens roads. After spending 24 hours N.W. of Nab Tower, 12 of them N. of Warner Shoal, made off without being detected.
11.7.	2057 in BF 2564 destroyer in sight (belonging to a searching group of 3 destroyers with saws). L.U.T. double fan. Hit after 9 minutes 28 seconds. Nothing seen. Both torpedoes heard in hydrophones until they exploded. Cracking and sinking noises. 12 minutes later nothing further seen at periscope depth.
13.7.	Entrance report for Brest. Depth-charges and bombs, some of them well-placed, 6 more times until picked up by escort. Several Schnorchel alarms because of hydrophone bearings, searchlights and locations.

Criticism:
Patrol carried out with perseverance and determination. By comparison with earlier boats, this one encountered much stronger opposition on her way out and in her operations area. Because of navigational difficulties all fixes were inexact and the boat reached the English coast. From there she has brought valuable observations for further operations. Successes recognized: 1 steamer probably sunk; 1 probable hit on steamer; 1 hit on destroyer; 1 probable hit on destroyer. Commanding Officer will receive the German Cross in gold. Further experiences: Schnorchel definitely located, but approach and bombing at night inaccurate.

- 448 -

15.July 1944.

I.	U 107	-	BE 73	U 300	-	AO 16	U 543	-	CG 14	U 858	-	Op(AK 30)
	129	-	BF 81	490	-	FL 99	546	-	DH 21	859	-	KP 55
	154	-	CC 63	505	-	BF 82	547	-	DT 91	860	-	KG 98
	181	-	Op(LC 80)	516	-	Op(EC 90)	549	-	Op(EO 59)	861	-	Op(GA)
	196	-	Op(MS 80)	530	-	Op(EN 33)	719	-	Op(AM 50)	862	-	ER 86
	198	-	Op(KZ 16)	534	-	Op(AK 67)	804	-	AK 73	1222	-	BF 61
	233	-	Op(BB 75)	537	-	Op(LD 40)	855	-	AE 57	1229	-	AN 36
	247	-	AL 38	539	-	Op(EB 80)	857	-	Op(BD 83)

	Group Command "Mitte":
	U 286	-	Op(AN 37)	U 299	-	Op(AN 31)	U 319	-	Op(AN 34)	U 988	-	Op(AF 87)
	295	-	Op(AN 23)	317	-	AN 3120	771	-	AN 2770	1191	-	Op(AN 28)

	Western Boats:
	U 212	-	Op(BF 32)	U 390	-	Op(BF 36)	U 741	-	BF 3275	U 988	-	BF 6178
	243	-	BF 2799	672	-	BF 2554	767	-	BF 2790	1191	-	BF 2798
	309	-	BF 2733	678	-	BF 2797	953	-	Op(BF 32)

On Return Passage: U 107 - 129 - 247 - 543 - 547.

Entered Port: U 741 - Le Harve; U 771 - Bergen.

Sailed: U 1062 - Penang; U 518 - Lorient; U 621 - Brest.

II.

Air Reconnaissance: None.

III.

Reports on the Enemy:

0843	U 319 air attack in AN 3444.
1020	in BF 2877 4 destroyers sighted, course S.
0025	U 299 air attack in AN 3411.

None.

U-boat sightings:

No. 19 Group:	0925	U-boat diving in BF 2853 course 240⁰.
No. 18 Group:	0035	U-boat in AN 3414, course 270⁰, 8 knots (see paragraph III a) U 299).

Enemy units were located in: AL 3850 - AM 4839 - BF 2640.

According to a Radio Intelligence report an aircraft crashed into the sea in ED 9142, course 151⁰ (U 530 is in this area).

None.

- 449 -

IV.	Current Operations:
	a)	Western boats:
		1)	U 741 entered Le Harve. Boat got entangled in an English minesweep on 12.7. at 40 meters. Jumping wire broken, hawser in port propeller. Both periscope and Schnorchel out of action due to a collision at night on 13.7. while schnorchelling.
		2)	U 621 left Brest. In accordance with most recent experiences of boats, she is to proceed through the N. sector of the Channel.
		3)	U 243 is known to be lost. According to a British broadcast the Commanding Officer and 38 men are prisoners of war. She sailed from Bergen on 15.6. and made a weather report on 27.6. from AM 41, after she had been ordered on 17.6 to proceed to BF 22 at maximum continuous speed, as much as possible on the surface. It was intended to operate this boat in the Channel. As the Channel situation was not clear at the beginning of July, she was ordered to enter Brest on 2.7. There is no clue as to the cause and date of loss. According to dead reckoning she could not have reached the W. Channel and must therefore have been lost on passage.
		Group Command "Mitte":
		U 319 reported an air attack at 0843/15/7 in AN 3444.
		U 229 was attacked by an aircraft at 0035/16/7.
		U 317 was ordered to report her position. She should have entered port long ago.
		U 771 entered Bergen.
		Group Command Baltic:
		U 475 is in her operations area, U 250 on her way to the Gulf of Finland.
		U 679 has arrived at waiting position in AO 3265. Boat was chased by M.T.B.s until 5 miles off the entrance. 5 hits during a gun action, 8 wounded.
		Atlantic boats:
	b)	U 396 left Bergen for Trondheim to adjust T5s.
	c)	None.
	d)	U 478 and U 1225 must be presumed lost. The boats left Kiel on 20.6. and 17.6. respectively

- 450 -

		for the Atlantic via the Iceland Passage. They have not yet made passage reports and were therefore probably sunk by aircraft in the Iceland Passage. This assumption is confirmed by U 478's last report of an air attack in AF 4852. Probable dates of losses: U 478 - 30.6. and U 1225 - 23-26.6. Losses in the Iceland Passage during June and July now total 8 boats (including 5 Schnorchel boats) out of 25 on their way out. 4 further boats had to return due to damage by air attack. Of these one had to be paid off (U 998). It is assumed that these losses are due in the main to fast Mosquitoes. (Statements from captured Norwegian Mosquito pilots on the use of these aircraft in the Norway area).
		On the basis of these experiences, Serial Order No. 14 was radioed to all boats (see Appendix).

V.	Reports of Success: None.


			(Signed): GODT.
			Chief of Operations Department
			for B.d.U.








- 451 -

Serial Order No. 14

July 1944 issue

For all boats leaving home ports and the Norway area for the Atlantic:

During the last weeks enemy air patrol along the approach route has increased, especially in the areas AN 20, AF 70, 40 into AE.

Flying boats, large aircraft, carrier-borne aircraft and Mosquitoes are to be expected all the time. The latter fly with and without Radar. There is particular danger from Mosquitoes without radar as there is no warning from the Fliege or Tunis sets (Translator's note: radar interception sets). The aircraft approach at a speed of 5-600 KM per hour, so that the boat can never dive, after sighting them, in time to reach the safety depth A. This means that it is quite wrong to dive immediately when an aircraft is sighted, unless the aircraft is clearly seen to be a slow, 4-engined machine not in the immediate vicinity and not making a run-in. The following instructions are given in order to avoid this very considerable danger from Mosquitoes:

1)	Boats will proceed submerged only, using Schnorchel, from the time they part from their escort until they reach large square AL.
	a)	Look for favorable Schnorchelling conditions, i.e. darkness, fog, bad visibility, heavy sea.
	b)	Schnorchel for short periods at a time, 30-45 minutes, especially if Schnorchel has to be used in good visibility and calm sea.

2)	If for technical or other reasons Schnorchel cannot be used, charge battery as follows:
	a)	As long as there is constant daylight, vary times of charging and do it as far as possible in good visibility.
	b)	If there are only a few hours of darkness, charge during this time. But if there is known to be particularly strong air or radar activity during the hours of darkness, charge by day, contrary to Serial Order No. 13.
	c)	Flak armament ready to fire, Commanding Officer on the bridge.

3)	If it is thought that the enemy is following the boat's course, take strong evasive action. It does not matter if boats arrive several days late in their operations area. The Commanding Officer's

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	most important job is to get his boat safely through this dangerous area, where we have suffered heavy losses during the last weeks.

4)	If a carrier group crosses the sights during passage submerged, attack regardless.


		Naval War Staff (2nd Division) B.d.U. Op.
		Most Secret 01613 Fs.

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			Appendix to B.d.U.'s War Log of 1.7.1944.

Summary of the development of the torpedo arm in
operational U-boats.

Situation as of 1.7.1944.

A.	Following on the summary given in the War Log of 10.5.43 and the memoranda on T V in War Logs of 24.9.43, 1.12.43 and 1.5.44, herewith a further review of the development of the torpedo arm on operations, under the following headings:
	1)	Pistols: Pi 2 and TZ 3 (Pi 3))
	2)	FAT I and II
	3)	L.U.T.
	4)	T III a
	5)	T V with TZ5 and Pi 4
	6)	Net-passing pistols and torpedoes
	7)	Equipment of boats with torpedoes.

B.	1)	Pistols Pi 2 and TZ 3 )Pi 3):
		Pi 2 has now been used for 18 months as non-contact pistol for the G 7E. Although relatively few Pi 2 have been fired as conditions of U-boat warfare have changed, it can nevertheless be said that this pistol has continued to prove satisfactory even with the new depth settings in force since March 1943. Operational experiences permitted the following relaxations of previous operational restrictions:
		a)	August 1943: "MZ in" permitted in all weathers and at depth settings of 7 meters and below.
		b)	March 1944: "MZ in" permitted even if there had been severe explosions close to the boat, provided the testing of the gyroscope showed no defects; the gyroscope was shown to be more liable to damage than the MZ-unit of the pistol. Development of a non-contact pistol for the G7A from the Italian "Pi S1C" was begun in January 1943. It became ready for operational use in August 1943 under the designation "torpedo firing unit 3" (TZ 3) and "Pi 3". The term "torpedo firing unit", used here for the first time, is used to indicate the MZ-unit which is fixed in the head. Now only the impact pistol - Pi 3 - has to be fitted into the head on board, as hitherto, before loading into the tube.

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The same operational restrictions and depth settings apply to TZ 3 as to Pi 2. Operational experiences are similar to those with Pi 2. They are not unfavorable, but the number of operational shots fired is not enough to give a final opinion.

State of equipment:	with Pi 2 all operational boats.
	with Pi 3 about 50% of operational boats.

The reason for the lack of TZ 3 (Pi 3) lies in difficulties of production mainly due to the collapse of Italy.

In spite of considerable efforts on the part of torpedo experimental stations, it has not so far been found possible to eliminate end-of-run detonators, as so firmly demanded by B.d.U. It has not even been possible to discover fully the reasons for them, as attempts to cause artificial end-of-run detonations by sinking torpedoes in deep water have not been successful. In theory the reasons are believed to be:

a)	Firing of the impact unit when hitting the bottom;
b)	Vibration of the MZ unit when the torpedo sinks to some depth and the current fails to be switched off.

Efforts are being made in the first instance to develop a current cut-off for all MZ pistols. Until this is ready the tactical disadvantage and the uncertainty as to whether or not a hit has been made at the end of the run shown in the firing tables will continue, especially with electric torpedoes. This is particularly the case with the electric torpedo, because the end of its run cannot be fixed exactly and one has to reckon with a certain additional run at a decreasing torpedo speed, which in FAT shots, has some importance. As conditions of attack have become more difficult for the boats and firing ranges have therefore increased, boats constantly have difficulty in deciding whether or not the detonation of the torpedo means a hit, when the explosion is only heard.

App. 1. (See Serial Order No. 45, attached).

Nothing is known of any enemy countermeasure to our non-contact pistol, except a suspicion on the part of U 532 (Junker) that magnetic gear was being used, which has not so far been confirmed.

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2)	FAT I and II:
	G 7A FAT I continues to prove satisfactory.
	G 7E FAT II has also brought good results within the limits of its short run, which is not very suitable for FAT.
	In no case however has any success been achieved with the circling shot intended for use against destroyers. One of the main reasons for this is the fact FAT II has hardly been used since T V has become operational.

3)	LUT (torpedo which can be fired independent of angle on the bow).
	LUT is a development of FAT I and II. By inserting a new link in the loop mechanism the "LUT" course can be set parallel to the enemy's course in each instance, so that the torpedo can be fired from any angle on the bow. The loop pattern is in the form of a saw, the speed of advance of which can be set at between 5 and 21 knots. Consequently hitting prospects against convoys are increased. Further possibility of employment as anti-destroyer torpedo. Immediate use is only in G 7E (T III a, see paragraph 4)).
	This torpedo raises fire control difficulties. In addition to the firing angle, speed of LUT, preliminary run and supplement of the track angle must be passed to the tubes.
	LUT was first used operationally in February 1944. On 1.7.44 about 50 operational boats had been equipped. New LUT setting gear has to be fitted.
	As yet there are no operational experiences or successes.

4)	T III a:
	This torpedo is a T III with high powered battery. Its run is 7,500 meters, with FAT and LUT it is effective up to 9,000 meters.
	It became operational in February 1944.
	By 1.7.44. nearly all Atlantic and Mediterranean boats had been equipped with it.

5)	T V (Zaunkönig) with T Z and Pi 4:
	a)	TV was used:
		in the Atlantic from September 1943
		in the Mediterranean from October 1943

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in Northern Waters from January 1944

in the Black Sea from April 1944,

from the following bases, equipped with testing gear: Brest, Lorient, St. NAzaire, La Pallice, Kiel, Toulon, Pola, Narvik, Trondheim, Constanza.

Although desirable, it will not be possible to set up further fitting-out stations before the end of 1944, owing to the difficulty in obtaining the complicated testing gear.

Deliveries of TV for operations have not so far reached the required numbers. The reason is difficulties in delivery due to enemy action.

The equipment of individual boats had therefore to be temporarily reduced during February and March from 4 to 2 Zaunkönig. At present boats are being equipped on an average with 4 Zaunkönig, and in a few bases with 5.

TV successes have remained at the level of 60% hits. The torpedo has continued to fill the promise it showed after its first use in September. Details of results are:

By the end of June 1944 341 operational shots had been reported to B.d.U. of these:

175 hits and 20 probable hits = 58%
67	explained misses
44	unexplained misses
4	emergency shots
2	unexplained shots
33	failures.
The failures resolved them selves into:
17	tube runners
7	prematures
3	duds
1	tube-sticker
1	surface breaker
1	torpedo failure
3	unexplained failures.
Sunk with TV:
1	cruiser
128	destroyers and escort vessels and 23 probables
3	submarines
18	freighters
2	tankers.

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	c)	A large number of reports received since about March/April show that the enemy is making great efforts to produce countermeasures to TV. The reports speak of widely-varying types of noises observed in enemy destroyers, escort vessels, and anti-submarine vessels. The noises were described as being like a circular saw, a continuous gnawing, the rattle of a DKW engine. These are probably cases of the anti-TV towed noise-box. In the case of other noises, such as a singing-saw and humming, it is not known whether they derive from a new location gear or from a TV countermeasure. In 4 cases the TV hit, even when noises had been heard, in 3 cases it is suspected that the torpedo was diverted by a noise-box, in one further case the torpedo is believed to have been destroyed by depth-charges with shallow setting dropped into the wake.
		Further development is therefore concentrating on fitting which will avoid similar enemy countermeasures, as well as on the requirements for the new types of U-boat (170⁰ angled shot, deep shot, adjustable safety distance).

6)	Net-passing pistols and torpedoes:
	The development of torpedoes and pistols suitable for penetrating nets (pistols without lever, net cutters in the head and tail of the torpedo, slanted suspension lug) has been proceeding since the summer of 1943. By April 1944 there was a sufficient quantity of such gear available. There is no immediate need to equip all boats. Information received shows that the enemy is abandoning the use of anti-torpedo nets, mainly for reasons of seamanship. At present only boats proceeding to the Indian Ocean are being equipped with this gear, and Black Sea boats for the purpose of penetrating harbor barrages if necessary.

7)	Equipment of boats with torpedoes:
	The large number of types of torpedo available with different characteristics has made it necessary to fit boats out with several types in order for them to be equipped for many eventualities. The consequent difficulties of loading the tubes for day and night and the fresh decisions to be made by the Commanding Officer in each case have had to be accepted. It is aimed gradually to equip the boats with TV and LUT only, which means that the G 7A will become redundant. Type VII are now only carrying 10 torpedoes, for reasons of weight and stability, and Type IX only 2 upper deck containers for reasons of safety.

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			Appendix I

Serial Order No. 45.

With immediate effect the following are to be taken as guiding principles for the assessment of hits and torpedo detonations at the end of run of the G 7E calculated from firing tables:

1.	Behavior of the torpedo:
	Under the most favorable working conditions (torpedo adapted to oil-filled tail-piece, heated, battery fully charged, a full charge of air) the electric torpedo will make a run of 5,000 meters at a constant torpedo speed. This corresponds to a running time of 5 minutes 30 seconds. In addition a further run of 2,000 meters may be expected at a decreasing torpedo speed, during which the torpedo will continue to steer approximately the depth and course set. After about 8 minutes it will have made a run of 7,000 meters. The speed of the torpedo then drops quickly as the distance increases. After about 12 minutes (9,000 meters run) the control units main switch usually cease to function. In one exceptional case the torpedo was observed to run up to 17 minutes, without control, and the current failed to switch off.
	In the case of torpedoes in which the above conditions are not fulfilled, that is to say in most cases, the running times and distances cited are less.

2.	Behavior of the pistol:
	During the torpedo's run according to the firing tables, the Pi 2 (with "MZ-in") is fully effective. Over and above this non-contact firing can be expected to take place up to a running time of 7 minutes. The effective firing depth decreases however as the torpedo speed decreases.

3.	End-of-run detonators:
	In isolated cases, dependent on the condition of the torpedo, end-of-run detonations occur sooner or later and may overlap in time with possible hits. The reasons for them are not yet fully understood. They can be caused by:
	a)	Impact firing hitting the bottom;
	b)	Vibration of the MZ unit when the torpedo sinks to some depth if at the same time the current fails to switch off.

4.	Conclusions for the assessment of hits:
	From a technical point of view, under the best conditions, the electric torpedo is only fully

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	reliable up to the end of the run shown in the firing tables (5,000 meters). It has a limited use over and above this up to 7,000 meters. Above 7,000 meters (= 8 minutes running time) the torpedo has no further practical value. Under favorable conditions, therefore, there is some likelyhood that detonations which are only heard, and which occur within 7 minutes, can be regarded as hits, provided that the restrictions applicable with "MZ-in" have been observed. There is further a very slight possibility of hitting by impact firing between 7 and 8 minutes running time.

5.	When following doubtful explosions in future the following are to be given: size of target, whether loaded, depth setting, MZ-in or out, temperature of acid on firing, time of last topping-up of battery, running time, depth of water.

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Appendix 2

Serial Order No. 40.

April 1944 issue.

Equipment with torpedoes.

Each type of boat is in future to be equipped with torpedoes as follows. All previous orders are cancelled:

Atlantic:

Type VIIC	forward	3 TV, 2 FAT I, 3 T III FAT II (or 5 T IIIa FAT II)
	aft	2 TV

Type VIIC	forward	3 TV, 5 T IIIa LUT
(LUT boats)	aft	2 TV

Type VIID	forward	2 TV, 2 FAT I, 4 T III FAT II
	aft	2 TV

Type IX B and C
North Atlantic
	forward	3 TV, 3 FAT I, 4 T IIIa FAT II (or 7 T IIIa FAT II)
	aft	2 TV, 2 T III FAT II

Type IXD	forward	2 TV, 8 T III FAT II (or T IIIa FAT II)
	aft	2 TV, 2 T III FAT II
	upper deck	9 FAT I (or T I)

Type XB	aft	2 TV, 5 T III (or FAT II)

Northern Waters:

Type VIIC	forward	3 TV, 5 T III FAT II
	aft	2 TV

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Mediterranean:

Type VIIC	forward	3 TV, 5 T IIIa FAT II
	aft	2 TV

Black Sea:

Type II	forward	1 TV, 4 T III

Boats are to be equipped in accordance with paragraph 1) as far as the torpedo stocks at the base permit. They are to be given T III in lieu of types of torpedo not available.

Exceptions:

TV equipment for Northern Waters, Mediterranean and Black Sea is to be altered if necessary by the responsible Flag Officer U-boats according to the operational situation and torpedoes available.

Northern Waters boats are to be equipped with 3 FAT I forward instead of T III as soon as G 7A can be used in this area.

Upper deck equipment for Type XB will be decided separately in each case.

The equipment of Atlantic boats with 5 TV will be the subject of a Special Order.

Old "Serial Order No. 40", (issue of September 1 1943) is to be removed and destroyed.

Naval War Staff (2nd Division)/B.d.U. Op.

00816W.

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	Staff Headquarters
	Koralle, July 9, 1944

Supreme Command of the Navy

Naval War Staff 2nd Division B.d.U. Op.

Reg. No. Most Secret 310 ING.

In Commission on 1 June 1944:		443
Newly commissioned		11
Re-commissioned		1
U 188 not lost		1
		456
Losses on operations		16
Losses at home		0
Paid off (U 28, 998, 256, 382, 267, 270)		6
In commission on 1 July 1944:		434
Foreign boats: operational		2
at home		6
So far handed over to Japan		2
From training to operations (U 493, 748)		2

II.

Losses in June:

Atlantic and Indian Ocean:
Type VII:	U 241, 292, 373, 423, 629, 675, 477, 715, 740, 821, 955, 970	=	12
Type IXD2:	U 851	=	1
Northern Waters:
Type VII:	U 289, 987	=	2
Group Command "Mitte":
VII:	U 980	=	1

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Mediterranean: None	=	0
Black Sea: None	=	0
Home Waters:	=	0
For details of losses see Appendix.

III.

Distribution of Boats:

	II	VII	VIIC	VIID	VIIF	IXC	IXD1	IXD2

Operational	6	-	131	2	3	33	2	8
Trials	-	-	123	-	-	24	-	8
School	31	2	47	-	-	4	-	-

	37	2	301	2	3	61	2	16

	XB	XIV	XVII	XXI	XXIII	total	foreign

Operational	2	1	-	-	-	188	2
Trials	1	-	4	1	1	162	-
School	-	-	-	-	-	84	6

	3	1	4	1	1	434	8

During June 1944:
Boats became operational :	+	25	(+ 39)
Total number decreased by:	-	9	(- 4)
Number of operational boats increased by:	+	7	(+ 17)
Number of boats on trials decreased by:	-	13	(- 23)
Number of school boats decreased by:	-	3	(+ 1)

IV.

Distribution of operational boats on 1 July 1944:

Atlantic (including Landwirt boats)		101	(108)
Mediterranean		11	( 11)
Northern Waters:	Northern Waters operation	31	( 33)
	Group Command "Mitte"	29	( 21)
	Torpedo supply	2	( 2)
Black Sea		6	( 6)
Gulf of Finland		8	( 0)
		188	(181)

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During June in the Atlantic:

Daily average at sea:	47	( 43)
if which in operations area:	10	( 8)
on passage:	37	(35)
of these, on return passage	8	( 8)

VI.

The following sailed during June:

From home	to the Atlantic	8
	to Northern Waters	0
	to Group Command "Mitte"	16
	to Gulf of Finland	3
From France to the Atlantic		52
From Group "Mitte" to the Gulf of Finland		5

(Signed): GODT.

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Appendix 2 to Naval War Staff (2nd Division)/

B.d.U. Op. Most Secret 310 ING. S.O. only/44

U 241	First patrol. No report. Cause of loss unknown.
U 292	First patrol. No report. Cause of loss unknown.
U 373	Experienced boat. Loss due to aircraft attack in the W. Channel on 9.6.
U 423	First patrol. No report. Cause of loss unknown.
U 629	Experienced boat. No report. Cause of loss unknown.
U 675	First patrol. Last report 24.5. W of Norway. Air attack. Cause of loss unknown.
U 477	First patrol. No report. Cause of loss unknown.
U 715	First patrol. No report. Cause of loss unknown.
U 740	Second patrol. No report. Cause of loss unknown.
U 821	Second patrol. Loss on 10.6. due to aircraft attack at W. entrance to the Channel.
U 955	First patrol. Last report on 6.6. Air attack W. of Biscay. Probably lost as a result of aircraft attack.
U 970	Second patrol. Loss on 8.6. result of aircraft attack in Bay of Biscay.
U 851	First patrol. Last report on 27.3. S.E. of Newfoundland. Cause of loss unknown.
U 289	First patrol. Last report concerned carrier formation on 31.5. in Northern Waters. Cause of loss unknown.
U 987	First patrol. Last report on 31.5. Position off Westfjord. Cause of loss unknown.
U 980	First patrol. LAst report on 11.6. in Northern Waters concerning air attack. Cause of loss unknown.

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