| in, as persistent enemy air operations were resulting in heavy losses, wear and tear, without corresponding chances of success on our side. They are remaining in port to be ready for action within six hours, is necessary. |
| The question again rises in this connection whether it is better to hold a large number of boats ready for action in ports in Western France, or to send them out on operations in the Atlantic. |
| To be taken into consideration is the fact that although the danger of invasion in the Biscay area is slight, it cannot be entirely ruled out. As well as this, the possibility of an enemy attack on Brittany, where the French Resistance Movement is increasingly active and shipping movements are continually confirmed, is apparent. |
| As a result of U-boat operations in the Atlantic the following could be expected: |
| Withdrawal of enemy air and surface craft from the invasion area for protection of Atlantic convoys whose escorts were probably weakened as a result of the invasion. It is questionable, however, whether in fact such a diversion of forces would result. The enemy has at his disposal sufficient forces to be in both areas at full strength. Also, nowhere has it been shown that he has actually postponed any operations in favor of the invasion. |
| And even if the Atlantic operations had the desired effect, it is still questionable whether the deployment and chances of success would justify such an action. |
| These operations would most certainly result in heavy losses. In the case of non-schnorchellers, on the long outward passage, as well as in the waiting period of uncertain length probably necessary, owing to ignorance of enemy movements, before the finding of a worthwhile target. |
| Experience of the past year has shown the high losses and small chances of success incurred, for example, in an attack on a convoy, by a far larger number of boats. |
| In spite of this, such or similar operations would have to be undertaken if the boats were not required to repel further landing attempts. These, however, must still be reckoned with. |
| Naturally, heavy losses must also be expected in these operations. The possibility, though, of finding and attacking targets in this area is obviously greater than in the Atlantic, and above all the targets are more important. |
| Although two years ago "Norway's first line of defence lay in American waters", in other words where the bulk of the shipping was, today this maxim no longer holds good. It is more important |
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