F.d.U./B.d.U.'S War Log

16 - 30 September 1944

PG30355

     
     
 
16.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AL 26
U 275
-
 AF 76
U 546
-
 DT 13
U 863
-
 ER 16
 
154
-
 BB 99
281
-
 BE 38
547
-
 AE 87
865
-
 AE 68
 
155
-
 BF 45
285
-
 Op(AM 36)
650
-
 AE 84
867
-
 AF 87
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
196
-
 Op(AM 36)
673
-
 BF 58
871
-
 AL 24
 
180
-
 CF 79
309
-
 Op(AM 48)
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
925
-
 AL 29
 
190
-
 AL 30
382
-
 BF 49
743
-
 Op(AM 01)
953
-
 Op(AM 48)
 
195
-
 DH 16
398
-
 Op(AM 53)
758
-
 Op(BF 88)
963
-
 Op(AM 42)
 
198
-
 LF 55
437
-
 AL 32
763
-
 AE 91
979
-
 AL 28
 
218
-
 AF 71
445
-
 AE 85
764
-
 AE 83
985
-
 Op(AM 45)
 
219
-
 DG 93
480
-
 AL 33
772
-
 Op(AL 74)
989
-
 AE 85
 
228
-
 AF 47
482
-
 AM 33
802
-
 Op(BB 10)
993
-
 AF 72
 
244
-
 Op(AE 47)
484
-
 Op(AM 53)
804
-
 AE 87
1004
-
 AM 17
 
245
-
 Op(AD 89)
516
-
 AE 87
853
-
 AL 55
1062
-
 FD 87
 
247
-
 Op(BF 24)
518
-
 Op(CB 78)
855
-
 AE 87
1199
-
 AF 79
 
248
-
 Op(AM 53)
530
-
 AL 31
857
-
 AK 69
1221
-
 BC 29
 
256
-
 AL 67
534
-
 BD 34
858
-
 AF 76
1227
-
 AF 72
 
260
-
 BE 37
539
-
 AF 87
859
-
 LE 74
1223
-
 AL 16
 
262
-
 Op(BF 21)
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
861
-
 LB 81
1229
-
 Op(BA 89)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 225 - 256 - 260 - 275 - 382 - 437 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 534 - 539 - 546 - 547 - 650 - 673 - 763 - 764 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 859 - 861 - 989 - 993 - 1062 - 530.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
      According to intercept report Halifax broadcast following message:  1225 surfaced submarine in unspecified position.
    2) Enemy units located in:  AM 5240 - 9720 - 9540 - 9361 - AN 2330 - BE 1214 - BF 2670 - CE 7969 - BD 3243 - DJ 4186.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  As defence situation around English coast is at present not yet clear (North Minch, North Channel and Bristol Channel) U 296 received orders to move off or commence return passage, and report situation.
       
- 608 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    All other boats in coastal area were instructed to make every possible use of any withdrawal for sending situation report.  Reports are urgently needed in order to make a decision as to whether there is any point in throwing in further boats and whether operations close inshore can be supported.  U 285 is first boat to report return passage from North Minch on account of damage sustained in depth-charge attack.
    Situation:  Inside North Minch good chances of success, heavy patrol, depth-charges in AM 3685.  Boat is 36 hours off rendezvous point Bergen.
  c)- d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
17.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AL 33
U 275
-
 AF 76
U 546
-
 DT 11
U 863
-
 ER 27
 
154
-
 BD 99
281
-
 BE 35
547
-
 AE 83
865
-
 AE 91
 
155
-
 BE 63
285
-
 AF 79
650
-
 AE 85
867
-
 AF 67
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
296
-
 Op(AM 36)
673
-
 BF 54
871
-
 AL 25
 
180
-
 DG 33
309
-
 Op(AM 46)
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
925
-
 AL 45
 
190
-
 AL 32
382
-
 BF 45
743
-
 Op(AM 29)
953
-
 Op(AM 49)
 
195
-
 DH 18
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
758
-
 Op(BF 88)
963
-
 Op(AM 43)
 
198
-
 LF 55
437
-
 AL 32
763
-
 AE 68
979
-
 AL 25
 
218
-
 AF 72
445
-
 AE 83
764
-
 AE 91
985
-
 Op(AM 43)
 
219
-
 DH 98
480
-
 AL 34
772
-
 Op(AL 57)
989
-
 AE 86
 
228
-
 AF 71
482
-
 AM 32
802
-
 Op(BB 10)
993
-
 AF 72
 
244
-
 Op(AE 47)
484
-
 Op(AM 50)
804
-
 AE 87
1004
-
 Op(AM 17)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 32)
516
-
 AE 85
853
-
 AL 02
1062
-
 FD 76
 
247
-
 Op(BF 24)
518
-
 Op(DC 20)
855
-
 AE 84
1199
-
 AN 21
 
248
-
 Op(AM 50)
530
-
 AE 87
857
-
 AL 15
1221
-
 BC 52
 
256
-
 AL 61
534
-
 AK 95
858
-
 AE 87
1223
-
 AL 17
 
260
-
 BE 29
539
-
 AM 24
859
-
 LE 73
1227
-
 AF 71
 
262
-
 Op(BF 21)
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
861
-
 LB 91
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 228 - 256 - 260 - 275 - 285 - 382 - 437 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 546 - 547 - 650 - 673 - 763 - 764 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 859 - 861 - 989 - 993 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  (U 539 - Bergen).
  Sailed:  U 1228 - U 539 - Bergen to Flensburg.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
       
- 609 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c)  Enemy units located in:  AL 9746 - AM 5540 - 8930 - BE 6584.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Both weather boats were requested to report date of commencement of return passage.  Reply:  U 772 (southern weather boat) has just begun return passage having used up fuel reserves, weather reports as far as AL 33 inclusive.
      U 245 will probably commence return passage on 6.10.
    2) At present about 15 boats on return passage in Iceland Passage.  As, according to previous experience patrol is strengthened whenever boats are grouped together, boats were again advised to proceed with great care.
  c)  U 867 reported both diesels out of order in AF 7679.  Boat able to dive, requests tow.  Instructed to make for coast submerged and to report positions for this evening and early following morning at dawn.  Boats which are able to reach these positions are to report own position immediately and proceed thence.  So far no reports received.
  d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
18.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AL 32
U 275
-
 AN 24
U 546
-
 DG 85
U 863
-
 ER 56
 
154
-
 BB 99
281
-
 BE 32
547
-
 AE 91
865
-
 AE 91
 
155
-
 BE 62
285
-
 AN 24
650
-
 AE 86
867
-
 AF 76
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
296
-
 Op(AM 36)
673
-
 BF 46
871
-
 AL 18
 
180
-
 DG 35
309
-
 Op(AM 54)
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
925
-
 AL 44
 
190
-
 AL 32
382
-
 BF 44
743
-
 Op(AM 29)
953
-
 Op(AM 54)
 
195
-
 DG 66
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
758
-
 Op(BF 88)
963
-
 Op(AM 51)
 
198
-
 LE 50
437
-
 AE 88
763
-
 AE 69
979
-
 AL 23
 
218
-
 AF 87
445
-
 AE 83
764
-
 AE 91
985
-
 Op(AM 51)
 
219
-
 DT 15
480
-
 AL 32
772
-
 AL 02
989
-
 AE 91
 
228
-
 AF 72
482
-
 AM 32
802
-
 Op(BB 10)
993
-
 AF 76
 
244
-
 Op(AE 47)
484
-
 Op(AM 50)
804
-
 AE 85
1004
-
 Op(AM 01)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 24)
516
-
 AE 85
853
-
 AL 26
1062
-
 FD 49
 
247
-
 Op(BE 24)
518
-
 Op(DC 21)
855
-
 AE 85
1199
-
 AN 26
 
248
-
 Op(AM 50)
530
-
 AE 87
857
-
 AL 14
1221
-
 BC 49
 
256
-
 AL 28
534
-
 BD 31
858
-
 AF 47
1223
-
 AK 03
 
260
-
 BE 25
539
-
 AN 29
859
-
 LE 57
1227
-
 AF47
 
262
-
 Op(BF 21)
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
861
-
 LB 96
1228
-
 AF 87
                   
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
       
- 610 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 228 - 256 - 260 - 275 - 285 - 382 - 437 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 539 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 547 - 650 - 673 - 763 - 764 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 859 - 861 - 867 - 989 - 993 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 275 - 285 - 993 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  2107 U 667 air attack in AF 7676.
     2253 U 1228 air attack in AF 7962.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
18 Group: 2045 submarine in unspecified position (U 867).
  2251 submarine in unspecified position, course 3300, speed 15 knots (U 1228).
  2232 aircraft (NLJW) reported:  Am examining suspicious object, wake or eddy.
  2210 ASV location?  position unspecified.
19 Group: 0059 and 0102 submarine in unspecified position.
  1041 aircraft (348 W 19) probably belonging to submarine chaser unit "348" reported suspicious patch of oil in unspecified position.
    2) Enemy units located in:  AL 6141 - AM 9790 - BF 1220.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) Situation off Reykjavik from U 244:
     Boat met with only slight traffic, in 18 days only 2 small convoys in AE 4783 and 4759, and one single ship in AE 4743.  Slight sea patrol, heavy air traffic along coast and on airfield "Sandgerdi".  A number of fishing vessels in entire coastal area considerably hindered schnorchel sailing.
     Average listening conditions.  For 12 days boat
       
- 611 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     lay 4 miles northwest of "Stagi" without sighting anything.  Return passage scheduled for 23.9.  After 40 days at sea boat still has 90 cbm fuel reserve.
     In spite of the small amount of traffic U 979 will continue passage to this attack area as there are sufficient boats already in the more frequented areas such as the North Channel and Bristol Channel, and in the North Atlantic sighting possibilities would be substantially lower.
    Situation North Minch from U 296:
     Slight heavily escorted steamer traffic.  Increased defence measures with search gear and location by explosive soundings, nevertheless density layering favorable for boat.  Continuous land locations picked up on Borkum apparatus while schnorchel sailing.
     Boat fired 2 TV at destroyer and one LUT double spread at submarine chaser unit in AM 3644 and 64, all missed.  34 days submerged, return passage.
    In contrast to U 285 this boat assessed chances of success in the North Minch as slight.  This area will also remain occupied for reasons given above.
  c) U 275 the last Channel boat, and whose fate had already caused considerable anxiety, has entered Bergen.  Therefore out of the last 7 boats operating in the Channel only 2 were lost, and Channel situation appears more favorable than had been supposed.
  d) 1) U 218 and U 858 reported positions as intimation that they were going to the rescue of U 867, which had made fresh report that she lay stopped with run down battery, surfaced between 1800 and 2000 in the evening and between 0600 and 0800 in the morning.  Requested tow.  Towing however is quite out of the question on account of weather conditions and enemy air activity.  Rescue boats and U 1228 therefore received orders to take over the crew of U 867 and to sink boat.  The transfer will nevertheless be very difficult on account of weather (S.W. 6) and very heavy enemy air activity which picked up and attacked two boats (see also paragraph III a).
    2) Captain and Submarines West has arrived in Norway and taken over duties similar to previous ones, that is direction of Atlantic boats in inshore area, port distribution, docking capacity and general command.
    At the same time 11th Submarine Flotilla and all boats of Group "Mitte" placed under his command.
 
 
 
- 612 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
19.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AE 88
U 281
-
 AM 75
U 650
-
 AE 83
U 865
-
 AE 83
 
154
-
 BC 74
296
-
 AM 21
673
-
 BF 44
867
-
 AF 76
 
155
-
 BE 37
309
-
 Op(AM 54)
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
871
-
 AL 19
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
382
-
 BE 63
743
-
 Op(AM 29)
925
-
 AL 44
 
180
-
 DG 37
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
758
-
 Op(BF 88)
953
-
 Op(AM 54)
 
190
-
 AE 88
437
-
 AE 85
763
-
 AF 44
963
-
 Op(AM 51)
 
195
-
 DG 68
445
-
 AE 91
764
-
 AE 68
979
-
 AE 77
 
198
-
 LE 50
480
-
 AE 88
772
-
 AL 28
985
-
 Op(AM 51)
 
218
-
 AF 87
482
-
 AF 77
802
-
 Op(BB 18)
989
-
 AE 91
 
219
-
 DS 39
484
-
 Op(AM 53)
804
-
 AE 86
1004
-
 Op(AM 01)
 
228
-
 AN 24
516
-
 AE 83
853
-
 AL 22
1062
-
 FD 41
 
244
-
 Op(AE 47)
518
-
 Op(DC 21)
855
-
 AE 83
1199
-
 AN 26
 
245
-
 Op(AK 36)
530
-
 AE 85
857
-
 AL 21
1221
-
 BC 72
 
247
-
 Op(BF 24)
534
-
 AK 98
858
-
 AF 84
1223
-
 AK 61
 
248
-
 Op(AM 50)
539
-
 AN 35
859
-
 LE 56
1227
-
 AE 69
 
256
-
 AL 24
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
861
-
 LC 78
1228
-
 AF 7962
 
260
-
 BE 21
546
-
 DG 55
863
-
 ER 91
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
262
-
 Op(BF 21)
547
-
 AE 68            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 228 - 256 - 260 - 296 - 382 - 437 - 445 - 480 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 546 - 547 - 650 - 673 - 763 - 764 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 859 - 961 - 989 - 1062 - 482.
  Entered Port:  U 764 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) 2 submarine sightings (course 1800, speed 10 knots and course 2800, speed 6 knots) in unspecified positions.
    2) Allied units located in:  AM 9480 - 1640 - 9430 - AL 9390 - AN 5660 - 3790 - BF 6870 - BE 5161.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 859 reported entering Penang on 24.8.  On 1.9. boat sank freighter of 7,000 GRT in MQ 6249, course
       
- 613 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    900, and on 2.9. sighted carrier formation on S.W. course in MQ 93, medium speed.  No torpedoes fired as targets were out of range.  Sighted Catalina in LB 58 on 6.9. but remained unobserved.
  c) U 1228 broke off search for U 867 and made for Norwegian coast in AF 8733 (Froisfjord) on account of exhausted state of crew.  Exhaustion was probably due to break-down of schnorchel.
  d) 1) No further report received concerning rescue operation of U 867 apart from report from U 867 at 1721 from AF 7695.  Boat has either dragged itself towards the coast with remaining current in battery , or drifted with the current.  U 218 and U 858 are continuing search.  Rendezvous ordered as for 18 and 19th.
    2) After arrival in Bergen U 275 reported that it had left Channel area before receipt of orders for return passage, on account of heavy defence, and sank a passenger ship while returning to Norway in AN 7251.  Only slight air and submarine chaser activity in Iceland Passage, stronger along the Norwegian coast.
       
V. Reports of Success:  
    
U 859 1 ship 7,000 GRT
U 275 1 ship torpedoed.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
20.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AE 85
U 262
-
 Op(BF 21)
U 546
-
 DG 28
U 863
-
 ER 98
 
154
-
 BC 73
281
-
 AM 72
547
-
 AE 69
865
-
 AE 85
 
155
-
 BE 26
296
-
 AE 89
650
-
 AE 68
871
-
 AK 63
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
673
-
 BE 63
925
-
 AL 47
 
180
-
 DG 56
382
-
 BE 38
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
190
-
 AE 85
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
963
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
195
-
 DG 95
437
-
 AE 83
758
-
 Op(BF 88)
979
-
 AE 74
 
198
-
 LE 50
445
-
 AE 68
763
-
 AF 72
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
218
-
 AF 79
480
-
 AE 86
772
-
 AL 35
989
-
 AE 68
 
219
-
 DS 59
482
-
 AF 77
802
-
 Op(BB 18)
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
228
-
 AN 23
484
-
 Op(AM 53)
804
-
 AE 91
1062
-
 FC 39
 
244
-
 Op(AE 47)
516
-
 AE 68
853
-
 AE 87
1199
-
 Op(AN 16)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 38)
518
-
 Op(DC 21)
855
-
 AE 91
1221
-
 BC 74
 
247
-
 BF 16
530
-
 AE 86
857
-
 AE 79
1223
-
 AK 56
 
248
-
 Op(AM 50)
534
-
 BD 35
858
-
 AF 79
1227
-
 AE 68
 
256
-
 AL 31
539
-
 AN 44
859
-
 LE 56
1228
-
 AF 87
 
260
-
 AL 97
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
861
-
 LC 88
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 228 - 256 - 260 - 296 - 382 - 437 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 546 - 547 - 650 - 673 - 763 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 859 - 861 - 989 - 1062.
       
- 614 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  Entered Port:  U 228 - 1228 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) 1) 1421 U 1228 attacked by aircraft in AF 8733.
    2) U 534 shot down twin-engined aircraft on 27.8. in BF 9225.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) English units located in AM 7220 - 6420 - 7690 - AL 9623 - 9860.
    2) At 0950 and 1420 2 aircraft on patrol reported:  Carrying out reconnaissance of suspicious patch of oil (both positions unspecified, nevertheless close together).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) No further situation reports received from boats in American waters in spite of many requests for same.  As intercept reports also give no clue to either boats or traffic, boats have again been urgently requested for situation reports.  These are important chiefly so as to be able to station new type IXC boats in favorable area, especially as operation in the Gulf of St. Lawrence is the first for 2 years, and there is no information available concerning traffic and defence.
    2) U 247 was ordered to move away to westward and report situation in operations area around Lands End.  Boat has been at sea for 4 weeks already and still has long return passage to Norway.  If possible boat will be stationed as weather boat until fighting capacity expended.
    3) Weather report positions from U 534 in the last few days have all been in BD 20 and 30.   As boat is to make return passage to Norway, it reported on request the reason for delay:  Boat had to reduce speed on account of damage to schnorchel installation, and repairs this
       
- 615 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      necessitated (head valve leaking, starboard diesel ventilation trunk broken off, no exhaust pressure, etc.).  After leaving Bordeaux boat shot down twin-engined aircraft on 27.8. in BF 9225.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) When no further report was received from U 867 during night of 19.9. boat received orders to surface on evening of 20th and report position and intentions in the case of there being no boat in sight.  Boats to continue search from last position U 867 AF 7695 in direction of swell.  No report has been received so loss of U 867 must be reckoned with.  Search will be continued until evening of 21.9.  If nothing is found searching boats to enter port.
    2) U 1228 reported how exhausted condition of crew, which necessitated approach to Norwegian coast, came about:
      While searching for U 867 was bombed by Sunderland on 18.9. at 2255 in AF 7962.  Schnorchel sailing was no longer possible as a result of this, and heavy smoke made even when surfaced.  Greater part of crew out of action, one death as a result of carbon dioxide poisoning.  Commander decided to make for Fröysjön Fjörd.  Boat was approached 3 times by 2 aircraft in AF 7931 but was able to ward off attacks.  Fresh attack while entering fjord at 1423/20, again unsuccessful.  By evening diesels were again in working order and boat put into Bergen for repairs.
    3) From reports from boats transferred from Western France and the high day's run totals of these boats it is obvious that air patrol in the North Atlantic and Iceland Passage is only slight.  Instead the enemy has intensified patrol off the Norwegian coast.  Operational figures of 18 Group which operates mainly in this area have continuously increased and reached a peak of 54 on 20.9.
    4) The disposition of enemy forces tied down by submarines in the Atlantic shows what the single effect of tying down forces is.  The release of these forces would intensify the situation in another theatre considerably, or might already have done so.
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 616 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Estimation of enemy forces tied down by submarines in Atlantic
(Situation 1.10.44)
       
A. Enemy vessels:
    
Auxiliary aircraft carrier
50
 each crew of
400
 -
20,000
Destroyers
110
     "       "     "
150
 -
16,500
Escort destroyer/frigate
400
     "       "     "
130
 -
52,000
Corvettes
250
     "       "     "
100
 -
25,000
Submarine chasers, large
150
     "       "     "
70
 -
10,000
Submarine chasers, small
250
     "       "     "
20
 -
5,000
       
B.   Air arm including ground staff, about
120,000
  
   
 
C. Operational staffs, total
40,000
  
   
 
D. Anti-submarine defence aboard merchant ships
11,000
  
 
 
       
V. Reports of Success:  
    U 534        1 aircraft.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
21.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AE 83
U 281
-
 Op(AM 49)
U 547
-
 AF 71
U 863
-
 FC 36
 
154
-
 BC 57
296
-
 AE 86
650
-
 AF 76
865
-
 AE 87
 
155
-
 BE 22
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
673
-
 BE 62
871
-
 AK 68
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
382
-
 BE 37
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
925
-
 AL 47
 
180
-
 DG 82
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
190
-
 AE 83
437
-
 AE 91
758
-
 Op(BF 88)
963
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
195
-
 DG 88
445
-
 AF 71
763
-
 AF 75
979
-
 Op(AE 71)
 
198
-
 LE 50
480
-
 AE 83
772
-
 AL 33
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
218
-
 AF 76
482
-
 AF 75
802
-
 Op(BB 18)
989
-
 AE 93
 
219
-
 DS 83
484
-
 Op(AM 53)
804
-
 AE 67
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
244
-
 Op(AE 47)
516
-
 AE 69
853
-
 AE 87
1062
-
 FC 31
 
245
-
 Op(AK 39)
518
-
 Op(DC 21)
855
-
 AE 68
1199
-
 Op(AM 17)
 
247
-
 BF 15
530
-
 AK 93
857
-
 AE 84
1221
-
 BE 95
 
248
-
 Op(AM 50)
534
-
 AK 99
858
-
 AF 76
1223
-
 AK 81
 
256
-
 AE 79
539
-
 AO 77
859
-
 LE 52
1227
-
 AE 91
 
260
-
 AL 94
541
-
 Op(BC 10)
861
-
 LE 43
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
262
-
 Op(BF 21)
546
-
 DG 13            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 256 - 260 - 296 - 382 - 437 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 539 - 546 - 547 - 650 - 673 - 763 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 859 - 861 - 989 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 617 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)- b) None.
  c) 1) Enemy units located in:  AN 2940/2950 - 2940 - BE 1580 - DU 28/29 - AM 5420 - 3570 - 7482 - AL 9670.
    2) U-boat sighting at 0830 in unspecified position.
    3) 1 ASV location by aircraft of 18 Group at 2137 in AF 8753.
    4) Escort aircraft reported at 1910:  Am investigating suspicious patch of oil.  (position not given).
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) Following report commencement of return passage:
      U 963 from North Channel (2 groups of signal corrupt) and U 758 from Bristol Channel.  In 7 days U 758 sighted only patrol vessels and destroyer patrols, but no steamers.  Once while schnorchel sailing boat was located by vessel with circular saw (anti-T 5 device) and had searchlight used on her.
    2) After fifth request U 1223 sent passage report leaving BD 15, and U 155 on return passage to Norway from AL 92.
    3) Following have reported entering Bergen:  U 437 and U 650.  U 650 sank corvette in AE 8664.  Both boats made quick passage, possibly they were not able to schnorchel on account of bad weather and had to recharge on the surface.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) No report received from U 867 or boats going to its rescue.  Search is therefore abandoned and boats to enter port.
    2) Boats on transfer from Western France to Norway will arrive in Bergen for the greater part between 22 and 26.9.  In order to avoid a sudden concentration of messages signaling arrival, which in this heavily patrolled area would mean an additional danger for the boats, convoys will stand at assembly points at fixed times on these days, and after 2 hours will escort into port those boats which have by then arrived.
       
- 618 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    3) In the last few days a striking number of reports have been received from boats concerning serial numbers which have been missed.  It is now clear what difficulties in communication the transfer to complete "submerged passage" will incur.
       
V. Reports of Success:
    U 650        1 corvette.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 619 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix to diary of 21.9.44
       
Front experiences with active radar apparatus type Hohentwiel (Air Force development) up to 20.9.44.
       
1) Equipment situation:
          By 20.9.44 64 front boats had been equipped with Hohentwiel installation, of which 24 have been destroyed by enemy action.  At present 32 are being built in to type VII and IX boats.
       
2) Front Experiences:
          U 862 (Timm), enemy patrol from 20.5. to 9.9. 2 months of which were spent in tropical waters, reported on 17.9. from Penang.
            "Radar apparatus Hohentwiel remained in operation till end of patrol  Range against laden freighter in tropics 72 hm.  Tropical climate caused no lasting effect."
            16 other boats have employed apparatus as active warning against air attack with success.
            According to reports received so far the reliability of Hohentwiel apparatus is substantially higher than that of Gema.
            These experiences confirm the accuracy of the demand made by Admiral Commanding Submarines in March 1942 that anti-aircraft radar apparatus should be installed in submarines in place of Gema.
            This demand was supported by C-in-C Submarines and later by C-in-C Navy in the face of considerable opposition from responsible officers of Naval High Command, and was finally realized in the autumn of 1943 when installation of Hohentwiel in submarines was begun.
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 620 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
22.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AE 91
U 281
-
 Op(AM 57)
U 547
-
 AF 72
U 863
-
 FD 91
 
154
-
 BC 55
296
-
 AE 91
650
-
 AN 23
865
-
 AE 85
 
155
-
 AL 92
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
673
-
 BE 57
871
-
 AK 91
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
382
-
 BE 26
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
925
-
 AL 47
 
180
-
 DG 84
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
190
-
 AE 67
437
-
 AF 87
758
-
 AL 28
963
-
 AM 45
 
195
-
 DS 34
445
-
 AF 72
763
-
 AF 79
979
-
 Op(AE 47)
 
198
-
 LE 50
480
-
 AE 67
772
-
 AL 33
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
218
-
 AF 87
482
-
 AF 79
802
-
 Op(BB 18)
989
-
 AE 71
 
219
-
 DS 88
484
-
 Op(AM 50)
804
-
 AE 68
1062
-
 ER 86
 
244
-
 Op(AE 47)
516
-
 AF 72
853
-
 AE 85
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 68)
518
-
 Op(DC 21)
855
-
 AE 69
1221
-
 BE 97
 
247
-
 BF 14
530
-
 AE 67
857
-
 AE 85
1223
-
 BD 15
 
248
-
 Op(AM 50)
534
-
 AK 66
858
-
 AF 87
1227
-
 AE 83
 
256
-
 AE 87
539
-
 AO 74
859
-
 LE 62
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
260
-
 AL 67
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
861
-
 LE 53
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
262
-
 Op(BF 21)
546
-
 CE 79            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 256 - 260 - 296 - 382 - 437 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 547 - 650 - 673 - 758 - 763 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 859 - 861 - 963 - 989 - 1062.   
  Entered Port:  U 539 - Flensburg;  U 650 - 437 - Bergen;  U 861 - Penang.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) Colombo broadcast submarine sighting report from English steamer at 1505 in MR 4610.
    2) Enemy units located in:  AF 4560 - AL 9882 - 9792 - 9941 - BF 4995 - 2816.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 281, on passage from Western France to Norway received orders to take up station in operational area North Minch, as 8 boats are already operating in North Channel.  So far no reports have been received from these boats, while U 285 gave favorable report after entering port from operation in North Minch.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Conclusion that enemy anti-submarine patrol has been strengthened off the Norwegian coast has been confirmed by report from Fifth
       
- 621 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      "Luftflotte".  A transfer of 4 engined aircraft of 19 Group (Biscay) to submarine patrol off Bergen, and also off Trondheim and Stavanger must have taken place.  The weight of "Coastal Command" operation against submarines and convoy traffic has therefore shifted to Norwegian waters.
    2) Group East:
      New dispositions of Finnish boats:  3 boats to "Nashorn" patrol, 6 other boats off south coast of Finland in large attack area as far as Aaland Sea inclusive.  All boats apart from U 358 have passed westwards through Reval gap and area on passage to operations area.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
23.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AE 68
U 262
-
 Op(BF 21)
U 547
-
 AF 72
U 865
-
 AE 88
 
154
-
 BC 61
281
-
 Op(AM 55)
673
-
 BE 26
871
-
 BD 51
 
155
-
 AL 65
296
-
 AE 68
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
925
-
 AL 47
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
180
-
 DS 22
382
-
 AL 98
758
-
 AL 35
963
-
 AM 19
 
190
-
 AE 68
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
763
-
 AN 23
979
-
 Op(AE 47)
 
195
-
 DS 53
445
-
 AF 79
772
-
 AL 31
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
198
-
 LE 50
480
-
 AE 68
802
-
 Op(BB 18)
989
-
 AF 72
 
218
-
 AN 29
482
-
 AN 23
804
-
 AE 69
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
219
-
 EH 21
484
-
 Op(AM 50)
853
-
 AE 83
1062
-
 ER 58
 
244
-
 AE 71
516
-
 AF 76
855
-
 AF 47
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 92)
518
-
 Op(DC 14)
857
-
 AE 83
1223
-
 BC 63
 
247
-
 BE 36
530
-
 AE 68
858
-
 AN 29
1227
-
 AE 85
 
248
-
 Op(AM 50)
534
-
 AK 68
859
-
 LE 43
1221
-
 BB 88
 
256
-
 AE 85
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
863
-
 FD 47
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
260
-
 AL 64
546
-
 CE 72            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 218 - 244 - 256 - 260 - 296 - 382 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 547 - 673 - 758 - 763 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 859 - 963 - 989 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 218 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 1226 - Kiel;  U 267 - Nazaire.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  0625 U 482 air attack in AF 7687.
  b)  None.
       
- 622 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
18 Group: 0150 submarine in AF 8789, course 2600, speed 6 knots.
  0700 diving boat in AF 7923, course 1900, speed 12 knots (U 482).
    2) Enemy units located in:  AM 7550 - 5110 - 5610 - BE 9130 - 4228 - 1810 - 4477.
    3) A great number of ASV locations by aircraft along the Norwegian coast.  No submarine reports.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a) U 267 sailed from St. Nazaire.  The last boat has therefore left Western France.  U 267 which was commissioned retrospectively and fitted with improvised crew drawn from experienced base personnel, had commenced passage to Norway.
  b) - c) None.
  d) 1) All type IXC boats to put into Kristiansand south, and all type VIIC Trondheim or Bergen; IXC boats then to proceed to home waters in convoy as these boats cannot be repaired in Norwegian area owing to lack of spare parts.
    2) After joining convoy U 859 was torpedoed and sunk shortly before entering Penang.  For further details see diary of 25.9.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
24.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AE 69
U 267
-
 BF 55
U 547
-
 AF 79
U 871
-
 BD 49
 
154
-
 BC 38
281
-
 Op(AM 29)
673
-
 AL 98
925
-
 AL 47
 
155
-
 AL 39
296
-
 AE 61
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
963
-
 AL 38
 
180
-
 DS 27
382
-
 AL 91
758
-
 AL 33
979
-
 Op(AE 47)
 
190
-
 AE 89
398
-
 Op(AM 55)
763
-
 AN 24
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
195
-
 DS 58
445
-
 AL 91
772
-
 AE 87
989
-
 AN 34
 
198
-
 BE 50
480
-
 Op(AM 50)
802
-
 Op(BB 10)
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
219
-
 EH 19
482
-
 AF 76
804
-
 AF 71
1062
-
 ER 51
 
244
-
 AE 75
484
-
 Op(AM 50)
853
-
 AE 91
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 68)
516
-
 AF 87
855
-
 AF 71
1221
-
 BB 87
 
247
-
 BF 32
518
-
 Op(DC 17)
857
-
 AE 91
1223
-
 BC 64
 
248
-
 Op(AM 50)
530
-
 AE 69
858
-
 AN 31
1226
-
 AO 48
 
256
-
 AE 83
534
-
 AK 62
863
-
 FD 75
1227
-
 AE 87
 
260
-
 AL 02
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
865
-
 AE 87
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
262
-
 Op(BF 21)
546
-
 CE 45            
 
       
- 623 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 244 - 256 - 260 - 267 - 296 - 382 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 547 - 673 - 758 - 763 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 963 - 989 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) Aircraft of 15 Group reported suspicious patch of oil at 1830 in unspecified position.
    2) Enemy units located in:  AM 3680 - 9780 - BE 2165 - 3230 - 3450 - BF 1620 - 2170 - 4350.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) On account of the long absence of reports and experiences from boats in North Channel which are urgently required in order to gauge further operational possibilities, U 963 on return passage, and U 484 and U 248 the two boats which have been in the area the longest (5 1/2 and 5 weeks at sea respectively) were ordered to return and report situation at earliest possible opportunity.
    2) During the night U 248 reported position AL 3389, on return passage to Norway.  Boat attempted to penetrate North Channel on 11.9. via AM 4560 but was continuously forced off.  Reported anti-submarine units in 4530, 4963, patrol vessels in 4930 and fired curved shot which missed at destroyer in 4957 and 4951.  Schnorchel sailing at night between AM 4960 and 4420 was continuously interrupted by submarine chaser units.  All AM.  (Young commander on first patrol).
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
- 624 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
25.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AF 47
U 267
-
 BF 54
U 547
-
 AN 31
U 871
-
 BD 76
 
154
-
 BD 14
281
-
 AM 27
673
-
 AL 95
925
-
 AL 47
 
155
-
 AM 19
296
-
 AF 47
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
963
-
 AL 36
 
180
-
 DS 43
382
-
 AL 67
758
-
 AL 32
979
-
 Op(AE 47)
 
190
-
 AF 71
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
763
-
 AN 24
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
195
-
 DS 84
445
-
 AN 23
772
-
 AE 85
989
-
 AN 35
 
198
-
 LE 50
480
-
 AF 71
802
-
 Op(BB 18)
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
219
-
 EH 46
482
-
 AF 79
804
-
 AF 75
1062
-
 ER 19
 
244
-
 AE 76
484
-
 Op(AM 50)
853
-
 AE 68
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 96)
516
-
 AN 23
855
-
 AF 75
1221
-
 Op(BB 79)
 
247
-
 BE 31
518
-
 Op(DC 14)
857
-
 AE 67
1223
-
 BD 59
 
248
-
 AL 33
530
-
 AF 71
858
-
 AN 35
1226
-
 AL 32
 
256
-
 AE 91
534
-
 AK 62
863
-
 FK 33
1227
-
 AO 16
 
260
-
 AL 29
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
865
-
 AL 31
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
262
-
 Op(BF 21)
546
-
 CE 18            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 244 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 267 - 296 - 382 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 547 - 673 - 758 - 763 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 963 - 989 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 989 - Kristiansand;  U 548 - 763 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
18 Group: 1022 suspicious object, probably periscope in AF 7925.
    2) Enemy units located in:  AM 9950 - 7660 - AN 5150 - BE 3183.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) U 714 and U 262 were ordered to commence return passage from Bristol Channel as boats have been at sea four weeks already and the passage to Norway will take at least another 5.  Both boats to make situation report as soon as they are out of area.
    2) U 548 and 763 have entered Bergen after transfer passage.  U 548 sent no passage report owing to transmitter trouble.  Loss of this boat had
       
- 625 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
      already been reckoned with.  (See diary of 10.9.44).
  c)  None.
  d) Loss of U 859:
    Boat was sunk on 23.9. shortly after 0632 in position 050 50' N., 1000 10' E.  (just before entering Penang) by enemy submarine.  Torpedo hit amidships.  Boat lay at 30 meters.  A total of 20 men were rescued from bow and stern compartments.  12 of these were picked up by enemy.  8 were rescued by Japanese submarine.  Search is continuing.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
26.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AF 48
U 262
-
 Op(BF 21)
U 541
-
 Op(BB 10)
U 865
-
 AL 24
 
154
-
 BD 12
267
-
 BF 46
546
-
 CE 12
871
-
 CD 33
 
155
-
 AM 17
281
-
 AM 26
547
-
 AN 34
925
-
 AL 47
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
296
-
 AF 46
673
-
 AL 68
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
180
-
 DS 48
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
714
-
 Op(BF 22)
963
-
 AL 34
 
190
-
 AF 72
382
-
 AL 62
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
979
-
 Op(AE 47)
 
195
-
 EH 13
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
758
-
 AE 87
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
198
-
 LE 50
445
-
 AN 23
772
-
 AE 83
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
219
-
 EH 49
480
-
 AF 48
802
-
 Op(BB 18)
1062
-
 ER 13
 
244
-
 AE 84
482
-
 AN 24
804
-
 AF 76
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 99)
484
-
 AM 50
853
-
 AE 69
1221
-
 Op(BB 70)
 
247
-
 AL 99
516
-
 AN 28
855
-
 AF 76
1223
-
 BC 82
 
248
-
 AL 32
518
-
 Op(DC 14)
857
-
 AE 68
1226
-
 AL 33
 
256
-
 AE 68
530
-
 AF 72
858
-
 AN 36
1227
-
 AO 16
 
260
-
 AL 33
534
-
 AK 39
863
-
 FL 17
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 244 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 267 - 296 - 382 - 445 - 480 - 482 - 484 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 547 - 673 - 758 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 963 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  (U 1226 - Horten);  U 482 - Bergen.
  Sailed:  U 1230 - Kiel.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:  
     
  1255 Azores aircraft sighted periscope in 430
       
- 626 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
       
     
    10' N., longitude not given, course 2500, speed 5 knots (U 546?).
  1255 surfaced submarine in Halifax area sighted by English unit.
  0430 submarine sighted by American steamer in DN 6490.
    2) Enemy units located in:  AL 2973 - AM 7760 - BD 7778 - BE 2395 - 2356 - 2329 - 1970 - BF 9190 - 1133 - 2810.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) U 714, ordered to commence return passage from Bristol Channel yesterday, reported from AL 3988 already.  Found no enemy traffic in operational area, but only strong defence and continuous patrol of coastal routes by patrol vessels and destroyers, strongest during day.
  c)  None.
  d) 1) Current Order No. 10                )
    2) Experimental message No. 158)        in Appendix.
    3) Experimental message No. 160)
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 627 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
     
Appendix 1 to diary of 26.9.44
       
Current Order No. 10
issued October 1944
Defence situation in South Norwegian area
       
A. Air:
            With the surrender of the western ports enemy anti-submarine patrol is now concentrated in sea area off South Norwegian coast and in the passages to Atlantic.  Especially strong concentrations off main ports of Bergen and Trondheim.  Enemy air activity is now very strong (up to 60 machines a day) and further increase is likely.  Continuous patrol over entry to fjords and convoy assembly points.
            Anti-submarine patrol is carried out by large aircraft and Mosquitoes, and in good weather also by carrier-borne fighter-bombers and fighters.  Large and small formations (up to 50 machines) of Mosquitoes and Beaufighters carry out coastal patrol at the same time, attacking our own convoys.  The greatest danger for boats is therefore from the moment of surfacing, along the coast until making fast; keep at full anti-aircraft readiness until reaching port as attack is likely to develop at any moment.  When attacked by formation look out for favorable moment for diving.  FOr attacking tactics see Current Order No. 9.
       
B. Sea:
            Enemy air and sea superiority make it possible for him to operate as far as Norwegian coast.  Appearance of submarine chaser units in coastal foreshore must be reckoned with.  Look out for enemy submarines at entrances to fjords.  In the long-night season there is also danger from S-boats.  Keep efficient watch on the bridge, high speed, zig-zag course, radar watch.
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 628 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix 2 to diary of 26.9.44
Experimental message No. 160
       
           Experiences gained by boats operating in the Channel and inlets around England show that boats can operate successfully in shallow waters in spite of sea patrol.
       
Reasons:
a) Density layering caused by coastal tides adds to the difficulty of picking up boats by hydrophone and asdic, and makes schnorchel sailing possible under hydrophone direction-finding to to signal strength of 2, but special care must be taken to make all-round search about every 15 minutes.
b)   Ground echoes and density layering make location of boats lying on the bottom considerably more difficult.
c)   Lying on the bottom prolongs duration of submergence.
d)   Exploitation of currents makes quick, noiseless alteration of position possible.
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 629 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Appendix 3 to diary 26.9.44
Experimental message No. 158
Report from Marienfeld concerning air attack
       
           Located 2 aircraft with "Gema" range 45 and 85 hectometers.  First approach warded off at 30 hectometers with 3.7 cm., second and third at 10 and 25 hm. with 2 cm.  Aircraft was not seen, fired on by means of radar bearing.
       
Deduction:  Radar has again proved useful for aircraft warning and anti-aircraft defence.  Without optical vision an attacking aircraft could be forced to turn away by means of radar directed anti-aircraft fire and bombing attack ruined.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 630 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
27.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AF 58
U 262
-
 BF 15
U 546
-
 BD 84
U 871
-
 CD 39
 
154
-
 AK 87
267
-
 BF 42
547
-
 AN 35
925
-
 AL 47
 
155
-
 AM 15
281
-
 Op(AM 36)
673
-
 AL 65
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
296
-
 AF 48
714
-
 AL 39
963
-
 AE 87
 
180
-
 DS 75
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
979
-
 Op(AE 47)
 
190
-
 AF 75
382
-
 AL 39
758
-
 AE 85
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
195
-
 EH 19
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
772
-
 AE 83
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
198
-
 LE 50
445
-
 AN 23
802
-
 Op(BB 18)
1062
-
 EH 78
 
219
-
 EH 75
480
-
 AF 49
804
-
 AF 79
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
244
-
 AE 82
484
-
 AM 01
853
-
 AF 47
1221
-
 Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
 Op(AK 68)
516
-
 AN 31
855
-
 AF 79
1223
-
 BC 76
 
247
-
 AL 95
518
-
 Op(DC 14)
857
-
 AE 69
1226
-
 AO 16
 
248
-
 AE 87
530
-
 AF 76
858
-
 AN 36
1227
-
 AL 24
 
256
-
 AE 68
534
-
 AK 03
863
-
 FL 45
1229
-
 Op(CA 32)
 
260
-
 AL 27
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
865
-
 AL 25
1230
-
 AO 48
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 244 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 296 - 382 - 445 - 480 - 484 - 516 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 547 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 858 - 963 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 858 - 547 - Kristiansand.
  Sailed:  - . -
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c) 1) U-boat sightings:
     
0205 aircraft "348 W 9" sighted probable submarine in 550 N. (position otherwise unspecified).
0428 ASV location by aircraft "348 W 17" in 540 14' N., longitude not given.
    2) Enemy units located in:  AK 8660 - AL 3930 - AM 9730 - 0180 - 8880 - 9130 - 7250 - AN 1860 - BD 3560 - 6796 - BE 2260 - 2760 - BF 2520 - CG 8470.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 979 has commenced return passage from operations area off Reykjavik.  Radio message corrupt,
       
- 631 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    therefore as far as is known only 6,000 GRT freighter torpedoed while entering port on 22.9. in AE 4752, and one other ship sunk.  Other successes possible.  Was rammed by patrol vessel during attack, main periscope damaged.  Boat remained at 20 meters while hunted with depth-charges and asdic and was not caught.
  c)  None.
  d) Short torpedo report from U 275 gives further details concerning torpedoing of 12,000 GRT passenger ship with T 5 on 2.9. in AM 7249.  Ship turned towards the coast after explosion and two temporary halts.  (See diary of 19.9.44).
       
V. Reports of Success:
    
U 979 1 ship sunk
  1 ship torpedoed.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
28.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AF 83
U 262
-
 BF 15
U 546
-
 BE 76
U 925
-
 AL 47
 
154
-
 AK 85
267
-
 BF 41
673
-
 AL 02
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
155
-
 AM 11
281
-
 Op(AM 36)
714
-
 AL 37
963
-
 AE 85
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
296
-
 AF 49
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
979
-
 AE 76
 
180
-
 EH 12
309
-
 Op(AM 36)
758
-
 AE 83
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
190
-
 AN 28
382
-
 AL 37
772
-
 AF 67
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
195
-
 EH 46
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
802
-
 Op(BB 10)
1062
-
 EK 75
 
198
-
 LE 50
445
-
 AN 23
804
-
 AN 23
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
219
-
 EH 75
480
-
 AF 57
853
-
 AF 71
1221
-
 Op(BB 70)
 
244
-
 AE 82
484
-
 AM 17
855
-
 AN 29
1223
-
 BC 75
 
245
-
 Op(AL 81)
516
-
 AN 34
857
-
 AF 71
1226
-
 AG 16
 
247
-
 AL 67
518
-
 Op(CA/DC)
863
-
 FL 73
1227
-
 AL 25
 
248
-
 AE 85
530
-
 AF 79
865
-
 AL 18
1229
-
 Op(CA 33)
 
256
-
 AE 69
534
-
 AL 15
871
-
 CD 61
1230
-
 AO 16
 
260
-
 AL 26
541
-
 Op(BB 10)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 244 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 296 - 382 - 445 - 480 - 484 - 516 - 530 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 256 - Kiel (Group "Mitte")
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a) - b) None.
  c)  Enemy units located in:  AL 9560 - 9640 - 9488 - AM 7220 - 7610 - BE 3260 - BF 1260.
       
- 632 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 1227 detailed to CG 95.
  c)  U 219 to supply U 1062 (on return passage from Japan) at sunset in EH 7589.  Executive report to be sent during night of 2.10. if not already dispatched on 1.10.
  d)  None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
29.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 92
-
 AF 91
U 262
-
 BE 36
U 546
-
 BE 48
U 925
-
 AL 47
 
154
-
 AK 95
267
-
 BE 63
673
-
 AL 78
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
155
-
 AE 88
281
-
 Op(AM 36)
714
-
 AL 34
963
-
 AE 85
 
170
-
 Op(ET 21)
296
-
 AF 91
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
979
-
 AE 85
 
180
-
 EH 12
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
758
-
 AE 83
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
190
-
 AN 35
382
-
 AL 82
772
-
 AE 68
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
195
-
 EH 81
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
802
-
 BB 67
1062
-
 EH 72
 
198
-
 LE 50
445
-
 AN 23
804
-
 AN 23
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
219
-
 EH 81
480
-
 AF 58
853
-
 AF 75
1221
-
 Op(BB 70)
 
244
-
 AE 83
484
-
 AL 38
855
-
 AN 29
1223
-
 BC 77
 
245
-
 Op(AL 45)
516
-
 AN 35
857
-
 AF 71
1226
-
 AO 16
 
247
-
 AL 67
518
-
 Op(CA/DC)
863
-
 FL 88
1227
-
 AL 18
 
248
-
 AE 83
530
-
 AN 23
865
-
 AL 19
1229
-
 Op(CA 33)
 
256
-
 AF 47
534
-
 AL 14
871
-
 CD 67
1230
-
 AO 16
 
260
-
 AL 34
541
-
 Op(BB 10)            
 
  On Return Passage:  U 92 - 154 - 155 - 190 - 198 - 244 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 296 - 382 - 445 - 480 - 484 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  U 92 - 296 - Trondheim.
  Sailed:  U 547 - 548 - 858 - 989 - Kristiansand for the south.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)  0037 air attack on U 245 in AL 5423.
  b)  None.
  c) 1) 1915 aircraft "348 W 17" reported ASV location to Liverpool in 540 05' N., longitude not given.
       
- 633 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
    2) Enemy units located in:  AM 9880 - 9470 - 4770 - BE 3430 - 3370 - 1110 - BF 5180.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b)  U 256 was ordered to continue return passage to home waters via Bergen.
  c)  None.
  d)  Experimental message No. 162 was transmitted to all ships:
     Report from U 437:  Shadowing aircraft picked up on Hohentwiel three times and fired on by means of radar bearing.  Afterwards aircraft flew by to port at altitude of 100 meters under heavy anti-aircraft fire.  Twin-engined night fighter made inaccurate attack, presumably because of immediately returned anti-aircraft fire directed by radar.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
       
30.September 1944.
 
 
 
I.
U 154
-
 AK 67
U 262
-
 BE 35
U 546
-
 BE 42
U 925
-
 AL 47
 
155
-
 AE 85
267
-
 BE 38
673
-
 AL 72
953
-
 Op(AM 53)
 
170
-
 EK 79
281
-
 Op(AM 36)
714
-
 AL 32
963
-
 AE 85
 
180
-
 EH 14
309
-
 Op(AM 55)
743
-
 Op(AM 02)
979
-
 AE 83
 
195
-
 EH 87
382
-
 AL 58
758
-
 AE 67
985
-
 Op(AM 52)
 
190
-
 AN 35
398
-
 Op(AM 50)
772
-
 AE 69
1004
-
 Op(AM 02)
 
198
-
 LE 30
445
-
 AN 23
802
-
 BB 92
1062
-
 EH 45
 
219
-
 ER 13
480
-
 AF 58
804
-
 AN 31
1199
-
 Op(AN 17)
 
244
-
 AE 67
484
-
 AL 36
853
-
 AF 76
1221
-
 Op(BB 70)
 
245
-
 Op(AL 55)
516
-
 AN 35
855
-
 AN 34
1223
-
 BB 98
 
247
-
 AL 92
518
-
 CB 77
857
-
 AF 75
1226
-
 AO 16
 
248
-
 AE 91
530
-
 AN 28
863
-
 FS 34
1227
-
 AL 19
 
256
-
 AF 48
534
-
 AL 23
865
-
 AK 63
1229
-
 Op(BB 70)
 
260
-
 AL 32
541
-
 Op(BB 10)
871
-
 CD 94
1230
-
 AO 48
 
  On Return Passage:  U 154 - 155 - 170 - 190 - 198 - 244 - 248 - 256 - 260 - 262 - 267 - 398 - 445 - 480 - 484 - 516 - 518 - 530 - 534 - 546 - 673 - 714 - 758 - 772 - 802 - 804 - 853 - 855 - 857 - 963 - 979 - 1062.
  Entered Port:  - . -
  Sailed:  U 1226 - Horten;  U 1228 - Bergen to Hatwik.
       
II. Air Reconnaissance:  None.
       
- 634 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
III. Reports on the Enemy:
  a)- b) None
  c) 1) 1103 aircraft "348 W 28" reported to Ballykelly:  Am investigating suspicious patch of oil in 540 40' N., longitude west not given (AM 55/57 probable).
    2) Enemy units located in:  AF 8726 - 7920/76 - 80 - AL 9190 - AM 9240 - 4760 - BF 9220 - 1510 - 2380.
  d)  None.
       
IV. Current Operations:
  a)  None.
  b) 1) After yesterday's air attack U 245 reported boat again fully operational.  No location confirmed either before or during attack.
    2) U 398 reported commencement of return passage from operations area off North Channel as fuel reserves expended.  Boat sighted no traffic, but heavy air activity and anti-submarine patrol.
  c) - d) None.
       
V. Reports of Success:  None.
       
       
                                                                      (signed):  GODT.
       
                                                              Chief of Operations Division
                                                                              for B.d.U.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
- 635 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
Final Summary of Submarine Operations in Channel
       
           In the Appendix to diary of 10.8.44. the development of submarine operations against the enemy invasion fleet in the Channel was traced.  The final summary is linked up with this and closes with the loss of the western area as base for operations.
       
           Beginning of July:  Operational possibilities and fighting conditions for boats in the Seine area could be judged as thoroughly favorable from a very positive report from U 984.  This boat sank 1 frigate and 2 ships of together 15,000 GRT under slight to medium defence.  It was therefore conclusively proved to operational staff that submarines could operate in these narrow, shallow waters.  The decisive part played by the Schnorchel in achieving this was explained in the last summary.
       
           In considering the operational possibilities the periodic change from a favorable to a doubtful summing-up is striking.  Reason for this can be attributed to the insufficient information at the disposal of operational staff.  As the boats were continuously submerged and therefore could not transmit any immediate messages by radio, their reports were only received after arrival back in port, i.e. 8-14 days later.  It was therefore always possible that the impression gained from these messages had changed and new boats arriving there met with quite a different situation, that is, more difficult conditions.  A current, rough summing-up of the situation was only possible by studying intercept reports of enemy's sightings and attacks on submarines.
       
           2nd July Channel situation:  According to fresh and fairly reliable information 18 convoys run to invasion area daily (9 out and 9 back), that is 4 from the Plymouth area, 3 from the western Channel and 2 from the Thames.  Sailings are arranged so that landing beaches are reached between midday and dusk, which means that at night there is no traffic in our submarines' operational area.  The marked ways are secured by flanking destroyer patrols.  Convoy escort itself usually consists of a few M.G.B.s.
       
           In the Seine area as before inexplicably weak to medium patrol, which however might be due to the fact that enemy was perhaps expecting mines or small battle units instead of submarines.  All the same the now fairly frequent submarine sighting reports by enemy aircraft speak against this supposition.
       
           The main difficulties for the boats are still caused by the numerous submarine chaser units in the approach routes to the western Channel.  Since the beginning of the invasion they have obviously been strengthened.  In the middle of June, 3 boats one after the other, after attacking units, were forced to
 
 
 
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commence return passage having been located, hunted, damaged or practically starved; after that the order was given that these units were not to be attacked, but attempt was made to get by unnoticed under all circumstances, either by lying on the bottom or making use of available currents.  So far it is known boats have managed to reach Seine area since the issue of this order.
       
           The very great air activity was in practice not dangerous for the boats.  Many attacks were made on the Schnorchel it is true, but the bombs dropped so wide that real danger to the boat never existed.
       
6th July: Commencement of intensified sea patrol in the Bay of Biscay.  The enemy closed in slowly with cruiser and destroyer formations right up to Brest harbor and even attacked one of our submarine convoys, having first made sure that there was no counter offensive to reckon with.  The submarines remained undamaged it is true, but two of the escort vessels were sunk.
       
           This activity in the Biscay was linked up with the beginning of the land offensive at Avranches which was intended to cut off Brittany and blockade it from the sea.  It was not possible to raise the blockade on account of the complete breakdown of our Air Force and low striking power of our patrol forces.  In the course of the next few weeks the enemy advanced southward and operated off La Pallice and Bordeaux with the same unconcern as in the North.
       
           Apart from a considerable increase in the difficulty of entering and leaving port, an already dangerous undertaking for boats on account of sea and air attacks on convoys, the Biscay offensive had the effect of calling the whole submarine convoy system into question owing to the continual loss of escort vessels.  As counter-measure, convoy assembly points were moved in as far as possible to land so as to come within range of our own coastal artillery.  From a practical point of view this only had a psychological effect on the enemy, since the radar directed artillery fire considerably endangered our own convoys also.  The attacks also lead to total suspension of the patrol service and limited minesweeping of outward routes up to the 200 meter line.
       
           As the enemy moved even closer and more unconcernedly in the narrowest Biscay foreshore, we turned to the only available defence measure, the submarine, and submarines without Schnorchel at that, which were lying more or less idle waiting to have it installed.  Nevertheless only accidental success could be expected from their operations.
       
           Between 7.7. and 2.8. 8 boats operated off Brest in 16 day at sea (sea days limited by battery capacity) and 2 boats off Lorient in 4 days at sea.  As had been foreseen they were not able to make use of radar locations
 
 
 
- 637 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
   transmitted to them by radio, did not sight the enemy in a single instance and had no success.
       
           But the deterrent effect of even the slightest defence is shown by the 2 single attacks on the part of the Air Force in which 2 destroyers were sunk and one cruiser damaged.  This loss though a small one for the enemy, had the effect of making him considerably more careful in the following days and restrained him from operating so close in to the coast.  This conduct altered only after it had become clear to the enemy that these attacks were only isolated efforts.
       
7.7. - 21.7. Channel situation:
       
           In this period 5 boats which sailed one after the other for the Seine area, put back into port in the same order.  Together they sank five ships totaling 35,000 GRT, 3 destroyers and torpedoed 3 ships totaling 21,000 GRT and one destroyer, and also carried out 2 mining operations along the south coast of England.  Here the Channel operations reached an unexpected peak.  After the initial difficulties - 6 boats forced to put back into port prematurely, 2 lost according to British broadcast, satisfactory successes began to be recorded.  All boats hopefully predicted chances of success depending on the heavy concentration of traffic and therefore slight danger of being picked up.  The approach was uniformly described as very difficult, but nevertheless boats managed to get through to operational area without doing battle and undamaged by skillful out-maneuvering of submarine chaser units.  Quite different was the summing-up of defence situation in operations area itself.  3 boats reported weak, practically non-existent defence, and the 2 others very strong.  It is certain that the defence must have been very strong from a numerical point of view and the effect on a single boat entirely dependent on the luck and dexterity of its commander.
       
           Navigation is very difficult as the taking of lines of soundings is the only means of estimating position, reception of radio bearings being only possible in favorable cases.  The margin of error likely to occur by this method is shown by the operation of a boat which judged its position to be between the Cotentin peninsula and the Channel Isles and therefore made off to the northeast when it suddenly found itself in the Spithead roads close before the entrance to Portsmouth harbor.  Fortunately it was not noticed or fired upon among the peaceful traffic with riding lights set which lay at anchor there.  In spite of most exciting circumstances, as for instance while diving in front of an approaching ship when the boat touched bottom at 9 meters leaving the conning tower sticking high out of the water, boat still managed to reach the open Channel by Schnorchel sailing.  In so doing boat had to pass by a number of ships at the closest range.
 
 
 
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        This involuntary operation showed that it was possible to fight in this area, and a minelaying operation the most suitable.  The operation was prepared but never came into execution because of the general retreat from the Channel later.
       
21.7. - 1.8. Channel situation:
       
        The impression of strengthened defence in the Seine are grew steadily stronger.  2 boats had to put into Boulogne and Le Harve with considerable damage.  One of these was suddenly accurately depth-charged by destroyer while lying at depth of 60 meters on bottom, so much so that when boat had surfaced and shaken off destroyer it was found to be unfit for diving.  Loss of one boat is known from English broadcast, and also the numerous intercept reports which characterized the beginning of this period remained almost entirely absent.  These were all signs of an intensification of defence situation in the Seine area.
       
2.8:  The ever increasing seriousness of the situation in Normandy made an enemy break-through seem possible and with it cutting off of Brittany.
       
        After a break-through the land battle would be limited to defence of the Brittany bases, Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire, thereby bringing the submarine equipment and repair ships directly into the front line.  The bases would have to be held until the boats in them were ready to sail at all costs.  All supply traffic either to or from the bases would be completely out of the question.
       
        This consideration lead to the following orders:
       
1)   With immediate effect all boats putting out to sea are to take enough fuel to enable them to make return passage to Norway after operation.
2)   Boats returning from the Channel which have not enough fuel for passage to Norway, must commence return passage in sufficient time to enable them to reach Bordeaux.  (This will mean 9 boats at the moment).
3) All other boats at sea to return to Norway and not western France.
       
4.8:  The enemy achieved a break-through on the Normandy front at Avranches.  The situation developed with such rapidity that the few troops still in Brittany were forced to make a hurried retreat on the fortresses by enemy reconnaissance spearheads and terrorists.  This has caused great disorder in the fortresses which means considerable interference to dockyard working and calls into question the completion of boats and installation of schnorchel.  The incorrect, uneasy summing-up of the enemy situation by Army commands in the fortresses has given rise, as for instance in the case of the Flotilla S.O., Lorient, to the impression that a prolonged defence of the fortress is impossible, so that
 
 
 
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order was given for all boats to put to sea immediately.  Also dockyard working was suspended at short notice and workers conscripted for defence of fortress.
       
        Intervention of military High Command was necessary to straighten things out and restore normal dockyard working on completing the submarines.
       
        At St. Nazaire the conditions were similar although the enemy was considerably further off.  Here too the tense situation only quieted when the enemy made no further advances.
       
        The threat to the northern bases was greater than that to those in the south.  This fact governed the measures which were next taken.
       
1) Boats in Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire which can be completed to be got ready as soon as possible.
2) Boats which cannot be fitted with schnorchel in these ports to be transferred to La Pallice or Bordeaux (making use of this opportunity for transfer of valuable submarine personnel or specialists) and installation of schnorchel to be completed in the south.
3) Boats which cannot be fitted with schnorchel even in La Pallice or Bordeaux to be decommissioned and crew to return home for transfer to new boats.
       
        On account of breakdown in communications with Brittany, commanders and crews not yet returned from leave were ordered to report to Bordeaux, so far as they were needed for boats being got ready there.  But it later became clear that this was also impossible due to breakdown in communications caused by terrorist activities and air attacks.  Therefore many of the boats which after completion in southern docks were to have gone into operation before returning to Norway, had to commence direct return passage with reserve commanders.
       
            The transfer of these boats soon proved itself a full scale operation since the enemy, as already mentioned, blockaded the coastal routes with destroyer and cruiser formations.  An attempt to engage these formations during the transfer with 3 submarines, which sailed from Lorient in great haste because they were the only available counter-measure, was completely unsuccessful.
       
           A retrospective statement shows the heavy losses incurred during transfer.  They can be attributed to the uninterrupted attack of battle units, starvation caused by combined attack of submarine chaser units and aircraft and minelaying by aircraft which can no longer be countered.  Convoys could only wait a short while at assembly points so that they could be back in harbor by day-break.  As it was not always possible for submarines with their inaccurate methods of navigation to find the convoy immediately, they were often forced to remain a long time in the vicinity of the especially dangerous
 
 
 
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   assembly points, or to enter port out of convoy.  In many cases they put off to sea again in order to return to convoy assembly point next day.
       
   
 
Sailed on transfer
Number lost
Percentage lost

With Schnorchel
7
3
43%
Without       "
8
4
50%
       Total
15
7
47%
       
           As losses of boats with and without schnorchel counterbalanced one another it can be concluded that a considerable amount of losses were due to mines.
       
           Seen retrospectively, the transfer apart from boats in Brest was not really necessary.  But after the Americans' quick advance in Brittany it could not be foreseen that the bases would not be attacked for weeks to come.  Rather one had to suppose that the Americans would attempt to take the fortresses with all strong forces available in order to have the ports at their disposal for the unloading of urgent supplies.
       
6.8:  Captain Submarines West transferred from Angers to submarine base at La Rochelle.  The intention to keep command post at Angers as long as possible on account of the good intelligence communications had to be given up as the first enemy reconnaissance spear-heads were sighted 30 kilometers northwest of Angers.  The transfer had the advantage of placing Captain Submarines West in the midst of his troops enabling him to make quick decisions on measures affecting the submarine weapon on the spot, even though the intelligence communications grew steadily worse.  Transfer was executed on 8.8.  Captain Submarines West took over the control once more which had been temporarily assigned to Commander-in-Chief Submarines.
       
9.8:  On account of the bad equipment of the besieged fortresses in Brittany in anti-tank weapons and ammunition, Group West requested submarines to be made available for urgent supplies.  Supplies to be sent from Army H.Q. I (South Biscay ports).  Supply by submarine the only possible method.
       
           Although the submarine with its complicated installations and well-trained crew formed a good fighting weapon it makes an unsuitable transport on account of the small loading capacity, so that for the time only 4 boats were got ready.  Request for a boat to be sent to St. Malo had to be turned down on account of the shallow water and enemy situation.  Only Brest and Lorient could be considered for supplies.
       
           Loading in La Pallice progressed smoothly so that on the evening of the 12th two boats were ready to put to sea, each with 70 - 80 tons of mixed ammunition and anti-tank weapons.  They arrived in Lorient on 17th.
 
 
 
- 641 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
           In Bordeaux on the other hand there were loading difficulties for the two boats in question, U 180 and U 195.  Shortly before they were due to sail it was reported that the first was loaded with 15 tons of dynamite and 7 tons of 2 cm ammunition, also 16 tons of dead freight.  It was therefore detained since the transport of unessential and unrequested explosives for the defence of the fortresses did not justify the operation of a submarine in the present Biscay situation.  A number of enquiries on the part of Group West to operational Army commands produced the fact that there was not sufficient anti-tank material available for the defence of Bordeaux itself, and therefore supply of other bases from this area completely out of the question.  It was therefore decided to unload the two boats once more and send them on operational duty, and that no further boat was to be made available for supply so long as it was not a question of transporting vital ammunition in short supply.
       
11.8. Situation in Submarine bases:
       
           The only fortress attacked so far was Brest.  The enemy confined himself however to heavy air attacks and artillery bombardment.  The land situation in the other bases was also calm, apart from isolated air attacks.  On 12.8. and attack was made on the submarine pens in Brest with super-heavy bombs (6 tons, 7.2 meters in length).  Roof of the pen was pierced by a hole 10 meters in diameter, one hit on the dividing wall which collapsed in places above and below, one girder collapsed on the roof of the outside wall of the first pen.  The bombs themselves did not fully penetrate, their effect in the pens was slight so that no damage to submarines was caused.  At the same time attack was made on the pens in Bordeaux with 500 kg. bombs.  14 hits were scored on the roof of the pens (6.2 meters concrete + 3.2 meters steel grating), only slight damage.  Attack was renewed next day and 12 hits scored though scarcely any damage resulted.
       
           As no hits were scored on the completed part of the bunkers - top layer of steel grating, it cannot be estimated whether they would hold against the "block-busters" used here for the first time.
       
15.8. Channel situation:
       
           In this period 2 of the expected 5 submarines entered port.  They achieved the biggest successes so far, that is 6 ships sunk together 39,000 GRT and 2 torpedoed, together 13,000 GRT.  The traffic situation, general attacking conditions and chances were estimated as continuing favorable and confirm previous experience.  The very strong defence met with in the Seine area by both boats is striking, not, as up till then only in the Biscay and western Channel, and especially after attacks and firing of torpedoes.  U 309 for instance had to return after only 6 days operation in landing area on account of complete exhaustion and over-exertion of crew.
       
           With these very satisfactory successes it was simultaneously announced that 2 boats had been lost and a third forces to put into Boulogne as result of severe damage caused by depth-charges.  Once more the situation
 
 
 
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was rendered completely indeterminable for operational staff.  Successes and losses counter-balanced one another, as had been the case since their first appearance in the Seine area, retrospectively estimated.  Again command had to wait for reports from the next boats.
       
19.8:  Survey of submarine situation in the West taking into account boats which put to sea on transfer, those remaining in port, on operation or direct return passage to Norway.
       
   
Sailed on transfer
Lost
In harbor
Of which last boat ready for "op" on:
Brest
7
2
2
5.9.  
Lorient
6
5
4
10.9.    
St. Nazaire
2
-
3
26.8.  *
La Pallice
-
-
7
4.9.  
Bordeaux
-
-
-
4.9.  
      * expected back from Channel.
       
           The dockyards did excellent work in lowering these estimated target-dates.  In Lorient and St. Nazaire it was even managed to recommission ships which had already been paid off, and made them ready for transfer passage, even if only with temporary erected schnorchel or water-tight flanges on torpedo tubes.
       
           On 25.8. the last boat sailed from Bordeaux, thus removing the necessity of having to defend the port.  The destruction of installations and withdrawal of crews commenced.  The crews from La Rochelle were partly reinforced by submarine base personnel.  All other soldiers, workmen and employees, etc. totaling over 20,000 men, began return march to Germany.
       
   26.8:  The main task of Captain Submarines West, namely to prepare the boats for sea and organize defence of the western ports so far as it concerned the submarine weapon, was accomplished.  Office of the Captain Submarines West was dispersed and staff drafted back to Germany by air.  Control of last boats on passage to operations in the West was taken over by Commander-in-Chief, who, after the breakdown in whole intelligence communication system (apart from wireless telegraphy) between the bases, was able to survey the whole situation just as well.
       
28.8. Channel situation:
       
           In spite of repeated requests to the remaining 7 boats in the Seine area to send situation report at all costs, even if it meant leaving operational area, no report was received.  No clue was provided by radio intercept reports or ASV locations.  The last reports received from boats spoke of intensification of Channel situation, the B.B.C. announced losses of 2 boats by name, also an enemy report of destruction of one other boat which apparently attempted to break through the Channel at Calais in an easterly direction.  These facts gave rise to considerable misgiving as regards the existence of the boats.
 
 
 
- 643 -
 
 
     

 

     
     
 
           It was very probable that the enemy had not only strengthened his defence numerically but had also taken other defensive measures, for example the flanking of convoy routes by submarine barrages.  Judging by a report from a boat in the Bay of Biscay it is also possible he is employing other defence measures ("anti-submarine kite").  Destroyers passed overhead while boat lay at depth of 180 meters on the bottom, towing explosive.  One of the charges exploded on the boat's side and caused considerable damage.  But this is the only case of such a thing happening according to reports from boats.  (The old "anti-submarine kite" is a very dangerous weapon in shallow water).
       
           On summing-up therefore a fairly negative picture confronted operational staff:  Complete ignorance with regard to the situation, no information concerning the boats and intensified defence.
       
           For these reasons no further boats were sent to the Channel, and instead boats sailing from Biscay were detailed to the west coast of England (Bristol and North Channel) in the expectation that these areas would be less heavily defended.  The traffic situation according to the small amount of available data should be favorable.
       
           Further, the remaining boats in the Channel were ordered to commence return passage as they still had the long journey to Norway in front of them, which would take at least 4 1/2 weeks reckoned by the present low day's run.
       
          Later the situation was shown to have been a lot more favorable than it now appeared.  Of the 7 boats mentioned only 2 had been lost, the five others reported themselves again on return passage.  Together they sank 5 ships totaling 23,850 GRT, 1 destroyer and torpedoed 1 ship of 7,000 GRT, they confirmed on the other hand the considerably intensified defence situation.
       
           With this the submarine operation in the Channel was over, during which the old fighting spirit of the submarine arm had again proved itself with distinction.  A retrospective survey showed that the operation was correct contrary to all previous fears and all continually renewed doubts, and brought satisfactory successes considering the extremely difficult circumstances and the heavy though bearable losses.  They had a sharp though not decisive effect on enemy supply and thereby relieved the troops engaged in the land battle, and brought, apart from the numerous successes, important experiences and knowledge in the total field of submarine warfare, especially with regard to the new boats.  Also it tied down considerable enemy patrol and escort forces which would otherwise have been free for other duties such as interruption of our own supply traffic along the Dutch coast and in the Norwegian area, as well as for heavier air attacks generally on supply communications to the western front.
       
           The successes would have been considerably higher and the losses certainly lower, if the boats had been capable of greater submerged speed and longer operational radius submerged.  As the new types were designed for these
 
 
 
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characteristics above all others, high hopes for the future are justified.
       
        The effect of the schnorchel was certainly decisive, and operation in the Channel without it would have been quite out of the question.  Only a few months ago it would have seemed impossible that a boat could operate for 42 days without breaking surface once.  Only by means of the schnorchel was it possible to operate close to the English coast again and to bridge the intervening gap between the operation of the new and old types of boats.
       
Total successes:
       
Sunk: 12 destroyers and corvettes
  20 ships totaling 112,800 GRT.
Torpedoed: 1 destroyer
  7 ships totaling 44,100 GRT
   
  3 minelaying operations
       
Degree of efficiency:
a) Reckoning according to number of boats operating :
       
   
Boats
Losses
Losses %
Units sunk
Degree of efficiency per boat lost and units sunk
Total operating
30
20
66.6
32
1.6
Without home boats
24
14
58.3
32
2.3
       
b)   Reckoning according to operations executed by above mentioned boats:
       
   
Boats
Losses
Losses %
Units sunk
Degree of efficiency per boat lost and units sunk
Inc. home boats and abortive operations
45
20
44.4
32
0.7
Exc. home boats and without abortive operations
33
14
42.2
30
0.9
       
Final Survey:
    
           The west is no longer available as a base for operations.  Its place has been taken by Norway and one or two ports in home waters, since those in the former were not sufficient.  The operational possibilities are therefore limited.  The IXC boats can no longer operate in the Caribbean and along the Gold Coast without refueling.  For these the Newfoundland area and American coast are of increased importance.  The St. Lawrence River can be added to
 
 
 
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   these, as it can be sailed again with schnorchel boats.  Operation of type VIIC in the Channel will as a rule no longer be possible, as the outward and return passages alone last 7 - 9 weeks, and by that time as far as one can see the boats would no longer be in a condition to operate in such a difficult area.  For these therefore, there only remains the coastal waters around England such as the Moray Firth, Minch, and North Channel, as well as waters off Reykjavik.  
       
           With regard to enemy defence, it can be expected without the least doubt that it will be concentrated in Norway, the Atlantic passages, the North Sea and Baltic approaches.  Theoretically it is possible for the enemy to set up such a thick patrol veil that the old boats which have to schnorchel-sail comparatively often would be bound to be picked up sooner or later and then have to bear concentrated attack.
       
           The loss of the West would have been of decisive importance had the submarine war to be carried on with same types of boats as before.  But a very great under-water range, high submerged speed and great diving-depth will enable the new type XXI boats to break through to the Atlantic in spite of concentrated defensive patrols, and to operate with success in the North Atlantic and other very distant areas.
       
   
Mid-Channel Operations
         
Lost   Reached operations area   Successes
* 269   *764   Sunk:
971 Z *984   9 destroyers and patrol vessels
        7 ships totaling 42,000 GRT.
678   *621    
243   *763    
        Torpedoed:
988 F     2 destroyers and 1 probable
        2 ships totaling 13,000 GRT.
         
*441   *741    
1191   671    
767   *953    
*390        
9
   7
=
 16 boats in all
       
*
=
 Sailed from west coast of  France
0
=
 Sailed from home ports    
Z
=
 By destroyer    
F
=
 By aircraft.    
 
 
 
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Submarine operations in invasion area and area in danger of being invaded
       
           See appendix to War Diary of 10th August 1944.
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
 
 
 
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
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