EASTERN SEA FRONTIER

WAR DIARY

APRIL 1942

CHAPTER III

THE CONVOY SYSTEM

        Throughout April preparations for the coastal convoy system were carried forward by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier in accordance with the directive issued on the 3rd of the month by the Commander-in-Chief. Escort groups were organized, schedules drawn up and the machinery of administration constructed. But all these preparations were simply the preliminaries for a means of protection which could not possibly, because of the limited number of forces available, be introduced before the middle of May. It was, therefore, necessary, in view of the continued high rate of sinkings, to provide immediate defense against the submarines by supplementary methods.

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ships now sailing independently between Lookout and the Chesapeake should be formed into convoys. The proposed system would work as follows: merchant vessels would put into Lookout at night. Ordinarily between twelve and twenty vessels would seek refuge in the anchorage which, pending the laying of a proposed mine field, is now guarded by ships equipped with listening gear, depth charges and guns.

        In the early morning the merchantmen would form up together, four ships to a column. Convoy doctrine requires that there should be 600 yards between ships and 1000 yards between columns. Those vessels unable to maintain nine knots or capable of more than thirteen would sail independently. Escort would be provided by one slow ship that would lead the convoy and by three fast ones that would patrol to seaward and in rear of the convoy. Whenever a destroyer was available it would be added to the escort force.

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introduce the convoy system as proposed by CESF because neither ships nor men were available in sufficient number to implement the plan.

        It was necessary for CESF in this month to improvise methods for the protection of shipping in the northern as well as the southern extremity of the Frontier. On April 23rd he drew up plans for a coastal convoy from Boston to Halifax and Sydney. Such a convoy provided many complications since it served as the middle link in a chain of shipping extending from our southern coastal waters to the open seas of the North Atlantic. In addition, at the northern end control would have to pass from our hands into those of the British. It was, therefore, necessary to devise some system that would integrate the activities of two different navys and fit together the sailing schedules of our coastal convoys with those of the North Atlantic.

	(a)	Assemble, equip and organize the convoy in New York, except for those vessels that load and sail from Boston. The latter will join the convoy at the rendezvous with the escort.
	(b)	Hold a pre-sailing conference in New York. As the escorts base at Boston, Massachusetts, the escort Commander will not ordinarily be present

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		at the pre-sailing conference. The Port Director, New York, will inform the Port Director, Boston, for passing on to the escort Commander and to the masters of ships joining the convoy from Boston, of any decisions reached of which they should have knowledge. (If practicable, a representative of the Port Director, Boston, should be present at the pre-sailing conference.)
	(c)	Route shipping as independent units to the rendezvous where the convoy is to be formed and where the escort joins the convoy. Ordinarily the rendezvous will be in Cape Cod Bay. Shipping that can transit the Cape Cod Canal will be routed via Long Island Sound and Buzzards Bay.
	(d)	Route the convoy under directives issued by the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
	(e)	Furnish the Commandant, First Naval District with essential information.

        The Commandant, First Naval District, or his designated representative, will:

	(a)	Equip and issue the necessary orders and instructions to the escort Commander and the masters of those ships joining the convoy direct from Boston.
	(b)	Exercise the control of shipping from and after it reaches the northern half of Buzzards Bay.
	(c)	Arrange for the transit of shipping through the Cape Cod Canal.
	(d)	Arrange for services to the escorts.
	(e)	Arrange with the British Liaison Officer for placing aboard of the Commodore's ship any British stores and signalmen that will be required. Information thereon will be furnished by the Port Director, New York, prior to the sailing of the convoy ship.

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in a consideration of the two convoy systems described above. Perhaps a clearer impression can be gained by following the fortunes of a single vessel from the Gulf of Mexico to Halifax. No ship, in all probability, would proceed in exactly the fashion described below, but such a voyage is at least possible and indicates the variety of methods of protection that have been devised. A tanker from the Gulf would receive her routing instructions from the Port Director at the port of departure. She would sail through the Florida Straits and thence up the coast, passing as close inshore as safe navigation permitted. By day she would follow shipping lanes patrolled by land based aircraft and by surface vessels; by night she would lie over in patrolled or protected anchorages. Her first stop for the night might well be Charleston whence she would proceed to Cape Lookout. Thus far she would have traveled independently, but at Lookout she would join the convoy that would protect her on the trip to the Chesapeake. From the Chesapeake she would make a daylight run to the Delaware. From here, if of limited draft, she might take advantage of the inland waterway to New York but a larger vessel would in all probability join another convoy from Delaware to New York.

        At New York the ship would probably lie over for a day or two while vessels for the northern convoy assembled. On the evening of departure there would be a pre-sailing conference between the various masters before their ships set off independently next day through the Sound, Buzzards Bay and the Cape Cod Canal for the rendezvous in Cape Cod Bay. Here they would form up in convoy under British escort and proceed to Halifax under British

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and American air coverage. From Halifax the ship might possibly join an eastbound Atlantic convoy on the way to Europe.

        Under this system of patrolled anchorages, broken voyages, short convoys through endangered areas, and independent daylight sailings along shipping routes patrolled by surface craft and covered by airplanes, as increasingly strong system of protection was built up for the merchant shipping along our coast. But all these measures of defense were supplementary to the convoy system from Hampton Roads to Key West, which, as Cominch had directed on April 3rd, should begin on May 15th. Two days before the end of this month, on April 29th, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier presented Cominch with a set of proposals governing the operation of this convoy system.

        Five escort groups were formed from the available strength consisting of nine destroyers, five corvettes, nine PC's, two gunboats and ten trawlers. Eighteen small vessels were set a side as a reserve pool. These vessels drained off most of the existing surface craft in the Frontier. It was the opinion of Commander Eastern Sea Frontier that with the forces available it would be impossible to insure adequate protection for vessels traveling in convoy and also to perform such other tasks as rescue and offensive action against the submarines. He, therefore, recommended that the proposed date for the introduction of the convoy system be delayed until such time as the strength of the Frontier forces had increased to such an extent that adequate protection for ships traveling in convoy could be assured.

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and ship convoys around dangerous areas to the waters south of Hampton Roads.

        Specifically it was suggested that ships leaving from the Florida Straits should go up the coast as far as Jacksonville or Fernandina where they would lie over for the night. On the following day they would proceed to Charleston, on the day after to Cape Fear and on the day following that to Hatteras. Most of these voyages would be taken independently during daylight, but in particularly dangerous areas short convoys could be instituted.

        This recommendation was in reality, another attempt to solve the familiar problem: How to make the best use possible of the limited forces available. The difficulties of instituting the convoy system before sufficient escort vessels were on hand lay in the fact that inadequately protected convoys presented large, attractive and ill-defended targets. To obviate this CESF at the end of April recommended the delay in the introduction of the convoy system until such time as our increased strength could give us the assurance of protection for our convoyed vessels. The security provided by his proposal to extend the defense system south of Hatteras was admittedly less than that which could be obtained from an adequately escorted convoy, but by the same token the dangers inherent in the broken daylight voyages and the protected anchorages were far less than those to be expected in an inadequately protected convoy.

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