EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
APRIL 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER VII
  
 
 
 
MERCHANTMEN AND TANKERS
  
     
 
        This month added new paragraphs of resourcefulness, patience, endurance and heroism to the great survivors' story begun three months ago. Ships went down and lives were lost but other ships and men took their places to keep the cargoes moving up and down the coast. Throughout the weeks just passed old methods of protection were strengthened and new ones were devised to defend the merchant vessels against the submarine.
  
     
          A variety of minor difficulties complicated the work of making the system of protection completely effective. These difficulties were set forth in a letter written by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier to Com 3 on April 24th. Ships did not always sail at scheduled times; frequently notices of departure were not sent out until many hours after actual sailings; vessels did not always adhere to the routing furnished by the Port Directors; inaccurate reports of arrival and departure were occasionally received. All these errors and oversights complicated the work of protecting ships with forces already insufficient to insure adequate coverage for the shipping lanes.  
 
 
          Another cause of losses is best described by an examination of the sinking of the S. S. ULYSSES, on April 11th. This British ship had originally been routed from Panama via the Yucatan Channel and the Florida Straits to Halifax. In the Florida Straits the UYLSSES collided with another  
     
 
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ship and was slightly damaged. Because of this she was given a new route to Halifax by the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic and West Indies. These instructions the Master of ULYSSES disobeyed, proceeding straight up the coast towards Norfolk. In so doing he took his vessel right into the most dangerous area in the Frontier where she was attacked and sunk. Neither Commander Eastern Sea Frontier nor the Director in New York were informed of the original routing instructions given the ship in Panama. The British Routing Officer in Norfolk was told on April 8th that the ship was on its way up the coast, but he received no definite information about positions and times. No one at Headquarters Eastern Sea Frontier knew where the ship was after the Master had disregarded the routing instructions given him by the British Commander-in-Chief. Had Commander Eastern Sea Frontier been informed protection for the injured vessel could have been sent and the sinking quite probably prevented.
  
     
 
        The whole incident demonstrates the necessity for close cooperation among allies, for the prompt exchange of information between authorities, for exact obedience to routing instructions. Incidents of this sort were perhaps unusual, but they occurred often enough to emphasize the need for constant attention to the prescribed methods.
  
     
          To encourage such attention and to assist the merchant seamen in adapting themselves to the trying conditions under which they worked Commander Eastern Sea Frontier began in this month to send out memoranda to the Masters of Merchant Vessels. The first was distributed on April 10th. It paid tribute to the courage and skill of masters and skill of masters and crew and gave to  
     
 
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them the assurance that "immediate assistance will be sent with dispatch" in the event of enemy attack. It also contained a list of important regulations to be observed in the safeguarding of merchant ships. Masters were asked to follow closely the routing instructions, to zigzag day and night, to keep radios at 500 kilocycles in order to receive changes in routing as soon as possible, to traverse dangerous areas at daylight, to keep their ships darkened at night and to keep lookouts alert at all times. To these precautions was added information on the habits of the submarines and measures to be taken in the event of torpedoing.
  
     
 
        Subsequent memoranda during the month dealt with the need for shutting down engines before abandoning ship, for silence about ship movements in bars and public places, for having all lifeboats in a proper state of readiness at all times, for having adequately trained lookouts, and for avoiding the use of calcium-carbide water lights on waters covered with oil. All these precautions were based on actual experiences that had been reported by survivors. For example, in a recent sinking "a large number of lives were lost" when a life ring with a calcium-carbide light was thrown down on the water from a sinking tanker. The light ignited the oil and started a fire in which many of the survivors were burned to death.
  
     
          Of all the merchant vessels one type, the tankers, suffered the most severe losses. Because of the peculiar value of their cargo they were the special targets marked out by the submarines. In March a Committee appointed by the Petroleum Industry War Council reported that if the sinking  
 
 
 
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rate of January, February and the first weeks of March were continued throughout the year 125 of the 320 tankers available on this coast would be destroyed. With them 3,000 lives would be lost. Such losses would mean that the supply of oil on the east coast would sink to disastrous levels and the year 1943, the Committee predicted, would be "intolerable." Intolerable the future might be, but the immediate present is bad enough. The Committee warned that the events of the past few months when 26 tankers were lost had demoralized the crews many of whom, especially the engineering men, were leaving.
  
     
 
        In view of these appalling losses the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier was not wrong in advising the Secretary of the Navy on April 10th that "the sinkings of ships, tankers especially, on this coast is a serious matter resulting, if continued, in dire consequences to our war effort."
  
     
          There were many suggestions for improving the situation. The Committee for the Petroleum Industry recommended arming and degaussing all ships as soon as possible, selecting gun crews with great care, and increasing the use of the Civilian Air Patrol which it believed should be placed under the Army. On April 2nd, Com 5 in a letter to Commander Eastern Sea Frontier proposed that "to reduce the number of vessels being lost it is suggested that the Navy take over all remaining tanker tonnage" on the East coast. If this was not practicable he recommended that at least one officer be assigned to each vessel and enough men to maintain an efficient lookout at all times.  
     
          While these suggestions were being considered seven tankers were  
     
 
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sunk in the first ten days of April. In the first week of the month the Shell Oil Company requested permission to place Piper Cub planes on their ships to perform patrol and search. It was believed that such a step would build up the morale of the crews and increase the safety of the ship and cargo. When this proposal was turned down the company suggested that it be permitted to fly planes, land based, along the routes followed by their tankers. On April 14th the scheme was vetoed by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier "because of technical and practical objections."
  
     
 
        In only one way, however, could further tanker sinkings be absolutely prevented. That method was suggested to the Secretary of the Navy by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier on April 10th in a letter requesting more fast ships for combating the submarine. "If," he said, "such forces are not supplied in the near future it is recommended that consideration be given to the stoppage of tanker sailings until escorts vessels become available."
 
     
          Six days later Opnav sent the following dispatch "Commercial oil tankers for Gulf and Caribbean and U. S. Atlantic ports shall be held in port pending further orders. Molasses tanker traffic permitted in Gulf ports but not North of Port Everglades." Thus no oil moved in tanker bottoms along the coast in the last two weeks of the month. In view of the existing situation on the sea this was the only step to be taken to preserve the tanker fleet against the better days it is hoped will come, but in the meantime, the east coast was living off its capital as far as oil is concerned.  
     
 
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        On the 28th Cominch informed Commander Eastern Sea Frontier that control of all U. S. tankers from the Panama, Caribbean and Gulf to the Eastern Sea Frontier areas was vested in his hands "with the necessary authority to direct their sailings as required by the existing situation." Next day, after receiving reports from all interested commands, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier felt that the shipping situation was such that he could safely send out the order to all tankers "to proceed and continue movement until further notice."
  
     
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
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