EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
APRIL 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER VIII
  
 
 
 
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FRONTIER
  
     
 
        Experience during the last four months has demonstrated the practical value of the Sea Frontier as an element of naval administration. It has also revealed that in general, the structure of the Frontiers has been built upon sound principles of organization. But the need for some modification in the design of hte Eastern Sea Frontier has been revealed during the months of extraordinary strain produced by the intense submarine warfare. On April 8th, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier in a letter to Cominch expressed the opinion that this Frontier as established, "does not meet present war conditions for the following reasons:"
  
     
          1.        Commandants of Naval Districts are so occupied with other district activities that they can give but little attention to military and Frontier matters. The U-boat activities along the coast show clearly that the handling of forces to combat the menace requires the full time and immediate attention of local operating commanders.  
 
 
          2.        As a result of conflicting duties, the authority of District Commandants is delegated to subordinates--either retired or reserve officers--not fully experienced or competent to handle situations that arise and not fully prepared to make decisions without reference to Commandants.  
     
          3.        The inclusion of Army Air Forces within the Frontier structure makes it highly desirable that officers actually exercising command should  
     
 
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be active officers of high rank.
  
     
 
        These comments by Commander Eastern Sea Frontier indicate the most significant weakness in the whole structure of Frontier organization. In broad terms this weakness can be defined as follows: operational command of a frontier area is vested in the commander but his orders are transmitted through subordinates, the Commandants of Naval Districts whose primary concern is not with operations but with the provision of services and supply. In the directive setting up the Frontiers, a clear distinction between the zones of authority held by Frontier Commanders and District Commanders was made. But the purpose for which these seperate spheres of activity were set up will not be entirely fulfilled unless individual chains of command are established so that the operational authority possessed by Frontier Commanders will not be diverted or diminished when transmitted through Commandants primarily concerned with other duties.
  
     
          For this reason, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier based his proposal for reorganization upon the general principle of separating the fighting from the service forces in much the same way they are divided in any operating fleet. In the fighting forces he recommended grouping the following elements: the seagoing vessels assigned to teh Eastern Sea Frontier, the Army Air forces assigned to coastal protection, the Navy Air forces assigned to coastal protection, the Inshore Patrol, and the routing authorities.  
     
          The service forces would include all naval districts and operating bases under his command, navy yards, air stations, and Army airfields.  
     
 
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These essential units should not be involved in any of the tasks assigned the Fighting Forces since they were fully occupied with vital problems of repair and upkeep of material, and the housing, feeding, and recreation of the personnel. All Sea Frontier military action would be divorced from their control and, by the same token, all service forces would be separated from control of the Sea Frontier.
  
     
 
        Having established the basic principle of division between the mutually exclusive but complementary forces, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier proceeded to recommend a revised method of administration. All of the fighting forces in an area would be organized into a task force under a flag officer who would be directly responsible for his area under the direction of Commander Eastern Sea Frontier. This responsibility was large, embracing the training of personnel, the organization of the forces, and decisions of military action. Commander Eastern Sea Frontier directives would provide the framework within which the task group commander could express his initiative.
  
     
          The authority of these Commanders in each area would cease at the harbor entrance net. Inside this barrier, the District Commandant would be responsible for such matters as mine sweeping and laying, patrol of mine fields, control of air patrols, and so forth. It was proposed, however, that Port Directors should be under Task Group Commanders rather than under the Commandants. The Commanders would br provided with a staff of Army and Navy officers who would maintain a twenty-four hour watch at headquarters.  
 
 
          To provide for the adequate transmittal of information between  
     
 
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the various commands involved, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier recommended an elaborate system of communication between air stations, task group headquarters, and Headquarters of Eastern Sea Frontier.
  
     
 
        The service forces would continue in command of all physical properties of the various shore based activities. To indicate the nature of the broad division between the two kinds of forces, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier suggested the analogy between a Fleet and a Fleet Base.
  
     
          The fundamental principle of the suggested reorganization was the division of authority in two parts which conformed closely to the lines of cleavage between the activities of those primarily concerned with operations and those essentially charged with service. The purpose of this was to facilitate military operations by placing them in the hands of those concerned exclusively with them. The soundness of the principle has been demonstrated frequently; the most familiar American example is to be found in the system of administration created in Europe in the last war when officers at Brest, Gibralter, and Scotland served in effect as task group commanders under the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters who was based at London.  
     
          The purpose of the reorganization was recognized by Cominch in a dispatch of April 12th and a letter of the 16th. In the former, he stated that Commandants assigned as Task Group or Force Commanders by a Sea Frontier Commander should consider such duty their primary duty. In the letter he notified Commander Eastern Sea Frontier that additional flag officers would be sent to various districts as Assistant Commandants.  
     
 
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To this series of communications Commander Eastern Sea Frontier replied by letter on April 27th. He believed that additional personnel would not "meet fully the active conditions" of his command, and that even with such help the Commandants could not give their full attention to the Eastern Sea Frontier which was a full time job. He proposed instead that the flag officers serving as Assistant Commandants should have their duties specifically confined to Eastern Sea Frontier and the Naval Local Defense Forces and should have control over all military operations both air and surface which are at present controlled by the Commandant.
  
     
 
        On May 2nd Cominch approved this recommendation "in principle" with the following amplification:
  
     
          District Commandants would retain full responsibility for all operations of the Sea Frontier and the Local Defense Force. The Assistant Commandants would act under the authority delegated directly to them by District Commandants.  
     
          By this amplification the principle of assigning operational authority to those exclusively concerned with operations, thus divorcing District Commandants from any part in Frontier operations was denied. But in practice, though his control flowed through less direct channels, Commander Eastern Sea Frontier obtained the purpose for which he had recommended the change of administrative structure.  
     
 
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