NORTH ATLANTIC
  
 
NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
DECEMBER 1941
  
     
 
CHAPTER II
  
 
 
 
March 10, to December 7, 1941
  
     
 
1.
  
     
          On March 10, 1941, Admiral Andrews, then Commandant of the Third Naval District, assumed additional duties as the first Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier. One of the first things he had to do was to prepare a plan on which the forces assigned to the defense of the Frontier could operate. Any such plan had to be designed in recognition of the fact that the Frontier has been placed in "Defense Category B" by WPL-46. Frontiers in this category were assumed "to be subject to minor attacks." Therefore it was prescribed in WPL-46 that "harbor defenses will have one manning relief, and a part of the obstacles will be prepared but not put in place. Certain defensive sea areas will be established and a limited off shore patrol may be instituted, with a limited control of shipping entering and leaving the harbors."  
 
 
          To meet the requirements laid down in these conditions the Commander, North atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, on March 16, 1941, issued his first operations plan, The North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier Plan O-4 (Rainbow 3), Short Title NA-NCF-44. With the details of this plan, or with the various modifications that were made in the months that followed, it is unnecessary to deal, since Appendix 3 is devoted to this subject.  
     
     
     
 
 
 
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But it is important to notice here that the plan in al its stages of development served two distinct purposes. In the first it provided a pattern within which all the forces assigned to the Frontier could act in the event of enemy attack. Patrol areas were defined, sea lanes established, tasks for all available surface craft were described, methods of harbor defense set forth, and machinery for the coordination of air and surface forces developed. In the second place the plan, the first of its kind, provided a concrete basis for the determination of the exact place of a Naval Coastal Frontier in the total naval organization. As changes in the original operation plan were made, command relations and spheres of authority, both within the Frontier and beyond it, were more clearly defined than had been possible before. This was an important contribution in view of the fact that coastal frontiers were new and untried organs of administration before the war began. An example of this is seen in the Chief of Naval Operations' comment on the operations plan that was forwarded to him on July 3. "This review, the first made of a Plan O-4, has been of high interest and value to the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. THe plan in general indicates excellent appreciation and effective development of the intentions of the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to the new Naval Coastal Frontier Commands."
  
     
          The final revision of Plan O-4 was issued on December 5, 1941. Two days later it was put, unlike its predecessors, to immediate use.  
     
     
 
 
 
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2.
  
     
          It was well enough to have plans for the defense of the Frontier, but it was imperative to have forces and material to implement them. One week after assuming his new command, on March 17, Admiral Andrews sent out a letter to the Commandants of the various districts within the Frontier. In this he requested information on the"current state of defense," specifically on the following subjects:  
     
 
  A. Section Bases.
B. Obstacles - Net, Booms, Harbor obstructions of all kinds.
  C. Deperming and Degaussing Stations.
  D. Naval Vessels in the Districts available for duty with the coastal defense forces.
  E. Coast Guard vessels located in the Frontier.
 
     
  He also asked, at the same time, for the Naval Local Defense Force Operating plans and District Operating Plans for the Services.  
     
          Throughout the rest of the month, the answers to his request came in. By the first of April, the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier was in a position to determine the state of readiness within the Frontier. Section bases in the districts were, in general, "under construction," though at least two were in actual operation. The report of the Commandant of the First Naval District was typical of all others. At Boston, barracks for 180 men were being built, but funds for the administration building, shops, storehouses and communications canter "awaited final approval." At Portland, a temporary base had been established "until funds available" for construction of a permanent one. At Newport, "necessary steps are being taken to purchase and lease" facilities. Bases at  
     
     
     
 
 
 
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Woods Hole, Rockland, and Block Island "await action."
 
     
          Net Depots, torpedo baffles, anti-motor boat booms, all the facilities for harbor obstacles were in much the same condition. The report of the Commandant of the Fourth Naval District was much like the others. The storage house for the nets would be ready about the first of April. Date of delivery of boom defense material was indefinite, quarters for the personnel had not been started. The anti-submarine net was finished.  
     
          One or two Deperming Stations and Degaussing Ranges were in operation and in all other instances locations for stations had been selected or building was underway.  
          The number of surface craft available in each Naval District ranged from 4 to 11. Most of these vessels were converted yachts, Eagle boats, seagoing barges, and subchasers. Few, if any, had sound gear and the seakeeping qualities of all were severely limited.  
            
          In sum these reports indicated that much had already been planned, that something had already been done, and that a great deal remained yet to do. In the course of the next few months, progress was made in preparing most of the defenses of the Frontier. Harbor entrance control post were established at the principal ports, controlled mine fields were laid in the harbors by the Army, contact mines were accumulated, submarine nets were manufactured, section bases were placed in operation and so forth. By the first of December, what might be called the static elements of the defenses of the Frontier were in a fairly advanced stage of development.  
 
 
 
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        Not so much can be said for mobile forces. A short time after the war began, the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier had at his disposal the following surface craft:
  
     
 
    4 - PY Boats  
    4 - SC Boats  
    1 - 165' C.G.C.  
    6 - 125' C.G.C.  
    2 - PG Boats  
    3 - Eagle Boats  
  Total 20  
 
     
 

    The capabilities of these vessels were described by Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier in a letter written to the Chief of Naval Operations on December 22, in the following words: "An examination of the following list shows vessels varying in speed from 9 knots to a possible 15 knots for the Eagle boats and the Dione of 16 1/2 knots. The Coast Guard Cutters are the best fitted for anti-submarine work, but are small and are mostly fully occupied in their regular Coast Guard duties. There is not a vessel available that an enemy submarine could not outdistance when operating on the surface. In most cases the guns of these vessels would be outranged by those of the submarine. The limited capabilities of these vessels are apparent."

  
     
          A review of the air forces available revealed somewhat similar conditions. In all there were, in December, a total of 103 planes within the Frontier. These were divided into the following categories:  
     
 
  Trainers 51
  Scouts (OS or OB) 18
  Utility 14
 
     
 
 
 
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  Transport 7
  Patrol (P or PB) 6
  Torpedo 3
  Fighters 3
  Bomber 1
  Total 103
 
     
          It was with forces such as these, twenty surface vessels with neither the speed nor the firepower to wage war against the submarine, and 103 planes, about three-quarters of which were unsuited to the task assigned, that the defense of the Frontier was undertaken on December 7.  
     
     
 
3.
  
     
          The whole concept of naval coastal frontiers had been derived from the obvious need to coordinate the activities of the two Services in defense of our coastlines. (See Appendix 3.) The creation of such an authority presupposed not only a plan, but also a place for mutual operations. Ten days after Pearl Harbor, the Chief of Naval Operations, in a dispatch of December 18, set forth the immediate necessity of establishing joint operations offices in coastal frontiers, sectors, and sub sectors.  
 
 
       Five months earlier, on July 9, 1941, the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier had proposed to the Commander of the Northeast Defense Command, the development of a Joint Control and Information center on the 14th floor of the Federal Building at 90 Church Street. In his letter of that date, he said in part:  
     
 
  "The area suggested combines adequate space, centrally located, with close proximity to present Naval Communications installations, as well as convenient accessibility to various types of land communication channels.
   
   
 
 
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  "It is proposed that at the suggested Joint Control and Information Center, there be present, when desirable, Army liaison officers, who together with representatives of the Navy, could work closely on defense problems. This close contact, it is believed, would be of value in expediting action connected with questions relating to Sub-sector and Sector defense, as well as decisions in matters pertaining to the Northeast Command and Naval Coastal Frontier.
 
  "To illustrate the operation of the proposed Information and Control Center in a particular situation, the following case is presented.
   
          A radio position report is received through Naval Communications of an enemy aircraft carrier off the coast. Quick decision and action is essential. With liaison officers present from the Army First Air Force, a bomber attack can be initiated and coordinated with both Naval Coastal Frontier Aviation and such Atlantic Fleet Aviation as may be within striking distance. At the same time, the Army Air Defense Information Center can be informed of the situation, and of the action taken, so that the Army Air Interceptor Command can prepare to meet the threat of enemy land bombing attack."
 
     
          The proposal was accepted by the Army and plans for the establishment of the Joint Control center went forward rapidly. On the 14th Floor, next to the Headquarters of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, a space was set aside for the use of the Army. Here there were offices for the Northeast Defense Command and the First Air Force, a message center room, a coding room, and a teletype room. (See Floor Plan, Appendix 1.)  
     
          The Navy likewise had a telephone switchboard for command telephones, a teletype room, and a large room for "Operations." Along the walls of this last room, charts of the Atlantic area and the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier were set up. Actual alterations of the existing floor space were almost completed by December 13, and three days after the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations was received the Frontier could report that the Joint  
     
 
 
 
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Operations Office was in operation.
  
     
          What is the purpose of such a center? In general terms it is to "maintain a running estimate of the military situation in the theatre of operations by means of plotting information on operating charts and maps and maintaining a digest of unplottable material." On the charts that were set up around the operations rooms, the following plots are kept:  
     
 
  A. Merchant ships traveling off the coast - changed every hour.
B. All surface patrol vessels - changed every hour.
  C. All air patrols operating on coast - changed every half hour.
  D. Enemy operations and enemy contacts, including air warning received from the Army Air Corps Regional Filter Center.
   
 
          The purpose of all this plotting is to assist "in determining what forces are available to take action in any eventuality," and to provide the officers on duty with enough information to enable them to take "swift and decisive" action. All the information from every possible source - patrols, observation stations, the forces afloat, and the Harbor Entrance Control Posts flows into the Joint Operations Office and there is reduced to such form that the men on duty can act upon the knowledge they have before them. The nature of the task confronting the Army and Navy officers has been defined in colorful terms:  
     
          "The steps by which information collected from all available sources is turned into military intelligence so that proper action can be taken in the premises is a problem of: 1. observation,  
     
     
 
 
 
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2. communication, 3. plotting and evaluation of information, 4. determination of own forces available for action, 5. decision as to proper action to take, 6. communications necessary to cary out operations of the decision, and 7. action.
  
     
          "It is nothing but the old problem of the eye and the mind and the hand and the foot multiplied many times and the big difference between the winner and the loser is the time and timing."  
     
  The importance of such a center for joint control and information has been clearly recognized. On December 31, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, sent a letter to all commanders of Coastal Frontiers urging the rapid establishment of Joint Operations Centers. In this letter, the writers stated that "Commendable progress in approaching this ideal has been made in the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, where a 'Joint Operations Office' has been established, and in various Coastal Frontiers where joint Harbor Entrance Control Posts have been placed in operation." Accompanying this communication was a layout plan and written description of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier Office, to serve as a guide for the other activities in the development of their own joint centers.  
     
 
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          In the months between March and December, the outlines of the administrative machinery of the Frontier had been clearly drawn, measures to increase the cooperation between the Army and Navy had been taken, plans for operations in the event of enemy attack had been  
     
 
 
 
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developed, material to insure the inner defense of the coast against attack had been accumulated as fast as the decisions of higher authority permitted. Yet the whole structure of defense that has been erected during these past months rests upon the forces that are available to act in case of enemy action and those forces consist, within the Frontier, of twenty small boats of varying capabilities and 103 planes, a large proportion of which have no place in modern war.
  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
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