NORTH ATLANTIC
  
 
NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
DECEMBER 1941
  
     
 
CHAPTER III
  
 
 
 
DECEMBER 7 to DECEMBER 31, 1941
  
     
          Three general measures were taken to protect the coast and defend the Frontier waters as soon as the war broke out. To begin with, all the available air and surface craft took up a patrol of the areas that had been assigned to them in the war plans. An inshore patrol around particular focal points off important harbors was maintained while an offshore patrol was established soon after December 7. This latter task was undertaken by the Army because the Frontier possessed no planes capable of carrying on searches so far at sea. Operating from Westover Field, Massachusetts, Mitchel Field, New York, and Langley Field, Virginia, three Army planes from each field made two sweeps daily out over the ocean. Under the circumstances existing within the Frontier, these planes have performed a service of the greatest importance but the aviators are working constantly under a severe handicap because they lack the naval training that would enable them to distinguish between friendly and enemy vessels.  
     
          The need for small craft to supplement the patrol work of airplanes and surface vessels is clearly demonstrated by the following dispatch of December 15 from the Chief of Naval Operations to all Commandants of Naval Districts:  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
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  "This has been sent by mail for information to Chief of Staff Army and Chief Army Air Forces. It is requested that small vessels be equipped with radio for transmitting voice or telegraph as may be required for reception by Army warning net ashore, be stationed fifty or more miles offshore to report approaching enemy aircraft, surface vessels and submarines to Army Aircraft Warning Service. If available, crews should be made up of Navy Personnel, otherwise of undoubtedly loyal civilians."
 
     
          The second measure taken to defend the Frontier from enemy attack was announced on December 10, in a dispatch that read as follows: "A mined area covering the approaches to New York Harbor has been established. Incoming vessels will secure directions for safe navigation from patrol vessel stationed off Ambrose Channel Entrance." Throughout the month the system of mines, booms and nets, that had been designed to augment the controlled fields already laid by the Army was extended and strengthened. Special Warning Number 140 advised all ships and stations on December 19, that "A mined area covering the approaches to Chesapeake Bay has been established. All vessels are required to take pilots before entering the Bay." On the next day, the Chief of Naval Operations, in answer to a dispatch from Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier of December 11, expressed his desire to increase the protection in this area by laying a field of contact mines at the entrance to the Chesapeake. Similar fields were sowed in the approaches to Boston and Portland Harbors by the twenty-third of the month. All up and down the coast nets, booms, and mine fields were laid down to increase the protection of the focal areas.  
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
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        But there was one form of enemy attack against which observation sweeps, surface patrols by small, slow vessels, or the construction of harbor obstacles would be relatively little use. If the Germans chose to send their U-boats against the merchant shipping that plied the waters of the Frontier, other methods of protection would have to be introduced. It will be recalled that one of the major tasks assigned the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier in Wp1-46, was the protection and routing of merchant shipping. This responsibility was qualified in the following fashion:
  
     
          1. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately upon the entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter within United States areas.  
     
          2. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of intra-district, intra-frontier, and inter-frontier shipping.  
     
          3. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping.  
     
          4. Intra-district shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval Districts under the direction of the Commander of the Naval Coastal Frontier.  
     
          5. The shipping of the associated powers, operating in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Commanders in Chief, Commanders of Sub Areas,  
     
 
 
 
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and Naval Coastal Frontiers and by the Commandants of Naval Coastal Frontiers and by the Commandants of the Naval Districts to the extent required by the existing situation and as may be practicable by the use of available forces.
  
     
          One week after America entered the was, on December 15, this system was altered and elaborated by an Annex to WPL-46 called WPSC-46. Certain distinct areas of shipping control, as described below, were then set up and assigned to the following "Principal Shipping Control Officers:"  
     
          1. The Shipping Control Officer of the Office of Naval Operations -- the Western Atlantic.  
     
          2. The Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier -- the Pacific Area.  
     
          3. Commander, Panama Naval Coastal Frontier -- North and South bound shipping in the Pacific area of the Panama Naval Coastal Frontier.  
     
          4. Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet -- the Pacific Fleet Control Zones.  
     
          5. The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet -- The Far East.  
     
          Further, it was stated that the Shipping Control Officer in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, would control shipping in the Western Atlantic area by directives to the Commanders of the North and South Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontiers, and to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet. The Commanders of the Naval Coastal Frontiers would control shipping as directed by the Principal Shipping Officer in Command by directives to (A) Commandants  
     
 
 
 
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of Naval Districts within the Frontiers, and (B) Commanders of units of the Naval Coastal Defense Forces under their command.
  
     
          Not included in the above list, was one agency of great importance. Port Directors in the various ports were directly responsible for the actual routing of shipping. Their significance had increased steadily throughout the year 1941, as the Lend-Lease Shipments had increased.  
     
      The duties of the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, insofar as they dealt with coastwise shipping, were twofold. In the elaborate system of administration, he was charged with the defense of the Frontier and, acting under the general instructions of the Chief of Naval Operations, with the protection and routing of merchant vessels.  
     
          Adequate protection for merchant shipping was a thing which the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier could not during the past month provide. With only a score of surface vessels on hand a critical weakness in the air it was impossible to think in such terms. The forces available were used in search and patrol more with the idea that they could provide early intelligence of enemy activity than in the hope that they could take decisive steps to prevent enemy action. Such defense as could be made of merchant shipping had to be found in other directions.  
     
       The immediate response to be made in case of the arrival of the U-boats had been prepared before our entry into the war. It took the form of routing ships through areas that might be endangered.  
     
     
     
 
 
 
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The purpose of the plan was twofold. Along selected sea lanes cargo vessels could be directed through waters least accessible to submarines, while the narrow lanes themselves would greatly reduce the area to be patrolled and protected by whatever forces were available. In July 1941, such routes had been established for vessels in the overseas trade and in that same month the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier had laid out a system of lanes for ships operating between New York and Halifax when and if those waters became endangered. On December 5, 1941, he took, in a revised Operations Plan, a further step in the protection of our coastwise shipping. It was directed that:
  
     
          1. Pending issuance of instruction relative to routing of Coastwise Shipping and designation of Coastal Sea Lanes within the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier by the Chief of Naval Operations, the following Coastal Sea Lanes are established:  
     
 
  a. A "Reference Line" will be established and all coastwise traffic will move in lanes relative thereto. The "Reference Line" will be shifted from time to time as deemed necessary by the Chief of Naval Operations or the Coastal Frontier Commander.
 
  b. The "Reference Line" is initially established as a line passing through the following aids to navigation:
   
  Route Designation.
   
  RA - Lat. 34°15'30" N., Long. 76°28"30"W.
  RB - Diamond Shoals Lightship.
  RC - Wimble Shoal Lighted Whistle Buoy
  RD - Chesapeake Lightship.
  RE - Winter-Quarter Shoal Lightship.
  RF - Five-Fathom Bank Lightship.
  RG - Barnegat Lightship.
  RH - Fire Island Lightship.
  RI - Block Island Southeast Lighted Whistle Buoy.
   
  (1) IF BOUND VIA CAPE COD CANAL.
   
  RI - From Block Island Southeast Lighted Whistle Buoy.
 
     
 
 
 
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  RJ - Hen and Chickens Lightvessels, conforming to the sailing directions in U. S. Coast Pilot for approaches to and passage of the Cape Cod Canal.
RK - Canal Approach Lighted Bell Buoy.
  RL - Humarock Outer Lighted Bell Buoy.
  RM - Boston Lightvessel.
                  Continuing as in (2) below.
   
  (2) IF BOUND VIA VINEYARD AND NANTUCKET SOUND OUTSIDE CAPE COD.
   
  RI - Block Island Southeast Lighted Whistle Buoy.
  RN - Gay Head Lighted Buoy, thence following deep water channel through Vineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound to -
  RO - Pollock Rip Lightship via Pollock Rip Channel.
   
 
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  RP - Orion Shoal Lighted Whistle Buoy via Great Round Shoal Channel, thence to:
  RQ - Chatham Lighted Whistle Buoy.
  RR - Nauset Lighted Whistle Buoy.
  RS - Peaked Hill Bar Lighted Whistle Buoy.
  RM - Boston Lightvessel.
   
 
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  RT - Cape Ann Lighted Whistle Buoy.
  RU - Boon Island Ledge Lighted Whistle Buoy.
  RV - Portland Lightvessel.
  RW - Matinicus Rock Whistle Buoy.
  RX - Mt. Desert Rock Lighted Whistle Buoy.
  RY - Little River Lighted Whistle Buoy, then, following middle of Grand Manan Channel to:
  RZ - The intersection with the International Boundary Line off West Quoddy Head, Maine.
 
     
          2. Coastal Sea Lanes are established as follows:  
     
 
  a. LANE A. North and South bound shallow draft vessels to be routed along "Reference Line" and inshore of it. North bound vessels to pass close to "Reference Line", South bound vessels about two miles inshore of the line whenever practicable.
 
  b. LANE B. Offshore from the "Reference Line" is prescribed a zone three miles wide in which no vessels at all are to be routed.
   
  c. LANE C. A zone between three miles and six miles offshore from the "Reference Line is reserved for South bound traffic.
 
 
 
 
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  d. LANE D. North bound deep draft vessels are to be routed outside of seven (7)
 
     
          3. The Coastal Sea Lanes given in paragraph 2 above are the principal routes for coastal shipping. These lanes will be altered by changes in the "Reference Line" or otherwise to minimize hazards and to meet operating considerations. In routing vessels through Cape Cod Canal, Vineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound, consideration will be given to the routes given in the U. S. Coast Pilot.  
     
          On December 16, a routing plan was put into effect by the Chief of Naval Operations on the basis of the Sea Lanes described by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier eleven days before.  
     
          During the month further steps were taken to increase the security of merchant vessels. On December 22, Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier sent the following dispatch: "Due to requirements of all merchant vessels running completely darkened it is considered advisable to increase zone from 1 mile wide to 3 miles wide between lanes C and D, in order to decrease possibilities of collision. Route coastwise vessels (northbound) in Lane D outside of nine (9) miles offshore of the reference line which will leave a zone 3 miles wide between Lanes C and D, in which no vessels will be routed. Reference line and lanes referred to are shown in NA-NCF-46 distributed December 5, 1941.  
     
 
        On the same day the routing system was amplified by Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier as follows: "Desire following coastwise routings be placed in effect for North and Southbound voyages of colliers engaged in trade between North Atlantic Coast ports and Hampton Roads. On Southbound voyages when light draft
  
     
     
 
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south of New York, use South bound inshore Lanes, for shallow draft vessels two miles inside of light vessels. On north bound vessels when loaded, give master option at time routing is issued to proceed north inside and close aboard light vessels in north bound lane. Masters to be advised to proceed with caution if crossing south bound lane off Chesapeake Lightvessel, and that whichever north bound routing is issued it must be followed."
  
     
          Such were the steps that were taken in the past month to protect the vital shipping of our coastal waters -- patrolled areas, air coverage, selection of shipping lanes, routing of vessels. In the twenty-four days of war just passed the measure of protection provided by these methods has not been tested , as have none of the other aspects of our defense system. This December has been a period in which the whole structure of defense built up during the past years -- plans, material, and forces was being organized for a test of strength. But at no point within the Frontier has the structure been actually tested by enemy action.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
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