EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
FEBRUARY 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER III
  
 
 
 
THE AVAILABILITY OF FORCES
  
     
 
        The search for forces went on throughout February. If the results were not very gratifying, it was less because the forces were well hidden than because they were not in existence. The lesson of the first world war, when Lloyd George in April 1917, had predicted that unless the American Navy could provide "ships, ships and more ships" the German submarine would bring "England to her knees in August," had been forgotten by the time the second world war began. The basic fact of the matter was that when we entered the war, we did not have the naval strength required to defend the merchant shipping we needed. Thus the negotiations carried on during the past month between the various commands at times looked much like robbing Peter of a promissory note so that Paul could be paid with it.
  
     
          It will be recalled that late in January, Planes of the Fleet Air Arm at Norfolk were made available to Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier. Since these planes were the only ones within the Frontier capable of maintaining an effective offshore patrol, they performed service of tremendous importance and value "particularly when it is realized that the flight personnel engaged were very largely inexperienced and in a training status." But the arrangement was not entirely satisfactory to anyone concerned. From the point of view of Cinclant, such duty did "seriously interfere with the Fleet Aircraft training program" at a time when there was a shortage of pilots as well as planes. The lack of the latter was felt as keenly by Cinclant as the unavailability of the former. The assignment of the planes at Norfolk  
     
 
 
 
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  to temporary duty under Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier had raised the whole problem of the distribution of planes between the various commands. This problem was settled by Cominch January 31, when he informed Cinclant that the shortage of patrol planes in the Atlantic was recognized and would be made up by delivery of 42 PBY's during February, March, and April.  
     
          From the point of view of Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier, the assignment of planes from the Fleet Air Arm was not entirely satisfactory because the duty was an "emergency" measure and admittedly temporary. Also use of the planes could not be permitted to interfere with regular duty with the Fleet. Any hope that the situation might be improved in February was dashed by Cominch's assurance on January 31 to Cinclant, that the Naval Coastal Frontiers would not be provided with planes until Fleet squadrons were brought up to strength.  
     
          A further disappointment occurred on February 3. It will be recalled that near the end of last month, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier suggested that some of the forty PBY's at Elizabeth City might be assigned temporarily to the Eastern Sea Frontier. These planes, it was understood, were grounded because the British, to whom they belonged, lacked pilots to man them. On February 3, the Office of Naval OPerations informed Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier that the "RAF aircraft -- urgently required by the British are being fitted with long range tanks and equipped for ferry to British Isles as expeditiously as material can be made available."  
     
          Thus the month began without much promise that the situation in the air could be improved in the immediate future. One possible source of assistance remained. On January 14, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier had  
     
 
 
 
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  recommended to Cominch that "when armed naval aircraft for long range patrol are available, a sufficient number be assigned to the Coast Guard Air Stations in this Frontier, in lieu of the unarmed obsolete equipment now being used for offshore patrol. The Coast Guard pilots in question have had Navy training and are exceptionally competent to carry out Frontier offshore patrol." There is a certain irony in the fact that the patrol planes at Norfolk could perform only limited service because they were being used to train pilots while the contribution of the experienced pilots of the Coast Guard was restricted because of the "unarmed obsolete" planes used.  
     
          In February, however, negotiations were begun which promised to alter this situation. On the last day of January, the Commandant of the Coast Guard informed the Bureau of Aeronautics that personnel under his command was not being used to full advantage. It was his recommendation that forty-six additional planes be assigned to bases throughout the country. One week later the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics approved this recommendation with the suggestion that forty OS2U-3's be assigned to Coast Guard Stations as soon as possible. On the ninth of the month, the Chief of Naval Operations took further action in the matter by ordering that all these planes located on the Eastern Coast instead of dispersed throughout the country as originally planned. On the 13th, the planes were definitely assigned to five fields from Salem, Mass., to St. Petersburg, Florida, but the dates of delivery were estimated as February 27 through March 11. The result of the negotiations was that no appreciable actual change took place in the strength in the air throughout the month.  
     
          The situation on the surface was much the same as in the air. Little  
     
 
 
 
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  basis and permanent improvement could be made because additional forces in large number did not exist. But expedients could be resorted to that might bring temporary change. On February 7, Cominch informed Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier that "you are authorized by the Chief of Naval Operations to employ at sea anywhere within your Frontier at your discretion, any or all of the 70 ft. and 80 ft. cutters of the Coast Guard which normally are assigned to local defense forces. --- by attack combined with escort and patrol operations, the primary task is to protect shipping in the Frontier lanes."  
     
          Four days later in a dispatch to all Naval Districts of the Frontier and NOB Newport, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier indicated some of the factors that might delay assignment of the cutters to active duty. "Arm, equip, and provide with depth charges," he said, "all 70 to 75 foot and 80 to 83 foot Coast Guard cutters immediately. As many depth charges as practicable should be carried. Guns should be one pounder and machine guns 50 caliber. If available, with three inch, 23 caliber on the 83 foot cutters if practicable. Listening gear to be installed as it becomes available. This to be given highest priority. These vessels are to be used on coastal sea lane patrol. Expedite action and report immediately action taken."          
     
          On February 17, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier followed up this dispatch with a request for an Operation Plan for the cutters in each district. From that time on until the end of the month, replies came in from the activities within the Frontier. The general tenor of these replies is indicated by the letter sent, together with an Operation Plan, to Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier by Com Five near the end of February. "Vessels," he  
     
 
 
 
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  said, "mentioned herein will probably not be equipped and armed for this service until approximately February 28, 1942." Information from the other districts was much the same -- again the plan but not the material to implement it until some time in the future.  
     
          In the middle of the month aid was promised from an unexpected quarter. On the 13th, Cominch informed Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier that 24 trawlers were being sailed from England for St. John's "in the course of the next few days." They were "being lent to C in C U.S. Fleet for A/S operations under Command on East Coast North America." "Further signals -- regarding their disposal" were promised after the ships arrived at St. John's. Four days later Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier informed the districts and the naval operating base at Newport of the prospective arrival of these ships. None of them actually did arrive during the month and it is recognized that when they do, their usefulness will be limited by their capabilities. They are not equipped to operate in southern climates, they contain not so much as a small pipe threading tool with which to make repairs, and with two exceptions, they are coal burners requiring a very high grade of coal. Of needed assistance, they certainly will be, but as Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier said on February 26, "it is not considered that these vessels would be satisfactory escort units."  
     
          One further source of strength was tapped during the month, when destroyers from the Fleet were assigned to Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier. On January 23, he had "strongly recommended" that at least one equipped with listening gear be based at Hampton Roads to assist in meeting the enemy threat at the point of greatest danger.  
     
 
 
 
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          In the last week of this month, this request was granted when the USS Roe was assigned for ten days temporary duty to the Commandant of the Fifth Naval District. On February 3, when the submarine activity around Cape Hatteras was reaching its full fury, another request was made "for the immediate assignment of two destroyers to Com Five for temporary duty in view of the critical situation in the vicinity of the Virginia Capes."  
     
          Two days later, the H. P. JONES, ROE, LUDLOW, WAINWRIGHT, MAYRANT, TRIPPE, and ROWAN were made available to Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier sometime between the sixth and the eighth. One week later, three of these destroyers were operating in the Norfolk area, while one had been sent to Com Four. The following week, all seven of these ships had been detached from duty under Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier and were on their way to Iceland.  
     
          Substitutions were made on February 19, when the DALLAS, UPSHUR, and JACOB JONES were ordered to duty under Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier. Two of these went immediately to the Norfolk area and the JACOB JONES remained in New York. She was joined on February 28, by the DICKERSON which made the fourth destroyer operating in the Frontier by the end of February. In all during the month, eleven ships were placed at the disposal of Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.  
     
          This is an imposing figure, representing numerically, a force one-third as strong as the total force already in the Frontier. Because of the destroyer's speed, firepower, and listening gear, the qualitative addition was far greater. But the figure must be used with caution. Never, in the first place, were all eleven on duty at one time. All were assigned for only temporary duty and none remained long enough in any one place to perform  
     
 
 
 
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  with complete effectiveness. The reaction of the Commander of the Inshore Patrol in the Fifth Naval District is suggestive of the degree of usefulness obtained. His words are especially significant because more destroyers operated in his area than anywhere else during the month.  
     
          In a letter to Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier he said, "A very unsatisfactory condition exists, resulting from frequent changes in destroyers assigned for temporary duty with the Local Defense Forces of this district.  
     
          "Upon arrival it is usually found that vessels need fuel, provisions, stores, and repairs. Each time a change is made, there is considerable loss of time occasioned by supplying the needs of the vessel. Also frequent confusion in orders, new vessels have to get local orders, communication plans, special information, and indoctrination.  
     
          "The result is that there is a great deal of lost motion and considerable loss in effectiveness of anti-submarine patrols."  
     
          The most obvious remedy for this unsatisfactory condition, lay in the permanent assignment of destroyers to duty with the Frontier. Such was the suggestion of the Commander of the Inshore Patrol, and the recommendation on February 7 of the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier when he stated that fifteen destroyers were "absolutely essential" for the defense of shipping within the Frontier. During the past month, however, neither of these proposals was accepted. With the limited number of destroyers available to the Navy, the increase of strength in any one area could be obtained only by weakening the protection in some other sector. More destroyers on out coastal sea lanes meant less on the trade routes to England.  
     
          The choice during the past month has therefore lain between two unsatisfactory  
     
 
 
 
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  alternatives. Forces could be concentrated at one point, thus leaving other areas open to submarine attack; or forces could be dispersed throughout endangered areas but not in sufficient number to guarantee the absolute protection of any particular sector. The principle of dispersion was decided upon, but it was recognized that some additional assistance would be necessary if the Frontier were to combat with success the activity of the submarines. Therefore, destroyers in the Fleet were assigned to temporary duty under Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier whenever they happened to be on this coast for repairs and overhaul. The hope was that by such manipulation, one ship could be made, in a sense, to do the work of two, but this was accomplished only by the reduction of efficiency, in absolute terms, of any particular destroyer operating for a limited number of days within the Frontier.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
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