EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
FEBRUARY 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER IV
  
 
 
 
The Convoy System Considered
  
     
 
        To defend merchant shipping against submarine attacks there is one classic procedure. The history of the first world war demonstrated that ships, men and weapons, could be brought into most successful combination against the U-boats through the operation of the convoy system. British experience in the early years of this war has served only to confirm this lesson of the past. It was inevitable therefore that as soon as our coastwise shipping was placed in jeopardy by the arrival of the enemy, steps would be taken to introduce the convoy system.
  
     
          But the lessons of history cannot be read without some reservations. Conditions along the overseas trade routes on which convoys have been principally used, differ materially from conditions along coastal sea lanes. Ships plying between England and America cannot time their passage by lying over in sheltered harbors at night. In addition, vessels far at sea are deprived of the air coverage afforded by planes operating from shore bases. Advantage of all these defensive measures can be taken by coastwise merchant vessels.  
     
          Though history seemed to provide an answer in the convoy system, it also had written across the waters of the Channel, the Western Approaches and the North Atlantic, a warning. All experience had shown that the effectiveness of the method depended directly upon the strength of the forces engaged in implementing it. Unless convoys are adequately defended the hazards to merchant vessels gathered together in large and insufficiently protected concentrations are increased, rather than diminished. Still,  
     
 
 
 
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  despite these reservations, the convoy has proved itself the most dependable weapon in the hands of the allied nations and it was therefore natural that proposals for its introduction should be forthcoming as soon as the submarines appeared.  
     
          On February 12, Cominch "directed the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier to submit a plan for a convoy system to protect coastal shipping in this Frontier." During the next few days Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier sought the recommendations of all the Naval District Commandants within the Frontier. From them he obtained replies indicating, in varying degree, their opposition to the immediate introduction of the convoy system. In most instances these opinions were based upon the limited capacity of the defense forces assigned the Districts.  
     
          After considering these reports from the Naval Districts, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier presented Commander in Chief with his own views on the subject in a letter of February 26th. The recommendations contained in the communication were based primarily on five general considerations that had been taken into account in studying the situation.  
     
          A. The number and speed of vessels requiring protection.  
     
          B. Availability and capabilities of vessels to be used for escort purposes.  
     
          C. Availability and characteristics of airplanes to be used for air coverage.  
     
          D. Safest routes to be used.  
     
          E. The question of compelling certain overseas merchant vessels now being routed to seaward to use coastal lanes.  
     
          It will be noticed that three of the five general considerations were  
     
 
 
 
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  concerned with that arithmetical factor which it has been suggested lay at the heart of the submarine problem. In assessing the value of the immediate adoption of the convoy, it was necessary first to weigh the number of ships to be protected against the number of ships and planes available to perform the task of protection.  
     
 

        The commander, Eastern Sea Frontier presented to Commander in Chief, some figures on the volume of merchant shipping within the frontier: every day the following vessels were moving southward:

  
     
 
  A. From west end of Cape Cod Canal to New York via Long Island Sound
13
     
  B. From New York to Delaware Capes
18
     
  C. From Delaware Capes to Cape Henry
20
     
  D. From Cape Henry to South of Charleston, South Carolina
15
     
   
Total
66
 
     
  The average northward ships movements were approximately the same. In all, therefore, there were each day between 120 and 130 ships requiring protection within the boundaries of the Frontier.  
     
          The forces available to protect these vessels were described by Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier in the following words: "At the present time there are available in the Frontier but 9 vessels, exclusive of the EAGLES which are unreliable, that have a speed of fourteen knots or better. There are also but 19 vessels with a speed between 12 and 14 knots. This latter grouping includes 10 125-foot Coast Guard cutters, 5 EAGLE boats, 3 PY's, and 1 165-foot slow Coast Guard cutter. The foregoing takes in all vessels of the Frontier that have any possible qualifications for the duty in question ---." In all there were 28 surface vessels that could be used on convoy  
     
 
 
 
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  work, and should these ships be used on such duty the harbor entrances and coastwise lanes would be practically stripped of protection.  
     
 

        The number of planes available at this time did not differ materially from the total on hand February 7 when Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier had written that "Except for the patrol bombers of the Fleet Air Detachment now at Norfolk, there are no long range naval patrol offshore and giving adequate protection to merchant shipping. The only naval planes attached to the districts are single engined planes which, when carrying depth bombs, have a range of very little more than three hours."

  
     
          In view of the large number of merchant vessels that would require convoy protection, and the limited number of ships and planes available to provide such protection, COmmander, Eastern Sea Frontier replied to Commander in Chief, with the recommendation "that no attempt be made to protect coastwise shipping by a convoy system until an adequate number of suitable escort vessels is available."  
     
          It was apparent, however, that something had to be done, if possible, to increase the safe passage of cargo vessels. Toward the end of February, the comparative lull discernable in the middle of the month, was broken by a sharp rise in the number of sinkings. Continued losses were having their effect upon crews, some of whom during the month refused to take ships out of New York Harbor. Therefore, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier suggested several steps that might be taken to meet the existing situation before the convoy was adopted. Specifically, he recommended that:  
     
          A. Every possible use be made of inland waters and canals.  
     
 
 
 
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          B. Ships be routed as close inshore as safe navigation permitted with schedules so arranged that particular danger points would be passed during daylight.  
     
 

        C. Coastwise lanes be given every possible protection with every type of available plane and craft.

  
     
          D. If the enemy abandoned his present method of offshore sinkings to operate against inshore lanes, daylight runs between such points as New York and Delaware Capes, and Hampton Roads be instituted with concentration of patrol around Hatteras.  
     
          E. All shipping, including overseas shipping to and from the West Indies, South America and Cape Town be routed along the coastal lanes since escort vessels were not available for ships routed offshore.  
     
          F. Coastal convoy from Cape Cod to Halifax be instituted.  
     
          It was the suggestion of the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier that the convoys system should be introduced only if these remedies when applied proved inadequate, and that, under any conditions the convoy system should wait upon the arrival of sufficient forces. In anticipation of the day when such forces would become available the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier laid out a schedule of convoys, fast and slow, between New York and various points along the south east coast of the country. Analysis of these schedules revealed that at least 64 ships would be required to protect all the shipping sailing in convoy - or more than twice as many as are now in the Frontier.  
     
          As a final comment on this matter, the Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier recommended that if "it becomes necessary to initiate the coastwise convoy system ---- it be done gradually, and that the first section should be that south of Hampton Roads. The next section that should be undertaken would be Cape Cod-Boston-Halifax." And in connection with the convoys running from New York down to Key West, he recommended that in view of the limited capabilities of the escort vessels reliefs should be arranged at Hampton Roads  
     
 
 
 
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