EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
MARCH 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER V
  
 
 
 
THE CONVOY SYSTEM CONSIDERED
  
     
          In keeping with the recommendation set forth in CESF's letter of February 25th the introduction of the convoy system was postponed by Cominch on March 6th until such time as suitable forces were available. At the same time, the supplementary means of protection proposed by CESF were approved and placed in effect. But the mounting gravity of the situation on our coast was such that the subject of the convoy remained alive. Throughout the month preparations for the day when the system could be safely introduced were carried forward.  
     
          The subject was first raised on March 6th by the Commander of Task Force 21 in a dispatch in which he emphasized the severity of the prospective losses for the month. He suggested that an opening of the cycle of the HX and SC convoys from six to seven days would release two groups for service along our coast "if lack of escort vessels is holding up inauguration of North Atlantic Seaboard coastal convoys." An indication of how closely the submarine warfare in the Frontier is connected with the whole world shipping problem, is suggested by the fact that delaying the proposed opening of the Halifax and Sydney convoy cycle by one day would reduce imports to England by 30,000 tons a month.  
     
          This recommendation was followed on March 7 by a review of the whole situation drawn up by Cinclant. He began with the statement that reinforcements from the British, available about mid April, would release two groups of escorts totaling 20 vessels. From there he went  
     
 
 
 
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  on to say that:  
     
 
No decrease in strength of individual escort units should be made, especially since better weather may result in more sub activity against trade convoys. Since recent experience confirms strongly that extended sweeps at high speed especially during daylight is most effective against present sub tactics, corvettes should be withdrawn rather than DDs-in general, consider coastal convoy escorts preferable to individual ship escorts and hunting by anti-submarine patrols of surface craft. Until sufficient number planes and suitable escort vessels are available for running down and staying with sub contacts developed, and for comprehensive coastal convoy system, to minimize danger coastal patrol traffic from subs recommend employment measures suggested by CESF in his study serial 979 and partial establishment coastal convoys for appropriate categories or vessels with especially valuable cargoes.
 
     
          Having thus concurred in the steps already taken to alleviate conditions on this coast Cinclant went on to make other proposals for subsidiary methods of protection. In so doing he revealed two significant factors in the situation. The fabric of shipping is closely interwoven; no single strand can be broken or snarled without destroying the basic pattern of the commerce of the world. What is happening on the east coast of this country directly effects the fortunes of our allies across the sea. In the second place, Cinclant implies that there are more ways to increase the strength of forces in one area than by building additional units or depriving some other sector of needed protection. Ships slipping through the large meshes of loose organization can be caught and utilized if the net of administration is tightened up. These points were made in the following section of his dispatch of March:  
     
 
 
 
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The following factors are related to the whole situation in the Atlantic and appropriate measures as practicable would help the general situation: (A) Reduction Atlantic, Gulf, Coastal traffic by prosecution pipe line projects and rail routing freight and troops as far as possible along the route. (B) By avoiding delays caused by unexpected demands and changes in sailing dates, regular scheduling troop movements and punctuality in meeting dates, would permit better employment of fleet vessels and more accurate planning. (C) If cycle were increased to eight weeks additional fleet DDs could be made temporarily available to Sea Frontiers between Magnet Convoys. (D) Increase in number of district patrol squadrons. (E) To cover inland routes like Cape Ann, Cape Cod area, and Block Island area, as protection to coastal trade routes, and as menace to subs, ultimate laying of mine fields along the coastal shelf. Until TERROR is finished middle of year no large mine layers available, and availability of mines unknown.
 
     
          These two dispatches were both based upon the assumption that the convoy system was the most effective method of protection that could be used against the submarine, but both recognized that introduction of the system must wait upon the accumulation of sufficient forces. In the absence of such forces the decision was reached to continue the methods of defense proposed by CESF on February 25, while investigating the kind of organization that could be used when the time came to begin the convoy.  
     
          On March 16th Cominch informed Cinclant, CESF, CGSF, and CCSF that they should send representatives to a conference to arrange for a convoy system for the East Coast-Caribbean area. The discussions would begin not later than March 20th and would be held in the Navy Department.  
     
 
 
 
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  Captain T. R. Kurtz, the Chief of Staff, and Captain F. G. Reinicke, the New York Port Director appeared as the representatives of CSEF. On the 27th the Conference presented Cominch with a comprehensive report on the whole subject.  
     
          Two facts conditioned the nature of the whole system. An average of 35 vessels a day left the Gulf-Caribbean area for northern ports, a fact that determined the number of convoys necessary. These ships were about evenly divided between the Gulf and the Caribbean so it was necessary to have two routes along which the vessels that could be efficiently run in convoy was 40-50 this meant that one convoy had to be sent over each route every three days. The conference recommended that one of the southern termini be placed at Key West and the other somewhere "in the natural focus of the remaining routes of this trade," preferably Guantanamo. Vessels over 15 and under 10 knots would sail independently.  
     
          A schedule and a route were proposed by the members of the committee. The Key West convoy would leave port at 0200 arriving at Rebecca Shoals about daylight. After rounding the shoals the ships would form up in a double or triple column, but not in a broad front, for passage through the Florida Straits. On the morning of the following day they would be at the northern end of the Straits. Once there the ships would form up in accordance with standard ocean convoy procedure and proceed along the northern route on the axis or slightly west of the Gulf Stream. Four days after departure from Key West, in the forenoon, a  
     
 
 
 
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position off the Virginia Capes would be reached. Here the ships for Norfolk and Chesapeake Bay and those proceeding north via the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal would be detached. Other ships, bound north, from Norfolk or the Chesapeake would come out to join the convoy under local escort.
  
 
 
 
        By evening of the same day the convoy would arrive off the Delaware Capes where ships for Philadelphia would be detached. Five days out, at 0600, the convoy would reach Ambrose. Here it would be broken up with ships for New York going into port and ships bound farther north sailing independently via Long Island Sound, and the Cape Cod Canal. At Boston, the southern termini of the HX convoys, they would join other ships bound for Halifax.
  
 
 
 
        Southbound traffic would proceed in the same fashion in reverse, leaving from New York or Hampton Roads in the early morning. These convoys would follow a route west of the northbound ships, clear of the Stream.
  
 
 
 
        Six escort groups would be required to implement this system, four at sea and two lying over. The six-day lie-over cycle would be divided at either end of the routes.
  
 
 
 
        This schedule represented the ultimate hopes of the Conference. It was recognized that some time would pass before ships could be found to fulfill the requirements. Therefore, a set of alternatives were set up. Until escort vessels were available the northern terminus would be Hampton Roads instead of New York.
  
     
 
 
 
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  When the convoy broke up off the Virginia Capes all those ships bound for NOrfolk or Chesapeake Bay ports would go into the Bay along with the escort vessels. Other ships proceeding by inland water routes would start up the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. The vessels that remained would go on to New York independently by daylight and under air coverage. These, it was believed, would usually arrive in time to anchor inside the Delaware breakwater by nightfall, but if delayed they would be instructed to remain inside Chesapeake Bay until next morning. Lynnhaven Roads was the northern terminus where the convoys would be formed up.  
     
          The other route -- Guantanamo to New York -- required less manipulation. It was recommended that convoys between these two ports should form up and take a prescribed unbroken course north and south. It can be seen that this proposed convoy system followed very closely the suggestions made by CESF in his letter to Cominch on February 25th.  
     
          An important question in connection with these convoys was the command relations. The Conference recommended the following procedure:  
     
          1. Convoys and escorts should be controlled strategically by the respective Sea Frontiers while within the Frontiers.  
     
          2. Control would shift at the expected time of crossing boundaries rather than on a purely navigational basis.  
     
          3. All escort groups for both the Gulf and Caribbean convoys would be placed in a single task group under a Task Group Commander who, in turn, would be under CESF in order to insure unity of Command.  
     
          On March 2nd. Cominch returned the report of this conference with his approval. He estimated that the Hampton Roads-Key West convoy  
     
 
 
 
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  would be ready by May 15th and the Guantanamo-New York convoy, by sometime in July. He further ordered that CESF should control all escort of convoy operations on the Atlantic seaboard between Boston and the Caribbean through the medium of Task Groups Commanders who would be the other Commanders of the interested Frontiers. Cominch further stipulated that CESF was delegated all necessary power to integrate this plan and to deal directly with the agencies concerned.  
     
          Thus, by the end of March, the plan for the convoy system was thoroughly developed. But it rested upon the operations of a force estimated by the conference as 31 destroyers and 47 corvettes or PCs. On the day that the report of the Conference was sent to Cominch there were in the Eastern Sea Frontier three destroyers on temporary duty, no corvettes, three PCs and 5 SCs.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
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