EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
WAR DIARY
MARCH 1942
  
     
 
CHAPTER VII
  
 
 
 
THE MERCHANT SEAMEN
  
     
          In the last war one of the most persuasive arguments against the convoy system that the Admiralty could think of was based upon the assumption that merchant captains would be incapable of keeping station in the convoy formation. Such fears, in the event, proved groundless, but the argument is suggestive of the degree to which the success of anti-submarine warfare depends upon the intelligence and skill of ship masters.  
     
          During the last three months, the courage and patience, as well as the ability of the merchant seamen, have been put to the test within the dangerous waters of the Frontier. The courage required to take vessels through waters where shipmates have perished and the masts of sunken ships stand as warning tombstones is apparent, but the other qualities required of crews and masters have, perhaps, received less public recognition. To keep station in convoy, to follow routing instructions, to sail as close inshore as safe navigation permits, demands a degree of skill and training not ordnarily needed in the merchant marine. In addition, a hundred restrictions now fence about the master who used to movewith relative freedom along the sea lanes. Before a trip can begin, there must be discussions with port directors, or conferences with naval officers and other merchant captains. Departures must be made at a designated time, the ship must proceed through designated channels,  
     
 
 
 
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  the voyage must be broken at designated places along the coast. At sea, the ship must keep radio silence and run through the night without benifit of lights. The master must know recognition signals and be prepared to use them; he must be familiar with signal codes. naval procedure, and methods of identification for enemy ships and aircraft. And in all his relations with the Navy that is seeking to protect him, he must deal with naval officers new to the business of actual war, and with reserve officers new to the Navy.  
     
          Recent events have demonstrated that officers and men of the merchant marine have, on the whole, adjusted themselves successfully to the strange and dangerous conditions; but they have also revealed how great are the obstacles lying in the way of adjustment. Some of these events are worthy of consideration.  
     
          It has, in the first place, been difficult to obtain adequate and efficient crews. One chief mate complained of the "usual troubles -- that is they all got drunk in port and were hard to handle." As the weeks went by, they were not only hard to handle, they were increasingly hard to find. After a typical trip, one captain stated that it was impossible to keep a good crew on board, that on making his home port he lost thirteen of a crew of thirty. Another more emotional master gave as his opinion, that unless the Navy forced personnel of tankers to sail, shipping would stop and he himself would wind up in a morgue. This was taking too jaundiced a view of the matter, but there is no doubt that the constant shifting of crews and the shortage of men was causing great concern along the coast. A board appointed by the petroleum industry to  
     
 
 
 
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investigate conditions, called particular attention to this problem, but recognized that its solution would come only with increased protection and security for the ships and men. The loss of manpower was felt particlarly among the licensed personnel, especially the engineers, who could find safer jobs at much higher pay ashore.
  
 
 
 
        Not only was it difficult to find enough trained men to man the ships, but the loyalty of some of those who did sign on was suspected. The files of the District Intelligence Offices are filled with the names of sailors who are believed to have sympathy for the enemy cause. The number of actual agents is certainly small, but the realization that there were at least some, caused concern to the masters and the shipping companies. That there was and still is Axis activity among the crews cannot be doubted. Even innocent and wholly loyal crew members could still be used by "suspicious characters" as sources of information. Places like the Highway Tavern, Old Hamburg, and Schmidt's in Bayonne were favorite hangouts for the agents. The bartender at one of these places had been a butcher on the MANHATTAN and AMERICA and was thus familiar with the shipping world. The son of the proprietor of another, worked in the commissary department of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey where, it was presumed, he obtained valuable information that assisted in quizzing the seamen who came to the bar. Various other tricks were resorted to; the most ingenious and least successful being the anonyomous telefhone call. Wives of men on ships would be called and asked by a feminine voice,
  
     
 
 
 
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"Has Charlie gotten back yet," or questions of a similar nature. This ruse rarely worked and indeed it is hard to determine why so much time was spent trying to obtain such information about coastwise shipping. As the report of one of the District Intelligence Offices said, the submarines could lie off focal points up and down the coast and await the arrival of ships without having any previous knowledge of sailing times.
  
 
 
 
        Of more immediate concern to the masters is the difficulty presented by navigation under existing conditions. The shipping lanes in January and February lay so close together that vessels running at night without lights were in some danger of collision. In the course of the last month, there were several accidents of this nature, though most of them caused only minor damage. But the existence of the possibility persuaded masters to disobey routing instructions upon occasion. One day in February, an airplane found that in one small area, fifteen out of thiryt ships sighted were off the prescribed sea lanes. The alteration of the shipping routes at the beginning of this month has done much to reduce the danger and increase the willingness of captains to follow routing instructions.
  
 
 
 
        The provision that vessels must keep as close to shore as safe navigation permits, had likewise increased the hazards of the voyages. These risks are revealed in the experiences of the S.S. RARITAN bound from Bonventura for New York City with a cargo of coffee in February. On leaving the canal, she was given two positions, one off Jacksonville, the other off Diamond Light, by which she should guide her course. While at sea off Florida, these orders were changed by a code message advising
  
     
 
 
 
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her to remain as close inshore as possible. Throughout the trip north, the weather was extremely bad. The captain stayed on deck for ten straight days without even taking off his shoes. On the twenty-fourth, the RARITAN was very close to Frying Pan Shoals but since the exact position was uncertain due to bad weather, the captain had been unable to get a fix for some time. About midnight, the ship grounded on a shoal eighteen miles off Cape Fear. The crew was rescued but the vessel broke up the next day. Casualties of this sort at a time when the normal hazards of winter weather were heightened by the necessity for inshore navigation were to be expected, and it is remarkable that there have not been more of them.
  
 
 
 
        Less dangerous, but more iritating for the masters, were the various incidents that arose out of the inevitable misinterpretations of the newly prescribed regulations. At Norfolk for instance, the S.S. MALCHACE was given two sets of clearance signals, one for the 18th of February and one for the 19, since it was uncertain on which day the ship would depart. On the afternoon of the 18, she passed through the net using the signals for that day. The ship anchored overnight just outside the net, getting underway the next morning using the signals for the 19. A patrol boat stopped her and "raised a little hell" with the master advising him that he had to use the signals in force on the day he passed through the net. A half hour of debate ensued while the two ships drifted, the master maintaining the signals for the day were to be used, the skipper of the patrol boat equally positive that he should have used the signals for the day before when he passed through the net. No solution was
 
     
 
 
 
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possible since each proved adamant. The master said he was acting on the instructions of the Port Director of Norfolk and that he and his friends "don't know who's right and who's wrong when officers disagree and contend." He hoped that officers would "get together and formulate some plan."
  
 
 
 
        There were times of course when the merchant ships did not respond properly to recognition signals and there were other times when the members of the Inshore Patrol got confused. Just after dark on March 21, the S.S. OLNEY, off Fernandina, saw a Navy patrol boat about a mile inshore. The patrol boat turned a searchlight on teh OLNEY, silhouetting the ship against the sky when viewed from the sea, and signalled, "what ship?" The master replied with his call number and added, "Shut off that goddam bright light."
  
 
 
 
        Of all the ships along the coast in the past few months, the E. R. KEMP probably had the worst time. Her sailings were delayed by the necessity of looking for more crewmembers and when they were found, there were further delays caused by naval "red tape" in hte various ports. The captain, a nervous man to begin with, became increasingly upset over the situation , a condition aggravated, it was said, by loss of sleep. The chief mate was "insensed" over the state of coastwise shipping and declared that tankers had no protection whatsoever. Due to his experience in the First World War, he knew that the Germans had refueling places on this coast which he believed should be sought out and constantly attacked. The captain agreed with his mate; he was in fact, very badly disposed toward the Navy because of "too much ultra efficiency and red tape in port."
  
     
 
 
 
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        On one dark night in March, the E. R. KEMP sent out an SOS. After that nothing was heard from her until the following day when she safely made port in Charleston. When the radio operator was questioned about the affair, he protested that he was just a country boy from Texas who didn't want to get into trouble over distress signals. But he did add that on the previous night he was told by the captain to stand by for a distress signal as a suspicious craft had been sighted. A few moments later the captain had called down the speaking tube to send out at message. Later the captain appeared in the radio room and told the radio operator that there had been a misunderstanding. He had merely given the country boy orders to go to bed. What the truth of the matter was it is impossible to say, but it was quite definitely the opinion of the radio operator that the captain spent far too much time playing poker with the chief engineer when he should have been running the ship. It is further known that the captain rarely complies with routing instructions and is of the considered opinion that he knows a good deal more about navigation than the United States Navy.
  
 
 
 
        Ships of this sort were rare in these coastal waters during the past few months. Most of the officers and men took their chances, accepted the inconveniences, and tried to reduce the risks by conscientious and courageous action. They complained, with some reason, that they had insufficient protection, that there were sometimes needless delays, that they saw too few warships on the surface, and too few planes in the sky, but they maintained their own morale and they kept the cargoes moving.
  
     
 
 
 
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