DE635/A16-3 U. S. S. ENGLAND (DE 635) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Serial No. 022 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
c/o Fleet Post Office, | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
San Francisco, Calif., | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2 June 1944. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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1. On 18 May underway from Purvis Bay, Florida Island, Solomons Islands, in company with U.S.S. GEORGE (DE 697), with ComCorDiv 39 aboard as OTC, U.S.S. RABY (DE 698), and with ComCortDiv 40 aboard the ENGLAND. Underway prior dusk on orders from Commander Third Fleet to intercept a Japanese Submarine believed headed for Buin (Southern tip of Bouganville) with supplies. This submarine was intercepted and destroyed by five projector Mk. 10 attacks with hits on the second and fifth attacks. Patrolled in area and up the possible track of the submarine (if this was submarine we were after he was 24 hours ahead of schedule) during the night and until late in the afternoon of the next day. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2. In the late afternoon of the 20th formation changed course to proceed and patrol area as shown on Enclosure (h), as it was believed seven Japanese submarines were taking station on this line. We were to arrive area on dawn of the 22nd. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
3. On 22 May at 0350 Love the GEORGE made radar contact on a surfaced submarine which was subsequently destroyed by projector Mk. 10 hits delivered by the ENGLAND after he submerged. This is believed to have been #1 submarine on the line. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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CONFIDENTIAL U. S. S. ENGLAND (DE 635) | ||||
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4. At 0605, 23 May, the RABY made radar contact on a surfaced submarine which was subsequently destroyed by projector Mk. 10 hit delivered by the ENGLAND. This is believed to have been #3 submarine on the line. | ||||
5. At 0120 Love, 24 May, the GEORGE made radar contact on a surfaced submarine which is believed to have been destroyed by projector Mk. 10 attack delivered by the ENGLAND, although evidence was not conclusive until the next day at 1300 Love when we recovered more debris. | ||||
6. At 0944, 24 May, the ENGLAND made sound contact on a submarine. Two projector Mk. 10 attacks were made by the ENGLAND with no success. The ENGLAND conned the GEORGE in for a 32 charge creeping attack and seven minutes after the GEORGE dropped, the ENGLAND dropped a thirteen charge pattern on doubtful contact. No evidence of damage, contact was not regained. This is believed to have been #5 submarine in the line. | ||||
7. At 1120 26 May the ENGLAND and the RABY made radar contact on a surfaced submarine which was subsequently destroyed by projector Mk. 10 hit delivered by the ENGLAND. At time of contact ships were proceeding Seeadler Harbor for logistics. | ||||
8. On the morning of 26 May the ENGLAND rendezvoused with Task Group 30.4 to give CTG 30.4 all pertinent information connected with the sub hunt. Rendezvoused with RABY and GEORGE again at sunset at which time all ships changed course for Seeadler where we were to arrive at dawn 27 May. Due to sub contact and attacks, however, we did not arrive until 1500 27 May. | ||||
9. Remained anchored overnight in Seeadler Harbor and got underway at 1800, 28 May to continue the hunt. The U.S.S. SPANGER (DE 696) had joined our group after having brought the ENGLAND, GEORGE and RABY two hundred and fifty projector Mk. 10 charges apiece, from Purvis Bay. | ||||
10. On the night of 30 May, while patrolling the line, the GEORGE and RABY left the formation to assist two destroyers, the U.S.S. HERMAN and the U.S.S. HAZELWOOD in a submarine contact. The ENGLAND and SPANGLER continued on patrol. | ||||
11. On the night of 31 MAy while conducting patrol of the line, TBS conversation was heard between the GEORGE and the RABY. From this it was gathered they had contact on a submarine, and course was changed to close. Arrived in the area about 0500 and commenced to circle on 5000 yard circle. The OTC had previously ordered the GEORGE and RABY to hold contact until dawn and then attacks would commence. The attacks commenced as scheduled and the GEORGE, RABY, SPANGLER and ENGLAND attacked in that order, with ENGLAND obtaining a hit. This submarine is believed destroyed. | ||||
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CONFIDENTIAL U. S. S. ENGLAND (DE 635) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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12. From information gathered after our arrival in this area from CCD39, it is considered possible that there had been two and possibly three submarines in this area. The OTC informed us on our arrival that the GEORGE, on the 30th, had hit a submerged submarine with projector Mk. 10 charges. At noon on the 31st there were three distinct oil slicks in the area, one from the submarine hit by the ENGLAND, one about four miles northwest of this, and still another about eleven miles northwest of the second one. It is believed possible that a submarine had come from Truk to fuel the submarines that were thought to be in the line. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
13. The contacts may be summarized as follows: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Note: Column four above includes salvos fired by GEORGE, RABY, SPANGLER and ENGLAND. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
14. It is to be noted that on four occasions violent underwater explosions followed hits by Projector Mk. 10 charges. The time of the | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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CONFIDENTIAL U. S. S. ENGLAND (DE 635) | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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explosion after the hit varied from two to seven and one quarter minutes. This explosion is possibly self destruction when all hope of saving the sub is lost. The explosion is so intense, however, that it is believed to be an explosion of their torpedo war heads. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
15. In the action reports covering these engagements the number of hit by Projector Mk. 10 charges has been estimated. This estimation is based on two things: (1) the number of detonations believed heard and (2) the intensity of the explosions. Since the first is very hard to judge correctly, this is not dependable; and, since no officer or man aboard has ever knowingly heard one projector charge go off, there is nothing relative to the explosion on which an accurate estimation of the number of charges that went off can be determined. Consequently the hits listed are believed to be a minimum. It was previously believed that if one charge exploded the rest would counter mine; this, however, was not the case, as the intensity of the explosions varied considerably. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
16. In the period covered by this report the ENGLAND fired fifteen salvoes from the projector Mk. 10 with a full pattern each time. Only one salvo were there any duds. On this salvo one charge failed to leave the projector and one charge blew off its tail assembly and had an erratic flight. The pin was replaced in the dud and the charge was lowered over the side. Of the fifteen salvoes fired it is believed all were fired with submarine contact except possibly one that was fired after a hit had been obtained. It is believed this one was fired on disturbance in the water. Runs, salvos and hit per sub are shown below: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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17. The type submarine encountered in these attacks is not known. However, it is believed the one destroyed north of Bouganville was of the large cruiser type as it was most probably carrying supplies to Bouganville. This is probably why it took hits from two salvos to finally down him, whereas the others were probably destroyed with a hit from one salvo. Also on the first hit on the first sub his depth was only one hundred feet, and the hits are not as likely to do as much damage as they | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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CONFIDENTIAL U. S. S. ENGLAND (DE 635) | ||||
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would had he been deeper. It is to be noted that all other hits indicated submarine depth from 175 feet to 300 feet. | ||||
18. It is believed that normally a hit on a submarine with one salvo of projector Mk. 10 charges will be lethal, unless perhaps, only one charge hits the submarine either well forward or well aft. In every attack in the operations covered by this report, where hits were obtained, several pieces of deck planking were among the debris, and it is believed if charges hit to blow loose deck planking there are others near enough to his hull to be lethal. In no instance on any of these attacks, while we were recovering debris, were there any signs of human remains; however, in every case numerous sharks were seen in and around the area. Sometimes as many as twelve or fourteen would be visible at one time. | ||||
19. The tactics encountered in these attacks seem more or less standard with a few exceptions. Almost all of the attacks were characterized with a slow speed of the submarine, which was, in most instances, between 0 to 3 knots. One thing was noted - when the submarine was not under attack, or no ship had contact, he would try to clear the area at speeds of 3 to 6 knots. In two or three instances it is possible the submarine either stopped or backed down just prior to firing time. Most of the time the submarine would present his stern and if he did not, he would always be in a turn. It was quite common for the submarine to take advantage of the wake of the firing ship, and on one occasion a sub followed up our wake at a speed of 4-5 knots, whereas at firing time he had been going very slow. | ||||
20. Enclosure (H) gives the positions of attacks according to the England. These positions varied from ship to ship due overcast weather conditions and a drift varying from .8 knot to 1.4 knots with a set of W x N and WNW. It is believed, however, that the oil slicks reported by planes near our attack positions for #1 and #7 submarines are from the submarines hit by the ENGLAND, as no other attacks were reported in these areas by either planes or surface craft. | ||||
21. In the reports on all attacks the question as to where the evidence (debris recovered and oil samples) is forwarded is left blank, because, as of this writing it is still aboard. It will be so held pending disposition as directed by Commander Third Fleet. | ||||
22. The success obtained in this operation is due to several factors: (1) accuracy of information regarding submarine positions, (2) teamwork and cooperation by the USS GEORGE, USS RABY and later the USS SPANGLER, and (3) training of officers and men in ASW operations prior to commissioning. The contact with the enemy submarine on 19 May was the ENGLAND's first contact with the enemy. The Commanding Officer is more than satisfied with the way all hands conducted themselves and the way the | ||||
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equipment functioned. The team operated as a unit and functioned with little or no confusion. During the attacks the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer were interchangeable at the conn and both obtained hits. The ASW officer, Ensign A.D. Daily, operated the recorder on all attacks, and hits were obtained with three different soundmen on the stack as follows: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1. AYERS, Paul E., 863 98 73, SoM3c - 1 salvo hit. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
2. BERNHARDT, Roger E., 726 68 46, SoM3c - 3 salvos hit. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
3. PROCK, John D., 876 38 07, SoM2c - 3 salvos hit. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
CIC was a part time job for the Executive and Communications Officers, while GRANZELLA, Nelson, 375 78 50, CQM(PA), did most of the plotting. As on any Anti-Submarine team that functions properly, there were no stars. All hands lived up to the standards that can be expected of them by the United States Navy. The Commanding Officer is proud of the teamwork and efficiency that was displayed. All hands are looking forward to more opportunities to damage the enemy. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
23. Positions at 0800, 1200 and 20000 for this operation are given below: | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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W. B. PENDLETON. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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CCD 40/A16-3 U.S.S. ENGLAND (DE 635) 4 June 1944 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
1st Endorsement | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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1. Forwarded. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
C. A. THORNWALL. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
FBE4-39/ | ||||||||
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET |
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ESCORT DIVISION THIRTY-NINE |
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USS SPANGLER(DE696) | ||||||||
June 17, 1944 | ||||||||
CONFIDENTIAL | ||||||||
SECOND ENDORSEMENT to | ||||||||
DE635/A16-3 | ||||||||
Serial 022 | ||||||||
Dated 2 June 1944 | ||||||||
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1. Forwarded. | ||||||||
2. Apparently enclosures (A) to (F) inclusive were forwarded under individual endorsements separately. | ||||||||
3. Enclosures (G) and (h) are forwarded herewith. | ||||||||
HAMILTON HAINES | ||||||||
Copy to: | ||||||||
CCD 40 | ||||||||
USS ENGLAND | ||||||||
Advance Copy to: | ||||||||
Cominch | ||||||||
Comdespac | ||||||||
COMSOPAC FILE | ||||||||||||||
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA AND FORCE |
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER |
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A16-1/(322) | ||||||||||||||
Serial 001643 | ||||||||||||||
21 JUL 1944 | ||||||||||||||
TOP SECRET | ||||||||||||||
3rd Endorsement on | ||||||||||||||
CO USS ENGLAND | ||||||||||||||
conf. ltr. A16-3 ser. | ||||||||||||||
022 dated 2 June 1944. | ||||||||||||||
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1. Forwarded. | ||||||||||||||
2. Inasmuch as some data in the basic letter and enclosure (H) thereto, is based on information of a high classification, this entire report is reclassified as TOP SECRET. | ||||||||||||||
3. Only two copies of each attack report were submitted. Since both are required by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. ENGLAND is directed, by copy of this endorsement, to submit an additional copy for the files of this Command. | ||||||||||||||
4. Debris and oil samples collected by the U.S.S. ENGLAND will be forwarded to the Director, Naval Engineering Experiment Station, Annapolis, Maryland, when received. | ||||||||||||||
5. The remarks of the Commanding Officer, commending his crew, are heartily concurred in. From the results reported, it is obvious that the entire crew functioned as a smoothly working, deadly attack team. Likewise, freedom from material failure throughout the two week period covering the attacks indicates an enviable standard of material readiness. It is believed that the damage inflicted on enemy submarines by the U.S.S. ENGLAND compares favorably with the best results obtained by any vessel during this war. | ||||||||||||||
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COMSOPAC FILE | ||
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA AND FORCE |
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER |
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A16-1/(322) | ||
Serial 001643 | ||
21 JUL 1944 | ||
Subject: Anti-Submarine Actions by U.S.S. ENGLAND - Report of. | ||
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6. It is noted in four of the seven actions covered by these reports, violent underwater explosions occurred from two to seven minutes after hedgehog hits on the submarine. In one other case, similar explosions occurred six hours after a successful hedgehog attack. The cause of these explosions continues to be a mystery. The following have been suggested: | ||
(a) Timed explosive charge fired at attacking ship. | ||
(b) Torpedo or other heavy charge fired to injure sound gear of attacking ship. | ||
(c) Heavy charge, containing oil and pieces of debris, to simulate destruction of the submarine and to aid in evasive action or escape. | ||
(d) Detonation of torpedo warheads within the submarine to provide certain destruction of the submarine and personnel when severe damage makes escape impossible. | ||
Assumptions (a) and (b) are believed to be false since no sip was damaged and all explosions were so deep as to have no surface indication. Between (c) and (d), it is difficult to choose. However, the evidence would seem to favor (d) - self destruction - for the following reasons: | ||
(1) Explosions occurred only after hits by hedgehogs, which in themselves would produce severe if not lethal damage. In the case of the May 19th action, the first successful attack brought up some debris, but contact was regained and the major portion of the debris and oil appeared after a violent explosion following the second successful attack. | ||
(2) The violent explosions seem to have occurred in the immediate vicinity of the sub. In the May 22 action, for example, traces of the sub were still good for a few seconds after the violent explosion, then seemed | ||
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COMSOPAC FILE | ||
SOUTH PACIFIC AREA AND FORCE |
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER |
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A16-1/(322) | ||
Serial 001643 | ||
21 JUL 1944 | ||
Subject: Anti-Submarine Actions by U.S.S. ENGLAND - Report of. | ||
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to spread out like a very large knuckle. In the case of the violent explosion occurring only two minutes after hedgehog hits, it would seem unlikely that enough time had elapsed to propel a heavy explosive charge a safe distance from the submarine. | ||
(3) Perhaps the strongest argument is that contact was not regained after four of the heavy explosions, although three ships conducted an extensive search in each case. In two cases bubbling oil slicks were observed 14 to 16 hours after the successful attacks. | ||
7. Enclosure (A) to this endorsement presents a composite picture of the action on the night of 30/31 May. The attacks pictured were originally thought to be on one submarine. However, in view of the underwater explosions it is now considered very likely that there was more than one. | ||
J. H. NEWTON | ||
Copies to: | ||
ComCortDiv 39 (less enclosure (A)) | ||
ComCortDiv 40 " " " | ||
CO U.S.S. ENGLAND " " " | ||
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Cinpac File | ||||||||||
UNITED STATE PACIFIC FLEET |
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AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS |
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HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF |
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A16-3/AS | ||||||||||
Serial 000684 AUG 1 1944 | ||||||||||
4th Endorsement on | ||||||||||
CO USS ENGLAND conf. | ||||||||||
ltr. A16-3 Ser. 022 | ||||||||||
dated 2 June 1944. | ||||||||||
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1. Forwarded, concurring in general with the remarks submitted in the 3rd endorsement. The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, is very proud of the officers and men of the U.S.S. ENGLAND who performed their mission against enemy submarines in a superb and successful manner. | ||||||||||
2. Cincpac concurs with ComSoPac in the opinion that at least some of the extremely heavy explosions which have occurred on several occasions usually several minutes subsequent to reported hits by hedgehogs (or depth charges) are most likely caused by self destruction. | ||||||||||
C. H. McMORRIS | ||||||||||
Chief of Staff | ||||||||||
Copy to: | ||||||||||
CO USS ENGLAND | ||||||||||
ComCortDiv 39 | ||||||||||
ComCortDiv 40 | ||||||||||
DE635/A16-3 U. S. S. ENGLAND (DE 635) | ||||||||||||||||||||
Serial No. 022 | ||||||||||||||||||||
c/o Fleet Post Office, | ||||||||||||||||||||
San Francisco, Calif., | ||||||||||||||||||||
CONFIDENTIAL 14 June 1944. | ||||||||||||||||||||
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1. It is requested that Enclosure (H) to reference (a) be changed from "SECRET" to "TOP SECRET" and that it be destroyed by burning after it has served its purpose. | ||||||||||||||||||||
2. Above mentioned enclosure is a plotting sheet tracing of operations of this vessel from 22 May to 31 May 1944. | ||||||||||||||||||||
3. All addressees were furnished a copy of subject enclosure. | ||||||||||||||||||||
W. B. PENDLETON. | ||||||||||||||||||||