U-25 - 2nd War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with help from Andi Forster

Departed	Date	Arrived	Date	Days at Sea
Wilhelmshaven	13 January 1940	Wilhelmshaven	19 February 1940	38

 

Click the icon to download a KMZ file displaying the U-boat track, significant events and locations for this patrol.  You must have Google Earth loaded on your computer to view this file.  Download Google Earth here

 

Ships Hit
Date	KTB Time	Position	Ship	Tons	Nationality	Convoy
17 Jan 40	12.55	60°57'N, 1°7.5'W	POLZELLA	4,751	British
17 Jan 40	13.15 - 14.10	60°57'N, 1°7.5'W	ENID	1,140	Norwegian
18 Jan 40	16.25 - 17.03	59°9'N, 5°48'W	PAJALA	6,873	Swiss
22 Jan 40	13.22	49°27'N, 13°05'W	SONGA	2,589	Norwegian
3 Feb 40	14.32	38°27'N, 11°18'W	ARMANISTAN	6,805	British	OG-16
13 Feb 40	07.16	60°51'N, 0°36'W	CHASTINE MAERSK	5,177	Danish
			Total = 27,335
Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

---

			K  r  i  e  g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h                                                     " U 25 "
			Kommandant:  Korvettenkapitän Schütze
			Beginning:    03.01.1940
			Ending:        19.02.1940
				© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	- 1 -
		03.01.40	Wilhelmshaven	West shipyard.
		07.01.40		Detailed examination for the cause of the oil trace.
		08.01.40		Fuel oil loading at the U-boat base.
		09.01.40		Diving test in calm water, no oil trace.  The results lead to the conclusion that fuel in the harbor and from fuel loading in unfavorable locations flooded parts of the upper deck and gets stuck there.
		10.01-12.01.40		Making ready and equipping the boat at the U-boat base.
		13.01.40	Wilhelmshaven	Departed from the 3rd Entrance.
		01.34	NW 2, cloudy, Vis. medium, with dropping temperatures in the Jade, very heavy pack ice t	Moved down the Jade with an ice protector on the bow with one Sperrbrecher ahead and a tug in formation behind it.
				Because the ice protector is not constructed heavily enough, it is damaged at 8 knots speed
				Continued from this point at 4-5 knots.
		15.00	Schillig Roads	At the ice limit:  Trim test, afterwards continued transit.
		16.15		Released by Sperrbrecher in Wangerooger Channel.
		16.36	NW 2-3, cloudy, Vis. poor (misty)	Passed Lightship "F".
		20.00	AN 9571	Proceeded at GF via Norderney peacetime position on Route I.
		14.01.40
		00.00	Route I
		02.30	AN 6934	A great number of white lights shining about the entire horizon in sight.  Avoided.  (Fishermen??)
		08.05	AN 6434
			NW 3-4, Sea calm	Depth keeping practice.
				An under water telegraph tone "O" is frequently heard bearing 160°T (a U-boat in waiting station?)
		12.00	AN 6197	Course 340°.
			NW 2-3, Vis. medium, deteriorating	No observations.

	Sun and Moon Data 13.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 14.01.40

	- 2 -
		15.01.40	North Sea
		00.00	AN 4999	No observations.
			N 4-5, intensifying shifting clockwise, Sea 3, Vis. good	Course 350°.
		10.02	AN 4533	Enemy aircraft
			NbyW 7-8, heavy seas, Vis. good to moderate, occasional snow showers	Dived.  2 bombs far off, afterwards depth keeping practice.
		15.30	AN 4377	Surfaced.  On the surface at LF course 320°.  Conning tower hatch closed
			N 8-10, storm, high seas, Vis. changing
				Weapons use not possible.
		16.01.40	Southeast of the Shetlands
		00.00	AN 4268	No observations.
			Storm shifting clockwise, high Sea, short swell, partial cross sea
		07.00	AN 4261	Dived.  Work on torpedoes and engines.
			NW storm, very heavy squalls, Vis. changing	Depth keeping practice.
		13.00		Surfaced.
		15.20	AN 4232	Course 340°, weapons use not possible, enemy destroyer in sight bearing 270°T target angle 90°.
			NW 7-8, N-swells
		21.20	AN 2721	U-25 closed to range approximately 5000 meters.
		21.32	N 4-5, swells, bright moon	Destroyer turns toward suddenly.  Range quickly decreases.  Crash dive.  Apparently U-25 was not detected, still the destroyer remains nearby.  Maintained silence.
				Surfaced.  Transit speed, course 0°.
		17.01.40	Northeast of the Shetlands
		00.00	AN 9276	Transit speed, course 0°.
		05.50	N 5, in squalls N 7, Vis. medium to bad, very short seas	A dimmed steamer on a SW course, is pursued, however, was lost from sight in a rain squall.
		07.15	AF 7979	Course 270° south of 61°N.
			Vis. changing, occasional snow showers
		11.56	AF 7887	Steamer in sight bearing 0°, SSW course.
			Swells, cross seas, Vis. good	Dived.  Initiated approach. (south of 61°N)
		12.35		Shot at steamer.  Range approximately 3000 meters.
				Nationality not determined (approximately 1500 GRT).
				Missed.

	Sun and Moon Data 15.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 16.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 17.01.40

	- 3 -
		17.01.40
		12.55		Shot on the second steamer, was following the first one.  Steamer has 1 stack, several king posts (gray, without nationality markings, do not recognize flag, British auxiliary warship?) about 5500 GRT.  Can make out stern artillery.  Range = 1200 meters.
				Hit forward of the bridge, very heavy detonation.  Sheets of flame (munitions magazine?).  Steamer vanished in 12 seconds.
		13.15	AF 7879	Surfaced.  Pursued the first mentioned steamer.  Shot before the bow (4500 meters).  Steamer attempted to escape with changing courses.  Artillery bombardment.  After 3 shots the crew abandoned ship.  ("ENID", Norwegian, 1140 GRT)
				21 shots fired for effect.  7 hits observed, amidships, ship burning.
		14.10		Torpedo shot, foreship is hit and flies in the air (apparently cellulose).  Aftership burning.
				Sinking not observed, ship is considered as destroyed.
		14.15		Ran off on course 270° at GF.
		15.20		Dived for torpedo loading.  Worked on the diesels.
		17.10	Vis. deteriorating, heavy snow showers	Surfaced.  Course 225° at HF.
		18.01.40	West of the Shetlands
		00.00	AN 1139	Course 225°.
			Wind shifting to the N, Sea 2, long swells, Vis. changing
		07.15		Course 180°.
				Because weather conditions develop very favorably, searched the English exercise area between the Orkneys and the Herbrides
		10.46	AM 3467 to AM 3497	Back and forth.  No observations.
		14.30	Weather deteriorating, heavy squalls	Transit continued.  Course 270°.
		16.05	AM 3488	Steamer in sight to port.  Target angle 0°, range = estimated 3000 meters, becomes very indistinct in driving snow.  Because a dimmed English escort vessel is beside it, is assumed to be in convoy.  Surface attack, range estimated at 1500 meters
			Rough sea, NbyW 3-4, Vis. bad
		16.25	Vis. under 1000 meters	1st  shot:  Hit in foreship, lights go out; during the retreat (precautionary measure because the English escort is lost from sight) no results are determined.
		16.50		2nd  shot:  Miss probably because strong heeling of the boat the boat.
		17.03		3rd  shot:  Hit astern.

	Sun and Moon Data 17.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 18.01.40

	- 4 -
		18.01.40		Waited to observe the effect.  When the visibility improved somewhat, a very large Swedish tanker is made out clearly, the so previously estimated range was too great.
		17.18		The English escort performs rescue work.  The tanker sinks and disappears.
		17.26		While running off U-25 was suddenly taken under fire by cannons from 2 escort vessels.
		17.29		Crash dive.  Sound pursuit.
		18.30	Visibility improves, very bright moon, Sea rough, NbyE 3, cloudy	Surfaced, afterwards depth charges about 1500 meters distant.
				Course 270°, at GF.
		19.12		Mast to starboard (silhouette of the Nelson Class - 2 ships in line ahead formation).
				Internal rage could be read in everyone's eyes! "In the bow tubes only 1 torpedo and the most sought after target nearby!" - Crash dive.  Reloading, which was not possible earlier because of the sea state, could not be completed any faster.
				Initiated approach:  Enemy stopped.  Sounds could not be made out.  Shot a torpedo at estimated range = 1200 meters.  If there had been 4 in the tubes, it would have been a 4-fan.  No detonation!  Torpedo was heard for a long time. The appearance of the enemy does not change.  I approach to open up for a stern attack when the forms of a rock emerge.  It was the "Sulisker" rock which was not hit because the range was too great!
		19.50		Surfaced.  Correction after a navigation fix 4 nm.
		19.55		Enemy destroyer in sight.  I turned away and went to the south of the Sulisker rock.  Course 180°, GF.
		22.00	AM 3616	Course 225°, GF.
			Wind shifting to the right, freshening, Sea increasing
		22.35		Again a patrolling destroyer abeam to starboard, on opposite course.
		19.01.40	Northwest of the Herbrides	Course 245° cruising speed.
		00.00	AM 3441
			Wind increases heavily, shifting to the right, Vis. changing greatly
		08.00	AM 2698	Course 250°, 2 x HF, seas are heavy, running from astern.  Weapons hardly impossible.
			NE storm, high seas, long swells

	Sun and Moon Data 18.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 19.01.40

	- 5 -
		19.01.40
		10.50		Nevertheless a submerged attack is initiated on a steamer sighted (approximately 3-4000 GRT).  Shot precisely at target angle 90°.  Range = 2500-3000 meters.
		11.13		Firing data and aim point are very favorable.  Depth setting 7 meters.  Detonation early (heard after about after 20 seconds).  No effect observed on the target.  Failure must be due to too high/rough seas, boat can be held only athwart the seas.
				A repetition of the shot is no longer possible in the rough seas.
		12.00	AM 2814	Dived.  Work on torpedo armament and engines.
		15.53	AM 2817	Surfaced.  Continued on course 200°, HF.  No further observations.
			Rapidly changing unsettled weather, lower winds with heavy shifting gusts, short seas, hail showers, Vis. changing
		20.01.40	West of the Hebrides
		00.00	AM 2959	No observations.
		05.30	Weather as before very variable winds shifting to the SO and strengthening, Vis. often impaired in showers	It is suspicious that the numerous steam trawlers observed in this area in November are missing.
		12.00	AM 4657
			West of Ireland	Course 180°, HF.
			Weather shifting, Vis. mostly unusually fine.	No observations.
		21.01.40	Northwest of Ireland
		00.00	AM 7361
			SE 3-4, rapidly intensifying, Sea rough, Vis. changing greatly restricted in showers.	No observations.
		05.10	AM 7634
		08.00	SSE 7, high seas, swells, Vis. very good	Passed a single fishing trawler.  On course 190°, LF due to the heavy seas.

	Sun and Moon Data 19.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 20.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 21.01.40

	- 6 -
		21.01.40
		12.00	AM 7683	Dived.  Reset torpedoes.
		18.00	Heavy seas, long swells	Course 180°.  No observations.
				Weapons use not possible.
		22.01.40	West of the Channel entrance
		00.00	BE 3321	No observations.
			Slowly subsiding wind from the SSE (5-6), Vis. good	From a U-boat's weather report it can be taken that it is nearby.
				In accordance with a Radio Message from the B.d.U. a convoy left Gibraltar today at 11 knots.  I hope that U-44 serves as contact keeper.  By information available up to the present, fast convoys proceed off the coast (Finisterre).  I continued on course 180° and in the evening came to course for Cape Villano.
		07.45	BE 3617	After a celestial navigation fix difference between dead reckoning and actual position 21 nm, 280°T.
			Very light winds from the south, long swells, clear sky, Vis. very good
				Course 180° at HF.
				Attack weather.
		09.35	BE 3643	Smoke feather in sight.  Maneuvered ahead course 230°.
			Continued weather improvement
		10.05	Dived.  Initiated attack.  Shortly before shooting recognized Norwegian national insignia.
		11.04	Surfaced.  Warning shot ahead of the bow.  Steamer stopped.
		11.08	Crash dived on the basis of an incorrect observation (sighting of stern artillery on the steamer).  Maneuvered ahead to a firing position
		11.38	Surfaced, because there was no behavior contrary to international law by the steamer.  Range = 4500 meters.  3 shots ahead of the bow.  Steamer launched 2 boats, including a very good motorboat.  The large standoff is maintained, because steamer appears very suspicious.
			Listening to the Captain and examination of the papers gives the following result:  steamer "SONGA" (2595 GRT) under Norwegian flag, had accepted name and nationality only shortly before the departure from New York on tele-diagrammatic instruction, previously: "ADA" under the Panamanian flag.  Ship owner is Otto Behnke, London (up to 1938 Danzig)! Therefore the steamer is English property.  Besides, prohibited goods are aboard:  cotton, textile goods, spare parts for automobiles and engines according to information of the Captain, at least half of the cargo is prohibited goods.  Port of destination Atwerp-Rotterdam.  Captain stated he was already made aware pf the possibility, and expected to encounter an enemy check point, and with that enemy determination of banned goods. (Standing Navy Order No. 126).
			The entire crew was seen in the well-equipped boats, (motorboat with cutter in tow) and had apparently expected the sinking of the steamer.

	Sun and Moon Data 21.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 22.01.40

	- 7 -
		22.01.40
		13.22	BE 3593	Authorization for the destruction of the steamer is considered proved.  It was sunk with a torpedo coup de grace sinking after 7-8 minutes.
			S 2, long flat swells, cloudless, Vis. very good
		15.40		Course 180°, HF.
		18.05		At twilight (due to the risk of location particularly in view of the boats positioned nearby U-34 and U-55) sent an SOS on the steamer frequency with the name and location of the steamer to aid in the rescue of the SONGA crew.
		19.30	BE 3899	Course 160°.
			Weather deteriorating, freshening S 4-5, Vis. moderate, hazy horizon, short swells	No observations.
		23.01.40	Western Bay of Biscay
		00.00	BE 6342
			Increasing wind and Sea from the south, in spite of bright moonlight, Vis. moderate
		01.50		In accordance with B.d.U. 0021/23/64 2 English destroyers are located south of Portugal on a northerly course.  After plotting a meeting is possible at Villano.  This is the objective.
				However, there is also the possibility that both of the destroyers we are searching for are with the northbound convoy.
				I am hope for clarification in Radio Messages from U-41.
		08.00	BE 6655
			SbyE 6-7, and heavy Seas 5-6, short unpleasant swells
		12.00	BE 6697	No observations.
			Wind strength increasing in the storm, very heavy Sea, such that green seas break over the boat, Vis. medium	Weapons use is impossible.

	Sun and Moon Data 22.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 23.01.40

	- 8 -
		23.01.40
		13.30	BE 6931	Dived.  Reset the torpedoes.
				During Sunday received several αα short signals concerning two convoys running westward from the Channel which I cannot operate on because the range is too great.
				Knowledge of the previously unknown U-34 and U-35 operations area, which has now been ordered in connection with the convoys, is a relief.
				Because of bad weather, drove for 3 hours at depth 50 meters, for the peace of the crew.
		16.30	BE 6934	No observations.
			S 10, high Sea, short swell, Vis. changing
		20.30	South storm 11-12	αα short signal from U-44.
				Square CG 8255, convoy steering 350°, running at 8 knots.  I now operate on this convoy which, at the moment, is still more than 520 nm away.
				Because at present the weather is too bad to advance (at LF the bridge takes green seas) the visibility in rain and storm is virtually zero, I decide to dive again and wait for improvement in the weather.
		21.50		Dived.  From plotting the convoy will be positioned at Cap Finisterre the day after tomorrow in the evening.  However, I intend to go toward him first, to meet him before contact with "U-44" is broken.

Sun and Moon Data 23.01.40

	- 9 -
		24.01.40	Bay of Biscay
		00.00	BE 6962	LF 160°.
		06.35	BF 6969	Surfaced.
			Wind and seas have abated, heavy short swells, Vis. moderate to poor, quite bright, milky, cloudy, warm	HF course 160°.
				Still taking a lot of water at higher speed.
				Cape Villano will be reached today in the late evening.  By driving faster I will still meet the convoy in the coming night, however at present no increase in speed is possible.  Weapons use is still doubtful.
		08.15		αα short signal from U-44 (?) Convoy CG 8225.
				Agrees with plotting.
		12.00	BF 7142	No observations.
			Wind and Sea abating, swells are longer, Vis. sometimes very poor (fog)
		13.15	BF 7189	Correction after a navigation fix 135°T, 24 nm.  I will attempt to adjust course and speed so that I just meet the convoy at dawn to reduce the possibility of missing it.
		25.01.40	Bay of Biscay
		00.00	BF 7845	No observations
			SSW 2-3, long easy seas, Vis. moderate to very poor, fog banks and rain showers, bright	Course 160°.
		05.30	CG 2256	Course 180°.
			Weather as before, Vis. partly below 500 meters	Opposite the reported course line of the convoy.
				From plotting the convoy must come into sight about 09.00 hours.
		09.30	Vis. increasing rapidly, to the west about 10000 meters, to the east about 7000 meters, WSW 1-2, easy small waves	Exceptionally good attack weather.
				Instead of the convoy one steamer each is sighted at the limit of visibility to port and to starboard.  A new contact keeper message or bearing signal by U-44 would make the job very much easier, but it must be accepted that U-44 is executing another task after attacking.  A B-Dienst report correlates to him after which U-44 must have detached from the convoy.
		12.00	CG 2558	Because no more smoke clouds come in sight ahead,  I decide to turn and to catch up to the current predicted meeting point for the convoy.  Unfortunately, the proposed GF, which would have made possible it for me to reach the convoy with certainty at Cape Villano, is only a wish.  The starboard diesel has failed, a
			Vis. is very good

	Sun and Moon Data 24.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 25.01.40

	- 10 -
		25.01.40		stuck lubricating oil pump is not working.  Am now running 8-9 knots at HF in diesel-electric because the oil smoke development from the other diesel at more than HF is too great.
				Course 0°.
		16.30	CG 2283	While passing three separate steamers to starboard and port at the limit of visibility (more than 10 nm), suddenly 2 destroyers - apparently English - come into sight on a reciprocal heading.  Crash dive!  Initiated approach.  The destroyers which are heard very clearly throw depth charges (17 charges), even before I can make them out in the periscope.  I see a destroyer intermittently approximately 6000 meters away.  (S and T-class), target angle 90°, low speed, apparently listening.
			WSW 2-3, Sea 1-2, light swell, Vis. changing
		17.30
				I ran off on course 320° at periscope depth and after nightfall at depth 25 meters, because destroyer sounds were heard continually.
		19.50	CG 2256	Surfaced.
			Completely overcast, nevertheless very bright	Proceeding on diesel-electric on course 300°.
				Expect to complete repairs to the starboard diesel by tomorrow morning.
		21.56		Report from B.d.U. to U-44 saying that the sought after convoy had already been dissolved yesterday after shots on 2 steamers by U-44.   Now U-44 is positioned only about 20 nm southeast of U-25.  It [U-44] will probably run off again to the south.
		22.00	Vis. changing heavily, sometimes moderate
		26.01.40	East of Cape Villano
		00.00	CG 2218
			SW, light freshening, Sea choppy, rapidly building swell
		00.15		In accordance with Radio Message 2259/25/56 from B.d.U. 2 steamers with unknown escort vessels (therefore a convoy) are reported on a southerly course.  Because the courses are known quite accurately, the chances of meeting are high.  Unfortunately, my highest speed is 9-10 knots with heavy smoke and sparks.  The intention to cooperate with U-44 and occupy fixed positions (for example CG 2438 and 2517) in order to locate the enemy by day is thwarted by the failure of my starboard diesel.  I will now I try to proceed exactly on the reciprocal heading of the convoy and hope to find him.  U-44 will act independently and will certainly try to get to the enemy during the day.
		01.40	CG 2136	Course 26°, reciprocal heading to the enemy convoy.
			Vis. medium (2-3000 meters), quite bright, SW 4, Sea choppy, swells

	Sun and Moon Data 25.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 26.01.40

Excerpt from U-44 KTB concerning Radio Message 2259/25/56 from B.d.U. - 2 steamers

		26.01.40
		00.42		Radio Message 2259/25/56 received:
				U-25 and U-44 from B.d.U.
				Very, Very, Urgent.  Unknown unit with 2 steamers positioned at 20.00 hours BF 7594 and proceeding at 11 knots via BF 7846 and CG 2136 to CG 8245 left edge.

 

	- 11 -
		26.01.40
				Expect to meet at 02.45 hours if the enemy runs at 11 knots.
				No observations.
				Visibility is unsatisfactory.
				The U-boat warning messages sent yesterday did not apply to U-25.  The estimate of French Armed Forces in BF 7569 is a mistake, or are the French hunting their own submarines?
		05.00	BF 7874	To get away from the hostile U-boat hunting forces in the decreasing visibility, I came to course 320°.  The starboard diesel is in service again.  LF course 320°.
		10.00	BF 7725	Course 0°.
			SSW 3-4, light sea and swell, Vis. changing 2-3000 meters, occasional light rain	No observations in minimal visibility conditions.
		14.00		Course 45°.
		15.30	BF 7461	due to low visibility.
			Vis. under 1000 meters
		18.30	BF 7438	Sight only slightly better.  Continued on with the protection of darkness.  Course 45°, KF.
				No observations.
		27.01.40	NW of Cape Villano
		00.00	BF 7284	Radio Message from B.d.U.:  Execute supply as ordered in today's Radio Message for U-44 and under the same preconditions.  Confirm receipt of the named radio messages.  Report intentions and date.
				The thought behind the fuel oil supply operation is certainly to test the possibility altogether, follow-on applications play such an important role that other considerations must be put aside, since
				1)  my fuel oil supply of 58 tons is just enough, that with the greatest economy on the return transit, I can execute this task.
				2)  my small torpedo inventory (5 torpedoes) might be also used during the consumption of the existing fuel.
		00.20		Therefore I report:  To B.d.U. "Position BF 7284, proceeding southward, possibly during the night of 30-31 January.  Radio Message reception is confirmed.  Have only 5 torpedoes."  U-25,
				At once course 185°.  Diesel-electric HF, 8.5 knots.
		08.00	BF 7476	Transit speed course 185°.  Diesel-electric HF, 8.5 knots.
			SSW 2-3, choppy sea, light swell, Vis. good, cloudy	No observations.

	Sun and Moon Data 26.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 27.01.40

Excerpt from U-44 KTB concerning Radio Message 1837/25/49 - Resupply in Spain

		25.01.40
		20.28	Radio Message 1837/25/49 received.
				U-44 from B.d.U.:
				If observed, and there are difficulties with the authorities, declare a "distress situation".  Notify the Attaché, who will handle the situation and negotiate a stay of up to 24 hours.
				The instruction becomes worthless, as I can no longer execute supply, because of fuel inventory.  By optimistic calculation I could just manage with + 0.  Do not consider this supportable.  Plus I have only 3 torpedoes inside the boat.  During supply transfer of 4 upper deck torpedoes would be likely possible.  However, these are G7a, and are not suitable for convoy use during the day.
				Therefore the following intentions:
				1.)  go just south of 41°N 120-150 nm from land.
				2.)  there operate on independent ships with the one torpedo at hand, because 1 stern torpedo and 1 bow torpedo are necessary for the return transit.
				3.)  there try to transfer [upper deck torpedoes].
				4.)  Approximately 16 tons of fuel still remain for this.
		21.45	Therefore Radio Message 2002/25/55 sent to B.d.U.:
				Square CG 2298 23 January shot a steamer from a convoy, heavy depth charge pursuit.  Convoy lost.  A second steamer sunk at night.  No supply.  3 torpedoes in the boat.  Torpedo transfer not possible up to now.

 

	- 12 -
		12.00	BF 7842
			SW 3, Sea uniformly choppy, Vis. changing, patchy small rain showers
		21.25	CG 2271	Passed a passenger steamer to port, name and nationality not distinguishable.
			Very dark
		28.01.40	NW of Porto
		00.00	CG 2511	Course 185°, 8 knots.
			Becoming brighter, however Vis. changing, occasionally poor, SW 3-4, light Sea, low swell	The convoy reported on the afternoon of 26 January southwest of Cape Vincent must have passed if it steered north.  Possibility is taken as a given with the very low visibility.
		07.30	CG 2736	Course 180°, 8 knots.
			Heavily cloudy, light freshening SSW wind, Sea 3	No observations.
		12.00	CG 2769	No navigation check was possible for over 48 hours.
		20.00	CG 5139
		20.20	Very dark, Vis. sometimes bad	A steamer on a westerly course is suddenly in sight to starboard on the horizon in the clearing weather.
				Because there is still uncertainty about whether resupply will succeed, fuel must be conserved.  A pursuit of the sighted steamer would require several hours at high speed.
		29.01.40	West of Berlengas
		00.00	CG 5196	No observations.
			Wind and Sea sharply abating, Vis. improving	According to B.d.U. Radio Message 2335/28/94 there is a U-boat warning in CG 2286 (20.00 hours).  Not applicable to U-25 and - to judge so far - for U-44.  It seems that some nervousness is taking hold within the French Observation Service.
		07.35	CG 5496	Torpedo track passed far ahead.  Ran for 40 minutes with zig-zag at GF from the danger area.  U-25 was positioned before the unfavorable horizon and no enemy submarine was observed.  Apparently the enemy figured on a far higher speed.  Even after the shot nothing was observed.
			Treacherous weather, W 1-2, Sea and swell 1, Vis. good
		09.00	CG 5736	No observations.
			Light breeze from the west, no Sea, very long easy swells, remarkably wide [illegible word] (summer weather)	First navigation fix possible after 3 days.

	Sun and Moon Data 27.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 28.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 29.01.40

	- 13 -
		14.00	( CG 5873)	Correction after a navigation fix 23 nm, 170°T.
			CG 8224	Course 130°.
		16.10	CG 8253	Cape Vincent in sight.
				The visibility allows observation at approximately 40 nm.
				The utter lack of traffic in this busy area is surprising.
		18.30	CG 8268	Now I intend to approach Cadiz unnoticed to execute the resupply completely undetected.
				The German steamer "THALIA" has been waiting for several days, so it must be expected that a submarine resupply across the border is known.  Any further evidence must be avoided.
				I head for Cadiz at 10 knots and will be submerged at dawn.
		30.01.40	South of Lagos Bay
		00.00	CG 8392	Course 100°, 10 knots.
			Cloudy, calm, mirror flat sea	Several small coastal steamers and to starboard a large steamer on a westerly course (illuminated with lit nationality markings).
		06.49	West of Cadiz	Twilight is beginning.  I must dive in order not to be recognized as a U-boat.  A number of small vessels illuminated differently, sometimes dimmed all around.  Hostile patrol vessels must be expected.
			CG 9277
			Deteriorating visibility
				Put the boat on the bottom.
				Contrary to the instructions provided by B.d.U., I intend to enter Cadiz soon after twilight so as not to be disturbed by the moon rising about midnight as soon as we arrive.
				On the bottom topped up the battery with water.
		18.37	CG 9277	Surfaced.
			Light southwest wind, calm sea, light rain showers, Vis. medium, very dark	Some illuminated vessels in sight around in the distance.
				With 2 x HF through the channel of the Bay of Cadiz close by Rota and Punta Santa Catalina then proceeded on the 340° bearing from the specified anchor location of the supply vessel.  Twice passed vessels at approximately 100 meters, without them sighting U-25.  Only the clear description of the supply vessel made finding it possible, because other vessels had anchored nearby.  Communication was established megaphone.
		20.05	CG 9521 lower-left	Made fast alongside "THALIA".
			Light southwest breeze, very dark, low visibility	φ = 36°31'N, λ =  6°15.7W

	Sun and Moon Data 29.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 30.01.40

	- 14 -
				Thanks to the support of the Assistant Attaché, Kaptlt.(Ing.) L o r e k, and the eager cooperation of the steamer crew the take over took place smoothly and efficiently.  The loading  of lubricating oil was time consuming.  Topping off water and minor fresh provisions supplement were executed at the same time.  The crew had the opportunity to bathe.  The thoughtful caution and concern of the officers of "THALIA" and crew deserved thanks and acknowledgment.
				The passing ferry and another vessel could not have seen U-25 which lay favorably in "THALIA's" shadow.
		31.01.40
		02.03	Cadiz	Departed "THALIA".  Left by the entrance route through the north channel undetected.  No traffic.
			Moon behind the clouds, misty, sometimes bright, Vis. medium
		03.15	CG 9279	Passed Rota bell buoy.
				I intend to run under the protection of the Spanish coast to the mouth of the Guadalquivir River.

	Sun and Moon Data 30.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 31.01.40

	- 15 -
		31.01.40		Am warned of French patrol vessels in square 9192, 9432, 9512 by Radio Message from B.d.U.  I believe they are positioned to intercept German steamers.
		03.28	CG 9278	French patrol vessel in sight.  He is positioned at the limit of territorial waters, course 330°.  Torpedo boat type "BALISTE".  Attack from within territorial waters is not possible; besides, the water depth of 12-15 meters is too shallow.  To attempt to move to the other side of the enemy would put me before the bright clear horizon, with the enemy before the indistinct horizon.  Moreover it appears correct in connection with the fuel resupply to remain undetected off Cadiz for now and consequently ran off to the west at 2 x HF.
			Light southwesterly wind, light Sea, Vis. good, occasionally misty
		08.00	CG 9197
			Vis. and weather deteriorating, SW 3-4, Sea 3, Vis. changing	No observations.
		09.40	CG 9181	Course 310°.
			With falling barometer expecting heavy wind and Sea, Vis. changing greatly	Dived temporarily in heavy rain squalls.
		12.00	CG 9174	Steamer with southerly course in sight.  Dived so as not to be recognized.  Attack is not possible given the sea state.
			SW 7-8, heavy short Sea, low swells
		16.15	CG 8368	Put the boat on the bottom.
			Southwest storm, Vis. bad	Waited for weather improvement.
		01.02.40	South Portuguese Coast
		00.00	CG 8368	Surfaced, course 260° HF.  Various steamer lights sighted on the route between Cape Saint Vincent and Gibraltar.  Neutral nationality insignia.  Holding on in the darkness and moderate visibility was not practical.
			SW 3, medium Sea, weather calming, Vis. moderate
		05.00	CG 8372	Abeam Cape Saint Vincent.
		09.00	CG 8285	Course 200°.
			Weather deteriorating, SW 3-4, light Sea, rain showers, Vis. changing	No observations.

	Sun and Moon Data 31.01.40
	Sun and Moon Data 01.02.40

	- 16 -
				Now I intend to head for what seems to be a turning point for convoys (square CG 8550) and hope for weather and visibility improvement.
		11.30	CG 8321
			SW 5-6, very rough sea, short swell, Vis. moderate	Weapons use is not possible.
				No observations.
		15.30	CG 8557
			W 6-7, heavy Sea	Course 30°, 2 x HF.
				In fact , the steamer traffic seems to pass close by Cape Saint Vincent in the darkness.  Therefore I headed for Cape Saint Vincent and reached it at midnight.
		02.02.40	Cape Saint Vincent
		00.00	CG 8592	At first, no steamer traffic observed.
			W 5-6, very rough sea, short swell, Vis. good, dark
		02.00	CG 8269	Course 0°, distance 10 nm.
			W 5, very turbulent Sea
		03.00		2 steamers in sight astern on northerly course.  Because one of the two steamers appears to be a big freighter, I approached closer, apparently U-25 was sighted.  (Marine phosphorescence) the steamer changes course and speed.
		05.24	CG 8239	Dived, to close the steamer.  Because the boat cannot be held at periscope depth and therefore use of torpedo weapons is not possible, surfaced.
			W 5-6, rough sea, short swells, good light visibility, dark
				Maneuvered ahead intending to attack the steamer during the day in better weather conditions.
		09.40	CG 5885	An approaching small steamer is avoided, since weapons use is not possible.
			W 5-6, rough sea, Vis. good
		10.30		At the same time, contact is lost with the large steamer.
		12.00	CG 5854	Because there is no contact, course 10°.
			Slight visibility deterioration, wind abating
		15.00	CG 5588	The steamer mentioned above seemed to enter Lisbon.  Because in the north there are several trawlers in sight, I come to a reciprocal heading to execute my "second short reconnaissance advance" carried out off the coast.
			W 2-3, choppy sea

	Sun and Moon Data 01.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 02.02.40

	- 17 -
				The report from U-44, which apparently sank 2 steamers more than 150 nm off the coast, led me to explore this hunting ground, because coastal traffic appears exceptionally thin to me.
		18.10	CG 5825	Course 270°, LF.
			Slight weather deterioration	According to a B.d.U. Radio Message English submarines are positioned at Finisterre and Berlenga.  I am convinced that together with the aforementioned French warships they are there to attack German steamers departing from Spain.  Here a German U-boat can meet in a windward position.  I hope to be able to meet an English submarine on my northward transit.  First, however, I intend to get a decent steamer.
		20.00	CG 5815
			Weather deteriorating, wind and Sea heavier, Vis. bad	Weapons use is not possible.
		03.02.40	West of Lisbon
		00.00	CG 5735	2 steamers on a parallel course. (Lisbon - America) Range = 6-7000 meters.
			SSW 5-7, heavy Sea, swells, Vis. deteriorating
		08.00	CG 5715
			Heavy storm, high Sea, very long swells, Vis. bad	Dived.  (Peace for the crew.)
		13.00	SW 1-2, very long swells, very rough sea, Vis. moderate, sun shine	Surfaced.
				Course 90°, LF.
		13.20		Smoke clouds bearing 50°T.
				2-3 steamers in sight.  Range = 4000 meters.
		13.25		Convoy?  Crash dive.
				Initiated attack.
				Rough sea at the limit, boat cannot be held perfectly.
		14.10		An escort vessel - French gun boat type ANERE - abeam 400 meters.
				Passed ahead of him.
		14.20		It passes approximately 300 meters astern and labors heavily in the seas.  My periscope is extended 2-3 meters in the troughs.

	Sun and Moon Data 02.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 03.02.40

	- 18 -
		14.32	CG 5716	Shot at a large freighter, range 5-600 meters.  Target angle 90°.
				Hit!  Several detonations.
				An exact picture of the number and type of the convoy could not be determined.  Periscope cut under at the shot, the boat could no longer be held, ran off at depth 30 meters on the reciprocal heading of the convoy.  All around more or less loud sounds which came and went, however.  Due to weather deterioration and because the boat could not be held at periscope depth., first surfaced after 1 1/2 hours when the sounds had gone away.
		16.20	Heavily cloudy, hazy, SW 3-4, heavy sea
				At GF on convoy course 180°.
		17.15	CG 5478	Found the sinking location of the English steamer "ARMANISTAN" (6805 GRT) with railroad parts from England to the Persian Gulf.  Large oil slick.  3 boats with approximately 50 crewmen of the steamer, some non-whites, lay at sea anchors.  An officer provided information and confirmed there was sufficient equipment for the boats.  My promise to transmit an SOS and navigation fix was unnecessary, because the position was already given repeatedly on the steamer wave.
				The incident throws an obvious highlight on the mentality of the enemy to see a sinking a steamer in the convoy and to execute no rescue measures for the shipwrecked.  So far I believed that independent neutrals proceeded in convoy for the hope of a safe and better rescue.  But even that is not assured.  The English officer believed:   "They were all afraid of you and ran away."  Initially I followed the convoy at 2 x GF.
		18.45	CG 5742	When darkness comes and makes the finding the convoy impossible, I head for Cape Saint Vincent to be able to attack the convoy again there tomorrow with light and good visibility.
			SW 4, rough sea and swell, Vis. about 4000 meters
		04.02.40	Northwest of Cape Vincent
			CG 8211	Course 125°, 2 x HF.
			No weather improvement, occasional rain showers, quite good light visibility, dark	Except for a steamer on reciprocal heading close offshore with illuminated nationality markings no other observations.

	Sun and Moon Data 03.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 04.02.40

	- 19 -
		04.02.40
		03.50		A steamer in sight ahead, steering on changing courses, because this was suspicious, initiated attack.  Steamer was lit up normally, had no nationality markings.  Changing speed levels, fired without prior warning at 500 meters with bridge aiming apparatus.  Miss.  Caused by rough sea. (Boat rolled heavily while shooting).  Because use of artillery is not possible in the situation and another shot is also unfavorable and would be too great a time delay in view of the convoy pursuit, gave up another attack and continued the transit and convoy pursuit.
		04.20	CG 8251
			SW 4-5, swell and very rough sea, Vis. good
		07.10	CG 8293
			SW 3-4, sometimes gusty, Sea 5-6, Vis. changing	Course 200°, HF.
				Waiting position for the convoy.
		07.35	CG 8296	An English destroyer of the W Class passed on course 245°.
				Crash dive.  After he has run off approximately 7000 meters, he stopped.
				I suppose, it is a flank protection or U-boat defense reinforcement and therefore believe that the convoy will soon soon be nearby.  Sound man believes he may have heard several steamers near the sounds of the destroyer.
		07.50	CG 8295	Surfaced, destroyer just visible in the haze.
			Very heavy chop, Vis. very much degraded	Visibility decreased in rain squalls to 3-500 meters.
				I proceed at HF on a parallel to the assumed convoy course and intend to attack with improvement in the weather.  In spite of very bad visibility I remain surfaced.
		10.35	CG 8378
			Very choppy sea, SSW 6, swell	With sudden clearing a motor tanker (4 masted) in sight bearing 110°T.
				Dived.  Attacked.  The boat is very difficult to hold, views are only limited.  Nevertheless I succeed in shooting a torpedo at the tanker whose nationality I cannot determine with certainty.  I estimate the ship to be approximately 3000 GRT and approximately 800 meters distant.  After detonation I determine:  tanker JAVA 8800 GRT (Danish).  Unfortunately, the hit apparently had no effect.  The ship can maintain speed and transmits: "JAVA to all.  At 11.30 O 35°44N 8°55W heavy explosion probably a mine one cable from ship.  All well "Master". - The torpedo ran 1800 meters and self-detonated, set depth 6 meters.
				Because I now recognize his neutrality, decide to maintain contact with him, to catch him at the entrance to the "tanker zone".

Sun and Moon Data 04.02.40

	- 20 -
		13.35	CG 8347	Maintaining contact is difficult.
			WSW 8-10, very heavy Sea, heavy swell, Vis. medium, occasional heavy rain squalls	Maintaining distance at 2 x HF.
		16.00	CG 8239	A fishing vessel or gun boat comes from the direction of the tanker and attempts to drive us off.  A second similar vessel is sighted with the tanker.  In the protection of a rain squall I succeed in getting ahead.
			Heavy westerly storm, wind shifting clockwise.
				Course 345°.
				The tanker set normal lights.
		20.00	CG 5864
			WNW 8-9, heavy sea	In darkness distance to the tanker can be reduced.
		05.02.40
		00.00	CG 5582	Abeam the tanker at 1500 meters.
			Wind subsides somewhat, very dark
		01.52	Very heavy marine phosphorescence	One of the escorts, apparent attracted by marine phosphorescence sets course for U-25 and ran towards it.
				Crash dive!
				The starboard exhaust gas valve does not hold tight.  Because of the obvious danger that valve plate will break the seat the valve can no longer be operated.
				The diving readiness of the boat is greatly limited.
				I decide not to call the readiness of the boat to submerge into question and to seal the valve by the use of floor plates as a blind flange, however, by this the starboard diesel becomes out of service.  This lowering of the war readiness must be accepted.  According to calculations and references it can be expected the provisional repair can be expected to withstand a submerged depth of 40 meters.
				Therefore, I am greatly restricted in operational readiness and decide to return at this time.  I also take into consideration the fact that the rear diving plane motor has failed and there is only one forward and one aft torpedo.
				Radio Message to B.d.U. 14.00 hours square 5156.  On return transit,  Starboard exhaust gas valve and diesel are out of service.  Diving capability limited.  So far have sunk "ARMANISTAN" from convoy.  Also 1 English auxiliary ship, 1 Swedish Tanker, 2 Norwegians totaling 26000 GRT.    U-25
				The Radio Message will be sent only at dusk.

	Sun and Moon Data 04.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 05.02.40

	- 21 -
				First I moved off from the coast for the execution of necessary repairs.  As a result, the good tanker escaped us.
		02.38		Surfaced, course 270°, 8 knots.
		07.15	CG 5464	Small east-west traffic observed to port.
			WNW 5-7, heavy Sea, long swells, Vis. changing
		07.30	Wind easing, Vis. improving	Course 0°, 8 knots (diesel-electric).
		10.00	WNW 3-4, short sea, long swells	Course 350°.
		12.00	CG 5194	Ahead to port on the horizon 2 steamers apparently with accompanying destroyers in sight.  Northerly course, target angle 190°.  Due to failure of the starboard diesel steaming is not possible, will still try to maintain contact in case the enemy changes course in order to be able to catch him tomorrow.
			NW 2-3, long swells, Vis. very good, Vis. greater than 12 nm
		18.50	CG 5135	Correction after a navigation fix, 140°T, 19 nm.
			Wind greatly abating, no Sea, long swells	Course 350°.
		06.02.40	West of Portugal
		00.00	CG 2762	Course 0°.
			Wind shifts to the south, very dark, Vis. low	Because the visibility was occasionally only a few hundred meters, I eased off from the convoy.
		08.45	CG 2432	to reset the torpedoes.
				Weapons use not possible.
		09.50		An apparently French gunboat in sight about 1000 meters in the haze.
				Crash dive!
		11.20	CG 2195	speed 8.5 knots.
			SbyW 7-8, high Sea, Vis. bad	Course 350° because at 0° the seas run over the bridge from astern.
		19.00	CG 2121	The convoy seems to have escaped.
			Wind slowly abating, slight visibility improvement (1-2000 meters), high Sea.

	Sun and Moon Data 05.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 06.02.40

	- 22 -
		07.02.40	West of Cape Villano
		00.00	BF 7719	A steamer to port at the limit of visibility (approximately 8000 meters) - apparently a passenger steamer on a reciprocal course.
			Weather improving rapidly, SW 1-2, swells, Vis. medium, dark
		08.00	BE 9399
			SW 1-2, long swell, Vis. very good
		12.00	BE 9332	No observations.
		20.00	BE 6682
			SSW 2, long swells, bright starry night
		08.02.40	NW Bay of Biscay
		00.00	BE 6621	Course 0°.
			SSW 2-3
		12.00	BE 3921	No observations.
			Summer weather, long swells, Vis. very good, SSW 2-3
		09.02.40	West of Ireland
		00.00	BE 3321	2 x lights at long range, probably fishing trawlers.
			SW slightly freshening, lightly cloudy
		08.00	AM 7651	No observations.
			SW 4-5, light Sea, long swells
		12.00	AM 7621
			Stiff SW, short heavy Sea, Vis. medium	No observations.
		10.02.40	NW of Ireland
		00.00	AM 4924	No observations.
			SW 5-6, very rough Sea, swell, Vis. medium, approximately 5000 meters	Course 20°, 9 knots.

	Sun and Moon Data 07.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 08.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 09.02.40

	- 23 -
		10.02.40
		12.00	AM 5143	Sea and swell make attack highly questionable.
			Weather unchanged, bad, cloudy, Vis. approximately 5-6000 meters.	No observations.
		11.02.40	West of the Herbrides
		00.00	AM 2848	Course 45°.
			South wind 5-6, shifting counter clockwise, rainy, Vis. bad
		08.24	AM 3547	After a successful test dive a large tanker is in sight bearing 0°T at target angle 80-90°.  Because of a change of course to the south attack is a possibility, the tanker has apparently come from the Pentland Firth, will to get ahead.  However, best speed is only 11 knots.  Tanker turned towards, but then away again, probably sighted the boat.  U-25 turns away.    to port 2 destroyers come into view from the haze.  Range approximately 5-6000 meters.
		08.45	AM 3548
			Wind shifting counter-clockwise SE and abating, Vis. to the north very good, to the south bad, rain showers
		08.58
				Destroyers (probably 3 destroyers) rake the sea area apparently listening on an easterly course at low speed, and hardly offer possibility for attack.
		11.15	AM 2666	Course 45°, 9 knots.
			Continuing weather improvement, sky overcast
		12.00	AM 3541	No navigation fix is possible for the past 48 hours.  Course 45°, 9 knots.
			Wind shifting to the SE, rough sea
				No observations
		12.02.40
		00.00	AM 3419
			SE 2-3, light Sea, Vis. low, dark	No observation.
		05.00	AM 3286	Course 60°, 9 knots.
		08.25	AN 1145	Smoke clouds in sight bearing 280°T.  Took ahead.  A fishing trawler in sight closer on the bearing.  Crash dive.  Attack initiated on smoke cloud shifting to the left.  Target is a steamer of approximately 1000 GRT, (regular service steamer Faroese - English?) led by a fishing trawler, passes at approximately 4000 meters, target angle 90°.
			NE 1-2, calm Sea

	Sun and Moon Data 10.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 11.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 12.02.40

	- 24 -
		12.02.40
		11.18	AN 1146	Attack given up, because the range is too large.
			(Navigation uncertain)	Continued transit course 60°, 9 knots.
			Light wind from the north, calm sea, Vis. very good
		16.30	AN 1134	(No navigation fix for the past 3 days)
			N wind 2, slight Sea, Vis. partly very good, occasional shower squalls	A three-masted steamer in sight, probably a tanker course 70°.  Approached by using a rain squall.
		18.13	AN 1212	The celestial navigation fix is inaccurate and results in an offset of approximately 10 nm to the north.
			NE 1-2, Vis. medium
				Initiated attack under the cover of darkness.  Nationality markings cannot be recognized.
		20.10 - 20.29	AN 1227	On course for stern attack.
				Surface shot with TUZA, missed, target angle 90°, speed 8 knots afterwards turned for a bow shot taken over the net-cutter.
				Approximately 1400 meters, target angle 110°.  Hit astern. Effect cannot be determined after a heavy detonation, high water column and bright light took place.
				Nevertheless the steamer continues on.
		13.02.40	West of the Shetlands
		00.00	AN 1232	Course 90°, 10 knots.
			Light NE breeze, Vis. medium, dark
		07.16	AN 2211	At the northern border of Zone A a steamer of about 5000 GRT similar to a tanker comes in sight which was sunk immediately afterwards.
			Arising light breeze, Vis. good
		09.00	AN 2211	Course 90°, cruising speed.
			Very good weather, Vis. good	No special observations.
		12.00	(AN 2223)	Correction after a navigation fix 35°T, 25 nm.  It has been 4 days since the last proper navigation fix.
			AF 7983
			ESE 1-2, few clouds, no Sea, Vis. very good	Course 140°, 10 knots.
		12.12	AF 7991	Crash dive!  Enemy aircraft.
		18.30	AN 2327	Course 160°, 9 knots.
			Light wind freshening, choppy sea

	Sun and Moon Data 12.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 13.02.40

	- 25 -
		14.02.40	Northern North Sea
		00.00	AN 2831	Course 160°, 9 knots.
				Possibilities for military action are exhausted. Torpedoes are shot.  From now on during the return transit all vessels are to be avoided.
		06.15	AN 3118
			SSE 3, light choppy sea, Vis. very good
		07.30	AN 3142	Dived.  Because I will no longer reach Mine Route Blue assigned to me early enough to pass in darkness, I intend to submerge during the day and proceed at night at cruising speed on the surface.  Maximum speed is 11 knots.
		17.35	AN 3421	Surfaced, cruising speed.  Course 152°.
			SE 2-3, choppy sea, Vis. medium
		15.02.40	North Sea
		00.00	AN 3752	Course 152°.  No observations.
			E 4-5, short sea, Vis. moderate	I intend at the beginning of dawn to continue on the Mine Route submerged.
		04.24	AN 3872	Radio Message from B.d.U. to "U-25":
			Wind shifting clockwise	"Not Route Blue but instead Route II."
				Consequently:  Course 172°.  The warning area must be avoided.
		10.00	AN 3713	Course 225°.
			NE 2-3, Vis. good, cloudy, course 225°
		13.00	AN 6221	Course 180°.
		15.20	NE 2, quickly growing cloudiness	The gyro-compass has failed.  It is noticed only lately, because gyro shifted and boat slowly came to the west of the course. (Appropriate message to B.d.U.)
		21.00		Replaced gyro sphere.  Attempt to determine ship position on the Doggerbank by depth sounder is inaccurate.  At night azimuth adjustment of the gyro.

	Sun and Moon Data 14.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 15.02.40

	- 26 -
		16.02.40
		00.00	Approximately AN 6272
			Wind calm, cloudy, Vis. very good
		06.30		Surfaced.  No stars to see.  During the day attempts to update navigation fail.
		20.30	AN 6193	Dived on the Doggerbank.
				Celestial navigation fix.
			NbyE 1-2, Vis. good	Return transit on Route II.
		17.02.40	Route II
			Wind calm, Vis. very good	On return transit.
			AN 6938	No observations.
			SE 1, Vis. very good	In accordance with B.d.U. made for Helgoland.
				Passed Point T .
				Individually own fishing trawlers and minesweepers passed.  Visual recognition signals exchanged.
				Otherwise no observations.
			AN 9538	Entered Helgoland.
			Fog, Vis. sometimes 2-300 meters, later clearing	Telephone report to B.d.U.
		18.02.40	Helgoland
		10.30	SW 1-2, Sea 0, Vis. clear	Departed Helgoland.  Course by Lightship "F" (in accordance with B.d.U. Orders)
		12.50	AN 9595	Abeam Lightship "F".
				In the ice field waited on on ice escort.  In vain.
				Order from B.d.U. via Wangerooge (II) "return to Helgoland".  Course north.
		15.00		Entered Helgoland.
		19.02.40	Helgoland
		08.30	Light westerly wind, no Sea, Vis. good	Departed Helgoland.
		11.00		Lightship "F".
				Upper Jade in tow by SCHLESIEN.
		14.20		Arrived at Entrance III.
				Afterwards shifted to base.

	Sun and Moon Data 16.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 17.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 18.02.40
	Sun and Moon Data 19.02.40

			S u m m a r y.       1.) Personnel:   a) The crew met all the demands made of them.  The men always worked hard and did their best.  Morale was good.  3 Petty Officers and 8 Men (25%) were newly ordered aboard.  In consideration of this, frequent exercises were executed at beginning of the patrol in the North Sea.  There is concern that the new Petty Officer of Lfb.I [Laufbahn I = career track I = Seaman], which are the best of the Personnel Reserve, are substantially below expectations.  There is not enough self-confidence and sense of responsibility.   b) Medical condition:     1.)  Ob.Stum. [Navigator] 8 day flu sometimes with high fever.     2.)  1 man with rheumatism and 1 man with boils.       2.) In the boat several faults were noted which probably could have been avoided by careful shipyard work.  Only unwelcome oversight of the shipyard by the command can correct the situation.  The oil trace appeared again.  After 5 days it existed in old form.  The appearance of the oil trace is especially conspicuous after blowing during surfacing, this happened irregularly, however, often strongly in appearance, the fault is still not repaired and can be justified by the command [illegible hand written sentence added here concerning oily harbor water].   Further, the following failures strongly limited the combat readiness of the boat:   a) Break down of the starboard exhaust gas valve.  After temporary repairs by a flange the starboard diesel only in limited service, the deepest allowable depth was estimated at 40 meters.   b) Failure of the aft diving plane motors.   c) Strong sound source from the forward diving plane motor whose use is also therefore limited (Practically: depth by hand steering).   d) Severe stiffness of the periscope, sometimes stuck.  The absence of the fresh water generator makes itself felt, since water has to be used very sparingly in order to fully extend the radius of action.  Installation of this device would be very desirable.       Torpedo weaponry:   In rough sea states of more than 5, wind more than 6, weapons use is nearly impossible.  Even if the boat can be held level at periscope depth, depth fluctuations of the torpedo are apparently so great that with a set depth of 6 meters jumping above the surface and self-detonation must be expected. (failure certainly appeared 2 times).

			There were 2 misses with the night targeting device in spite of sufficient data apparently achieved by the overtaking boat, such a tilting of the line of sight occurs that the torpedo is shot with a completely a false lead.  Aiming with the binoculars, the shooter does not have the right sensation, if he does not free himself from the targeting device.   Also, the order delay with the fast rolling motions of the boat appears rather large.     I have shot successfully 2 times at short range = about 1000 meters only over the stem with free lead.           The weather:  was according to the season unfavorable, 26 days in the Atlantic gave the following result:             in 9-days were attack was impossible because of heavy seas,             in 9 days where attack was greatly limited due to sea state,             in 8 days where attack was possible.             Visibility was below 1500 meters for 6 days and only very good for 5 days.       The fuel supply by THALIA in Cadiz went perfectly thanks to very good preparations.  The Assistant Attaché Kaptlt.(Ing.) Lorek and Kaptlt. Rüggeberg tried together with the steamer officers to provide good care to the boat along with the delivery of fuel. (supply with water and fresh provisions, bathing opportunity) The allotted time (23.00-05.00 hours) was not adhered to, because it seemed unfavorable in view of the moon.  U-25 ran into Cadiz at 19.00 hours and remained alongside THALIA from 20.05 to 02.00 hours.  When passing the pilot's steamers in the immediate vicinity, the greatest possible darkness must be sought and the ferry service must be disregarded. (When going alongside, U-25 was noticed only after calling, even by the alert watch personnel of the steamer)  The accurate description of the steamer (smokestack, stern) was very important, without which  there would obviously have been mistakes.  I recommend inconspicuous colored lighting (bluish) in a porthole.  The lubricating oil take over was the limiting factor. If THALIA crew follows their oath of secrecy (firmly bound by Kaptlt. Lorsk) one can count on complete confidentiality in the future.  U-25 remained undetected during the outbound and inbound transit near Cadiz to avoid suspicion, so a repetition appears possible several times.       Co-operation with German steamers. According to announcement 2 German steamers were to depart Cadiz 2-3 days after U-25 supplied.  I considered the execution of a common endeavor, however, it failed because of the uncertainty of the steamer's departure.  I regard cooperation of a steamer with a submarine quite advantageous and possible under favorable weather conditions which, unfortunately, at present was not available.  Calm weather conditions and sufficient light are prerequisites. The steamer has to go out as bait and head for the fixed position of a U-boat just off of the entrance. The steadiness of the weather conditions must be guaranteed. (Winter months are unfavorable).  Otherwise

			the steamer must depart only in the strongest darkness and bad weather conditions and a meeting place at sea agreed upon. (Success is called into question, in this connection.)       Intelligence of the enemy: According to the Assistant Attaché a French patrol vessel is stationed continuously off Cadiz and Bonanza, up and down, a second French patrol vessel possibly on longitude 7°10'W. Daily an English destroyer (Duchess?) runs at with high speed from Gibraltar for Ayamonte (Spanish/Portuguese border) and back. The Gibraltar - England steamer traffic proceeds from my observation as follows:  convoys (irregular) steer first on the latitude of Gibraltar (36°N) to longitude 10°20'W at a distance of 50 nm around Cape Vincent.  Afterwards they proceed on 10°20'W, so approximately 60 nm distance from the coast exactly on course 0° or 180°.  Passing near Cape St. Vincent during the day is apparently avoided.  Steamers proceeding independently run out after midnight from Gibraltar, positioned in the darkness at Saint Vincent and steer from there often changing courses,sometimes near the Portuguese coast, sometimes far set off. The escort is usually regarded as light, but there is a range of steam trawlers, individual French gun boats, mine sweepers, English destroyers and submarines which have, in my opinion, taken a kind of defensive position along the steamer routes and close up during U-boat warnings. Airborne reconnaissance on the Atlantic coast was not observed.  During the day near Cadiz - Gibraltar there is airborne reconnaissance apparently by routine one to two times a day.                                                                                                                          Korvettenkapitän                                                       and Kommandant

	Enclosures to U-25's KTB - click on the text at left to proceed to the documents
Radio	Excerpt of the Radio log
Excerpt	Excerpt from the KTB for 12-13 February 1940
ReportA	Kommandant's report on the sinking of Norwegian steamer ENID
ReportB	BdU report on the sinking of SNESTAD, ENID and CHASTINE MAERSK

---

Click the icons to view the associated records
	Return to the U-boat KTB page