UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
 
A16-3(1)
  
 
Serial 0224
  
 
(t11/jmr)
  
 
                                                                                                                       15 May 1942.
  
 
 
 
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
   
Subject: Destruction of Enemy Submarine by U.S.C.G. ICARUS.
   
Reference: (a) Comdt. 6th ND ltr A8/A3-1 serial 1320 of 11 May 1942, with enclosure (A).
  (b) Chief of Naval Operations Conf. ltr. A16-2(4)/Op16-F-9/(SC)/A16-2(3) #0901116 of 5 December 1941.
   
Enclosure:  (A) Original copy of reference (a).
 
 
 
 
        1.         Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith, it being noted that a copy thereof was not furnished the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet.
 
 
 
        2.         From a study of reference (a) certain observations have been made.  These are listed as follows:
  
 
 
 
                (a) That the submarine was waiting for a convoy and that a convoy would  been in the vicinity a very short time after the encounter indicates an accurate supply of intelligence information to the enemy.
  
 
 
 
                (b) That the submarine tried to get into the wake of the ICARUS substantiates the belief that German submarines are well aware of the limitations of our sound gear and perhaps our operators.
  
 
 
 
                (c) The commanding officer’s statement that had the submarine been able to man its guns ICARUS would have been sunk, may or may not be correct.  A commanding officer, who has sunk a submarine, is apt to be regarded as an expert in this line of endeavor.  His statements, therefore, may carry considerable weight.  The necessity for the anti-submarine vessel to man its guns has been, and continues to be, stressed.  For the psychological reasons outlined above, it is considered that this necessity should be emphasized to all anti-submarine vessels rather than any possible disadvantage of these guns which might exist in the event of a surface conflict.
  
 
 
 
                (d) Very little can be obtained from reference (a) as to the method of attack used by ICARUS.  When the action report is received, further analysis may be possible.  Contact
  
 
 
 
- 1 -
  
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
 
A16-3(1)
  
 
Serial 0224
  
 
(t11/jmr)
  
 
                                                                                                                       15 May 1942.
  
 
 
 
Subject:            Detruction of Enemy Submarine by U.S.C.G. ICARUS.
 
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  was obtained on the port bow at about 1800 yards according to one statement and 100 yards according to another.  The commanding officer stated that there were 3 minutes between the contact and explosion of the torpedo and the executive officer said 9 minutes.  Evidently the silhouette of the ICARUS type cutter misled the submarine captain and at a distance was mistaken for another type of ship.  No track of the torpedo was seen, which leads to the belief that the torpedo was electric.  Apparently, ICARUS had not considered the contact a submarine until the torpedo exploded.  Mushy echo became firm as the bearing drew toward the beam.  This would account for the bearing becoming firmer as it drew aft.  It is not clear whether or not the ICARUS made an attack on sound or on the area in which the torpedo exploded.  It is probable that a sound contact was made after the explosion of the torpedo, since there seems no logic in making an attack on a spot where the explosion occurred.  As the bearing drew aft down the port side, and commanding officer was not called until torpedo exploded, it would appear that contact was not considered a possible submarine until the explosion and that the ICARUS was not headed at the contact.  
     
          3.         From the interrogation, a clear description as to the type of submarine was not presented.  ON1 220-A “Submarine Identification” might have been helpful in this respect.  From the meager description set fourth, it is probable that the submarine was of the 517 ton German type.  That the submarine was completely covered with barnacles, as stated, would indicate that it has been operating from an outlying base where no docking facilities are available.  It may be possible that the barnacles were either painted on or were patches where the exterior paint had flaked off.  
     
          4.         Comment on interrogation of survivors will be forthcoming after return of the Representative of this Unit who was sent to Charleston, S.C., in that connection.  It is noted that the provisions of reference (b) were not carefully carried out in that there was some fraternizing between captors and prisoners and the captives were allowed to mingle with each other to the extent that the U-boat captain warned and instructed his crew on matters concerning security.  This undoubtedly vitiated to a large extent efforts to obtain information which might otherwise have been of extreme value.  
     
           5.         Return of enclosure (A) is requested.  
     
     
                                                                                                    
                                                                                                      T. L. LEWIS.  
     
 
 
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
 
AS
  
 
Serial 0246
  
 
1/Rs
  
 
                                                                                                                       May 18, 1942.
  
     
 
From:  Commanding Officer, Atlantic Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
   
Subject: Summary of information of the engagement between ICARUS and German U/boat obtained by visit to Charleston, S.C.
   
Enclosure:

(A) Copy of Lt. Cdr. J.T. Hardin, USN, report of visit to Charleston, S.C.
 
     
          1.         Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.
     
          2.         In the future, visits of this nature by members of this Unit are not recommended unless distances involved will permit arrival at the scene within a very short time after survivors have landed.  
     
          3.         Should a U/boat be captured or raised and brought into port on the Atlantic or Gulf coast at any time in the future, it is requested that orders be immediately issued to Commander T.L. Lewis, USN, and Lt. Comdr. J.T. Hardin, USN, without further request, for the purposes of inspection and gaining information pertinent to anti-submarine warfare.  
     
     
                                                                                                
                                                                                                   T. L. LEWIS  
     
     
     
     
     
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
     
                                                                                                  May 16, 1942.  
     
  MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDING OFFICER ASW UNIT, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET.  
     
 
Subject:   Summary of Information of an engagement between ICARUS and German U/B obtained by visit to Charleston, South Carolina.
   
Reference: (a) DIO 6ND report of interview of officers of  ICARUS and Survivors of sunken German U/B and dated 11 May, 1942.
  (b) Conversation with Lieut. Comdr. Nerr, Operations Officer 6ND Charleston, South Carolina.
  (c) Conversation with Capt. Guy Baker, Chief of Staff for Comdt. 6ND.
  (d) Conversation with Comdr. Souers, District Intelligence Officer, 6ND.
  (e) Conversation with officers of Intelligence Group from the foreign section of O.N.I. at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
 
     
          At 0830 12 May, 1942 reported to Operations office 6ND at Charleston, S.C.  I was told that the ICARUS had sunk a German submarine believed to be of the 517 ton class while proceeding independently enroute Key West, Florida.  The attack occurred about 25 miles south of Cape Lookout in 120 feet of water.  At 1625 EWT on 9 May, 1942, while cruising at 14 knots on course 2350 T, sound contact was made sharp on the port bow at a range estimated from 200 to 1800 yards.  At a time interval estimated from 4 to 9 minutes later an explosion was heard, seen and felt on the port quarter.  The estimated range varied in estimation from 100 to 200 yards.
     
          At this time the Commanding Officer of ICARUS took over the conn and made three attacks on the submarine.  These attacks were in the locality of the explosion, the details of which have not been satisfactorily reported.  The Commandant 7ND has been asked to provide the services of experts at the sound school in Key West to make a searching study with the Commanding Officer ICARUS and report on the details of the engagement.  
     
          The submarine came to the surface after two attacks consisting of 5 and 3 D/Cs respectively.  In the meantime ICARUS had proceeded to a distance approximately 1000 yards and opened fire on the hostile craft with all her guns as soon as the conning tower broke the surface of the water.  The submarine remained on the surface for about 4 minutes  
     
 
- 1 -
 
     
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
     
                                                                                                  May 16, 1942.  
     
  (MEMORANDUM TO ASWU OFFICER)  
     
  during which time 33 members of the crew escaped through the conning tower hatch.  
     
          These men were picked up by ICARUS and taken to Charleston, S.C.  On arrival the officers of the ICARUS were interviewed by the D.I.C. of 6ND followed by interrogation of each member of the submarine.
     
          The prisoners were small, healthy, loyal German subjects, well disciplined in security and noticeably military in bearing and appearance.  They came aboard ICARUS in order of seniority and left in the same order.  The Commanding Officer U/B thanked the Commanding Officer ICARUS for the good treatment his crew received.  
     
          One member of the survivors, badly injured, died enroute to Charleston.  Another is still in the hospital there with an arm missing.  
     
          The crew of U/B (averaged 22 years of age – the C.O. was 32 years old) displayed high spirits and a good degree of intelligence.  They were courteous to the D.I.C. answering any questions of a personal nature but refusing to answer those of military value.  
     
          The prisoners were turned over to the Provost Marshal at Paris Island, South Carolina who immediately took them to Fort Bragg, N.C. where they are now held in a specially prepared Detention Camp by the Army.  
     
          A special investigating unit, especially trained in the interrogation of survivors of German Submarines, from the Foreign Section of O.N.I. met them at Fort Bragg and are now carrying on the investigation.  This group consists of two U.S. Naval Officers, one of them has done this same work in England.  The third member of this group is an English officer who has done most all of this kind of work for England.  
     
          To date there has been little information of military value gleamed from the questioning of the survivors.  One reason is that they are security minded having been (it is believed) well trained in that respect.  Another reason is that while they were in the water and for a time on board ICARUS their C.O. was cautioning them against giving out information of any military value.  
     
          Items of interest noted but not at all established as facts are listed below.  
     
                  1.  Name of C.O. used to identify U/B.  
                  2.  Suspect U/B as being U-352.  
                  3.  Suspect it as being 517 tonner.  
     
 
- 2 -
 
     
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
     
                                                                                                  May 16, 1942.  
     
  (MEMORANDUM TO ASWU OFFICER)  
     
                  4.  Crew consisted of about 41 men and 4 officers.  
                  5.  U/B left some port in France about 1 April, 1942.  
                  6.  U/B had been in the area for 4 days.  There were no indications that this U/B had sunk any vessels although one member of the crew was heard to say that one ship had been sunk but did not give the time and place.
                  7.  Not impossible that the torpedo explosion had something to do with the damaging of the submarine.  
                  8.  Much to be learned about the activities of U/B prior to abandoning ship.  
                  9.  U/B reported to be coated with barnacles.  
                  10.  Investigation by divers should reveal damage done by torpedo explosion and/or damage done by the D/C attacks. Etc.  
     
          Information of sufficient importance and reliability to warrant immediate considerations are:  
     
          (1) The alertness of ICARUS in opening fire on the U/B with all her guns at the instance the conning tower of the U/B emerged is commendable and may have a great deal to do with their success.  A smothering fire from all guns raked to U/B at close range and prevented the crew from manning any gun.  
     
          (2) Survivors rescued by any vessel should be separated immediately upon coming aboard.  Officers should be kept from other members of the crew and if at all possible the youngest and least intelligent should be separated into a third group.  
     
          (3) The question of a small ship picking up a large number of survivors presents itself.  The Commanding Officer should be able to judge for himself.  At no time should he sacrifice his ship to get survivors.  But second only to the U/B itself, survivors are considered valuable booty.  Aside from the humanitarian point of view their rescue is desirable.  A life raft or small boat with food may be provided for them and their recovery effected at a later date.  
     
          Reports to follow that will help to make the story of U/B RATHKE complete are:  
     
          (1)  Report of the Engagement by ICARUS.  
          (2)  Report from Commandant 7ND in regard to study made by experts from the Sound School, Key West, Florida about the movements and method of attack by ICARUS during the engagement.  
     
     
 
- 3 -
 
     
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
     
                                                                                                  May 16, 1942.  
     
  (MEMORANDUM TO ASWU OFFICER)  
     
          (3)  Reports from ONI.  These may possibly include a preliminary report in the near future.  
     
   
     
                                                                                 Respectively,  
     
     
                                                                                 J.T. HARDIN,  
                                                                                 Lieut. Comdr.,  
                                                                                 U.S. Navy.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
- 4 -
 
     
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
  A16-3(1)  
  Serial 0270  
  1/Rs  
                                                                                                  May 25, 1942  
     
 
From:    Commanding Officer, Atlantic Fleet Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
   
Subject: Action Report, U.S.C.G. ICARUS, Analysis of.
   
Reference: (a) ICARUS ltr. Of 15 May, 1942 (Action Report).
  (b) ASWU Ltr. A16-3(1) serial 0224 of 15 May, 1942.
  (c) ASWU Ltr. A8 serial 0246 of 18 May, 1942.
   
Enclosure: (A) Subject analysis with sketch appended.
 
     
          1.         Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith.
     
          2.         By reference (b) this unit submitted certain observations and comments on the preliminary report of the action.  
     
          3.         Reference (c) forwarded a summary of information obtained by Lt. Commander J.T. Hardin, USN, on his visit to Charleston, S.C., following the engagement of ICARUS with enemy submarine.  
     
     
                                                                                                  
                                                                                                     T. L. LEWIS  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
     
                                                                                                  25 May 1942.  
     
 

ANALYSIS OF ACTION REPORT

  
 
USS ICARUS (C.G.)
  
     
  Attack at 1631, LZT, 9 May 1942.                  Employment:     Independent.  
  Latitude 34-12.5 N; Longitude 76-35 W.
     
  Weather conditions:      Sea smooth – wind high.  
  Sound conditions:         Excellent  
     
  Range at which contact was obtained:               1900 yards.  
  Range at which contact was lost:                       180 yards.  
     
          The method by which this attack was made cannot be determined from the report.  Contact was obtained about 150 on the port bow, range 1900 yards, at 1620.  This contact was held but echo was rather mushy until it drew abaft the beam when it became sharper.  The Commanding Officer was not notified until 1625 and it appears from the report and from the tentative plot that the echo became sharper and drew to the beam at about 1626:30 or 1627.  No variation in ICARUS course was made until 1629 when an explosion was seen and felt on port quarter of ICARUS, distant about 500 yards.  At this time, course was reversed, was changed to 0700 and headed towards the contact which was drawing toward the west.  The attack was delivered at about 1631 on the eastern edge of the swirl caused by the explosion.  It appears that this attack was delivered by sound tracking as the contact was lost at 180 yards.  Why the submarine ran towards the explosion area of the prematurely exploded torpedo is not known except that it was headed in that direction on firing and the torpedo exploded about 35 seconds later so the possibility it was decided to use the explosion as a sound screen.  The pattern was dropped on the time and the “seaman’s eye”.  
     
          From a reconstruction plot, it appears that the submarine would have to have been on approximately the same course as the ICARUS at speed of about 5-3/4 to 6 knots from the time of contact at 1620 until attack at 1631 and that at about 1625 or 1626 changed course towards the ICARUS, firing the torpedo at 1628:30 or thereabout, aimed to hit the ICARUS at 1629-42.  This was a shot at about a 1500 track angle.  The reconstructed track of the submarine bears out the information about the mushiness of the echo as until it drew abeam the echoes were obtained through the wake.  From information from the submarine the attack destroyed the periscope and killed the conning officer. (apparently the captain was not at the periscope or conning the ship).  
     
 
- 1 -
 
     
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE UNIT
  
 
150 CAUSEWAY STREET
  
 
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS
  
     
                                                                                                  25 May 1942.  
     
           Another attack was made after the ICARUS reversed course.  This cannot be even approximately plotted.  Apparently this also was effective as large air bubbles were observed.  A third attack was made dropping one charge on the air bubbles.  After reversing course another charge was dropped “to the right”, west, of the bubbles, which forced the submarine to the surface.  Apparently contact was regained after each attack as the report speaks of hearing noises.  Apparently this submarine was not using radical evasive tactics as all attacks appear to have been in almost a straight line along the submarine’s course.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
   
     
     
     
 
- 2-
 
     
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 
  CINCLANT FILE              UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
  A16-3(82)/( 01162)       CARE POSTMASTER, NEW YORK, N.Y.,  
     
                                                                              28 MAY 1942  
     
 
From: Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
To:  Commander Eastern Sea Frontier.
   
Subject: U.S.C.G. ICARUS – action report.
   
Enclosure:  (A) Copy of LantFlt ASW Unit serial 0246 of May 18, 1942 with enclosure thereto.
  (B) Copy of LantFlt ASW Unit serial 0224 of May 15, 1942
  (C) Copy of LantFlt ASW Unit serial 0270 of May 25, 1942 with enclosure thereto.
 
     
          1.         Enclosures (A) to (C), inclusive, are forwarded herewith for information as the ICARUS was operating under your command at the time.  
     
     
                                                                                        O. M. HUSTVEDT,  
                                                                                        Chief of Staff.
     
     
     
     
  Copy to:  
      CominCh (with Encls.)  
      LantFlt ASW Unit