Experiences and thoughts after 3 remote patrols
  
 
-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
  
     
 
from
  
     
 
 
 
Kaptlt.  S  c  h  u  l  t  z  e,  Herbert.
  
 
-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
  
     
                                                                                       
     
     
     
     
 
 
Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB
     
     
 
Experiences and thoughts after 3 remote patrols
  
 
-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
  
 
from
  
 
 
 
Kaptlt.  S  c  h  u  l  t  z  e,  Herbert.
  
 
-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-
  
     
 
General:  
        Efficiency: The efficiency of the crew and the boat agree completely with the thoughts and expectations made in peacetime.  On the whole, it is probably even higher than one could expect in terms of personnel and material.
   
        Personnel: Spirit and morale is always a matter of leadership and success, and thus crucial to the crew's performance.  Maintaining the exact duty routine of sleeping, waking, mealtimes, cleaning ship and torpedo maintenance, the most timely changing of the watch, maintaining boat etiquette and performing the toughest discipline are extremely important for keeping and creating good morale of the crew - thus for efficiency.  The calmness, determination, and nervousness and insecurity of the leadership radiates unimpaired to all and effects accordingly positive or negative on performance and thus on success.  For this reason, e.g. when alarms ring give clear, concise orders.  Scolding and cursing, groundless, terrifying exclamations like, "Destroyers there!" "Aircraft" or others should be avoided and replaced as far as possible by a calm, clear, unambiguous order - only so loud that transmission is certain.  Sighting reports are always initiated:  "I see such and such degrees or compass points . . . . !".  The . . .
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 2 -
  
     
 
 

insistence on such a report trains in each case for consideration and factual accurate observation!  Crew changes after a remote patrol are initially felt as painful in terms of camaraderie, but after the shortest time because of quick familiarization are no longer significant and the effect to the performance of the boat is not crucial if the change amounts to just a few (2-4 people).  Replacement of Obersteuermannes [Navigators] or the Bootsmannes [Senior Boatswain's Mates] only by the consent of the Kommandanten because these soldiers fulfill their extremely important functions through the particularly personal relationship and cooperation  with the Kommandanten and the Kommandant in these cases can only with difficulty and reluctance relinquish such once well trusted and experienced men.
  Occurrence of normal afflictions such as headache, toothache, stomach ache, minor wounds, pimples, etc. also pubic lice - even the severe case of gastric ulcer can be well treated and rectified with existing remedies at hand.  Psychological influence was of crucial importance in the latter case.
  Depth charge anxiety is unavoidable when the boat is severely shaken - but the thought of "It'll be okay!" "praying" helps as well as the thought of "Die decently!" or "Everything is sh__" - of course, only when you think you have exhausted all means of escape.
   
        Material: The pressure hull is excellent as the previous diving depths have proven. The G.W. diesels run reliably and have so far shown only minor faults.  The torpedo armament tubes have been good and reliable so far. Torpedo material is given special treatment, as it has a decisive effect on tactics
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 3 -
  
     
 
  and chances of success.
  The attack periscope in its light gathering and edge sharpness is only partially adequate, but very good in its handling.  The fogging of the mirror has become rarer after various improvements.  The top of the bottle can be doubled in my view, in the interest of greater light gathering and edge sharpness, at least in diameter, without compromising invisibility with careful use!  The fixed lines and the true bearing meter mechanism are very useful and beneficial! 
  So far, the speed measurement system, like the plotting mechanism, has been unreliable and full of malfunctions.  These two devices are a great aide for the navigation of the boat, but so far have not been felt to be vital.  The echo sounder has rendered excellent service and allowed me to navigate perfectly from the west coast of Ireland to the Deutsches Bucht without check by navigation fix or Radio Direction Finder bearings.  Use of fishing charts for better depth indication in the North Sea is highly recommended.  The magnetic compass must be compared with  the gyro-compass at least every 4 hours, in order to have a clear picture of the deviation condition of the boat - number of torpedoes - state of charging, etc. - at any given time. For this purpose, a corresponding log must always be kept!
  The artillery installation:
  The possibility of using the cannon is severely limited by the low free board of the boat.  One can still shoot up to Sea State 3-4 against the seas, if the disadvantage of the speed settings 1 diesel LF, alternately 1 diesel KF can be accepted. 
  The M.G. C/30 is unreliable with this mount and virtually unusable due to its deck instillation. Whether the tower installation brings
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 4 -
  
     
 
  significant benefits must first be proven. Anyway, this is assumed.  I believe the M.G. C/34 is very useful and promises many applications. For example, stopping illuminated steamers at night to stop unsolicited searchlights immediately
  Over deck torpedo canisters are very beneficial.  In favorable conditions downloading may take place, even in buoyancy condition B.  Running before the seas with one, alternately 2 E-motors KF, so that the Swells are matched.  This downloading evolution may of course be carried out at night, where the possibility of surprise is excluded.  Here main ballast tank 5 or 1 is flooded for downloading aft or forward.
  Thus far the torpedoes have given much cause for trouble.  Missed shots were probably addressed as a failures, and operator errors or wrong settings have also led to failures that would probably not have been misses. In any case, worry and lack of confidence in the main weapon of the submarine was the result. 
  At any rate, one key requirement is essential!  Premature detonation and those at the end of the run must stop and be excluded because this can be deadly to the boat itself today and the boat can not repeat the attack by day.
  Reason:  With each detonator every enemy ship (merchant and warship) becomes aware of an unsuccessful submarine attack. (That quickly gets around!).  It gives S O S - S O S chased and torpedoed by submarine, position etc. and one soon has the U-boat hunting formation on their neck without a chance to attack (after the 1st or 2nd unnoticed shot without a detonator the possibility is still very good that the attack can be repeated) because even independent steamers run off or drive in zigzags, increase speed,
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 5 -
  
     
 
  throw depth charges or shoot!
  An Eto was flooded in the tube, the cause was not exactly determined, that must not happen! Leakage of the outer tube door is possible but not proven.
  Requirement:  The angle torpedoes must be available!  It is not acceptable, because of the limited number of angle torpedoes, to forgo the possibility of fire control systems.
  The safety distance of the combat pistol must be known exactly.  One can not shoot a fan with a 7 second shot interval, because then it is no longer a real fan.
   
        Tactical lessons: 1.  The previous tactics:  disposition in defined large sea areas on an individual-boat basis was successful at the outbreak of the war, as long as the enemy had not yet fully implemented the convoy system. Apart from that, steamers are still driving individually, even slow ones, who feel strong enough with two cannons.
  2.  Guided approach to the convoy:  Good, but will only lead to partial successes - as long as no more submarines are available.  Convoys seem to scatter apart at the first torpedo hits and the lucky few approaching submarines are at a disadvantage due to the divergence of the ships. The ships, which continue to advance from the center of force of the U-boats, can escape easily, while the approaching boats are forced to submerge by a few destroyers.
   
        Tactics in the various sea areas: I consider prolonged activity in shallow coastal waters such as St. George's- and the Bristol Channels and the Channel to be questionable, probably costly due to the excellent English defense organization.  (Reports on submarine activity after sighting by aircraft or patrol vessels, or after torpedoing a ship result in immediate strong counteraction by
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 6 -
  
     
 
  U-boat hunting groups.)  I was forced to submerge after an aircraft attack (4 bombs), 20 minutes later the destroyers from a convoy were there - very good organization - we have no countermeasure - depth charges were thrown very precisely.  Hearing was not possible, because we put the boat on the bottom and turned off everything, despite this exactly over us one approach after another.  Only the fact that we had x + 55 meters over us in addition the excellent holding of the boat allowed us to survive the severe depth charge blessing with tolerable damage. 
  In the indicated above relatively narrow sea areas, the cooperation of U-boats against a reported convoy is hopeless, as a maneuver ahead and operating on the convoy again because of the strong patrols near the coast will be possible only in the rarest cases and time to maneuver ahead is no longer there.
  An attack on convoys in sea areas with water depth below 50 meters can meet with success only just before the evening twilight as a submerged attack, otherwise only by night on the surface due to the immediately invoked defense.
  A means must be found to fight the depth charge attacking destroyers and patrol vessels from greater depths. I am thinking of rising mines, light circling torpedoes with noise apparatus!  Gas bombs, periscope dummy mines and the like.  The S-gear for ourselves must come soon to allow a blind shot from 20-25 meters.
   
        Attack experiences: Awareness of being truly invisible, comes gradually. In fact, one is completely invisible at night and has to consciously overcome any negative feelings with the consideration that
  1.  the attacked enemy has the weaker position being on the defensive, because also by fatigue in the lookout, with prolonged
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 7 -
  
     
 
  rigid and inconclusive activity, he can by no means reach an attention level like the attacking boat,
  2.  our night binoculars are probably far superior to those of the enemy, and therefore, the giant shadow, seen from us, does not mean that he now sees us as big!,
  3.  the small U-boat in sharp silhouette could be discovered.  During the shooting and attacking exercises in Meckelenburg bay it was rarely possible to discover it from the [geboddelten - meaning immobile like a ship in a bottle] target ship, even though the best binoculars and the most vigilant and responsible eyed lookout were there,
  4.  one takes up artillery combat with a merchant steamer only if you are convinced that the merchant ship shoots worse than you - that it is more scared than you - and therefore always shoots worse than the U-boat, if the U-boat Artillery Officer does not just forget the procedures and in the heat of the battle orders the wrong yoke or valve.  Such artillery combat is pleasing and always raises the attack spirit of the crew immensely and that is why such a shooting must be done one day, however the horizon and air observation must not be disregarded.
  That's always the danger for us: too much concentration on one enemy causes lack of attention and observation to the other dimensions!
   
        Bridge watch: For that reason, time and again lookout organization, vigilance - let no fatigue arise. Again and again, the sector division must be checked. Simultaneously with the sighting report about the vessel, etc. to the Kommandant approximate course and size or type of vessel
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 8 -
  
     
 
  and the true bearing must be reported .  The Watch Officer on the bridge must be free to turn towards or turn away, depending on his assessment of the situation.  Thus he is taught to think and act on his own and in the time the Kommandant runs onto the bridge, will in the rarest cases be able to cause harm. By day, of course, the Alarm is authorized!
  Consecutive bearings and thus determination of the shift are fundamentally important and it must be emphasized again and again, immediately when vessels come in sight as 1st priority take a bearing!
  When deep diving or going up after the same, in every case the entire boat must be informed, so that stern tubes - hull closures, bilges, etc., are particularly closely monitored.
  When you must "Go rapidly to great depth", due to the very significant volume reduction of the boat, instead of flooding it must be pumped immediately with great means.  However, the descent can only be done dynamically at high speed!  Trimming with men if possible, only then balance with trim water on the reaching depth!  Maneuvers "All men forward" etc. only in urgent danger situations, because of the excitement and haste associated with it.  "Ready with life jackets and Tauchrettern" must be practiced frequently in war, so that this command is not considered an exceptional measure in serious situations, and does not lead to great movement but also everyone actually has his Tauchretter.
   
        Thoughts about the naval warfare: The end of the "GRAF SPEE" gives much to think about, because it concerns the trade war, of which our U-boat warfare is a part.  At the Falkland Islands the cruiser squadron went under, at the Cocos Islands the "EMDEN", in the Rufidji the "KÖNIGSNERG" all except the "KÖNIGSNERG" probably because they were at the coast or ventured into the dangerous proximity of land,
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 9 -
  
     
 
  without exhausting their military possibilities.
How would the legacy of this admiral continue if, after further developing the experience of the World War, a common anti-submarine tactic was devised, tested and safely used successfully in this war. When "GRAF SPEE" had to advance to La Plata and got into action, the subsequent run-in to Montevideo sealed its fate with almost deadly certainty, if he did not want to leave immediately. The story of this battleship and its operation cannot be concluded without the thought of its creator, Admiral Zenker!  How far-sighted were the tactical and strategic principles of this type and how would the legacy of this Admiral continue if one built on the experiences of World War I, further expanding common battleship-U-boat tactics, testing and using them successfully in this war!
  U-boats as reconnaissance and protection perhaps in the form of a protective ring or a line for the armored ships alternating with attacking tasks, and in return, keep the U-boat defense surface forces at bay!  Both with a supply ship as base also under U-boat protection!  Or maybe for the U-boats a submersible base, 4000-6000 ton U-boat with provisions, fuel, torpedoes and other goodies!
  The question of the armored ship as a trade raider or not, in spite of the "GRAF SPEE" is not to raise.  For the battleship as such is undoubtedly today's merchant raider as well as the U-boat, and both united in common tactics seem insurmountable!  Also cooperation with auxiliary cruisers appears necessary in a similar way.
  Another thought is this: just as you build a submarine trap, you can also build a destroyer or cruiser trap! How, it is certainly clear:  Eto carrier disguised as a merchant ship - is stopped by a destroyer or cruiser,
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 10 -
  
     
 
  fires Eto's, flaps fall and artillery!
  In addition, the third part the Luftwaffe - all 3 - surface forces - U-boats - Luftwaffe (long range bombers) in my view, tightly grouped together under a Befehlshaber der Handelkriegsführung [Commander of Trade Warfare] against England should be able to operate on convoy reports in planned cooperation.  This B.d.H. sits in the homeland with all information brought together.  Reports from auxiliary cruisers, armored ships and merchant ship cruisers - or destroyer traps - agents etc. provide opportunities for U-boats.  Their reconnaissance reports and contact keeper signals hand over the already weakened convoys to the long range bombers, which are then best in the sea areas off the unloading ports where it is more and more difficult for U-boats to work due to U-boat defenses. 
  The destruction of the unloading ports would be the task of the operational Luftwaffe, independent of this systematically carried out total trade warfare!  By means of such a centrally led trade-warfare, the lumbering convoy would have to be shaken even with relatively few available forces, and England forced to give up this system, or the disadvantages and losses would be so great, that a war decision would be brought nearer for this reason.
  Day and night the U-boats - then by day the aircraft and the last night mines; this is what the attack would look like in the last 300 nm the convoy has to pass through. And then into the clogged unloading ports, where smashed quays, many mines and constant air threat to the English sailors after the dangers of crossing offer no more rest and joy.
  I do not believe that these are fantasies, because in the end, the entire conduct of warfare, along with all the other basic conditions, has always
 
     
 
 
     
 
- 11 -
  
     
 
  been a matter of the planned organization of the forces.  The conduct of warfare as a long-range effect by auxiliary cruisers and U-cruisers in the South Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans seems just as important, because the pressure of the threat in all parts of the oceans, as well as the consequent binding of strong forces also far away from the actual north Atlantic theatre causes a weakening of the defensive forces there.
  In addition to these actually tactical ideas, the strategic demand for the earliest possible occupation of Norway and Sweden appears inevitable, as the return of U-boats and surface naval forces will become increasingly difficult as North Sea mine warfare intensifies, and the question of the operational areas closer to bases will be urgent!