A14-1
  Serial No. 026  
 
U.S.S. BOGUE
  
 
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE,
  
 
NEW YORK, N.Y.
  
     
 
From:   Commander, Sixth Escort Group.
To    :    Commander in Chief Western Approaches.
     
Subject:   Report of Proceedings – USS BOGUE Escorting Convoy
    ON-184 – Narrative Report on – Comments and
    Recommendations.
     
Reference:
(a)
 Atlantic Convoy Instructions, Article 45-1(ii).
 
 
Enclosures:
(A)
 A Discussion of Anti-Submarine Tactics
 
(B)
 The Chronicle of Flight Operations, USS BOGUE for the period May 15 to May
 
(C)
 The Track chart of Convoy ON-184 Showing the Relative Positions of the Submarine Attack of Lieut. Comdr. W.M. DRANE, USN, on May 22, 1943.
 
(D)
 The Track Chart of Convoy ON-184 Showing the Relative Positions of the Submarine Attacks and Sightings made by our Aviators
 
(E-1)
 The Narrative and Series of Pictures of Lieut. Comdr. DRANE’s Attack Together with Explanatory Remarks.
 
(F-1)
The Narrative of Lieut.(jg) KUHN’s Attack with a Series of Pictures and Explanatory Remarks.
 
(G-1)
 The Narrative of Lieut. Rogers Sighting.
 
(H-1)
 The Narrative of Ensign DOTTY’s Attack with (I-1) The Narrative of Lieut.(jg) STEARN’s Attack with a Series of Pictures and Explanatory Attacks.
 
(J-1)
 The Narrative of Lieut.(jg) CHAMBERLAIN’s Attack with a Series of Pictures and Explanatory Remarks.
 
(K-1)
 The Narrative and Series of Pictures of Lieut. ROBERT’s Attack with Explanatory Remarks.
 
     
          1.            In compliance with sailing orders the BOGUS departed Belfast Lough at 1837, May 15, 1943, and effected rendezvous with surface escorts of Task Group 92.3 less the USS LEA off Lough Foyle at 2200(Z).  This group – shortly to be referred to as the Sixth Escort Group – proceeded without incident to Iceland arriving outer entrance swept channel at 1500(Z), May 17.  The BELKNAP, OSMOND INGRAM and GEO. E. BADGER were ordered to Reykavik for refueling and provisions while the BOGUE and GREENE proceeded on to Havalfjordur.  The BOGUE anchored at 2040 while the GREENE proceeded to a tanker for refueling.  
     
          2.            The Sixth Escort Group had received orders to escort the  
     
 
-1-
  
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
     
 
ACV9/A14-1  
Serial No. 026  
   
Subject: Report of Proceedings – USS BOGUE Escorting Convoy
  ON-184 – Narrative Report on – Comments and Recommendations.
     
  S.S. TOLTEC from Iceland to join up with ON-184.  At 0035 on May 18 the BOGUE and GREENE got underway in compliance with sailing orders and proceeded to rendezvous with the BELKNAP, BADGER, OSMOND INGRAM and TOLTEC off Gretta Light.  At 0211 the rendezvous was effected and a course was set to cross ahead of the convoy.  
     
          3.            The LEA had been delayed several hours at Iceland for repairs and fuel.  She overtook the Sixth Escort Group and assumed position in the Anti-Submarine screen at 0900 on May 18, 1943.  
     
          4.            At dawn on May 19 three planes were launched to locate and cover the convoy.  At 0545 one of the planes reported sighting the convoy bearing 130 T, distance 20 miles.  Upon intercepting the convoy the S.S. TOLTEC was delivered to the Commodore.  
     
          5.            At about 0930 the BOGUE’s destroyer escorts took previously assigned positions in the convoy’s anti-submarine screen and the BOGUE took station in the Commodore’s column astern of the escort tanker.  
     
          6.            Flight operations were held on May 18,19,21,22,23,24 and 25.  A detailed account of these operations and weather conditions for the entire trip appears as Enclosure (B).  
     
          7.            On May 20 the LEA and the GREENE refueled from the escort tanker using the astern method.  
     
          8.            On May 21 a TBF-1 on patrol attacked a submarine on the surface and probably sank it.  The narrative report, photographs, and explanatory remarks on this attack appear as Enclosure (E-1).  
     
          9.            On May 22 five attacks were made by planes from the BOGUE on four submarines.  One submarine surrendered, after being attacked by two TBF-1’s, and was subsequently scuttled by the crew.  The U-boat captain, two officers and twenty-one enlisted ratings were rescued and taken as prisoners by the ST. LAURENT which had been sent to the scene following the surrender of the U-boat to the plane.  The narrative report, photographs, and explanatory remarks on these attacks appear as Enclosures (J-1) and (K-1).  
     
          10.            The attacks on the other three submarines on May 22 resulted in the probable sinking of two and the probable inflicting of heavy damage to the third.  The narrative reports, photographs, and explanatory remarks on these attacks appear as Enclosure (F-1), (H-1) and (I-1).  
 
 
          11.            The narrative report on the sighting of a submarine by  
     
 
-2-
  
     
 
 

 

 
 
     
 
ACV9/A14-1  
Serial No. 026  
   
Subject: Report of Proceedings – USS BOGUE Escorting Convoy
  ON-184 – Narrative Report on – Comments and Recommendations.
     
  A fighter plane from the BOGUE on May 22 appears as Enclosure (G-1).  
     
          12.            The Track Charts of Convoy ON-184 showing the relative position of the submarine attacks and sightings made by the BOGUE pilots on May 21 and May 22 appear as Enclosures (C) and (D).  
     
          13.            A discussion of Anti-Submarine Tactics appears as Enclosure (A).  
     
          14.            From the time the BOGUE left Belfast a continuous watch had been maintained on the newly installed HF/DF.  Three radiomen from the BOGUE manned this equipment under the supervision of Sub-Lieutenant J.B. ELTON, R.N.V.R., who had been assigned by CinCWa to assist on this trip.  The HF/DF equipment proved invaluable.  On the morning of May 22 this equipment was used to home one of the TBF’s.  At 1051(Z) an HF/DF bearing was obtained on a submarine, but before this bearing could be transmitted a TBF on patrol had already attacked the submarine.  In the afternoon an HF/DF bearing was directly responsible for the attack on the submarine which surrendered.  The attacks on this submarine have been discussed in paragraph nine of this report.  
     
          15.            An interesting point about the HF/DF bearing referred to above was that the U-boat was transmitting a fifty-nine group enigma message on series eight.  Shortly thereafter NSHQ Ottawa’s dispatch 221956 Z was received which is quoted below:  
     
  10 TH OF 58 AND 59 GROUP ENIGMA MESSAGES ON SERIES 8 AT 1323 Z and 1727 Z FROM VICINITY ON-184 OR HX-239 PROBABLY THE LATTER X NO EVIDENCE THESE TRANSMISSIONS FROM U-BOAT IN CONTACT  
     
          Without doubt the latter transmission at 1727 Z was made by the U-boat and wrote its death warrant.  This was reported to Captain “D” at Argentia who made the following signal to NSHQ:  
     
  IN CASE IT MAY HAVE BEARING ON THE INTERROGATION OF PRISONERS COMMANDING OFFICER OF BOGUE REPORTS THAT YOUR 221956Z ADDRESSED BY SHIPS ESCORTING HX 239 AND ON 184 WAS TRANSMITTED BY U-BOAT FROM WHICH PRISONERS WERE TAKEN BY ST LAURENT XX  
     
  16.            The BOGUE’s movements were somewhat handicapped when escorts were fueled from the escort tanker due to the fact that the tanker normally dropped back forcing the BOGUE back astern or hauling in between columns.  It is suggested that this tanker be assigned another position in the convoy to avoid any repetition of this difficulty.  
     
 
-3-
  
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
     
 
ACV9/A14-1  
Serial No. 026  
   
Subject: Report of Proceedings – USS BOGUE Escorting Convoy
  ON-184 – Narrative Report on – Comments and Recommendations.
     
          17.            It is also suggested that a frequency in the 4000 K.C. band be assigned for communicating with aircraft in place of the present 6666 K.C. frequency.  The latter frequency appears to be subjected to excessive interference.  
     
          18.            Considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining depth charges in the United Kingdom.  No aerial depth bombs were available in Ireland and no Mk.44 or Mk.17, Mod.2 in the United Kingdom were available to replace those expended on the East bound cruise.  Fifty Mk.17, Mod.1 charges were obtained from the Army Ordnance, who flew them in from England.  Adaptors were obtained Harlan & Wolff and the modification completed aboard ship.  It is recommended that supply of Mark 44 depth charges be made available at whatever United Kingdom port is to be used as an operating base and that, pending such arrangements, the ship carry sufficient charges for a round trip, substituting depth charges for the 500 pound bombs now carried.  Consideration of a larger depth bomb is recommended.  A 450 pound to 500 pound Torpex depth charge designed to fit TBF bomb racks would go far to remove the question mark on many aerial attacks.  
     
          19.            On the morning of May 25, in compliance with orders from CinCWa and Commodore Commanding Newfoundland Forces, and in agreement with the Senior Officer of the Escort, the Sixth Escort Group detached from the Convoy in Latitude 46017’ Longitude 43050’ and proceeded to Argentia.  The course was laid along latitude 45030’ to pass south of reported congested iceberg territory but the ice situation was still bad, many large bergs and growlers being encountered during that day.  Before dark a plane was launched for ice patrol to eighty-five miles ahead and reported track clear for that distance.  
     
     
     
                                                                                        G.E.SHORT.  
     
     
  CC:      The Admiralty  
              Cominch  
              ComNavEu  
              CinC CNA  
     
 
-4-
  
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
A DISCUSSION OF ANTI SUBMARINE TACTICS.
 
 
 
        The TBF is considered an excellent anti-submarine airplane in view of its depth charge capacity, endurance and speed.  The latter is a very important item which permits the plane to deliver its attack before the submarine can submerge.  This speed also exposes the plane to AA fire for the shortest possible period.  This squadron to date has sighted and attacked eight submarines and every attack was made with the submarine still on the surface.  The endurance is of considerable value in permitting the plane to remain on station a reasonable time to await relief.  The only disadvantage to this type of airplane is its size when used on ACV’s however this is not a serious handicap in view of its many favorable qualities.
  
 
 
 
        The .30 caliber tunnel gun has been removed from the planes of this squadron while on anti-submarine patrol and the tunnel window used for photographing the attack.  There appears to be no necessity for these guns on this type of duty in the North Atlantic.
  
 
 
 
        German submarines have recently started using two 20 MM guns for attacking aircraft.  Three attacks on separate submarines on May 22, 1943 encountered this AA fire.  It is therefore recommended that at least two and preferably four .50 caliber guns be mounted in the TBF wings.  This appears necessary for this duty and would no doubt be of considerable value in other types of duty.
  
 
 
 
        The type of attack preferred by this squadron is to use cloud cover, sun or other elements to the maximum for concealment.  When the clouds are not more than 5/10 below 5000 feet, patrol above the clouds.  When the clouds are more than 5/10 below 5000 feet, patrol in the base of the clouds.
  
 
 
 
        The attack is made in a long power glide at maximum speed when at considerable distance, however on approaching the vicinity of the submarine the speed must be reduced to 180 – 220 knots to reduce the possibility of a ricochet.  One submarine possibly escaped this squadron because of ricochets although the flat nosed depth charges were used and dropped with the plane in nearly a twenty degree dive and making only 200 knots.  In the final stage of the attack it is recommended that the wheels be lowered to reduce the speed to 160 – 170 knots then raised to clear the tunnel window for the photographs.  The plane is pushed over to about a 20 degree dive and steadied on the point of aim when the depth charges are dropped.  The advantage of this final push over and steady aim permits the bombs to be dropped with remarkable accuracy in contrast to the rapid sweep and split seemed accuracy required in the horizontal drop.  Another advantage is that the aim is steady long enough to permit the emergency release to be pulled after the firing button to insure that all bombs have dropped.  This is standard procedure in this squadron.
  
 
 
 
        The best angle of attack is believed to be from ten to twenty degrees from the center line of the submarine and preferably from astern.  A beam shot is avoided if absolutely possible.  The speed of the TBF has permitted ample time so far to chose attack position especially when concealed in the clouds.
  
 
 
 
        The depth charges are set for a depth of 25 feet and a spacing of 75 feet.  This large spacing is a compromise between our previously favored 50 feet and the 100 feet recommended by the Fleet Air Arm Anti-Submarine School, Balleykelly, Northern Ireland which all TBF pilots of this squadron attended.  This spacing seems to be ideal for our type of attack since our dive far shortens this interval considerably.  Also if the submarine has already disappeared it makes a longer spread over the possible submarine’s position thus increasing the chances of hitting.
  
 
 
 

ENCLOSURE “A”

  
 
-1-
  
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
        During the approach the pilot and radioman must check all switches in addition to the other routine requirements for dropping charges.  It is particularly important for the radioman to check and double check the station distributor and number of bombs to be dropped dials since any accidental or inadvertent pressing of the button on the stick will cause these dials to move as if the depth charges had dropped although the bomb bay door switch prevents them from actually dropping.  When the radioman has completed his required duties he mans the camera at the tunnel window.  The turret gunner uses the gun camera on all attacks to supplement the large camera.  He also uses the turret gun if personnel are in the conning tower.
 
 
 
        After dropping the depth charges the plane makes a sharp left turn to facilitate observation and the taking of photographs.  After marking the area and completing the contact report the plane climbs to sufficient altitude to permit the ship to check position briefly by radar.  The contact report is made during the approach if time permits.  This is important in that the ship will have submarine warning in case the plane should get shot down.
  
 
 
 
        It is assumed that the dawn and dusk patrols are the most important patrols to the welfare of the convoy and that submarine are most likely to be encountered on these flights.  Experience of BOGUE aircraft to date regarding submarine defensive tactics seem to be for them to remain on the surface and fight back.  In view of possible anti-aircraft fire it is considered desirable that fighter planes accompany the TBF aircraft on these particular flights if conditions permit.  If fighter support is used it is mandatory that some policy be laid down to coordinate the action of the fighter aircraft upon sighting, during the approach and attack.  Without this discipline the missions are doomed to failure.
  
 
 
 
        Some facts must be borne in mind ie: two planes in formation can be seen at far greater distance than a single plane.  Observation from the aircraft by the additional pair of eyes does not greatly intensify the search since the attention of the fighter pilot must be directed toward station keeping.  Maneuverability of a fighter is one of its prime assets.  Radical maneuvers of an aircraft will attract the attention of the surface observers more readily than a plane on a steady course.  Maneuvers often condense the vapor in humid air greatly facilitating detection.  Concealment is a primary factor in anti-submarine search.  Fighters must not destroy advantages.  It should be appreciated that except for the possibility of anti-aircraft fire, the anti-submarine aircraft could complete the mission on its own; and therefore, the fundamental mission of the fighter is to counteract AA action, and that this action will only develop during the latter and crucial stage of the approach.  The responsibility for control of the fighter must rest upon the anti-submarine aircraft since it has the responsibility of the fundamental mission.  There should never develop a situation where in the action of the fighter results in the failure of a successful attack.
  
 
 
 
        While it is desirable to close distance as quickly as possible when a submarine is sighted, excessive speed in the final stages must be avoided as discussed previously.  If the fighter dashes madly in without signal and drives the submarine down prematurely, those few sacred seconds might spell defeat.  The anti-submarine aircraft may wish to use clouds, sun or other means of concealment during the early stages of the approach.  The fighter must not compromise this strategy.  The situation will dictate the strategy and the ant-submarine aircraft must dictate the action.
  
 
 
 
        During the approach the fighter should ease out on the beam of the anti-submarine about 500 to 1000 yards and on signal when about 1500 yards from the objective increase speed and strafe the submarine from three to five seconds before the depth charge attack.  Interference with the depth charge attack must be avoided.
  
 
 
 
        Team work is essential and this is obtained only by a lot of practice.
  
 
 
 
 
 
ENCLOSURE “A”
  
 
-2-
  
 
 
 
 

 

Enclosure (C) The Track chart of Convoy ON-184 Showing the Relative Positions of the Submarine Attack of Lieut. Comdr. W.M. DRANE, USN, on May 22, 1943.
Enclosure (D) The Track Chart of Convoy ON-184 Showing the Relative Positions of the Submarine Attacks and Sightings made by our Aviators

 

 
 
 
 
 
“E-1”
 
 
 
NARRATIVE
  
 
 
 
Lieut. Comdr. Drane, USN                 Attack on May 21, 1943
  
 
 
 
        Plane was flying A/S patrol and was on second leg of flight, 60 miles from convoy, flying 3000 feet across Convoy’s course (170 degrees T) on a course 116 degrees T, when pilot sighted wake of U-boat about 8 miles on starboard beam.  Pilot increased speed from 145 knots to 200 knots, circling so as to approach sub from dead ahead.  During approach contact report was made to U.S.S. Bogue giving U-boat’s bearing and distance from convoy.  At the same time plane lost altitude so as to be at 50 feet at release point.  During later part of approach pilot lowered wheels to reduce speed in order to avoid ricochet of Depth charges.  When release point was reached, U-boat’s entire length was clearly visible.  Four depth charges were released by intervelometer.  Plane then continued on course for approximately 10 seconds to enable gunner and radioman to get pictures.  During this time neither the gunner nor the radioman saw the sub, though a swirl, or wake which seemed to end, was seen and the explosions were visible about 50 feet beyond or dead ahead in relation to the U-boat’s course.  Since this was not over 8 – 10 seconds since the pilot had observed the U-boat fully surfaced, it is possible that the explosions obscured it from view – either blanketing it or covering between it and the plane.  Nothing was ever seen of the U-boat thereafter, nor were there any traces of oil or anything else.  This in spite of the fact that the plane circled low over the torpex slick for about two minutes while it disappeared.  The plane then climbed to 7000 feet and circled rushing further efforts to contact the ship.  The ship in the meantime had dispatched two destroyers but due to low fuel (30 gallons left on return) and the expenditure of sea-markers, the plane was forced to return prior to their arrival.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
“E-1”
 
 
 
EXPLANATORY REMARKS:
  
 
 
 
Pictures No. 1 through No. 6 show the spray from the exploding depth charges gradually falling back into the sea and when they clear, the U-boat is no where to be seen.  Picture No. 2 shows the wake of the U-boat leading into the center of the spray more clearly than the others.
  
 
 
 
Pictures No. 7 and No. 8 show the torpex slick from the explosions, and, between it and the bottom of the picture, two dark circular patches on the water.  The smaller one is just above the sighting pip in the center of the picture; and, to its right, is the larger one with two white specks on either side of it.  It is not known what these are but they have an entirely different appearance from the characteristic torpex slick above it.  Some dark specks appear in the center of the torpex slick.  What these are is unknown.
  
 
 
 
Pictures No. 9 and No. 10 still show these three unknown dark specks on the edge of the slick.  Note that they have persisted long enough for the plane to circle the slick as No. 9 and No. 10 are taken from the opposite sides of the slick.
  
 
 
 
Pictures No. 11 shows more dark spots on the water, three of which are larger than the others and seem to stick further out of the water.  What they are is not known.
  
 
 
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 
 
“F-1”
 
 
 
Narrative
  
 
 
 
Lieutenant (jg) Roger C. Kuhn, USNR – Attack on May 22, 1943.
  
 
 
 
        Plane was flying regular A/S patrol for ON184 flying in the base of clouds (1500’) at 140 knots on course of 0300 T. when pilot suddenly noticed U/B surfacing 3 miles away just off port bow.  Pilot immediately climbed to about 3000’ and then started approach.  When plane broke through clouds U/B was fully surfaced and it immediately began firing on plane.  Lieutenant (jg) Kuhn continued in to attack opening up with his own .30 caliber cowl gun.  When at about one quarter of a mile away Lieutenant (jg) Kuhn started dive, gradually increasing angle until it was about 500 at release point.  During all but about last two seconds of dive U/B was firing on plane.
  
 
 
 
        The U/B was unable to submerge remaining on surface (down by stern) for one hour and two minutes after attack moving very slowly (about 2 knots) almost spinning in a small circle.  It finally stopped moving entirely and started sinking stern first.  Finally only conning tower was seen above surface and fully one minute later it too disappeared.  While it was circling after attack it blew its tanks emitting large sprays of compressed air or steam fully fifty feet in the air.  These appeared to come from about half way from the conning tower to the stern.  The first time this happened was about 3 minutes after attack and the second about 15-20 minutes later.  While U/B circled it was emitting large bluish oil streak --
  
 
 
 
        About one-half hour after the attack a sudden flash of intense white light was seen to come from the stern.  This appeared to be about 3 or 4 feet in diameter.  The pilot first thought this to be a signal and that the U/B had flashed a “TARE” to him, but no further attempts were made to communicate, and the light was too big and much too intense for an Aldis Lamp.  The pilot felt that no U/B would carry a search light big enough to make such an intense and large light.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 
 
“G-1”
 
 
 
NARRATIVE
  
 
 
 
Lieut. Richard S. Rogers, USN
  
 
 
 
        Plane was flying to aid TBF in attack on U/B which was resisting with gun fire.  When about 50 minutes from ship the aviator noticed a large wake about 8 miles ahead.  He took all possible advantage of cloud cover and applied full throttle to his F4F but before he could reach the scene the U/B was observed to dive when he was about 1½ miles away.
  
 
 
 
        No attack could be made a U/B was out of range of .50 caliber machine guns (no bombs were carried).  However, one TBF was sent to search this area and attacked a U/B in this vicinity at 1058 GCT.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
“H-1”
 
 
 
Narrative
  
 
 
 
Ensign Stewart E. DOTY, USNR – Attack on May 22, 1943
  
 
 
 
        Plane was on regular A/S patrol for ON184 flying on course of 2100 at 140 knots at 2500’ when an extremely long wake was seen on port bow about 9 miles away.  Pilot immediately climbed into clouds and began high speed approach at 190 knots to overtake U/B from astern.  When plane emerged from clouds U/B was directly ahead about 1½ miles still fully surfaced and going at high speed on a course of 1250 (3300 R.)  The U/B was on the4 convoy’s starboard bow about 16 miles ahead and steering at full speed on a course that would have intercepted.  It is probable because of the numerous other contacts earlier in the day that U/B was conscious of the presence of the convoy.  The U/B apparently did not see the plane for about 15 more seconds when it opened fire with its AA gun from the conning tower.  One, possibly two more, were standing over the hatch in the conning tower.  The plane continued on attack without taking any evasive action.  When the bomb release point was reached the plane was still in a 200 dive and flying at 190 knots when the four Depth Charges were released.  After releasing the pilot turned immediately to observe results.  The radioman saw the explosions completely envelope the entire U/B in spray.  In fact he first saw the U/B as it emerged from the spray dropping back into the ocean.  The gunner did not see the actual explosions but saw the U/B with the spray just falling at its stern.  To him it appeared that the U/B’s stern was thrown off course about 150.  The U/B ceased firing about 5 seconds before the D/Cs were released and it is possible that it was then preparing to dive.  No one was visible on deck as the plane passed over head but the U/B did not appear to try to dive at this time.  All the D/Cs appeared to explode in one place just a few feet off the U/B’s stern.
  
 
 
 
        At the time of the explosions the U/B appeared to lurch to starboard, lose all forward speed, and go completely out of control, buffets about by the waves.  About 1½ minutes later it slowly settled below the water.  Just after it sank a large bluish oil bubble came to the surface.  It was about 50’ in diameter and persisted for about to 8 minutes.  After about two minutes after it first disappeared, part of the conning tower and 20 to 30 feet of the bow reappeared on a 450 angle then slowly settled, stern first until only 8 – 10 feet was visible.  Fully 20 seconds later, still at a 450 angle the bow slipped under the water and another large blotch of oil came up without any indication of further movement of the U/B.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
“H-1”
 
 
 
Explanatory Remarks –
  
 
 
 
Picture 1 shows U/B steaming at high speed before attack as taken by cowl gun camera while plane is in a dive attacking.
  
 
 
 
Picture 2 shows plumes of first three explosions in various stages of development.  Wake left by U/B seen in bottom left.  The U/B is obscured by vertical tail fin.
  
 
 
 
Picture 3 – Nose of U/B proceeding along course just  seen as dark spec surrounded by foam which dies out in next two pictures.
  
 
 
 
In pictures 4, 5, and 6 the U/B is clearly seen still on course.
  
 
 
 
Pictures 7, 8, 9 and 10 show spray from fourth explosion as it starts and builds up to completely obscure U/B in 10.
  
 
 
 
In pictures 11, 12, 13 and 14 the spray gradually drops away.
  
 
 
 
Pictures 15, 16 and 17 show U/B emerging from explosive area.
  
 
 
 
Picture 18 – Note how U/B has been moving off to starboard some distance from force of blast though it still appears to be on about the same course as originally.
  
 
 
 
Pictures 19, 20 and 21 show U/B proceeding to submerge but it seems to be losing speed as little wake is visible in 21.
  
 
 
 
Pictures 22, 23 and 24 show U/B resurfacing, the bow is seen as small dark object in center of swirl.
  
 
 
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 
  “I-1”
     
  NARRATIVE  
     
  Lieut.  (jg) R. L. Stearns, USNR              Attack on May 22, 1943  
     
  Pilot was on regular A/S patrol circling convoy astern on course 0350 T at 1200’ in base of clouds at 140 knots when a fully surfaced submarine was seen dead ahead.  Pilot immediately increased speed and started to dive.  When about 750 yards away he fired a burst from the .30 caliber fixed cowl gun.  The U/B then opened up with 20 mm AA gun in the conning tower.  Aviator continued run and reached bomb release point at 125’ while in about a 300 dive.  The emergency release was pulled to drop bombs in a salvo as U/B was fully surfaced.  The bombs exploded while U/B was still on the surface and apparently still had not started to dive, even going ahead slower.  About one minute later, however, the U/B slowly disappeared in shallow dive, turning hard to starboard.  
     
  The gunner saw two explosions both on port side of U/B about 25 feet off its side.  The first explosion was at the tip of its stern, obscuring the U/B from view momentarily, the second at the bow.  The aviator and radioman saw only the second explosion after the plane had pulled out in its turn.  This explosion hid the U/B from the middle of the conning tower forward.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
  “I-1”
     
  Explanatory Remarks  
     
  Picture 1 shows submarine (dark spot parallel to top of picture) in center of shock wave before depth charges erupt above surface.  
     
  Picture 2 shows U/B’s wake entering (top left) shock wave.  It is almost obscured.  
     
  In picture 3 we have the start of explosion above water with wake visible leading into it.  
     
  Pictures 4, 5 and show explosion developing, the U/B obscured with wake still visible.  
     
  Picture 7, explosion has subsided, conning tower visible as U/B emerges from center of explosive area.  Wake leading into area is still visible.  
     
  Pictures 8 and 9, U/B more clearly visible emerging from the explosive area, showing bow-wave.  U/B has changed course to starboard, perhaps involuntarily.  
     
  Picture 10, the U/B is still not very far out of explosive area but has settled much lower in the water.  
     
  Picture 11 shows the U/B has sunk on almost an even keel with very little apparent forward speed leaving only long, narrow bubbling area as the water pours in over the top.  Note also how the U/B has changed course approximately 750 to starboard.  
 
 
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 
  “J-1”
     
  NARRATIVE  
     
  Lieut. (jg) Chamberlain, USNR              Attack on May 22, 1943  
     
          Plane was investigating HF/DF bearing flying at 1500’ in base of clouds on course 0670 T at 160 knots and sighted U/B in the position reported, bearing 1200T at distance of 25 miles.  Plane circled in clouds for undetected approach on U/B from its stern.  Plane dove reaching a release point at 100’ and let go his four D/Cs while still in a 200 dive.  The U/B apparently made no effort to submerge caught completely by surprise.  The bombs were seen to straddle the U/B, two on each side when they exploded.  
     
          The U/B resurfaced about 30 minutes later by which time Lieut. Roberts had relieved Lieut. (jg) Chamberlain.  After Lieut. Roberts attack with four D/Cs the submarine surrendered and later sank or was scuttled.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
  “J-1”
     
  Explanatory Remarks  
     
  In Picture 1, U/B’s bow and conning tower appear with stern engulfed in spray.  
     
  Picture 2, all but tip of bow engulfed in spray.  
     
  Pictures 3, 4 and 5, the U/B is emerging from explosive area.  
     
  Picture 9 shows conning tower only visible as U/B submerges.  
     
  Enlargements  
     
  A is taken just as plane passes over conning tower after releasing four D/Cs, two of which have not yet hit the water.  One is very close alongside just aft the conning tower, the other forward and a short distance to port (this one has lost its flat nose).  
     
  B shows the U/B emerging from the explosive area.  
     
  C was taken just before the conning tower disappears.  
 
 
 
 

 

 

 
 
 
 
  “K-1”
     
  NARRATIVE  
     
  Lieut. H. S. Roberts, USNR              Attack on May 22, 1943  
     
          Plane was sent out to relieve Lieut. (jg) Chamberlain after his attack.  While patrolling at 3000’ around smoke light the U/B was seen to surface almost directly beneath the plane.  Lieut. Roberts immediately attacked but the proximity of the U/B necessitated a dive of 500, releasing at about 00’ and pulling out at 100’.  Four D/Cs were released electrically in train followed by emergency release.  At the time they hit the water the U/B had fully surfaced and two distinct explosions were seen half way from the conning tower to the stern, one on either side of the submarine.  The bow was seen to rise out of the water, sink and rise a second time, this time on its side.  It sank again and finally rose a third time, this time on an even keel.  Immediately the conning tower opened and the crew started to pour out of the hatch.  The gunner opened up with the .50 caliber turret gun in an effort to keep them inside to prevent scuttling.  Between bursts, however, many of the crew rushed out and began waving white flags.  The surrender was reported the U.S.S. Bogue and as Lieut. Roberts continued to circle the disabled U/B the H.M.C.S. St. Laurent drew alongside just as the submarine sank.  Twenty-five prisoners were picked out of the water including the Commanding Officer and two other officers.  
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
  “K-1”
     
  Explanatory Remarks  
     
  Pictures 1, 2 and 3 show spray developing from exploding D/Cs completely enveloping the U/B, whose wake is seen leading into the explosive area.  Dark object on near side of spray is noteworthy as is the boiling effect at the end of the wake.  
     
  Pictures 4, 5, 6 and 7 show the Torpex swirl after the spray has died down.  Lieut. Roberts states that the bow of the U/B was visible at this point in the center of swirl and that the plane was firing on it with .50 caliber bursts.  This is indicated by the fact that the swirl moves from the center of the picture to the left showing the gun trained on the U/B as the plane was in its turn.  
     
  Pictures 8 and 9 show the bow of the U/B now beginning to rise above the surface.  
     
  Picture 10, the U/B’s bow is clearly visible far out of water on a steep angle.  
     
  Picture 11, the bow is still out of water with a slight boiling effect aft.  
     
  Pictures 12 and 13 show boiling effect developing into a plume as the U/B settles in water stern first (cause of eruption unknown).  
     
  Picture 14 shows torpex swirl with U/B now barley visible below the surface.  
     
  Picture 15, the second eruption emerging higher from the center of the slick (cause unknown).  
     
  Pictures 16, 17, 18 and 19 show the U/B again resurfaced but apparently down by the stern.