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        The plane attacked the submarine on the sub's port quarter.  Only one bomb was seen to explode in definite relationship to the sub.  It exploded 100 - 150 feet off the port quarter of the sub.  The demolition bombs were spaced at 150 feet, 180 K G.S.  The whole time the plane was squaring away for this run and during the diving attack, the submarine was firing at the plane with perhaps, a 3 inch deck gun forward of the conning tower, at least 2 30 calibre machine guns, located on the conning tower, and one 20 mm located aft on the conning tower near the rails at the aft end of the conning tower.  The explosion of the demolition charge must have shaken the sub because its gun fire ceased for about a minute.  During this attack the bow gunner of the plane was slugging the conning tower section of the submarine with 200 rounds of 50 calibre fire from 2 guns.  On the next run, a depth charge attack, the bow gunner, W. M. Thomas A.C.O.M., who has had much experience with armament, gained a fairly accurate view of the sub's armament, plus the personnel manning the guns.  The above armament was noted and this additional information gained.  The 2 30 calibre machine guns are mounted on pedestals or posts and the gun fits against the shoulder of the man.  It is aimed, therefore, like a rifle.  Thus far, it is the 30 calibre fire which has proved most damaging to the planes and which has accounted for the deaths of two officers of this squadron and the serious wounding of two enlisted men.  The rounds are now definitely believed to be incendiary as will be brought out below.

        Again the explosive bursts from the forward deck gun were astern of the plane.  Where the 20 MM fire from the gun aft on the conning tower was directed is not known.  This 20 MM gun fire appears to have been well astern of the plane.  However, the 30 calibre fire hit the plane.  As the plane was approaching the sub, a 30 calibre round, apparently an incendiary, ruptured the gas line between the hull and wing tank.  The inside of the starboard wing became a mass of flames.  Smoke poured through the plane and drifted on to the flight deck.

        A.S. Creider, Machinist U.S.N., grabbed a shirt that was convenient and crawled into the starboard wing to try to smother the fire.  C O 2 bottles were passed to him.  The five pound C O 2 bottle was empty.  Two two and one half pound C O 2 bottles proved effective.

        Lt. Crockett, realizing that there was a likelihood of the plane exploding, decided to deliver a depth charge attack before the plane was ineffectual.

        1555Q:  Immediately Lt. Crockett got astern of the sub and attacked on course 200 degrees, the sub was on 180 degree course now, still turning to starboard apparently out of control.  4 MK 44 D/C were released at 200 knots IAS, diving angle 030 degrees, 300 feet altitude.  Bombs spaced 90 foot 190 K G.S.  During this swift dive, Creider was still combating the fire in the starboard wing.  At 1000 foot range, the plane's bow gunner opened fire with 2 50 calibre machine guns.  The pilot and the bow gunner saw the tracers pouring into the conning tower of the sub.  The sub returned the fire of the plane.

        After the release of the D/C the pilot made a tight climbing turn to port, and the pilot saw three-fourths of the submarine lying in the subsiding turbulence of the depth charge explosion.  The pilot reported seeing a tremendous explosion about fifty feet astern of the sub and slightly to the port quarter.  The submarine which had been running with stern down was now settling by the stern.  The whole hull, from conning tower to stern, was wholly submerged.  Water was breaking around the forward part of the conning tower.  The bow was at a sharp angle out of the water.

        Creider was now beginning to get the fire in the starboard wing under control.  Lt. Crockett now decided to circle at 1500 feet, 3 - 4 mile range and await the sub's submergence so he could deliver with the MK.24 bomb.  But the sub would not go down.  It continued circling slowly out of control.  Lt. Crockett radioed the base for help, which was immediately dispatched.

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        1608Q:  205P-11 radioed the base that the fire in the starboard wing was out and that the plane was remaining on station to guide other planes to the sub.

        1635Q:  Until 1635Q Lt. Crockett circled the sub.  Every now and then the sub would fire its deck gun.  But the bursting shells were always astern of the plane.  At 1635Q a PV1 from Bomron 130, Edinburgh field, Trinidad arrived at the scene of action.

        With the arrival of this plane Lt. Crockett took charge of the battle.  From his plane, he directed the next several attacks.  A constant watch was maintained by this intelligence officer and those from other squadrons, plus NAS personnel, on the voice scene of action frequency.  An accurate chronological log of the orders from Lt. Crockett, the replies of the other planes involved, and most of the voice communications were taken down verbatim.

        Lt. Crockett ordered the PV to deliver a depth charge attack from astern of the sub, while he swept the deck of the sub with 2-50 calibres in the bow of the plane.  The planes assumed their positions, the PV about 8 miles astern, Crockett 3 to 4 miles off the starboard beam of the sub.  At Crockett's signal a simultaneous approach was commenced.

        1640Q:  The PV came storming in at such a high speed that he passed through Crockett's tracers and delivered a beautiful attack.  The four depth charges released by the PV exploded as Crockett passed over the sub in a tight climbing turn.  The depth charge explosion jolted Crockett's plane, however, Crockett had a clear view of the depth charge explosions.  The depth charge explosions were a perfect straddle.  Two depth charges exploded off the port quarter of the sub.  One depth charge exploded within 20 feet of the port quarter of the sub, one within 20 feet of the starboard bow.  The columns of water completely covered the sub.

        The depth charges also knocked the sub beneath the surface.  Lt. Crockett maneuvered to release his MK 24 bomb.  As he was approaching, the submarine bobbed to the surface just like a cork, indicating that it had been blown below the surface and then bobbed up.  Lt. Crockett estimates the sub was below the surface 15 seconds.

        On the strafing run by Lt. Crockett, the bow gunner believes he cleared the guns of the crews because the firing from the sub ceased abruptly and the PV was not under intense fire as it closed the range with the sub.  After passing through Lt. Crockett's tracers, the PV pilot checked up on his personnel and plane and found no hits.  It has been reported that the PV had 4 MK 17(TNT) D/C instead of 4 MK 44(torpex) D/C.  If MK 44 D/C had been used it is believed the sub would have been destroyed.

        1645-1815Q:  Lt. Crockett and the PV circled the sub awaiting fresh arrivals for the battle.  The PV had expended its D/C load, and Lt. Crockett had only his MK 24 bomb.  Lt. Crockett reported that the sub's damage control must have been excellent because the sub remained on the surface and gradually brought up its after portion slightly, although the sub still remained in a marked stern down condition, slowly turning out of control to starboard.

        1815Q:  204P-8 Lt. (jg) J.W. Dresbach, PPC, arrived.  Lt. Crockett set up the next attack.  Lt. Crockett was to sweep the sub with gun fire from the starboard bow; 204P-8 was to deliver a D/C attack from astern of the sub.  The planes deployed and commenced the attack.

        1825Q:  The PV swept in with a vicious attack and pulled out.  Lt. Crockett rushed in, strafing with the 2 bow 50 calibres.  The conning tower seemed to be splattered with tracers from the PV and Lt. Crockett's plane.  The bow gunner believes he secured hits among the sub's personnel.  However, the sub kept up a continuous fire at 204P-8 which was bearing down from astern.

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The bow guns of 204P-8 were going full blast and raking the conning tower section of the sub also.

        Lt. Crockett saw the depth charges from 204P-8 make one huge explosion about 30 feet astern of the sub.  However, he believes he caught a glimpse of these 4 D/C striking the water in a spaced train.  The stern of the sub seemed to lift slightly at the explosion of these D/C, and the sub rocked violently.

        During the diving approach of 204P-8, Lt(jg) J.W. Dresbach was shot through the chest and shoulder with 30 calibre fire.  Just before he lost consciousness, Lt(jg) Dresbach released his D/C.  Lt(jg) Oren Christian, in the second pilot's seat, took over the controls of 204P-8 with less that 200 feet altitude and pulled the plane out of its dive.

        1830Q:  Although the pilot of 204P-8 was mortally wounded and dying, and with two enlisted men wounded, 204-P8 delivered a demolition attack on the sub from 1900 feet.  But the one demolition bomb which released exploded at least 200-300 feet off the port beam of the sub.

        While the attack by 204P-8 was in progress, 205P-2 had arrived, Lt. Comdr. Null PPC., Lt. Crockett told this plane to standby; that it would be used immediately after 204P-8 had attacked.

        205P-2 circled the area.  When no destruction of the sub resulted from the attack by 204P-8, Lt. Crockett set up the next attack.

        1834Q:  Again the PV swept in on the port bow for strafing attacks.  205P-2 made a D/C attack from the astern.  Involuntarily the pilot while opening his bomb bay doors, released the D/C, which exploded 600 yards astern of the sub.  Lt. Crockett had difficulty telling Lt. Comdr. Null to turn away out of the gun fire of the sub.

        1840Q:  PV announced that it had reached P.L.E.  The PV departed for base after delivering a nice attack and rendering wonderful aid in strafing.

        1842Q:  205P-2 made an attack on the sub with demolition bombs.  These demolition bombs exploded 500 feet astern of sub.  No bomb sight in plane.

        1850Q:  A B-18 arrived at the scene.  Approaching darkness prevented the B-18 from delivering a high altitude attack.  Although the B-18 had no guns aboard the pilot of the plane twice tried to deliver two D/C attacks, but nightfall prevented the delivery of an accurate D/C attack.  The B-18 postponed the attack until the sub could be definitely located.  From 1900 to 1955Q Lt. Crockett dropped 4 flares from 5000 feet, which ignited at 4000 feet, but the sub could not be found on the surface for a D/C attack by B-18 in the flare light.

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        Lt. Crockett in 205P-11 suffered no casualties, although the plane sustained six hits, all but one apparently by 30 calibre fire.

        During these operations, a blimp from Edinburg Field, Trinidad, hovered north of the scene of action.  Lt. Crockett ordered the blimp to remain at a distance observing the action and watching for any disabled planes that might go into the water.  The blimp wanted to get into the fray, but Lt. Crockett believed that the gun fire from the sub was too lethal for anything but a plane capable of around 200 knots.

Damage to 205P-11:

        One 30 calibre hole in the port wing tip.

        One shrapnel hit in the port wing tip.

        One 30 calibre hole in port float.

        One 30 calibre hole in port engine cowling, beneath the No. 8 cylinder.  Caused a slight oil leak in this cylinder - about 4 gallons an hour.

        One 30 calibre in starboard gull wing.  This bullet caused the fire inside the starboard wing.

        One 30 calibre hole in starboard bulkhead just forward of the starboard waist hatch.  This bullet cut the Fluxgate compass cable.  This bullet passed out the top of the plane.    

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Statement of:        A.S. Creider Machinist U.S.N., Hedron 11.

        The plane was hit on the first run and caught fire.  I climbed up into the starboard bomb bay.  2 C ) 2 bottles were passed to me.  These smothered the flames, and I used somebody's shirt to drag the smoldering bits on to the hard bare metal.  The gasoline was on fire and the rubber matting on the starboard wing were burning.  The aluminum tubing of the gas line was also burning.

        After I got the fire out I was near the bow turret.  Chief Thomas did a wonderful piece of shooting.

        Q.  What type of bullet caused fire to break out in the starboard wing?

        A.  It was apparently an incendiary bullet.  There was a small amount of white smoke amidst the black smoke of burning rubber.  I believe this was from the incendiary bullet.  The flames were reddish-orange.

        Q.  How effective did you find the C O 2 ?

        A.  The fire couldn't have been extinguished without them.  After I got the fire to smoldering, I raked the smoking bits over on bare metal and let them cool off.  One bottle of C ) 2 had no gas.

Statement of:        W. M. Thomas A C O M, Bow Turret

        I manned the bow guns continuously during the bombing attacks and strafing attacks on the sub.  I expended in all about 700 rounds of 50 calibre from the two bow guns.  I aimed for the personnel on the conning tower.  The conning tower was so crowded with men I don't believe you could tell who was hit and who wasn't.  I saw tracers going into the men on the conning tower.  I don't know how effective the strafing runs were.

        The gun on the deck forward of the conning tower would shoot out a puff of black smoke every time it was fired.  The fire of this gun, in my opinion, was to rapid to be a 3 inch gun.  It was in my opinion either a 20 or a 37 MM.  Now I am not sure of the calibre of this gun.  It could have been a 3 inch.  It was a large gun.  I didn't see any of the bursting shells from this gun.  They always exploded behind the plane; I heard this over the interphone.

       The sub had at least 2 30 calibre guns on the conning tower.  I don't know about the other armament.  I was too busy to pick out many details.

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to take over at the flight engineer's panel.  Monotto, the flight engineer then went back to help put out the fire.  The large 5 lb. bottle of C O 2 didn't have any gas in it.  Two small 2 and 1/2 pound bottles of C O 2 were used.  The reason for the empty 5 lb. C O 2 bottle is not known.

Statement of:        A. L. Houchin AMM2/c, Starboard Waist Gun.

        I fired the 50 calibre in the starboard waist hatch on all runs at the sub.  I used about 400 rounds in all.  Most of my firing was downward at a steep angle.  I know I hit the sub amidships several times, but I couldn't see whether I hit any of the men on the sub.

        The only place I saw gun fire from the sub was the conning tower.  But I noticed that the sub didn't fire at us at all while were were directly over it.  In my opinion the sub can't elevate the guns straight up.

        Coming in on the first run I saw several bursts off the starboard wing of the plane.  The bursts gave a dirty white smoke.  The shells made a soft, poofing noise.  These bursts were every bit a 100-yards off the starboard wing and 100-150 foot higher than our altitude.

        I saw the explosion of the D/C/ from the PV.  The explosions were very close to the sub.  Two explosions were right about the beams of the sub and were within 20 feet of the sub.  These explosions completely covered the sub with water.

        Every time we went over the sub I could see all the men in the conning tower crouching down and trying to press up against the sides of the conning tower.  The conning tower must have been armored and they were seeking protection by getting up close to its sides.

Statement of:        L. G. Bruner ARM3/c, Beaching Gear Hatch.

        I stood near the fuel connections in the beaching gear hatch with a C O 2 bottle to extinguish any fire that might break out here.  I didn't get to see any of the action.

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        The two 30 calibre machine guns were the ones that did the most damage.  The after 20 mm. gun did not give us enough lead to hit us.

        I never did see a gun aft of the conning tower on the deck.  The only men I  saw outside the conning tower was the one at the forward deck gun.

        I saw the D/C explosions from the PV.  The explosions straddled the sub.  You couldn't see the sub for a minute after these explosions.

        When we got to the scene of action the sub was pretty well on the surface, a little stern down, but when we left, the bow was up at a sharp angle and the sub from the conning tower to stern was completely under the water.  There was water breaking over the rails on the after end of the conning tower.

        After the PV attack, the sub would stop dead in the water, and then the sub would start up again.  It looked like the sub was about to go down.  Every time the sub would look like it was going to sink, I would set up for the MK 24 bomb and Mr. Crockett would say, "Stand by to release MK 24 bomb."

        On several runs the gunfire from our bow was hitting right inside the conning tower.  The way the men were packed and jammed in the conning tower you couldn't tell when one was hit, and I doubt if a wounded man could have fallen to the deck.

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Intelligence Summary

        Elaboration of the details of this attack is felt to be unnecessary in view of the complete narrative appended.  However, a few matters of interest should be reviewed.

        Lt. Crockett voluntarily assumed command of the attacks at the scene of action.  He and the PV pilot made strafing runs for the other attacking planes.  Lt. Crockett's plane was hit six times by the sub's gun fire.  He made a strafing run for the PV on its attack, and strafing runs for 204P-8 and 205P-2 also.  He made exceptionally fine observations.

        Lt. Crockett' carried four U.S. Navy photographers who made both stills and movies of the action.

        Once again accuracy with a demolition attack from 1500 feet without a bomb sight was found difficult.

        The 90 foot spacing at 190 K G.S. by intervalometer instead of the standard 60 foot spacing as required by Cominch was set up in order to compensate for the short spacing given by the intervalometer.  How many of the 4 MK 44 D/C exploded is unknown.

        The reason for only one tremendous explosion from D/C attack by both 205P-11 and 204P-8 is not accounted for.  Three reasons for this phenomena are advanced.  (1)  The intervalometer spaced erroneously, producing a relatively salvo effect instead of a train.  (2)  On both occasions the fountain of water thrown up by one of the D/C may have obscured the other upheavals of water from exploding D/C, the various torrents of water merging before they could be distinguished one from the other.  (3)  The angle of viewing the explosions may have been such as to prevent sight of the separate explosions.

        This engagement demonstrates that the enemy is still full of determination and will fight to the last.  It further demonstrates that the pilots of this squadron and other squadrons show no hesitancy in pressing home the attack even in the face of intense and accurate AA fire.  It further demonstrates the necessity of joint action by planes, and lays the ground work for the development of future coordinated tactics.

        This attack, within a relatively few hours run by a DD, shows the possibility for coordinated work between surface craft and aircraft.  If DD's are available and their obligations amenable to emergency employment of this type, DD's would prove indispensable in finishing a crippled submarine and in rescuing the enemy survivors if the submarine should be destroyed by the aircraft before the arrival of a DD.

        It might prove fruitful to despatch some type of relatively fast surface craft capable of dealing with an enemy submarine, whenever an attack is made on an enemy submarine by aircraft within 300 miles of the base provided the submarine is not positively destroyed without survivors.  The attacking plane and the relief planes could maintain a thorough hold down or tracking procedure sufficient to enable surface craft to deliver a lethal attack on the submarine and/or retrieve enemy survivors who may during interrogation provide the anti-submarine warfare forces with valuable information concerning the enemy.

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        Both planes and surface craft are hunting the water of the scene of action in the hope of finding survivors from this plane crew.

        Q.  Lt. Crockett, you have been in two engagements recently with enemy submarines, one at night and one during daylight.  Give a little summary of the situation encountered at night and in the daylight.

        A.  In the first place at night you can't see as well, even though you drop several flares to assist your vision.  Therefore, judgments of distances is faulty.  You are likely to release your depth charges either too short or too long.  Hence, if night attacks are to be effective, we've got to have more brilliant artificial lighting.

        Q.  What about the installation of a search light on the PBM?

        A.  A search light on a PBM would be a very imprudent addition of equipment for attacking an enemy submarine which is full of fight.  It would aid the pilot in illuminating the target, but it would also present a very easy target for the AA batteries on a sub.  I have found the enemy gun fire at night uncomfortably accurate without any illumination of the plane itself.  I had one of my pilot's killed in a night engagement and my gas tanks shot up.  Other planes without a light showing have suffered damage while attacking an enemy sub at night.  The enemy personnel manning the AA guns on the sub are accurate shots, indicating that they are trained gunners.

        Also at night the plane's gun fire gives the plane's range and altitude away to the alert gun crews on the sub.

        Now during daylight, even though the plane is a clear target for the enemy gunners, the pilot and his crew gains certain advantages.  Since depth charges are our primary weapon, daylight gives the pilot his best opportunity for the accurate judgment of distance in order to release his depth charges at the proper moment.  And even with a train of depth charges a pilot still has to make an accurate drop so the depth charges will be placed lethally with reference to the sub whether surfaced or submerged.  Daylight also affords the plane's gunners with a clear view of the target and thus promotes more accurate firing.  Daylight also affords the opportunity to observe damage to the enemy.  Also during daylight you feel more comfortable flying into a Fourth of July celebration.  During daylight the tracers from the enemy don't show up so ugly and purposefully.

        I'll take a day light attack anytime in preference to a night attack.  But if I find a sub at night, I'll attack him regardless of the difficulties.

        Q.  What do you think of the PBM3's aircraft in comparison to the PBY aircraft for anti-submarine warfare!

        A.  Well I've had about 1500 hours in PBY's and I've had about 400 hours in PBM's, and I choose the PBM for anti-submarine warfare over the PBY.  In the first place the bomb capacity is greater in the PBM than in the PBY.  The PBM's fire power is greater, but it still needs more fire power to combat effectively the gun fire of a submarine that is determined to fight it out with a plane.  In this connection I believe we need at least 4 - 50 calibre machine guns in the bow of a PBM.  At present I am working on such an installation.  The bow guns are the principal weapon for strafing.  Waist and tail guns are worthwhile, but we need concentrated fire power forward.

        The PBM is faster than the PBY.  And you need all the speed possible during an attack.  I have attacked a submarine at 240 knots IAS, and had no difficulty with the PBM.

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to the planes thus far has not been critical.

        Since the .30 calibre fire from the enemy submarines contains incendiary qualities, it is essential that we have C O 2 smothering systems for all our fuel tanks.

        Q.  Do you have any reason to believe from the observation of an enemy submarine or from the observation of the enemy subs' gunfire that the sub is equipped with any sort of fire control?

        A.  No.  As far as I have been able to determine the guns on the sub are fired manually.

        Q.  How have you found the radar on PBM-3S planes?

        A.  The radar on the PBM-3S planes is our best weapon to aid in offensive action against an enemy sub.  The ASG-1 and ASG-3 radars have a good range for the detection of enemy subs and they are invaluable instruments for accurate homing.

        Q.  Do you think PBM's should be used against surfaced submarines?

        A.  Judging from my two recent attacks, one at night and one during the day, on surfaced submarines, the PBM has not enough fire power; it is too big a target; it has no armor, it does not have enough speed for a level attack; it requires a steep angle of dive to get above 200 knots out of the plane.

        Q.  How do you suggest they be employed against submarines?

        A.  Now with the PBM, with its extremely effective radar and fairly long cruising range, can detect enemy submarines very well.  If the submarine attempts to submerge then the PBM can make a depth charge attack.  However, if the sub chooses to fight it out on the surface, the PV-1's and B-25's should be sent out to the scene of action immediately, homing on the M O's sent by the PBM.  This squadron has one PBM-3C which is equipped with a Norden bomb sight and loaded with eight 500 pound demolition bombs.  This plane can deliver a high altitude demolition bombing attack and then the PV's or the B-25's can deliver a depth charge attack at a high speed.

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