IN REPLY
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
REFER TO
NEW YORK, N.Y.
 
 
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
 
AIR FORCE
 
 
BOMBING SQUADRON 130
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI.  Signatures and Comment.
 
 
 
 
COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:
 
 
 
 
        1.        As an amplification of the report of the attack made upon a German submarine at Latitude 12-53N and Longitude 64-54W, 2117 Zed, August 6, 1943 by Lieutenant (jg) Theodore M. HOLMES, A-V(N), USNR, the following is submitted herewith for consideration.  This report is submitted because it is believed the narrative report of the pilot fails to indicate the degree of cooperation attained between the units participating and fails to present a clear and complete picture of the events as they occurred.
 
 
 
 
        2.        A running account of the action was obtained by cross-questioning the pilot, co-pilot, radioman, turret gunner, and plane captain.  Their report is consolidated into the below narrative.
 
 
 
 
                (a)  One-thirty Baker Five, Lieutenant (jg) Theodore M. Holmes, A-V(N), USNR, Pilot, Ensign Robert W. Tonner, A-V(N), USNR, Co-pilot, departed Xeres Field, Trinidad, B.W.I. at 1853 Zed on a submarine hunt mission.  When within fifteen (15) miles of the spot where the submarine was last sighted, ZP-51 airship K68 was sighted bearing about 45 degrees, distance fifteen (15) miles.  Continuing on his course, he arrived at the scene of the submarine sighting.  No submarine being evident, he continued on his course for six (6) minutes and then proceeded to fly a box search in a southwesterly direction.  When he was on the fourth leg of the search, the airship was again sighted several miles in a northerly direction on a southeasterly course.  At this time, the pilot heard the airship report by radio that the submarine was now on the surface.  Apparently, prior to this time, the submarine was submerged.  The PV-1 changed course to intercept the K-68 and circled it to receive a bearing of the submarine.  Lieutenant (jg) Holmes then flew on a southeasterly course, but was unable to locate the submarine.  When flying in a rain squall, he asked a PBM for further directions, instructions from this previously unsighted PBM, Lieutenant L.D. Crockett, A-V(N), USNR, pilot.  Upon clearing the rain squall, the submarine was sighted steaming on a straight course of 318 at about two (2) to four (4) knots.  The PBM was sighted at this time circling the submarine.
 
 
 
 
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IN REPLY
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
REFER TO
NEW YORK, N.Y.
 
 
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
 
AIR FORCE
 
 
BOMBING SQUADRON 130
 
 
 
 
COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:  (continued)
 
 
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                (a)
 
 
The PV-1 circled the submarine and received directions from Lieutenant Crockett who assumed radio command of the operations via voice frequency.  The plan of attack was established in which the PBM was to assist the PV-1 with machine gun fire by an attack from the starboard beam of the submarine; while the PV-1 was to attack from astern.  Thereupon, each pilot signified by "ready", and when the PBM started in to attack, the PV-1 went in.
 
 
 
 
                (b)  Lieutenant (jg) Holmes did not see the PBM during the attack run but believes that the number of bullets hitting on and around the submarine was in considerable excess to those he was firing.  He fired short bursts at extreme ranges, and then steadily as the range closed.  The turret operator fired steadily over the nose of the airplane at extreme ranges for the purpose of lobbing his bullets ahead of the airplane in the form of a rolling barrage and for the psychological effect on the crew of the submarine.  The pilot could not observe the effectiveness of this barrage but believes it worthwhile.  The results of the fixed guns could not be accurately determined due to the mass of fire caused by the bullets and tracers ricocheting off the deck of the submarine and the splashes of water about it from the fire pattern.  Four (4) depth charges, Mark 41, were released on this attack.  During the attack, the co-pilot looked back through the plastic escape hatch overhead and saw black bursts of anti-aircraft fire in rear of and at a greater elevation than the aircraft.  No small arms fire was observed on this attack.  The plane passed over the submarine forward of the conning tower from port to starboard at a course differential of about fifteen (15) degrees.  The co-pilot saw about six (6) men, stripped to the waist, standing on the deck, their heads covered with their arms, and their faces pressed into the conning tower bulkhead.
 
 
 
 
                (c)  The turret operator, when the range closed, reversed his turret in order to take the submarine under fire after the plane passed over it.  However, he was unable to fire because of the fact that the submarine was completely obscured by columns of water from the depth charge explosions.  He stated definitely that he saw several pieces of metal fly upward from the explosion.
 
 
 
 
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IN REPLY
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
REFER TO
NEW YORK, N.Y.
 
 
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
 
AIR FORCE
 
 
BOMBING SQUADRON 130
 
 
 
 
COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:  (continued)
 
 
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                (d)  The plane captain, whose duty it is to man the camera, was able to get but one picture close to the submarine.  The pilot inadvertently let the airplane assume a climbing attitude which depressed the tail until no view existed from the tail port.  At high speeds, the PV-1 becomes extremely tail heavy.  Pictures of little value were later taken from the camera hatch on the side of the airplane.  Lieutenant Crockett reported to Lieutenant (jg) Holmes by radio that the drop appeared to be a perfect straddle, and that the submarine submerged momentarily after the explosions until nothing of the submarine was visible.  It then surfaced and circled to starboard as if out of control.  Several times it appeared unsuccessfully to resume a straight course.  At this time, the second PBM, Lieutenant J. W. Dresbach, A-V(N), USNR, pilot, joined the attacking planes.  Lieutenant Crockett formed a plan for the second attack whereby Lieutenant (jg) Holmes would make a strafing attack from the submarine's starboard bow, Lieutenant Crockett a strafing attack from the port bow, Lieutenant Dresbach a simultaneous depth charge attack from astern.  This plan was  changed at the final moment to a bombing attack by Lieutenant Dresbach.  Lieutenant (jg) Holmes failed to get the change and made a strafing attack.  About in the middle of the attack, the submarine was suddenly totally obscured by a large cloud of black smoke from a bomb with an instantaneous fuse dropped by Lieutenant Dresbach from altitude.  One (1) fixed gun  of the PV-1 jammed at the start of the attack and was inoperative throughout the run.  At close range, Lieutenant (jg) Holmes changed course rapidly in order to allow the turret gunner to bear.  The turret guns raked the submarine.
 
 
 
 
                (e)  The PV-1 then climbed and resumed circling with the PBM's.  Again Lieutenant Crockett outlined the next attack over the radio which duplicates the second attack in plan.  Lieutenant Crockett gave the ready signal and all planes attacked.  Immediate action was applied to the inoperative fixed gun on the PV-1, it was tested and found to be operative.  One (1) gun fired one or two shots and was then out of ammunition; but the other gun continued to function throughout this attack.  All fixed gun ammunition was expended at the end of this attack.
 
 
 
 
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IN REPLY
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
REFER TO
NEW YORK, N.Y.
 
 
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
 
AIR FORCE
 
 
BOMBING SQUADRON 130
 
 
 
 
COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:  (continued)
 
 
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                (f)  On each of these two (2) later attacks, black anti-aircraft fire was observed by the crew of the PV-1, the fire being directed at the PBM's.  Small arms fire was observed coming from the conning tower and directed at the PV-1.  No hits were made on the PV.  Lieutenant (jg) Holmes had jettisoned his exterior droppable tanks prior to the first attack; and as gasoline was running low, he departed the scene of action and returned to Xeres Field.
 
 
 
 
        4.        This attack demonstrated the resourcefulness, determination and courage of the aviators participating.  Three (3) totally dissimilar units, a flying boat, and airship, and a land bomber, worked together as a team.  In spite of these handicaps, the pilots were able to plan and successfully execute a coordinated attack.
 
 
 
 
        5.        This attack demonstrated the cool determination and courage of the enlisted men of the plane crews.  Each crew member of the PV-1 functioned calmly and efficiently at his battle station duties.  The radio operator sent an attack message to the base while the airplane was making its initial strafing and depth charge attack.  The turret operator handled his turret like a veteran, and the plane captain did his best to obtain pictures.  It is believed that their conduct under fire was in keeping with the highest traditions of the Navy.
 
 
 
 
        6.        From a plot of the deduced position of the depth charge explosions, from the metal sighted in the air, and the subsequent actions of the submarine it is believed that the submarine was seriously damaged by this attack, possibly by damage to its port diving fins and damage to its bow.
 
 
 
 
        7.        It is noted from the photograph made at the time of dropping that the first depth charge to enter the water appears to be even to and about seventy-two (72) feet from the stern of the submarine.  Of the two (2) explanations for this distance, first, the planes relative course to the submarine being greater than the pilots stated; or second, the plane was in a skid or a turn at the time of dropping, the first seems more feasible.
 
 
 
 
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IN REPLY
CARE OF FLEET POST OFFICE
REFER TO
NEW YORK, N.Y.
 
 
UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
 
 
AIR FORCE
 
 
BOMBING SQUADRON 130
 
 
 
 
COMMENT OF SQUADRON COMMANDER:  (continued)
 
 
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        7.       
 
 
                  As the pilot fired the fixed guns at the conning tower, it would appear that the skid would be in the opposite direction in order to compensate for the advance of the submarine.  The pilot stated that he used evasive action on the attack and to sweep the deck with bullets by skidding the plane with his rudders.  Such action probably caused the bombs to be thrown from the trajectory of the plane.
 
 
 
 
        8.        As submarines now operate with the doctrine of active resistance to aircraft attack, it is recommended that pilots be provided with armor plate forward of the cockpit on the aircraft.  Original design of the PV-1 airplane included provisions for armor installation at station ninety-two (92); but no armor plate is installed on present Navy PV-1 aircraft.
 
 
 
 
        9.        It is believed that dual controls on all PV-1 aircraft are necessary as to a precautionary measure in case the pilot is wounded or killed.
 
 
 
 
      10.        It is believed that twin mount flexible fifty caliber machine guns in the nose is desirable to supplement the fixed guns.
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          G. G. PRICE,
 
 
                                                                                          Lt. Comdr. A-V(G), USNR,
 
 
                                                                                          Commanding.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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