U-64 - 1st War Patrol

Translation by Jerry Mason with the help of Andi Forster

Departed	Date	Sunk	Date	Days at Sea
Wilhelmshaven	6 April 1940	Herjangsfjord	13 April 1940	8

 

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Ships Hit

None

Note:  The positions in the table above and in the Google Earth patrol summary are derived from the KTB and in many cases do not match those set forth in authoritative references such as Jürgen Rohwer, Axis Submarine Successes of World War Two or the Uboat.net website.  The goal here is to present the picture relative to the U-boat and not the absolute position that the ship was attacked or sank.

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			K  r  i  e  g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h
			----------------------------------
			for "  U  6  4  "
			for the period
				from 16 December 1939
				to       5 April         1940.
				---------
		16 December 1939.                            Bremen                                    Commissioning 16.12.1939 - 12.03.1940.                            Kiel and Baltic                          Testing. 13.03. - 20.03.1940.                            Wilhelmshaven                          Independent training.                             U-boat base 21.03. - 26.03.1940.                            Wilhelmshaven                          Repairs                              Westwerft   27.03.1940.                              Wilhelmshaven                          Independent training and outfitting.                             U-boat base 27. - 29.03.1940.                            Kiel                                          Testing, AK cruise. 20.03. - 2.04.                            Wilhelmshaven                          Supply and outfitting.                             U-boat base 3. and 4.04.1940.                            Wilhelmshaven                          Radio direction finder calibration, sea trial.                             U-boat base and Jade 5.04.1940.                            Wilhelmshaven                         Conclusion of outfitting.                             U-boat base
				On board 9. August 1940.
				Kommand der 2. Unterseebootsflottille.
				on behalf of
				© U-boat Archive 2024 - all rights reserved

Click the flag to view the above page from the original German KTB

	Kommando
	of the 2, Unterseebootsflottille                                 On board, 9 August 1940
	Gkdos.Nr. 367 Ia.
	U. the Seekriegsleitung
	Berlin
	Submitted with the Kriegstagebuch for the period from 16.12.1939 to 5.4.1940
	A war diary has since been produced for the operation on which the boat was lost.
	on behalf of

 

			K  r  i  e  g  s  t  a  g  e  b  u  c  h
			----------------------------------
			"  U  64  ".
			Kommandant:  Kaptlt.    S  c  h  u  l  z  .
			Beginning:        6.4.40.
			Ending:           26.4.40.

				A d d e n d u m
				to the Kriegstagebuch "  U  64  "  .
			Made in Bjerkvik, 15 April 1940.
			Note: The addendum ends on page 6    -16.4.-

	- 1 -
		06.04.40		Put to sea from Wilhelmshaven at 13.15 hours
		16.00		Passed Lightship "F".  Headed for Point Toni.
		19.40		At Point Toni:  Saw a smoke feather far ahead on the horizon,  Soon thereafter the smokestack and mastheads of a steamer.  Suspect Ship 36.  Ran after it at high speed.  According to message Ship 36 would be met at Point H.
		07.04.40
		06.00		At Point H.  Steered on various courses until 08.00 hours.  Nothing seen of Ship 36.
		19.40		Continued transit to the north.  In the afternoon steamer in sight with course for England, avoided.  Wind and sea increase.  Boat can only run at 12 knots.
		08.04.40
		10.00		Crash dive for aircraft.  Surfaced shortly thereafter.  Again crash dive for aircraft.  Boat remained submerged from midday.  Boat stayed on the connecting line from Norway to the Shetland Islands
		15.00		Heard multiple detonations from depth charges.
		18.00		Surfaced.  Heavy, long seas, snow squalls.  A large four-masted bark 500 meters to starboard, course 350°.  Boat can barely make way, because the wind is from directly ahead.
		21.00		In accordance with orders went to position Nero 3.  Steered course 30.  Boat about 6 knots athwart the seas.  Masch.Mt. Bösener suffered a severe hand crush.  Must receive medical treatment as soon as possible.
		09.04.40
		08.00		Wind and seas abate.  Long high NW-Swell.  Speed 10 knots.
		13.00		Avoided a fishing trawler.
		10.04.40
		12.00		Røst Island abeam to port about 7 nm away.

	Sun and Moon Data 08.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 09.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 10.04.40

	- 2 -
		continued
		10.04.40
		13.00	[Stich course = an advance/thrust/lunge course]	Værøy Island abeam.  Masts of 3 destroyers come in sight.  Crash dive.  Destroyer turns away at the level of the boat and runs on a Stich course.  Passed out of sight.
		13.40		Propeller sounds.  At periscope depth a destroyer was made out.  Initiated attack.  Depth control was unsteady.  Boat broaches due to operator error.  Destroyer in 160°R, 700 meters away, turns towards hard.  Had seen the boat.  Boat was forced under.  At depth 15 meters turned away 90° and continued at GF.  Shortly thereafter severe concussion in the boat caused by depth charges, everything remains in order.  Caught the boat at depth 126 meters and leveled off at depth 80 meters at HF.  Destroyer sounds in the vicinity until 17.00 hours, then calm.
		21.30		Surfaced.  Took course under land of Røst Island and Værøy on the dark horizon.
		22.00		Dived before 3 destroyers.
		23.00		Surfaced.
		11.04.40
		00.30		The boat has Værøy abeam to port, strong searchlight, which searches around Værøy to sea.
		01.30		Again 3 destroyers ahead, dived; because it is now too bright, remained submerged.
		04.00		Reached a 110 meter location, put the boat on the bottom.  Except for the periscope bushing everything holds tight.
		18.00		Raised the boat from the bottom.  Steered with favorable current submerged in the direction of Narvik.
		21.30		Surfaced. Aircraft are still seen in the direction of the English warning area.  Dove again.  It is still too bright.
		22.15		Continued surface transit.  Beacons are extinguished.
		12.04.40
		02.30		A dark shadow ahead.  Suspect a destroyer.  Unfortunately there is no information on where the German destroyer patrol line begins.  Therefore assume it is enemy.  No Recognition Signal exchange.  Because it is getting light quickly.  Dived abeam Tranøy.

	Sun and Moon Data 10.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 11.04.40

	- 3 -
		continued
		12.04.40
		02.30 - 04.30		Boat steered various courses off Tranøy.
				Continued submerged cruise in the direction of Barøy. Distance about 8 nm.
		06.00		Propeller sounds.  2 destroyers about 2000 meters away.  Held to the left side of the channel.  Identified a strong current.  Got totally lost at times.  The nearby destroyers force sparing periscope use.  From the low height of eye you can see high mountain peaks, sometimes cliffs close by, which must to be avoided by changing course 90°.  The only fixed point of reference is the high peak of the mountain near Tranøy. This is the only navigational reference identified.
		09.00		At times 4 destroyers here.  Can still not make out Barøy.  With 2-3 knot current towards and HF the boat should now be close to Barøy.  The battery can only maintain this speed level for 5 hours.  If the situation is not resolved by 12:00 hours the boat must be put on the bottom.
		11.30		Rotvær Lighthouse in sight.  Soon thereafter Barøy Lighthouse in sight.
		13.00		Rounded Barøy, destroyers remain astern.  Continued surface transit.
		13.30		Destroyer smokestack and mastheads in sight ahead.  Because we are close off Narvik it must be German.  With the uncertain information and the confusing situation, I decide to dive.
				The battery is only able to provide power for 1 hour at HF.  Am about between Nero 1 and Nero 2.  Placed the boat in a small bay and charged with a disengaged engine.  A destroyer comes up from Narvik.  Dived.  Nothing is seen after half an hour. Apparently the destroyer turned back.
		14.30		Surfaced and tried once again to charge.  Visibility was bad.  Snow flurries.
		14.45		Aircraft over the south side of the fjord.  German aircraft.  In the middle of the crash dive, a periscope was sighted 1000 meters away.  Ran sharply towards, the crash dive was cancalled andI soon recognized a German boat.  It is "U-25".  I find out from him that German destroyers are ahead.
		15.00		Ran into Narvik.  The following reasons were therefore decisive.

Sun and Moon Data 12.04.40

17.00

	- 4 -
		continued
		12.04.40		1)  Completely unclear situation. If there were 10 German destroyers in Narvik, why were they only 6 nm from Narvik?
				2.)  Briefing with the Senior Sea Commander.
				3.)  Fuel supply.
				4.)  Repair of sea damage.
				a)  Forward periscope out of service.
				b)  Attack periscope large magnification blind,
				c)  Diesel compressor out of service,
				d)  Both pressure-resistant vessels for the inflatable boat and Marks buoy are full of water.  With the inflatable boat the cover has broken open.
				5.)  Battery is empty.
				6.)  Masch.Mt. Bösener to the Doctor
		16.00		Arrived in Narvik.  Reported to Freg.Kapt. Bey.
		17.00		Aircraft attack on Narvik.  Boat remained unharmed.  In the established uncertain situation, refueling is accelerated.
		23.00		Left Narvik harbor, because a new aircraft attack is expected the next morning.
		13.04.40
		00.00 - 01.30		Tried to put the boat on the bottom at the entrance to Herjangsfjord at Lokvik.  The shore is too steep.  The boat lies either strongly down by the bow or stern or slips off into deep water.
		01.30		Gave up the attempt.  Ran into Herjangsfjord and anchored in 28 meters water in the inner edge of the bay at Bjerkivk.  2 destroyers lie there as anti-aircraft protection and besides, the shore is occupied by a regiment of mountain troops.  In the morning received the Radio Message order to put to sea immediately.  Ordered ready for sea at 13.00 hours.  The battery will be full at this time.
		13.00		Work on the periscope and Marks buoy has still not ended. Put off ready for sea to 14.00 hours.
		13.20		In misty weather Narvik cannot be seen, an aircraft (float plane) was reported in the fjord.  Machine guns were manned.  Crew at diving stations.  Opened fire on approach.  The aircraft threw 2 bombs, that went into the water abeam to starboard and port of the boat in the forward third.  The boat was hit at the level of the Chief Petty Officer's Room and had water intake.

	Sun and Moon Data 12.04.40
	Sun and Moon Data 13.04.40

	- 5 -
		continued
		13.04.40
		13.35		Ordered all men out of the boat.  13 men got out, then the water spilled over the conning tower.  The conning tower hatch was still closed.  The boat sank in 28 meters water.
				From the statements of the remaining crew the disembarkation took place in peace and order.  Chlorine gases that formed made things more difficult.  At the moment of the bomb impact the boat was in a state of charging.  That's how seawater penetrated through the open battery ventilation shutters.  Initially the control room and aftership were fully intact, but water quickly got in through speaking tubes, battery shutters and dished bulkheads that couldn't be closed completely because something got stuck in between.  A few people who had saved themselves in the conning tower got out from there, the rest retreated into the engine room and flooded the diesel room using the hull valves.  They disembarked calmly.  5 dead must remain in the boat (in the foreship), 2 got out through the coning tower but were not seen after that, one did not recover from swimming to shore.  A total of 8 dead.
				The mountain troops ashore launched boats and rescued the swimming crew members, that could hardly have reached land without assistance.
				Bjerkvik is a Norwegian military training area.  The men were clothed from the confiscated stocks and accommodated in the camp.
				The names of the dead were:
				1.)  Btsmt König,
				2.)  Ob.Fk.Mt. Oehring,
				3.)  Mech.Mt. Wagner,
				4.)  Mtr.Ob.Gefr. Keuler,
				5.)  Mt.Ob.Gefr. Neese,
				6.)  Fk.Gefr. Buhl,
				7.)  Masch.O.Gefr. Reichenthaler,
				8.)  Masch.Gefr. Albertini.
				In the evening the following radio message was sent by telephone via the Regiment.
				To B.d.U.:
				"U-64" was sunk by aircraft attack at the north end of Herjangsfjord at Bjerkvik north of Narvik. Officers and 36 men rescued.  8 dead.  Request return by aircraft.
				Kommandant.
				Shortly after the attack on U-64 the English attack on German Narvik forces took place.  In Herjangsfjord the destroyer "HERMANN KÜNNE" was beached and blown up.

Sun and Moon Data 13.04.40

	- 6 -
		14.04.40	[Elvegårdsmoen military training camp]	A squadron of Ju 55s landed behind the camp on [frozen] Lake Hartvigd. Due to the snow, almost all the aircraft broke down and can no longer leave.
				The crew took on the tasks of monitoring prisoners, managing the explosives storage facility and the magazine.
				In the morning the Mtr.O.Gefr. Neese, who washed ashore, will be buried in the cemetery in Bjerkvik.
		15.04.40		The camp was attacked by light aircraft launched from a carrier. The attack was aimed at the Ju 55's standing on the frozen lake.
				The crew was put to work.
				Lt.z.S. Kuhnt went on a reconnaissance party operation.
		16.04.40	Bjerkvik	This is where the Addendum ends. From today continued a running diary. Crew at work service.  Lt.z.S. Kuhnt with 7 soldiers of the mountain troop are on a reconnaissance party operation.
		17.04.40		Lt.z.S. Kuhnt is back safe and sound from the reconnaissance party operation.  The crew is at work. Kommandant left for Narvik at noon with Wilhelm Bauer de Betas and Staffelkapitän Brandel.
		15.00		Arrived in Narvik. After consultation with Captain zur See Schall-Emden and General Eduard Dietel, the Kommandant gave the order for the entire U-boat crew to come to Narvik for further transport by train or plane.
		23.00		The crew arrived in Narvik.
		18.04.40	Narvik	The crew was accommodated in the Hotel "Stobel", Officers in the Hotel "Phoenix".  In the afternoon the first attempt to convey the men to the homeland by aircraft.  The aircraft couldn't land due to English destroyers.
		19.04.40		Today decision about transport. Tomorrow it will begin via Sweden. Everything is prepared to move away.  In the afternoon report of the English troop landing northwest of Narvik.

	- 7 -
		20.04.40		The Führer's birthday.  In the morning at 09.00 hours everything is on the train.  At 11.00 hours everything is cancelled again.  Half the men are missing.
				Lunch at the Royal. The General is giving his speech.  In the middle of the meal we see 3 English warships slowly moving close to shore.  1 cruiser, 2 destroyers.  Shortly thereafter cannon fire.  It is directed at the ferry, which was shot up, and the railway.  The track was disrupted at one point.
				Since further difficulties are to be expected, I contacted the railway company and scheduled the departure of the aircrew with Colonel Bauer de Betas and our group for 23.00 hours. At 02.00 hours the others are supposed to follow during the night.
				23.00 hours departure by train via Hundalen to the blown up bridge, which is about 7 km from the border.
		21.04.40	On the Swedish Railway
		04.00		Arrival in Bjørnfjell, Norway.  About 1/2 hour foot march behind the destroyed bridge.  The until 09.00 hours in the Berg Hotel quarters.
		09.00		The first civilians arrive.  Further march to the border.  There the crew was divided into 4 groups.
		11.00		Arrival of the train.  Boarded by group under lengthly inspection.
		15.00		Boarding ended.
		20.00		Set off from the border.
		22.04.40
		08.00		Passed Porjus train station.
		18.00		"    Aviken       "
			On board steamer "DER DEUTSCHE"
		23.04.40
		06.00		Passed Ostersund train station.
		18.00		"    Furby                "
		22.00		Arrived on Oxelösund
				Again excessively long disembarkation under bayonets and loaded rifles.  Further transport until 02.00 hours in 2 groups by tug to the German steamer.  Cameras and 2 pistols were confiscated.

	- 8 -
		24.04.40
		02.00		The entire crew is safe and sound on board.
		05.00		Ship weighs anchor for Gotenhafen.
		10.00 - 13.00		Passed Gotland.  Symptoms of intermittent fever occur. Kommandant lies in the bunk all day. Strong bronchitis.
		25.04.40
		08.00		Arrived in Gotenhafen.
		11.47		Further from Gotenhafen by railway to Berlin.
		21.15		Arrived Berlin.
		21.48		From Berlin.
		26.04.40
		01.37		To Hannover.  Stayed overnight there in a Wehrmacht hotel.
		07.55		From Hannover.
		11.33		To Wilhelmshaven.
			Summary: Reasons for the decision  to run into Narvik: 1.) Control Room Maat Bösener had crushed his hand so severely at the conning tower hatch that the whole inner surface was wide open.  The tendons seemed to have been cut, the middle fingers stuck out at an angle. The Kommandant had only planned to take the patient who, according to orders, to be given on 10 or 11 April to the returning destroyers. This was not possible given the changed situation. Now the sick man is to be given medical treatment in Narvik. 2.) From the moment we entered Vestfjord, news became increasingly sparse and the situation increasingly unclear. From 10 April from midday to 24:00 hours little news reception due to extensive underwater travel distances at great depths.  From 11 April 02.30 hours until evening 20.00 hours the boat lay on the bottom at 110 meters.  No Radio Message reception.  From 22.15 - 02.30 on 12 April strong Radio Message reception while submerged.  Then again dived and although proceeding at periscope depth because of the high mountains no Very Low Frequency reception. There were a total of 1-20 missing Serial Nos.   English destroyers were found as far as Barøy.  Nothing was known of German surface warships and their position.  What was actually going on?  What were the 10 German destroyers doing?  Where was the enemy anyway?  There was no radio communications with Wilhelmshaven emerging from behind Barøy.  In the battery there was only current for 1 hour at HF.

	- 9 -
			The boat was in its ordered position. A narrow, easily overseen body of water with isolated houses on the banks. Bright night, waning moon. These circumstances made the Kommandanten decide to run into Narvik.
			Reason for leaving Narvik early and anchoring in Herjangsfjord.
			1 hour after arriving in Narvik an aircraft attack took place consisting of 12 small aircraft.  This attack which would probably be repeated again soon, and in the depressing mood that lay over Narvik, the Kommandanten made the decision to sail as soon as possible.
			Departed Narvik at 23.00 in the evening on 12 April. Based on the situation found there, it was clear to the Kommandanten that an enemy attack was to be expected shortly. This resulted in the requirement to bring the boat into position quickly when it was ready to attack. There was still damage to be eliminated:
			1.)  A door in the conning tower casing could not be closed, it rattled when submerged.
			2.)  Both pressure-resistant vessels for the inflatable boat and Marks rescue buoy leaked. In one the cover was sprung and could not be closed.  The inflow of water affected depth control, if the lid burst open and the dinghy shot out as the boat approached, the position of the boat would be given away.
			3.)  The night/air search periscope was out of service. It must be brought in operation.  Since the attack periscope is relatively dark and high magnification was cloudy and therefore unusable, the Kommandant attached great importance to a usable night/air search periscope.  In the narrow waters of the ordered position, even at midnight one could not attack on the surface. It was too bright for that.  On the other hand, you couldn't see anything through the attack periscope in the 3-4 night hours.
			4)  The batter had to be entirely full.
			The Herjangsfjord was chosen for this work.  It occasionally offered anti-aircraft protection from destroyers anchoring there, the bank was occupied by German mountain troops and the site was not in the direction of the approach of the planes to Narvik.
				------------------

	- 10 -
			Assumptions about the nationality of the plane that dropped the bombs.
			At first it was assumed that it was an English aircraft. However, the fact that the English did not report the loss [of the U-boat] and that the aircraft did not open machine gun fire suggest that it was a Norwegian aircraft.  Norwegian aircraft were repeatedly found on the base at Bjerkvik.
			Defense against M.Z.        [magnetic influence torpedo pistol setting]
			Cables were found all over the upper deck around the side of the hull of merchant ships bound for England in Narvik harbor.  They were mostly simple strands that had been laid loosely in several loops around the side of the hull.  At intervals of 15 meters they were then tied together with a hitch.
			It would have to be determined by experts whether this cable if energized causes early detonations from the M.Z. set torpedoes. Should this be the case, the M.Z. setting of the torpedo should be considered developmentally obsolete and unusable.
				Kaptlt. and Kommandant.

 

	Enclosures to U-64's KTB - click on the text at left to proceed to the document
ChartA	Track chart 7 March 08.00 to 8 March 22.30
ChartB	Track chart 8 March 22.30 to 10 March 12.00
ChartC	Track chart 10 March 12.00 to 12 March 16.00
ChartD	Chart showing sinking location in Herjanfsfjord near Bjerkvik

 

	Comments of the Befehlshabers der Unterseeboote.
	With all appreciation of the reasons of the Kommandanten, which were particularly important on the first operation of the boat and before the enemy, it remains to be stated: 1.) Both before entering Narvik and after the order to leave, the Kommandant allowed himself to be tempted by misguided considerations not to do everything in his power to carry out the clear orders given to him. 2.) If the situation seemed unclear to the Kommandanten, he should have tried to get more information by radio. 3.) After entering Narvik, the Kommandant should have returned to his position as quickly as possible, instead of anchoring in the battle area for repairs and charging, especially since he was aware of the danger of aircraft after the first air raid and anti-aircraft protection at the anchorage by destroyers was only available temporarily.   The measures taken in the boat after the sinking were appropriate, the calm disembarkation led by the Petty Officers remaining in the boat is to be acknowledged.
		Signed in draft    D  ö  n  i  t  z  .
		For the Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote
		- The Chief of the Operations Department -

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