This record was kindly provided by the generous assistance of Tony Cooper

	C.B.04051 (54)
	Ship's Company of "U 660" at Brest - September, 1942.
	Presentation of decorations to personnel of "U 660" by Kapitänleutnant Lehmann-Willenbrock at Brest - September, 1942.

 

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REPORT ON THE INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM "U 660," A 500-TON
	U-BOAT, SUNK ABOUT MIDDAY ON 12th NOVEMBER, 1942, BY
	H.M.S. "STARWORT."
	_____________________________
	I.  INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
	"U 660" was sunk in position 37° 41'  N., 00° 10' W., about midday on 12th November, 1942, by H.M.S. "Starwort," while attempting to attack Convoy T.E.3.  She had previously been engaged in attacks against Allied forces concerned in landing operations on the North African coast.
	On 10th August, 1942, she attacked Convoy S.C.94, sinking four ships.  (See narrative.)
	The main features of this report are:
	(1)  Further details of U-Boat tactics.  (See Section XI (i), (ii) and (iii).)
	(2)  Description of silent running tests at Rönne.  (See Section XI (iv).)
	(3)  New types of Mediterranean U-Boat armament.  (See Section XI (viii).)
	(4)  New type acoustic torpedo.  (See Section XIII (ii).)
	(5)  Further remarks on S.B.T.  (See Section XI (xxi).)
	(6)  Duties of Captain (S) Mediterranean.  (See Section XI (ix).)
	(7)  Details of passage of Straits of Gibraltar.  (See Section V (iv).)
	A number of further details have also come to light regarding the functioning of German Search Receiver (G.S.R.), but it has been decided to delay publication of these until the next C.B.in this series.  It would seem that several different types of G.S.R. aerial are on trial.
	The following are the British equivalents to ranks mentioned in this report:
	Konteradmiral Rear Admiral. Kapitän zur See Captain. Fregattenkapitän Commander (Senior Grade). Korvettenkapitän Commander (Junior Grade). Kapitänleutnant Lieutenant-Commander. Oberleutnant zur See Lieutenant. Leutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant.
	The addition of the suffix "Ing." indicates an engineer officer and of "M.A." an officer of the "Marine Artillerie" corps.
	_____________________________
	II.  COMPLEMENT
	(i)  Composition
	"U 660" had a complement of 48-composed of four officers, four Chief Petty Officers, 13 Petty Officers and 27 other ratings.
	All except one officer and one Chief Petty Officer survived.
	(ii)  Captain
	The captain of "U 660" was Oberleutnant zur See Goetz Baur, aged 26, of the 1935 term.  Born in Shanghai, where his father was a member of the well-known German merchant firm of Reuter Bröckelmann and Company, Baur was educated at the German school there, and did not return to Germany permanently until shortly before entering the German Navy in April, 1935, at Stralsund.
	After three months' new entry training, he was drafted to the sailing training ship "Gorch Fock," transferring after three months to the cruiser "Emden," in which he served as an officer cadet during a nine-months' world cruise.  In 1936 he returned to the Naval College at Flensburg-Murwik, where he remained until 1937, when he was promoted midshipman.  In October, 1937, he was again appointed to the "Emden," in which he made another long cruise, this time in the Mediterranean and to India.  This lasted for six months, after which he was commissioned Leutnant zur See on 20th April, 1938.  He was then appointed to the newly-built destroyer "Hans Lody," in which he remained, latterly as First Lieutenant, until mid-1940, when he joined the U-Boat arm.  He was promoted Oberleutnant zur See on 1st October, 1939.
	Baur trained in "U 57," a school boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Klaus Korth, for whom he conceived a great admiration, and was later appointed First Lieutenant in "U 552." commanded by the well-known Kapitänleutnant Erich Topp, remaining in this boat until shortly before being given the command of "U 660" in late autumn 1941.
	He was an extremely popular an efficient captain.  His men said of him that he was "like a father with his sons," and all spoke enthusiastically of his keenness and initiative.  They thought that he would certainly have been decorated with the Ritterkreuz eventually, and were of the opinion that, in sinking "U 660," the British had destroyed one of the most important of the younger U-Boat commands.
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	To meet, Baur was frank and pleasant, though he knew exactly when he had said enough.  He appeared entirely unmoved by his sinking and capture, and bore the British no ill-will.  On his cap he wore the famous "red devil" badge of his former captains, Korth and Topp.
	(iii)  First Lieutenant
	The First Lieutenant was Leutnant zur See der Reserve Baron Edgar von Salis-Soglio, aged 30, of a well-known international family, with a branch in England.  He began his career at sea in 1933, when he signed on as a ship's boy in a vessel of the Hugo Stinnes line, with which company he remained, latterly as an officer, until the outbreak of war, when he immediately joined the German Navy.
	After a four weeks' period of new entry training at Wilhelmshaven, he spent eight weeks at Plön undergoing a Petty Officer's training course, after which he was drafted to the Navigation School at Gdynia, where he remained until June, 1940.  The next year he served as an instructor to the Luftwaffe in air-sea-rescue craft in Cherbourg, Jersey, Guernsey and Alderney.  In January, 1941, while stationed in Jersey, he was commissioned Leutnant zur See.  In mid-1941 he was appointed to U-Boats.  He joined "U 660" in Brest, replacing Leutnant zur See Schunck (see narrative) who had gone sick.  He had made two previous operational U-Boat patrols.
	Salis-Soglio was polite and pleasant in conversation, but inclined to be security-conscious, and very much of a Nazi at heart.  He admitted he had served in the S.S. for a short time.
	(iv)  Second Lieutenant
	The Second Lieutenant, Leutnant zur See Jaeger, aged about 21, entered the German Navy in December, 1940, and was commissioned Leutnant zur See in February, 1942.  "U 660" was his first operational U-Boat.  He was the son of a police officer in Hamburg-Wandsbek.  He did not survive, being killed by gunfire in the water while abandoning ship.
	(v)  Engineer Officer
	The Engineer Officer was Oberleutnant (Ing.) Jakob Hausermann, aged 34.  He started his career with the engineering firm of Heinrich Lanz, of Mannheim, and joined the German Navy as a stoker in 1925.  After six months' new entry training, he was drafted to Torpedo Boat "T 158" and remained in torpedo boats until 1939, only breaking his sea-time to take his Petty Officer's and Chief Petty Officer's courses ashore.  He said he had made cruises in torpedo boats to Spain, Sweden and Norway.
	At the start of the war he was drafted to the Kiel Naval College where he became an engineer instructor for all surface ships.  He was commissioned Leutnant (Ing.) on 1st July, 1941, and appointed to the U-Boat School at Gdynia, where he served as Engineer Officer in a school-boat.  He was promoted Oberleutnant (Ing.) in April, 1942.  He was a good type of middle-class German, obviously pleased with his quick promotion and full of self-confidence.  At the same time he was fully security-conscious.
	(vi)  General
	"U 660" was a happy ship.  The men all spoke well of their officers, with the possible exception of the Engineer Officer, whom one man criticised for his nervous temperament.  The men themselves were of the usual very limited experience, but the ill-effects of this were to some extent mitigated by good leadership.
	The men were not unduly security-conscious.
	_____________________________
	III.  EARLY HISTORY OF "U 660"
	(i)  Launching
	"U 660," stated to be of the series "U 651" to "U 668," was launched from the yards of the Howaldtswerke, Hamburg, in mid-November, 1941.  From then onwards members of her future complement were drafted to her, the ratings being accompanied on board the depôt ship "General Artigas" (11,254 tons, Hamburg-South America liner).
	(ii)  Commissioning
	She was commissioned on 8th January, 1942, the occasion being celebrated by a banquet on board the "General Artigas" attended by the whole ship's company and a number of distinguished visitors.  "U 660 was then attached to the 5th U-Boat Flotilla at Kiel.
	(iii)  Original Officers
	"U 660's" original officers were:
	Captain   Oberleutnant zur See Baur. First Lieutenant   Leutnant zur See Schunck, of the October 1938 term. Second Lieutenant   Leutnant zur See Jaeger. Engineer Officer   Leutnant (Ing.) Häusermann.

 

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	(iv)  U.A.K. Trials
	"U 660" sailed from Hamburg to Kiel on or about 10th January, 1942, passing through the Kaiser Wilhelm Kanal and making fast on arrival in the harbour at Kiel-Wik.  On or about 12th January, her trials for the U-Boats Acceptance Command (U.A.K.) began and lasted until early February, when she was frozen in at Kiel-Wik, together with a number of other U-Boats.  Once, about this time, "U 660" damaged a propeller on the ice and had to enter dry dock at Kiel to have a new one fitted.  The ship's company were then given leave in watches.
	The ice did not thaw until early April, and "U 660" was forced to wait until 10th April before she could complete the remainder of her U.A.K. trials, consisting solely of trimming tests.  These lasted for two days.
	(v)  Torpedo Firing Practice
	On or about 15th April, "U 660" passed out of the hands of the U.A.K. and sailed from Kiel to Danzig for torpedo firing practice.  She arrived at Danzig in the forenoon of 17th April, but did not enter harbour, the signal station redirecting her immediately to Hela, where she arrived at 1200, only to be diverted once more, this time to Gdynia, where she made fast alongside a 5,000-ton ship the same afternoon and embarked five torpedoes from her.  Prisoners explained that this series of redirections was due to the large number of U-Boats released by the sudden thaw creating congestion in all Baltic ports.
	For her passage from Kiel to Gdynia, "U 660" was fitted with a special bow ice protector.
	On 18th April at 0700, she sailed for her torpedo firing practice, which was carried out one mile offshore from Gdynia against four or five merchantmen acting as target ships.  Survivors said that one of then was called the "Vega," and two others were tankers.  (N.I.D. Note.  This is probably the "Vega," 7,287 tons, of Det Bergenske Dampskibs Selskab, of Bergen.)  On 19th April, a similar exercise was carried out.
	(vi)  Agru-Front
	In the afternoon of 20th April, "U 660" sailed from Gdynia to Hela for her Agru-Front trials, which lasted until 4th May.  During this period, Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Suhren, in command of the Agru-Front, came on board three times.  There were some 12 to 15 other U-Boats undergoing their Agru-Front trials at the same time as "U 660," and each was allotted an exercise area in the eastern Baltic.  One of these boats was "U 605," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Herbert Victor Schütze, of the 1935 term, and a personal friend of Baur's.  The crew called the Engineer Officers who boarded "U 660" for the Agru-Front "the Black Commissioners" ("Die Schwarze Kommission.")
	During her Agru-Front trials, "U 660" dived once at an angle of 54°, but her batteries did not spill.  Ratings said that the acid had been kept specially low as a precaution.
	(vii)  Miscellaneous Trials
	On 4th May "U 660" sailed from Hela to Danzig to do her tactical exercises.  On arrival she made fast off Holm Island.  It was found, however, that the congestion caused by the large number of U-Boats present was so great that there was no prospect of her doing her tactical exercises for some time.  She accordingly went into dry dock for a week to fit a new propeller, one of them having been damaged during the Agru-Front trials, and Baur was then ordered to continue exercising independently until the congestion was relieved.
	From 13th May until early June, therefore, "U 660" worked up independently in the neighborhood of Danzig, practising crash-diving and speed trials on the measured mile.  In early June there was still no prospect of her being able to do her tactical exercises, so she was ordered to Rönne for silent running trials.
	(viii)  Silent Running Trials
	In early June "U 660" sailed from Danzig to Rönne for silent running trials.  Congestion also ruled here and she had to wait a day in harbour before commencing.  The crew were granted shore leave.  Next day, however, she put to sea and carried out the usual series of these trials.  (See Section XI (iv).)
	(ix)  Leave at Swinemünde
	On or about 5th June, "U 660" sailed from Rönne to Swinemünde, where the ship's company was given local leave.  The Engineer Officer, who lived there, gave a party at his home for the officers on the night of 6th June.
	(x)  Theoretical Tactical Training
	On 9th June, "U 660" sailed from Swinemünde to Danzig, arriving there the same afternoon.  Conditions were still, however, extremely congested, so from the 10th to 20th June, selected members of "U 660's" ship's company were ordered to attend a course of theoretical tactical training in the depot ship "Deutschland."  (See Section XI (iii).)
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	(xi)  Tactical Exercises
	On 20th June "U 660" sailed from Danzig to Gdynia, and on 21st June at last began her tactical exercises in the Bight of Danzig.  These followed the usual routine of convoy attack, etc.
	(xii)  Final Adjustments
	On 1st July "U 660" sailed from Gdynia to Kiel and thence through the Kaiser Wilhelm Kanal to the Howaldtswerke at Hamburg, where she entered dry dock for final adjustments.  She was given another coat of paint, her K.D.B. and V.H.F. were taken out, and she embarked her full outfit of torpedoes.  The ship's company were given the usual leave in watches.
	(xiii)  Return to Kiel
	On 20th July "U 660" sailed from Hamburg to Kiel through the canal and made fast at Kiel-Wik.
	_____________________________
	IV.  FIRST PATROL OF "U 660"
	(i)  Departure from Kiel
	"U 660" sailed from Kiel for her first operational patrol early on 25th July, 1942, from Kiel-Wik.  She was accompanied by two other 500-ton U-Boats, one of them probably "U 605," and two UJ-Boats, and had an air escort of several fighter aircraft from time to time.  She sailed via the Great Belt and the Kattegat to Kristiansand S.
	(ii)  Call at Kristiansand S.
	"U 660" arrived at Kristiansand S. in the early hours of 27th July.  The whole passage from Kiel had been made on the surface and there had been no aircraft alarms.  On arrival she made fast at the pier opposite the corn silos at Sölyst, the other U-Boats lying alongside her.  The men were accommodated for the night in the hostel near the railway station.
	(iii)  Departure from Kristiansand S.
	About 0800 on 28th July, "U 660" sailed from Kristiansand S., still accompanied by one other U-Boat and with an escort of two patrol-boats.  The whole group hugged the coast until off Stavanger, when "U 660" altered course to 270°, the others continuing northwards.  Prisoners were unable to recall the exact alterations of course made on leaving Stavanger, but they admitted that there were several of them.  They believed that "U 660" did not make straight for the "Rosengarten," but proceeded first to a position well to the east of Iceland.
	(iv)  Passage of "Rosengarten"
	"U 660" passed through the "Rosengarten" on the surface on about 30th July.  She sighted a large number of drifting mines and detonated some of them.  Survivors were well aware of the presence of British minefields.  They said, however, that they did not fear them, since they had on board charts showing their exact position.  On completion of the passage, Baur sent the usual signal to the Admiral U-Boats giving his position and requesting further orders.  Until then, the lower deck rumour was that "U 660" was that "U 660" was bound for the Caribbean, where she was to be given freedom of action.
	(v)  Period of "Einzelstellung"
	On about 30th July, "U 660" received orders from the Admiral U-Boats to proceed to a position about 55° N., 20° W., and there to take up "Einzelstellung."  (See Section XI (i).)  Whilst proceeding to this surfaced position, she sighted several enemy warships and one fishing vessel, but each time withdrew at full speed.
	"U 660's" orders while in this position were to report the passage of any convoys or other shipping sighted.  Survivors said there were no other U-Boats in the vicinity.
	She sighted no ships, however, and her ship's company were thoroughly glad when, about 2nd August, the Admiral U-Boats ordered her to take station in a patrol line in position about 51° N., 36° W.
	(vi)  Arrival in Patrol Line
	"U 660" arrived in her position in the "Vorpostenstreife" (patrol line) of U-Boats in about 51° N., 36° W. on about 3rd August.  She remained in station for about two days, sighting nothing.  Other boats in this line were those commanded by Kelbling and Schütze.
	(vii)  Contact with Kelbling's Convoy
	About 4th August, the Admiral U-Boats ordered "U 660" to proceed into "Angriffsaufstellung" (attack formation) in a position about 52° N., 42° W., where she was to attack an eastbound convoy already sighted by the boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Kelbling.  (N.I.D. Note.  This is Kelbling, of the 1934 term.  It is not known which boat he commands.  The convoy was S.C.94.)

 

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	"U 505" (Kapitänleutnant Axel Lowe), "U 174" (Korvettenkapitän Thilo), "U 605" (Kapitänleutnant Schütze) and boats commanded by Kapitänleutnant Horn, of the 1935 term, and Korvettenkapitän Franzius, of the 1932 term, were among those attacking this convoy, whose mean course the Admiral U-Boats gave as 90°.
	On 8th August, "U 660" reached her station in the attack formation.  A moderate sea was running but there was bad visibility.
	(viii)  Attack on Independent Merchantman
	On the morning of 8th August, as "U 660" was shadowing the convoy, she sighted a 7,000-ton independently-sailing merchantman, proceeding at high speed.  Baur realised that he would have difficulty in keeping up with her and accordingly soon fired a salvo of four torpedoes at her, with depth setting 3 m. (10 ft.), speed 40 knots.  Although ratings in "U 660" were convinced that one of them had hit her, Baur himself ridiculed the idea, adding that, if she had been hit, she would certainly have been unable to continue at the speed she did.
	The course of this ship was stated to be almost due north.  Survivors were sure that she had been sent as a decoy to the shadowing U-Boats, some of which temporarily followed her instead of the convoy itself.  It was subsequently rumoured on board "U 660" that this ship had been sunk by gunfire from "U 605."  (N.I.D. Note.  There is no record of any independent ship having been sunk on 8th August, 1942.)
	The same afternoon Baur was ordered to resume his position in the attack formation against the convoy.
	(ix)  Sinking of Four Merchantmen
	"U 660" continued the pursuit of the convoy throughout the 9th August.  At about 1200 G.S.T. on 10th August, she was on the surface in a position to port of the convoy when Baur decided that the favourable moment to attack had arrived.  Owing to his having sighted a destroyer, he submerged to periscope depth and fired a salvo of four torpedoes - the first at 1220, the second at 1221, the third at 1221-1/2 and the last at 1222, all with a depth setting of 3 m. (10 ft.) and a speed of 40 knots, from about 500 yards.  Baur said that he was convinced that each found its mark, though he was not sure whether all four ships hit had actually sunk.  Survivors gave the position of this attack as roughly 57° N., 22° W. (N.I.D. Note.  At about 1022 on 10th August, the following four ships of S.C.94 were sunk by torpedo 400 miles south of Iceland, in the following order:
	No. 33.  "Condylis (Greek 4,439 tons) (one cable astern of station).
	No. 61.  "Empire Reindeer" (British, 6,259 tons) (1/2 cable astern of station).
	No. 52.  "Oregon" (British, 6,008 tons) (1/2 cable ahead of station).
	No. 62.  "Cape Race" (British, 3,807 tons) (in station).
	Course of convoy at time of attack was 050°.)
	Survivors were aware that the U-Boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Lemeke, "U 210," had previously been attacking this convoy and that she had been sunk.  (N.I.D. Note.  "U 210" was sunk in approximate position 54° 25' N., 29° 37' W., on 6th August, 1942, while preparing to attack S.C. 94.  Survivors from "U 210" stated that other boats attacking this convoy were those commanded by Kapitänleutnant Erich Topp ("U 552"), which may have attacked S.C.94 at 0200 G.S.T. on 4th August, Kapitänleutnant Mengersen, and Kapitänleutnant Reinhard Suhren ("U 564").  "U 379," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Rudolf Kettner, was sunk by H.M.S. "Dianthus" on 9 August in position 56° 30' N., 32° 05' W., also while attacking S.C.94.)
	When "U 660" fired this salvo, a British destroyer was, according to prisoners, stationed about 300 yards on her starboard beam, but, instead of attacking the U-Boat, she at once proceeded to the rescue of survivors from the torpedoed merchantmen.
	(x)  Depth-Charge Attack on "U 660"
	"U 660" herself submerged to 60 m. (197 ft.), put about and proceeded well to the westward.  After about one and a half hours, she came to periscope depth and cautiously returned to the scene of the sinking.  Survivors say they saw a large merchantman stopped near the wreckage of the torpedoed ships.  They were convinced that she was a Q-ship, for they noticed that in a short while a destroyer, which had previously sheered off to the south, turned back towards "U 660."  They felt sure that the supposed Q-ship had called the destroyer by W/T.  (N.I.D. Note.  This was probably the "Oregon," which, though hit, was still afloat with a flooded boiler room.  All survivors had been taken off.  She later blew up and sank.)
	As soon as the destroyer came within range, "U 660" prepared to attack her, having meanwhile reloaded tubes 2 and 3.  The destroyer constantly altered course, however, and Baur decided that the best position from which to attack her was from his stern tube.  The ship's company were therefore greatly disappointed when it was discovered that the cap had jammed and the attack could not be carried out.  Owing to the insufficient attention being meanwhile paid to her trim, she partially surfaced and survivors were convinced that the destroyer had sighted her.  Baur then ordered her to proceed at emergency speed ahead and submerged.  At 40 m. (131 ft.) the first depth charge detonated, exploding underneath the boat.  According to several prisoners, "U 660" then submerged to the maximum depth of 210 m. (689 ft.) later steadying at 200 m. (656 ft.).  She then sustained a heavy depth-charge attack, survivors counting some 40 in all.  They said that nearly all exploded well above the boat, the only damage caused being to one of her hydroplane motors.  "U 660" remained submerged for 12 hours, proceeding throughout at between 60 and 90 r.p.m.
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	(xi)  Second Patrol Line Position
	At 0100 on 11th August, 1942, "U 660" surfaced and observed that all was clear.  She reported her position to the Admiral U-Boats, who ordered her to approximate position 45° N., 38° W., where she was to take station in a "Vorpostenstreife" (patrol line) of about 12 U-Boats.  "U 660" set course 230° and arrived in her new position about 14th August, when she carried out the usual routine for U-Boats in a patrol line until 18th August.  One man thought this line might have been called "Gruppe Vorwärts"
	While in position, "U 660" transferred below one torpedo from her upper deck containers.  This was done during daylight in a period of calm sea but poor visibility.
	(xii)  Receipt of Special Communiqué
	On 11 August, "U 660's" ship's company heard the broadcasting from all German radio stations of a special communiqué describing attacks on a British convoy in which young U-Boat crews on their first patrol participated.  (N.I.D. Note.  German radio stations on 11 August broadcast a detailed description of attacks between 5th and 10th August, 1942, on "a British convoy in the Atlantic."  It added:  "Young U-Boat commanders were attacking the enemy for the first time, thus refuting enemy propaganda on the lowering of fighting morale and the lack of training of new U-Boat captains."  Between 5th and 10th August nine ships of convoy S.C.94 were torpedoed and sunk.)
	(xiii)  Sighting and Pursuit of Westbound Convoy
	At 0500 on 18th August, "U 660," while patrolling in the neighborhood of her "Vorpostenstreife," sighted a fast westbound convoy apparently consisting of two or three passenger liners and several destroyers.  She immediately reported to the Admiral U-Boats, who ordered her to pursue it as contact-keeper.  Baur replied that he was very short of fuel and that to pursue a convoy at such a high speed would soon expend all he had remaining, but the Admiral nevertheless instructed him to pursue the convoy at all costs, adding that he would send a relief as soon as possible.  "U 660" accordingly continued the chase to westward at emergency speed on the surface.
	It was not until 1700 the same evening that the first of the several U-Boats detailed to shadow the convoy got into position.  At 1900, in approximate position 45° N., 45° W., all six boats detailed had arrived.  "U 660" received permission to hand over her duty as contact-keeper to another boat.  One man believed that this group of six boats was called "Gruppe Leopard."
	"U 660" then signalled her fuel remaining and was ordered by the Admiral U-Boats to proceed to a position approximately 41° N., 33° W., where she would rendezvous with another boat which was to supply her with fuel.  In view of her lack of fuel, "U 660" proceeded the entire way on diesel-electric.
	(xiv)  Rendezvous with "U 174"
	At about 1200 on 19th August "U 660" rendezvoused with "U 174" (Korvettenkapitän Thilo, of the 1922 term).  The exact position of rendezvous is uncertain, but survivors assert that it was W.N.W. of the Azores.
	About 25 tons of fuel oil was transferred in the course of the afternoon.  The transfer took place while both boats proceeded ahead at slow speed, each supplying part of the hose.  Prisoners stated that the reason that Thilo's boat was selected to transfer oil to "U 660" was because the former was damaged and in any case unable to continue her patrol.  One man said her hydroplanes were badly damaged.
	"U 660" had only about 30 tons of fuel left when she rendezvoused with "U 174."
	(xv)  Passage to Brest
	After refuelling, "U 660" set course for Brest.  She proceeded on diesel-electric on the surface until entering the Bay of Biscay, after which her routine was to submerge at night and to proceed at high speed on the surface during the day.  Prisoners said that this procedure gave the best protection against aircraft; they did not like to surface at night, as they were convinced the British aircraft were fitted with some kind of detection gear for spotting surfaced U-Boats, while being themselves invisible owing to the dark.  (N.I.D. Note.  "U 660" was at this time not fitted with G.S.R.)
	(xvi)  Attack by Aircraft
	On 3rd September, as "U 660" was making towards Brest at full speed on the surface in company with the U-Boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Horn, the look-out sighted an aircraft immediately astern.  "U 660" manned her 20 mm. gun, but it was found that the breech was jammed.  She accordingly submerged immediately to 60 m. (197 ft.)  The aircraft dropped several bombs, none of which did any damage to her.  One man said that he distinctly heard the sound of Horn's boat as she broke up, and they all assumed that she had been lost without survivors.  Others, however, said they did not learn of her loss until they docked in Brest.  The look-out in "U 660" was given three day's arrest on making Brest for not having spotted the aircraft sooner.  (N.I.D. Note.  At 1444 G.M.T. on 3rd September, Whitley "V" of 77 Squadron attacked a U-Boat in position 47° 54' N., 10° 04'W., and at 1650 2/3 WhitleyP/77 attacked a U-Boat in 46° 42' N., 11° 08' W., course 130°.)

 

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	(xvii)  Arrival at Brest
	At 0700 on 6th September, "U 660" met two patrol vessels which were to escort her and Horn's U-Boat into Brest.  Horn's boat, however, did not arrive immediately, so that "U 660" was forced to wait throughout the whole of 6th September while submerged and the whole of the night of 6th/7th September on the surface.
	At 0730 on 7th September, Horn's boat had still not arrived, so "U 660" and the patrol vessels proceeded to Brest, where "U 660" entered Shelter No. 13 and lay alongside "U 605"  (Kapitänleutnant Schütze).
	(xviii)  Period in Brest
	On arrival at Brest "U 660" was attached to the 9th U-Boat Flotilla (Senior Officer, Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock) which had recently been formed, and consisted of boats returning from their first patrol.
	The ship's company were granted leave in watches.  Those that were in Brest, but not required on duty, were allowed to make excursions locally.  Some visited a U-Boat rest centre called Chateau Neuf.
	On 8th September, the Senior Officer of the 9th Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Lehmann-Willenbrock, decorated several members of "U 660's" ship's company with Iron Crosses (see frontispiece) in front of the barracks at Kerabecam.  The First Lieutenant, then Leutnant zur See Schunck, and the Second Lieutenant, Leutnant zur See Jaeger, were each awarded the Iron Cross, 2nd Class.  Twelve of the ratings were awarded the Iron Cross, 1st Class.  While in Brest, Leutnant zur See Schunck met with an injury to his arm and was replaced by Leutnant zur See der Reserve Baron Edgar von Salis-Soglio.
	"U 660" was repainted, her periscopes and compressor were removed and overhauled, and G.S.R., S.B.T. and an oxy-acetylene welding connection on her conning-tower were fitted.  One man said that a modified type of angling gear was also fitted here.  Details of this gear are not available.  Part of the time "U 660" lay in one of the U-Boat shelters that was convertible for use as a dry dock.  She later returned to Shelter 13.
	While in Brest the officers of "U 660" were invited to visit a Japanese submarine.  They refused, however, to return the Japanese hospitality on boat "U 660," which caused the Japanese some irritation.
	_____________________________
	V.  SECOND PATROL OF "U 660"
	(i)  Departure from Brest
	"U 660" sailed on her second patrol in the afternoon of 5th October from Brest.  Although prisoners said that some eight U-Boats sailed on or about this day, they only saw one leave at the same time as "U 660."  This other U-boat, however, had to put back on reaching the outer mole, owing to defects developing in her hydroplanes.
	"U 660" was escorted by one "Sperrbrecher" and two UJ-Boats until the open sea was reached.  She then set course 270° and proceeded on the surface until about 10° W.  She sighted no aircraft.  At this point, according to the Quartermaster's assistant, an Able Seaman, Baur received a signal from the Admiral U-Boats ordering a change of course and instructing him that he was eventually to proceed into the Mediterranean.  Baur did not, however, make known this fact to his ship's company until later.
	(ii)  Alteration of Course Southwards
	He then alter course to 180° and proceeded to approximate position 25° 30' N., 08° 40' W., where she waited for about one day for other U-Boats to rendezvous.  Survivors said that they did not themselves sight any of these other U-Boats, but that they understood that the Admiral U-Boats policy was to send a number of boats through the Straits of Gibraltar at approximately the same time.  On reaching this position, Baur made a speech to his ship's company informing them of what lay ahead.  Great excitement prevailed.
	(iii)  Maneuvering to Pass Straits of Gibraltar
	About 1100 on 9th October, "U 660" received a signal from the Admiral U-Boats ordering her to proceed at emergency speed on the surface to a point approximately 36° N., 06° 30' W.
	On arrival at this position in the evening of 9th October, "U 660" was instructed that her subsequent passage of the Straits was to be made at her captain's discretion.
	Bauer therefore ordered her to submerge until the morning of 10th October, in order to allow his ship's company fully to rest themselves before the passage.
	On the morning of 10th October he proceeded submerged until, at about 1930, he reached approximate position 36° 04' N., 05° 55' W.  Here he came to periscope depth, saw that there were no enemy vessels in sight and surfaced.  The boat then went to action stations, scuttling charges were placed in position and the officers armed themselves.

 

	8
	(iv)  Passage of the Straits of Gibraltar
	Soon after surfacing, "U 660" discovered from her G.S.R. that she was being located by land stations, and proceeded to zig-zag sharply at full speed on the surface, remaining well to the north of the Straits.  She saw the lights of Tarifa very clearly, and took a fix on them.  About this stage, the look-out reported the presence of another U-Boat about one mile astern of them, her silhouette being clearly visible.  Some six or eight boats made the passage of the Straits at about the same time as "U 660."  Among these were those commanded by Kapitänleutnant Kelbling and Kapitänleutnant Diggins.  "U 605" (Kapitänleutnant Schütze) had successfully negotiated the Straits two days earlier.
	One man said that "U 660" had on board charts showing the position of British A/S nets elsewhere, and hoped they would encounter none in the Straits.
	(v)  "U 660" is detected and Dives
	At 0045 on 11th October, when "U 660" was in position 36° N., 05° 25' W., two destroyers were sighted approaching her from starboard.  Baur immediately gave the order to dive, and "U 660" submerged to about 100 m.  (328 ft.)
	She then set course submerged at about 140°, which she maintained until about 1200 on 11th October, when she surfaced in approximate position 35° 38' N., 04° 30' W.  At about 1000 the same day, while submerged, "U 660" had heard the sound of depth-charge explosions in a position which she estimated as approximately 35° 38' N., 04° 55' W.  Survivors believed these were meant for the other U-Boat, which they thought was still following them.
	(vi)  Sighting of British Submarine
	After surfacing on 11th October, "U 660" set course at full speed for La Spezia, passing south of the Balearics and North of Corsica.
	On 12th October, while off Formentera, she sighted the conning tower of a British submarine, but withdrew at full speed on the surface.
	The rest of the passage to La Spezia was uneventful.
	(vii)  Arrival at La Spezia
	About 1600 on 15th October, "U 660" made La Spezia, where she made fast on the western side of basin No. 1.  The Senior Officer of the 29th U-Boat Flotilla, Kapitänleutnant Fritz Frauenheim, of the 1930 term, gave a dinner for "U 660's" ship's company in a local barracks.  After a day or two, some of the men were sent to Viareggio for leave.
	(viii)  Period at La Spezia
	While at La Spezia, "U 660" was repainted a suitable camouflage for operations in the Mediterranean, consisting of a lighter shade of grey, with a diagonal white stripe on her conning-tower.  The upper deck topedo-containers were also removed.
	Prisoners noticed 12 to 15 other U-Boats at La Spezia while they were there, among them "U 605" (Kapitänleutnant Schütze), "U 81" (Kapitänleutnant Fritz Guggenberger), "U 431" (Kapitänleutnant Dommes) and a boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Franken.  About half of these had left by the time "U 660" had sailed.
	One of the Petty Officers was sent overland to Brest to collect "U 660's" ship's company's gear, it being expected that she would stay for some while at La Spezia.  The unexpected receipt of sailing orders, however, resulted in his being left behind.  Another man had to be embarked to replace him.
	"U 660's" men were unfavorably impressed by their reception from the Italians, whom they described as unfriendly.  They thought the rations provided were good, but were not satisfied with their quarters and this gave rise to considerable ill-feeling.
	_____________________________
	VI.  LAST PATROL OF "U 660"
	(i)  Departure from La Spezia
	"U 660" sailed alone from La Spezia at 1800 on 24th October, 1942.  The Senior Officer of the 29th Flotilla made a short speech to her ship's company before sailing, but there were no other festivities.
	The Flotilla Engineer, Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Zürn, sailed with her and remained on board until she passed the last boom at 2020, when he was taken off by an M.L.
	Her orders were to proceed to Messina, where she was to complete with fuel.  She carried an E.R.A., who was to be put ashore at Messina, but who, owing to a subsequent alteration in "U 660's" orders, was never disembarked.
	She expected to return to her base about 7th December, 1942.

 

	9
	(ii)  Alteration in Orders
	One or two days out from La Spezia, "U 660" received orders from the Captain (S) Mediterranean instructing her to take station in "Gruppe Wal," a "Vorpostenstreife" (patrol line) of six or eight U-Boats disposed between Algiers and Majorca, in which position it was expected that an aircraft-carrier which had left Gibraltar would shortly be sighted.  Aircraft frequently caused "U 660" to dive and remain submerged for several hours.  Other boats in this line were commanded by Kelbling, Deckert and Schütze.
	(iii)  Sighting of H.M.S. "Furious"
	On 2nd November, "U 660" sighted from periscope depth a warship which survivors believed to be the aircraft-carrier H.M.S. "Furious."  Baur then submerged to 25 m. (82 ft.) and listen on his hydrophones.  He did not, however, get an opportunity of attacking, as the carrier immediately turned away in the direction of Gibraltar at high speed.  Survivors noticed, however that a number of aircraft left her flight deck.  They thought they were bound for Malta.  "U 660" thereupon continued her patrol as before.  One man claimed that another U-Boat unsuccessfully fired a salvo of four torpedoes at the carrier.
	Prisoners were under the impression that H.M.S. "Furious" was in the habit of proceeding to a point between Gibraltar and Malta twice a week.  There she would release her aircraft and return to Gibraltar.
	(iv)  Signal from Hitler
	On 6th November, while "U 660" was still in her patrol line, a signal was received from the Captain (S) Mediterranean, relaying an order from Hitler instructing "U 660" and all boats operating in her neighborhood to proceed independently to the neighborhood of Algiers to intercept a large Allied Convoy sailing from Gibraltar.  The signal, which was signed by Hitler himself, called on all boats in dramatic terms to give of their utmost, reminding then that on the success of their efforts in intercepting this convoy depended the very existence of Rommel's "Afrika Korps."
	The 7th November was spent proceeding at full speed to Algiers.
	(v)  Arrival off Algiers
	"U-660" arrived off Algiers in the forenoon of 8th November, lying a few hundred yards off the coast to the east of the town.
	(vi)  Pursuit of Eastbound Convoy
	She later sighted a fast eastbound convoy of two or three large ships, one of them an 18,000-tonner, escorted by destroyers.  She immediately followed this convoy eastwards.  Baur being under the impression at first that this was the large convoy to which the Captain (S) Mediterranean had referred in his signal.
	(vii)  Attack on 18,000-tonner
	In the evening of 8th November, "U 660" had reached a position favorable to attack this convoy.  She was just preparing to do so when an accompanying U-Boat, "U 73," commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Deckert, of the April 1937 term, fired two torpedoes at the 18,000-tonner and sank her.  These two torpedoes, according to survivors, passed right over "U 660" who was at periscope depth, causing consternation on board.  Baur subsequently signalled "Schafskopf!" ("Fool!") to Deckert, only to be sharply reprimanded by the Captain (S) for having thus broken W/T silence.
	In this attack, "U 660" twice used her S.B.T. in case any D/C attack directed against "U 73" should be diverted against her.  On each occasion she altered course just before ejecting the charges.
	(viii)  Return to Algiers
	On 9th November, the Captain (S) ordered "U 660" to abandon the attack on the eastbound convoy and return to Algiers, where she arrived in the afternoon of 10th November.  From then onwards, "U 660" acted independently ("Freijagd").
	(ix)  Attack on a Destroyer
	In the evening of 10th November, "U 660" attacked a British destroyer from the surface, firing a salvo of four torpedoes.  None of them, however, found its mark.  She had detected the destroyer by means of her hydrophones.  "U 660" then promptly made off at full speed on the surface, while the destroyer carried out as D/C attack in the vicinity.  On reporting this attack to the Captain (S), "U 660" received a reply to the effect that she must not carry out attacks on comparatively small craft while such a large number of more important objectives were available.  H.M. Ships "Rodney" and "Nelson" were, he added, more suitable targets.
	(x)  Visit to Oran
	On leaving Algiers, "U 660" proceeded at full speed to Oran, where she arrived at 0400 on 11th November.  Survivors said that she lay on the surface just outside the harbour entrance, from which point she was able to witness the Allied landings in progress.  She made no attack and left at 0600, proceeding northwards.

 

	10
	(xi)  Meeting with "U 73"
	At about 1000 on 11th November, when north of Oran, "U 660" encountered "U 73" and prepared to go alongside to exchange information.  The sudden appearance of a British aircraft, however, caused both boats to submerge and "U 660" did not surface again until after midday.  She then sighted an aircraft-carrier, but did not attack.  Survivors said that during the whole period 8th to 11th November there were large numbers of ships to be seen in their operational area and they had the greatest difficulty in formulating any clear programme of attack.  Baur was often extremely critical of the Captain (S)'s signals, especially in the latter part of his patrol, saying that the lack of co-ordination shown had resulted in inefficiency.  The constant submersion on account of aircraft was, moreover, most trying to the ship's company's nerves.  On one day alone they were forced to submerge on 19 separate occasions.  The Engineer Officer, who was not as young as he might have been, confessed himself about all-in.
	(xii)  Preparations for Final Attack
	At 0000 on 12th November Baur gathered his ship's company in the control room and told them of the position in the Western Mediterranean, emphasizing the importance of making an attack to relieve Rommel's position.  He called for three cheers for Hitler and an excited and enthusiastic atmosphere developed on board.
	_____________________________
	VII.  SINKING OF "U 660"
	At about 0800 on 12th November, while surfaced on a westerly course, "U 660" sighted an eastbound convoy, bearing 300° relative, some five or six miles distant from her.  (N.I.D. Note.  This was Convoy T.E.3.)  She did not submerge, however, until about 0830, when Baur could already see the mastheads of the approaching ships.  He was then slightly to the north of the convoy, which was on his port quarter.  He was anxious to repeat his feat of 10th August when he sank four ships with four torpedoes.  Early in the morning "U 660" had experienced trouble with the cooling system of her port diesel, but it continued to function.
	By about 1030, while "U 660" was still at periscope depth, Baur judged the moment to attack favorable and ordered his men to stand by to fire a salvo of four torpedoes at the oncoming vessels from his bow tubes.  Depth setting was three m. (10 ft.).  He was then in approximate position 37° 41' N., 00° 10' W.  At this point Baur noticed one of the escort vessels turn towards him and ordered absolute silence in his boat.  The motors were running at 90 r.p.m.  The escort vessel passed "U 660" to port, then appeared to stop and released a pattern of D/Cs, which exploded below the boat, to port and slightly ahead of her.  (N.I.D. Note.  Soon after 0930 G.M.T., H.M.S. "Starwort," one of the corvettes escorting T.E.3, was hunting and A/S contact on the port quarter of the convoy.  H.M. Destroyers "Wescott," "Verify" and "Wyvern" were carrying out an A/S sweep in the neighborhood and, having passed around the convoy, closed with H.M.S. "Starwort."  The latter thereupon carried out a hedgehog attack resulting in no explosions, followed by a stern attack with D/Cs set so shallow that observers in H.M.S. "Wescott" thought that "Starwort" must inflict damage on herself.)
	The effect of these D/Cs was to cause a water entry on the starboard side of the motor compartment and to put the torpedo-angling gear out of order.  The ship's company were standing by to dive deeper, in accordance with routine, when Baur ordered her to remain at periscope depth and to fire the salvo as arranged.  This was, however, found to be impossible owing to the damage to the angling gear and Baur ordered her to dive immediately.  He considered the possibility for a moment of firing his torpedoes by hydrophone, but this, together with all compasses and other control room gear, was also out of order.  It was then found that the water entry aft had put the starboard electric motor out of action.  The men rigged up a screen over the other motor to prevent it being similarly affected.
	The water entry aft was found to be more serious than at first suspected, so that all possible men were ordered forward to give her trim.  Ammunition and provisions were also moved forward.  There is some uncertainty regarding the exact depth which "U 660" attained, but many survivors spoke of depths considerably over 200 m. (658 ft.).  They were under the impression that their boat had created a new record in diving depths.  A few, however, said that she did not dive deeper than 160 m. (525 ft.).  Some prisoners said that the depth-gauges were all defective at this stage.  Despite the pumps being worked at full capacity, the water entry aft began shortly to assume serious proportions and as the boat made more and more water the batteries began to give off chlorine.  The main lighting system also failed.  "U 660" then lost trim by the bows and some of the weight had to be shifted aft.  Fifteen minutes before giving the order to surface, Baur ordered two charges of S.B.T. to be ejected.  (N.I.D. Note.  About this time H.M.S. "Wescott," who was stopped, obtained two echoes on her recorder.  The nearer of the two, at about 1,000 yards, appeared the most promising as its range varied only very slightly.)
	Ten minutes later, Baur attempted to eject a third S.B.T., but the ejector gear was out of order and he abandoned the attempt.  Further D/Cs were meanwhile dropped with great effect.  Realizing the hopelessness of his position, he ordered the engineer officer to blow the tanks.  In the confusion, however, the vents of No. 1 diving tank had not been closed so that bubbles may have appeared on the surface, thus betraying their position in advance.  "U 660" surfaced at about 1200.  (N.I.D. Note.  Soon after contact both "Wescott's" echoes faded, but almost immediately a disturbance as produced by air bubbles was noticed on the surface and "U 660's" bow broke surface at an angle of about 70°.)

Click on the text to see photos of the sinking of U-660

	11
	As soon as "U 660" had broken surface, Baur gave the order to abandon ship, remaining himself to the last in company with the engineer officer, who sank his boat by opening the vents and removing the cover of the sea inlet to the main bilge pump.
	The ship's company abandoned "U 660" in the most orderly manner, but survivors complained that two of their number had been killed by gunfire while in the water.  (N.I.D. Note.  "U 660" righted herself on the surface and her men lined up on the upper deck as if on parade.  All ships present fired 12-pdrs, pom-poms, Oerlikon and Lewis guns.  H.M.S. "Starwort" appeared to be about to ram, but instead passed close ahead of the U-Boat, turned quickly and stopped astern.  The destroyer's fire was therefore masked and capture of the U-Boat rendered impossible.  When a last burst of fire from a ship which was very close looked like killing the whole crew, they dived overboard and were followed very shortly by the scuttling party.  "U 660" then sank stern first.  H.M.S. "Starwort" picked up 29 survivors, "Verify" 7 and "Wyvern" 9.)
	"U 660" was unable to send a signal to the Captain (S) announcing her fate, as her W/T gear was defective.
	Though prisoners were not inclined to criticize their captain's actions, one man complained that Baur would have had plenty of time to dive and avoid the first D/Cs from the corvette, and showed bad judgment in not doing so.
	_____________________________
	VIII.  DETAILS OF "U 660"
	(i)  Displacement
	500 tons.
	(ii)  Type
	VII C.
	(iii)   Built
	Howaldtswerke, Hamburg.  Series "U 651"-"U668."
	(iv)  Armament
	(a)  Guns.  One 88 mm. (3.46 in.) forward.
	One 20 mm. on bridge.
	Mountings for four M.G.s on conning-tower.
	(b)  Torpedoes.  Fourteen carried on 1st and 2nd patrols, but only 12 on 3rd.  Two upper deck containers were removed in La Spezia.
	Pistols.  Four-whiskered.  G.7H. Type.
	(v)  D/F and R.D.F. Gear
	(a)  D/F gear was fitted.
	(b)  No R.D.F. fitted.
	(vi)  Search and Anti-Asdic Gear
	(a)  G.S.R. German Search Receiver.  Fitted in same experimental form as carried by "U 353."  (See C.B. 04051 (53) ).
	(b)  S-Gear.  Fitted.
	(c)  K.D.B.  Was carried until final adjustments, when it was removed.
	(d)  G.H.G. Hydrophones.  Fitted.
	(e)  S.B.T. Submarine Bubble Target.  Fitted.
	(vii)  Sounding Gear
	(a)  Elektrolot.  Fitted.
	(b)  Echosounder.  Fitted.
	(viii)  Propulsion
	(a)  Diesels.  6-cylinder 4 stroke with supercharger, manufactured by Germania Werft.  Thought to be similar to those in H.M.S. "Graph."
	(Maximum surface speed of "Graph" is 17.8 knots.)
	Maximum revolutions, 455 r.p.m. with supercharger.
	Bore.  400 mm. (15.7 in.) (as in "Graph").

 

	12
	(b)  Motors.  Made by Siemens.  R.P.M. at various submerged speeds were given as follows:
	Emergency speed   200 r.p.m. Full speed   175 r.p.m. Half speed   150 r.p.m. Slow speed   125 r.p.m. Dead slow   60 r.p.m.
	(c)  Compressor.  Junkers.
	(ix)  Diving Depths
	"U 660" was tested to a depth of 100 metres (328 ft.)
	(x)  Diving Angle
	"U 660" was stated to have often dived at over 40° while on patrol, without spilling her batteries.
	(xi)  Crash Diving
	"U 660's" record time for crash-diving was 30 metres (98 ft.) in 26 seconds.
	(xii)  Communications
	"U 660" carried the following W/T sets, all made by Telefunken A.G.:
	(a)  40/70-watt emergency set.
	(b)  Long-wave (over 300 metres) set.
	(c)  Short-wave (less than 300 metres) set.
	All above were receiver-transmitters
	(d)  "U/T" (Unterwassertelegraphie) Underwater Telegraphy:  Fitted.
	(e)  "U.K." (V.H/F):  None.
	(xiii)  Emergency Air Connection
	While at Brest, the emergency air connections were taken out of "U 660."  This follows normal practice in U-Boats nowadays.
	(xiv)  Oxy-Acetylene Welding Connection
	While at Brest, an oxy-acetylene welding connection was built into the bridge.  The aim of this was to provide a handy gear for repairing damage caused to the superstructure.
	(xv)  Badge
	"U 660" carried a raven as a badge on her second patrol but none on her last.
	_____________________________
	IX.  OTHER U-BOATS
	"U 73." - "U 73," formerly commanded by Kapitänleutnant Helmut Rosenbaum, has been taken over by Rosenbaum's former First Lieutenant, Oberleutnant zur See Deckert, of the April 1937 term.  Rosenbaum has been appointed Senior Officer of a flotilla of 250-ton U-Boats operating in the Black Sea.
	"U 81." - "U 81," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Fritz Guggenberger, was at La Spezia in October, 1942.
	"U 201." - "U 201," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Adalbert Schnee, was attached to the 1st U-Boat Flotilla at Brest in July, 1942.  She carried a snowman as her badge.
	"U 202." - Baur confirmed that "U 202," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Linder, is sunk.
	"U 203." - Baur recounted how Kapitänleutnant Rolf Mützelburg, commanding "U 203," had lost his life.  In September 1942, Mützelburg was on patrol in the Atlantic and decided to bathe.  When diving off the side of his boat, however, he hit his head on the saddle tanks, sustained concussion and died in the boat, which was brought home to Brest by his First Lieutenant having sunk nothing.
	"U 213." - A prisoner stated that "U 213" (Kapitänleutnant von Varendorff) was in Brest in July, 1942.  She carried the Bull of Scapa Flow as her badge, and was attached to the 9th Flotilla.  (N.I.D. Note.  This contradicts pervious information.  See C.B. 04051(53).)
	"U 333." - Bauer denied that "U 333" (Oberleutnant zur See Cremer) had been lost.
	"U 401." - Baur confirmed that "U 401," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Gero Zimmermann, was lost.
	"U 431." - "U 431," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Dommes, was operating in the Mediterranean in November, 1942.  He was at La Spezia in October, 1942.

 

	13
	"U 558." - "U 558," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Krech, was attached to the 1st U-Boat Flotilla at Brest in September, 1942.
	"U 564." - "U 564," commanded by Korvettenkapitän Reinhard (Teddy) Suhren, was attached to the 1st Flotilla in Brest in September, 1942.
	"U 586." - "U 586," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Titus von der Esch, of the 1934 term, formed part of the 11th U-Boat Flotilla at Bergen in August, 1942.
	"U 587." - Baur stated that "U 587," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Ulrich Borcherdt, was sunk.
	"U 589." - "U 589" is commanded by Kapitänleutnant Horrer, of the 1932 term, the First Lieutenant is Leutnant zur See Muller and the Second Lieutenant, Leutnant zur See Russ.  The Engineer Officer is Leutnant (Ing.) Rohlsen, of the 1937 term.  "U 589" was commissioned in August, 1941, and left Kiel on her first operational patrol in January, 1942.
	"U 605." - "U 605" (Kapitänleutnant Herbert Victor Schütze, of the 1933 term), a 500-ton Type VII C Blohm and Voss-built boat, worked up with "U 660," operated with her on her first patrol, passed through the Straits of Gibraltar about the same time, and subsequently operated with her in the Mediterranean.  She sank one 8,000-tonner while on her first Atlantic patrol, and is stated to have been attacked by a British submarine off the Balearics while on her way to Spezia from the Straits of Gibraltar on about 10th October, 1942.
	"U 661." - "U 661" is commanded by Kapitänleutnant von Lilienfeld, of the 1935 term.  Her First Lieutenant is Leutnant zur See Richter and her Second Lieutenant, Oberfähnrich zur See Felsen.  She was commissioned in February-March, 1942.
	"U 751." - Baur said that "U 751," commanded by Kapitänleutnant Bigalk, had been sunk near Iceland.
	U-Boat commanded by Czygan.  From intercepted correspondence it was established that Korvettenkapitän Czygan, of the 1925 term, was on his first patrol as a U-Boat commander in September, 1942.  (N.I.D. Note.  See also C.B. 04051(53), describing "U 353's" sole patrol and references to Czygan's boat.)
	U-Boat commanded by Diggins. - A U-Boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Diggins of the 1934 term, was sunk with no survivors in the Mediterranean in October-November, 1942, during an attack on a convoy.
	U-Boat commanded by Horn. - A U-Boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Horn, of the 1935 term, was sunk off Brest in September, 1942.  (See narrative.)  She was operating in the same area as "U 660" in the Atlantic in August, 1942.
	U-Boat commanded by Franken. - The U-Boat commanded by Kapitänleutnant Wilhelm Franken was at La Spezia in October, 1942.
	_____________________________
	X.  BASES, TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS, ETC.
	A.  Belgium
	Beverloo.  The various companies of the Manning Division at Beverloo are stated to be called by the names of towns and districts.  Some of these are Boulogne, Calais and Rheinland.
	B.  France
	Brest.  The 9th U-Boat Flotilla has recently been formed at Brest.  The Senior Officer is Kapitänleutnant Heinrich Lehmann-Willenbrock, formerly in command of "U 96."  This flotilla is stated to consist of about 26 U-Boats, most of them newly-commissioned.  A former hospital at Kerebecam has been taken over to accommodate personnel of this flotilla.
	C.  Germany
	(i)  Aurich.  The 6th Company of the Naval Signal School at Aurich is commanded by Oberleutnant zur See Neiger.  (As at October, 1941.)
	(ii)  Danzig.  While "U 660" was at Danzig in June, 1942, many Italian naval officers were there studying German U-Boat tactics and procedure.
	(iii)  Leer.  The 1st Company of the 8th Manning Division at Leer is commanded by Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Pitz.  (As at August, 1941.)
	(iv)  Norderney.  There is a drafting depôt at Norderney.
	(v)  Pillau.  The 9th Company of the Second Division of the U-Boat training school at Pillau is commanded by Oberleutnant (Ing.) Gerkin.  (as at commencement of 1942.)
	(vi)  Stralsund.  The 3rd Company of the 9th Manning Division as Stralsund is commanded by Kapitänleutnant Dohmsen.  (as at May, 1941.)
	(vii)  Wesermünde.  The Commanding Officer of the Technical School at Wesermünde is Kapitan zur See (Ing.) Karl Kaufmann, of the 1911 term, who has relieved Korvettenkapitän Patin.  (Information as at January, 1942.)

 

	14
	D.  Italy
	(i)  La Spezia.  The 29th U-Boat Flotilla is based on La Spezia.  Its Senior Officer is Kapitänleutnant Fritz Frauenheim, of the 1930 term, who commanded "U 101" until the end of 1940 and was later appointed Senior Officer of the U-Boat Flotilla at Salamis.  He does not appear to be very popular with U-Boat crews, but is said to be well thought of in higher quarters.  He sometimes deputizes for the Captain (S) Mediterranean.  The Flotilla Engineer Officer is believed to be Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Zürn.
	U-Boats make fast alongside the piers.  There are no shelters.
	(N.I.D. Note.  There have been no reports of shelters at La Spezia.)
	There are said to be 23 brothels in the town.
	(ii)  Pola.  Survivors estimated that there are about 22 U-Boats based on Pola.
	(iii)  Rome.  Rome is H.Q. if the Captain (S) Mediterranean.  The name of this officer is not known.
	(iv)  Viareggio.  Viareggio contains a rest-home on the sea front, where U-Boat men visiting La Spezia are sent for leave.  This is said to be one of the best hotels in the town.
	E.  The Netherlands
	Groningen.  There is a drafting depôt here commanded by Oberleutnant zur See der Reserve von Guggenberg zu Riedhofen.  (as at end 1940.)
	F.  Poland
	(i)  Gdynia.  The 7th Company of the 2nd Division of the U-Boat School at Gdynia is commanded by Kapitänleutnant der Reserve Burghagen, a U-Boat officer of the last war.  (As at August, 1941.)  The 6th Company is commanded by Kapitänleutnant Wiegand.  (As at January, 1942.)
	(ii)  Hela.  The penal battalion at Hela is commanded by Kapitänleutnant Schneider, who was previously in command of new entry training at Sassnitz.  The conditions in the camp, where some 200 men are at present said to be detained, are described as extremely severe.  Schneider is said to have made a speech to visiting U-Boat crews, in which he said that 70 per cent. of the inmates later go to the front, 10 per cent. to at least 15 years' penal servitude, 10 per cent. to a concentration camp and 10 per cent. are shot.
	_____________________________
	XI.  GENERAL REMARKS ON U-BOATS
	(i)  Atlantic Tactics
	A prisoner who had been on a course of U-Boat tactical instruction described the following forms of tactics in the Atlantic:
	(a)  "Einzelsiellung" (Reporting U-Boat).   This is the name given to the duty performed by a U-Boat, whose orders are to remain in this position until further notice.  Her duty is to report the passage of convoys and other shipping, but not to attack them.  She also makes weather and aircraft sighting reports.  This is not a popular duty with U-Boat men, who find it extremely dull.
	(b)  "Freijagd" (Independently-Operating U-Boats).  A U-Boat on "Freijagd" is permitted to operate at the C.O.'s discretion in a given area.  This is by far the most popular form of operation with U-Boat crews.
	(c)  "Verpostenstreife"  (Patrol Line).  The description given coincided with that in C.B. 04051 (53), Section XIII.
	(d)  "Aufklärungsstreifen"  (Reconnaissance Sweep).  The description given coincided with that in C.B. 04051 (53), Section XIII.  It was added, however, that the boats forming this line always proceed towards the approaching convoy.  The Admiral U-Boats presumes that at least one of them must sight the enemy, even if he is zigzagging.
	(e)  "Angriffsaufstellung" (Attack Formation).  Prisoner stated that the C.O.'s actions while in the attack formation are left very much to his own discretion.  If the convoy zigzags, each C.O. must alter course accordingly.  There is no collaboration in such a movement.  It also frequently happens that two or more C.O.s decide to take the same action at the same time.
	(ii)  Mediterranean Tactics
	Though an attempt is often made in the Mediterranean to employ the same forms of basic tactics as in the Atlantic, both officers and men realize the difficulties caused by confined space, and it is often found impractical to form into patrol lines and reconnaissance sweeps.  Accordingly, in the Mediterranean many boats are ordered to operate independently.

 

	15
	(iii)  "Trockenübung" (Theoretical Tactical Training)
	"Trockenübung" is the name given to the period of theoretical tactical training on land attended by selected members of a U-Boat's personnel during their period of working up.  It is often given at Danzig, shortly before proceeding on the period of practical tactical training.  The personnel usually attending is as follows:
	Commanding Officer.
	First Lieutenant.
	Second Lieutenant.
	Quartermaster.
	Quartermaster's Seaman Assistant.
	Telegraphist C.P.O.
	The instruction generally lasts for three days.
	(iv)  Silent Running Trials at Rönne
	Prisoners gave the following descriptions of the procedure when a U-Boat visits Rönne (Island of Bornholm) for her silent running trials:
	(1)  Arrive Rönne and make fast at quay.
	(2)  Visit local listening post and arrange programme of listening trials.
	(3)  Proceed a few miles to sea, escorted by a patrol boat, whose duty is to keep other craft clear of the trial area.
	(4)  Carry out trials of Diesels at various speeds on surface.
	(5)  Submerge.
	(6)  Carry out the following trials:
	(a)  Lying on sea bottom with auxiliary motors running at various speeds.
	(b)  Trimming noises.
	(c)  Moving of gear in boat.
	(d)  Giving orders on the loud-speaker system.
	(e)  Submerged motor noises at:
	A.  Dead slow.
	B.  Slow.
	C.  Half speed.
	D.  Full speed.
	It is not usual for a boat to surface until all her submerged trials are complete.  Between each item in her programme while submerged she communicates with the listening post at Rönne by means of her "U.T." (Under-water telegraphy).  It is largely for this purpose that all U-Boats normally carry their "U.T." gear while working up.
	(v)  Torpedoes in Mediterranean
	It is now normal for U-Boats operating in the Mediterranean to have their upper-deck torpedo containers removed as soon as they make their Mediterranean base.  This is done in the realization that aircraft render conditions in the Mediterranean unfavorable for transfer below of torpedoes from upper deck containers while at sea.
	(vi)  G.S.R. in Mediterranean
	It is now compulsory for all U-Boats entering the Mediterranean to carry G.S.R.  The Admiral U-Boats cautions captains, however, that they are not to place complete confidence in this gear.
	(vii)  Crash-Diving Speeds
	Statements by various prisoners indicated that it is considered quite normal for a U-Boat to crash-dive to the usual 30 metres (98 ft.) in 28 seconds or less.  One man said that "U 660" could reach this depth in 24 seconds, but others did not confirm this.  They added that U-Boats now often submerge so rapidly that there is a risk of water pouring into their conning-tower hatches before they are properly closed.
	(viii)  U-Boat Armament in the Mediterranean
	U-Boats operating in the Mediterranean are fitted, in addition to their usual armament, with one or two twin H/A guns on retractable mountings on either side of the bridge.  This work is carried out at their first Italian base.  Descriptions of the calibre of these guns vary between 13 and 20 mm., and it is not yet established for certain whether they are of Italian or German manufacture.  "U 660" did not carry them, as she was not long enough at La Spezia, but was due to receive them on return from her patrol.
	The mounting of the guns involves the widening of the U-Boat's bridge, and usually takes some weeks.

 

	16
	It is normal for two twin mountings to be fitted, operated by air pressure.  The mountings are fitted to retractable platforms which are automatically lowered into shafts welded into the pressure hull and passing through the casing.
	The operation of the twin mountings varies.  In most cases they are automatically raised and lowered by pressing on a lever fitted to one side of each, but in some boats they have to be raised or lowered by hand.
	Just abaft each twin mounting is an ammunition container similarly raised and lowered.
	(ix)  Captain (S) Mediterranean
	The whole of the U-Boat arm operating in the Mediterranean is under the orders of the "Führer der U-Boote," the nearest translation of which is Captain (S) Mediterranean.  The name of this officer is not known, but he is described as an older man, having captain's rank, who was not previously connected with U-Boats but served with distinction in the last war.
	His H.Q. is at Rome, though some prisoners thought that he also frequently visited La Spezia and one other base.
	He is believed to be directly responsible to Admiral Dönitz, the Admiral (S).
	He does not appear to be very popular with U-Boat captains, who blame him for the large number of different operational orders given and cancelled.  The difficulty of his task in relatively confined waters is, however, acknowledged.
	(x)  "Schepke Tonnage"
	Kapitänleutnant Joachim Schepke, who was lost in "U 100" on 17th March, 1941, once returned from a patrol and announced he had sunk 68,000 tons.  It was established, however, that he had only sunk 32,000, and he was immediately ordered by the Admiral U-Boats to put to sea again until he had sunk the balance.
	Thenceforth all claims obviously in excess of the truth have been known in the U-Boat service as "Schepke Tonnage."
	(xi)  Reserve Officers as U-Boat Captains
	An officer said that quite a number of reserve officers now command operational U-Boats, many of them having done extremely well, though not well enough to achieve any notoriety.
	(xii)  Torpedo Fire Control
	It had been planned to duplicate the torpedo fire control in most U-Boats, so as to replace instruments damaged by depth-charge attacks.  Difficulties of production have, however, held up this proposal.
	(xiii)  German Torpedoes for Italian Submarines
	One man said that Italian submarines are using German torpedoes and fitting German torpedo-tubes.  German torpedoes have been found to be more efficient.  (N.I.D. Note.  It is known that German 21 in. electric torpedoes are being supplied to Italian submarines, and that this involves small modifications to tubes.)
	(xiv)  Opinion of British Search-Gear
	In common with other recent prisoners, both officer and rating prisoners from "U 660" were convinced that the British have recently fitted a new type of search-gear which proved their boat's undoing.
	(xv)  Service in Mediterranean U-Boats
	Prisoners admitted that service in Mediterranean U-Boats is not as popular as service in the Atlantic due to the realization of the greater danger involved.
	(xvi)  Two-Man U-Boats
	A two-man U-Boat is building at Hela.  She cannot submerge deeper than five metres, carries four torpedoes, a crew of two and has an action radius of 150 miles.
	(N.I.D. Note.  This corroborates previous prisoners' statements, see C.B. 04051(53) XV (viii).)
	(xvii)  Minelaying U-Boats
	The series of minelaying 500-tonners including "U 217" are fitted for laying moored mines and exercise with this type of mine.  Survivors thought it probable, however, that they could also lay other types.  One man said they were fitted with six mine-shafts abaft the conning-tower.  (N.I.D. Note.  Reference to 500-ton minelaying U-Boats has been made in C.B.s 4051 (46 VII and 04051 (53) XV.)
	(xviii)  Polish Submarines
	The Polish submarines taken over by Germany are capable of a speed of 20 knots.
	(xix) Four-Engined U-Boats
	An E.R.A. said that the 1,000-ton U-Boats now operating are fitted with four diesels.  In some boats, they are coupled in pairs.  Another man said that three E-Boat type Maybach motors are fitted to U-Boats, producing a speed of 24 knots, but with a very small radius of action.  (See also C.B. 04051 (53), Section XV (xi).)

 

	17
	(xx)  Camouflage in Mediterranean
	The normal camouflage in the Mediterranean for U-Boats is blue-grey or green.
	(xxi)  S.B.T.
	The latest type of S.B.T. consists of a metal container about 12 cm. (4-1/2 in.) in diameter and
	30-35 cm. (12-13 in.) long, containing both "Gerauschkugel" (sound-producing pillules) and bubble screen pillules.  Prisoners supposed that all German U-Boats are now fitted with S.B.T.
	(xxii)  Engineer Officer Training
	Konteradmiral (Ing.) Thäter is in charge of all German Engineer Officer's training.
	(xxiii)  Oxy-Acetylene Welding Connection
	Many new U-Boats are being fitted with oxy-acetylene welding connection on their bridge to facilitate welding at sea of damage inflicted by air or surface craft.
	_____________________________
	XII.  OTHER SHIPS
	(i)  "General Artigas"
	The "General Artigas" (11,254-ton Hamburg-South America liner), which is used as an accommodation ship at Hamburg, was in the yards of the Howaldtswerke in July, 1942.
	(ii)  "Piet Hein"
	The former Netherlands Royal Yacht "Piet Hein," described as of about 200-tons displacement, has been taken over by the Germans and is now manned by German personnel.  She is used for inspection of canals and for taking parties on inspections.
	_____________________________
	XIII.  MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS
	(i)  Air-Sea Rescue Organization
	An officer who had served in German air-sea rescue craft from mid-1940 to mid-1941 gave the following description of the organization at that time:
	(a)  The organization is controlled and manned by the Luftwaffe, who provide the boats.
	(b)  A number of naval personnel were at that time drafted to it as instructors.  As more and more Luftwaffe personnel became proficient, however, the naval personnel were released and returned to naval service.
	(c)  There were about 10 boats to a flotilla.
	(d)  A flotilla was based on most Channel ports.  For instance, there was one flotilla at Jersey, where he was based, one at Guernsey, one at Alderney, one at Cherbourg, where there was also a flotilla.
	(e)  The central organization is itself responsible to the Luftwaffe squadron locally, which has technical control of each flotilla.  Thus a single Luftwaffe unit can control many air-sea rescue flotillas.
	(f)  The boats themselves were largely converted private motor-launches.
	(g)  The Luftwaffe has abandoned the idea of mooring floats in mid-Channel owing to currents.
	(ii)  New Type Acoustic Torpedo
	A Seaman torpedoman gave the following description of a new type acoustically-controlled torpedo:
	(a)  The torpedo is acoustically controlled by a device just abaft the warhead.  This consists of a series of 8 or 12 microphones mounted on either side of the torpedo.  These are connected to a central shaft which operates the rudders.  Two other systems of microphone arrangement have been tried, but the above has been found the most satisfactory.
	(b)  Originally, the rudders were electrically operated, but a compressed air system of control has now been substituted.  This operates the central shaft by opening and closing a series of valves similar to the system used with the gyro.
	(c)  The torpedo will follow its target.  The amount of helm required is given to the rudders by the microphones, which set the rudder a given number of degrees according to the microphone nearest to the source of noise.  Difficulty has been experienced owing to the torpedo having a turning circle of 95 m. (104 yards).
	(d)  This torpedo has been given an extra long range of 16,000 m.  (17,500 yards) in order to enable it to overhaul its target.
	(e)  This torpedo is said to be still in the experimental stages.  During a trial in the Baltic against destroyers the firing torpedo-boat found that it came back and struck her in the propellers.
	_____________________________

 

 

 

	18
	APPENDIX
	_________
	Ship's Company of "U 660"
	(i)  Survivors:
Name. Rank. English Equivalent. Born. Baur, Götz Oberleutnant zur See Lieutenant 1.  8.17 Häusermann, Jakob Oberleutnant (Ing.) Lieutenant (E) 4.  4.08 von Salis-Soglio, Edgar Leutnant zur See der Reserve Sub-Lieutenant (Reserve) 2.  8.12 Facker, Wilhelm Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class 13.  5.13 Bohrisch, Herbert Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class 30.  7.16 Krude, Josef Obersteuermann Chief Quartermaster, 1st Class 15.12.14 Urban, Heinz Bootsmannsmaat Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class 6.  2.20 Behrends, Alfred Bootsmannsmaat Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class 28.  6.20 Reinboldt, Adolf Bootsmannsmaat Boatswain's Mate, 2nd Class 3.  8.19 Rieger, Alfred Hermann Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 28.  2.19 Tanz, Egon Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 14.  8.21 Gurrey, Walter Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 3.11.19 Meija, Heinrich Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 4.  2.18 Plattl, Rudolf Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 30.10.19 Schulze, Walter Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 19.11.19 Betina, Franz Maschinenmaat Mechanician, 2nd Class 9.  8.19 Weigel, Heinrich Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class 24.  4.21 Wieduwilt, Karl-Heinz Funkmaat P.O. Telegraphist, 2nd Class 8.  3.20 Tölle, Helmuth Mechanikersmaat P.O. Artificer, 2nd Class 13.  3.20 Borscheid, Hans Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 3.12.22 Diefenbach, Ludwig Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 22.  4.23 Bachmann, Alfred Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 21.  9.22 Bettkober, Herbert Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 13.  1.23 Hensch, Walter Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 7.  9.22 Dinklage, Walter Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 2.  3.22 Niepert, Heinz Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 13.  3.23 Drewer, Willi Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 15.  3.24 Welte, Kuno Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 5.  7.22 Deckelmann, Heinz Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 1.  6.23 Benzmann, Paul Matrosengefreiter Ordinary Seaman, 1st Class 12.10.23 Gerstner, Kurt Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 8.  5.21 Matthes, Gerhard Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 20.  8.22 Gehle, Herbert Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 2.  9.21 Eger, Heinz Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 10.  9.21 Hiller, Erwin Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 23.  6.23 Vogel, Josef Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 14.10.19 Dicke, Freidrich Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 20.  3.23 Brinkhoff, Wilhelm Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 25.  9.22 Eisenhardt, Hermann Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 25.  2.23 Wagner, Werner Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 24.  1.24 Riedel, Rolf Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 9.  7.22 Klimpel, Heinz Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 17.  6.19 Müller, Manfred Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 23.  1.22 Weichhan, Werner Maschinengefreiter Stoker, 2nd Class 12.  3.23 Simon, Heinz Funkgefreiter Ordinary Telegraphist, 1st Class 23.  7.21 Piper, Hans Wolf Funkgefreiter Ordinary Telegraphist, 1st Class 18.  9.21
	Officers . . 3 Chief and Petty Officers . . 16 Men . . 27     46
	(ii)  Casualties:
Name. Rank. English Equivalent. Jäger Leutnant zur See Sub-Lieutenant   Möller Obermaschinist Chief Mechanician, 1st Class
	Officers . . 1 Chief and Petty Officers . . 1 Men . . -     2
	(iii)  Total:
	Officers . . 4 Chief and Petty Officers . . 17 Men . . 27     48
	((C47619)  428   2/43

 

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